Files
claudemesh/apps/cli/scripts/join-roundtrip.ts
Alejandro Gutiérrez 0c4a9591fa feat(broker): invite signature verification + atomic one-time-use
Completes the v0.1.0 security model. Every /join is now gated by a
signed invite that the broker re-verifies against the mesh owner's
ed25519 pubkey, plus an atomic single-use counter.

schema (migrations/0001_demonic_karnak.sql):
- mesh.mesh.owner_pubkey: ed25519 hex of the invite signer
- mesh.invite.token_bytes: canonical signed bytes (for re-verification)
Both nullable; required for new meshes going forward.

canonical invite format (signed bytes):
  `${v}|${mesh_id}|${mesh_slug}|${broker_url}|${expires_at}|
   ${mesh_root_key}|${role}|${owner_pubkey}`

wire format — invite payload in ic://join/<base64url(JSON)> now has:
  owner_pubkey: "<64 hex>"
  signature:    "<128 hex>"

broker joinMesh() (apps/broker/src/broker.ts):
1. verify ed25519 signature over canonical bytes using payload's
   owner_pubkey → else invite_bad_signature
2. load mesh, ensure mesh.owner_pubkey matches payload's owner_pubkey
   → else invite_owner_mismatch (prevents a malicious admin from
   substituting their own owner key)
3. load invite row by token, verify mesh_id matches → else
   invite_mesh_mismatch
4. expiry check → else invite_expired
5. revoked check → else invite_revoked
6. idempotency: if pubkey is already a member, return existing id
   WITHOUT burning an invite use
7. atomic CAS: UPDATE used_count = used_count + 1 WHERE used_count <
   max_uses → if 0 rows affected, return invite_exhausted
8. insert member with role from payload

cli side:
- apps/cli/src/invite/parse.ts: zod-validated owner_pubkey + signature
  fields; client verifies signature immediately and rejects tampered
  links (fail-fast before even touching the broker)
- buildSignedInvite() helper: owners sign invites client-side
- enrollWithBroker sends {invite_token, invite_payload, peer_pubkey,
  display_name} (was: {mesh_id, peer_pubkey, display_name, role})
- parseInviteLink is now async (libsodium ready + verify)

seed-test-mesh.ts generates an owner keypair, sets mesh.owner_pubkey,
builds + signs an invite, stores the invite row, emits ownerPubkey +
ownerSecretKey + inviteToken + inviteLink in the output JSON.

tests — invite-signature.test.ts (9 new):
- valid signed invite → join succeeds
- tampered payload → invite_bad_signature
- signer not the mesh owner → invite_owner_mismatch
- expired invite → invite_expired
- revoked invite → invite_revoked
- exhausted (maxUses=2, 3rd join) → invite_exhausted
- idempotent re-join doesn't burn a use
- atomic single-use: 5 concurrent joins → exactly 1 success, 4 exhausted
- mesh_id payload vs DB row mismatch → invite_mesh_mismatch

verified live: tampered link blocked client-side with a clear error.
Unmodified link joins cleanly end-to-end (roundtrip.ts + join-roundtrip.ts
both pass). 64/64 tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-04 23:02:12 +01:00

118 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript

#!/usr/bin/env bun
/**
* Full join → connect → send round-trip.
*
* Uses a mesh already seeded in the DB (reads /tmp/cli-seed.json).
* Creates a fresh invite link, runs the join command, connects with
* the newly-generated member identity, sends a message to peer B,
* asserts receipt.
*/
// Run this script with CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR=/tmp/... set in env —
// ESM imports hoist above statements, so we can't set process.env
// after the `import { env }` side effect has already run.
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { BrokerClient } from "../src/ws/client";
import type { JoinedMesh } from "../src/state/config";
import { loadConfig, getConfigPath } from "../src/state/config";
if (!process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR) {
console.error(
"Run with: CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR=/tmp/claudemesh-join-test-rt bun scripts/join-roundtrip.ts",
);
process.exit(1);
}
execSync(`rm -rf "${process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR}"`, {
stdio: "ignore",
});
const seed = JSON.parse(readFileSync("/tmp/cli-seed.json", "utf-8")) as {
meshId: string;
peerB: { memberId: string; pubkey: string; secretKey: string };
};
async function main(): Promise<void> {
// 1. Build invite.
const link = execSync("bun scripts/make-invite.ts").toString().trim();
console.log("[rt] invite:", link.slice(0, 60) + "…");
// 2. Run `claudemesh join` with the same CONFIG_DIR.
const joinOut = execSync(`bun src/index.ts join "${link}"`, {
env: {
...process.env,
CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR: "/tmp/claudemesh-join-test-rt",
},
}).toString();
console.log("[rt] join output (tail):");
console.log(
joinOut
.split("\n")
.slice(-7)
.map((l) => " " + l)
.join("\n"),
);
// 3. Load the fresh config and connect as the new peer.
console.log(`[rt] loading config from: ${getConfigPath()}`);
const config = loadConfig();
console.log(`[rt] loaded ${config.meshes.length} mesh(es)`);
const joined = config.meshes.find((m) => m.slug === "smoke-test");
if (!joined) throw new Error("smoke-test mesh not found in config");
const joinedMesh: JoinedMesh = joined;
console.log(
`[rt] joined member_id=${joinedMesh.memberId} pubkey=${joinedMesh.pubkey.slice(0, 16)}`,
);
// 4. Connect also as peer-B (the target) so we can observe receipt.
// Uses the real keypair from the seed (needed for crypto_box decrypt).
const targetMesh: JoinedMesh = {
...joinedMesh,
memberId: seed.peerB.memberId,
slug: "rt-join-b",
pubkey: seed.peerB.pubkey,
secretKey: seed.peerB.secretKey,
};
const joiner = new BrokerClient(joinedMesh);
const target = new BrokerClient(targetMesh);
let received = "";
target.onPush((m) => {
received = m.plaintext ?? "";
console.log(`[rt] target got: "${received}"`);
});
await Promise.all([joiner.connect(), target.connect()]);
console.log(`[rt] joiner=${joiner.status} target=${target.status}`);
const res = await joiner.send(
seed.peerB.pubkey,
"sent-by-newly-joined-peer",
"now",
);
console.log("[rt] send result:", res);
for (let i = 0; i < 30 && !received; i++) {
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
}
joiner.close();
target.close();
if (!res.ok) {
console.error("✗ FAIL: send did not ack");
process.exit(1);
}
if (received !== "sent-by-newly-joined-peer") {
console.error(`✗ FAIL: receive mismatch: "${received}"`);
process.exit(1);
}
console.log("✓ join → connect → send → receive FLOW PASSED");
process.exit(0);
}
main().catch((e) => {
console.error("✗ FAIL:", e instanceof Error ? e.message : e);
process.exit(1);
});