docs(roadmap): v1.34.16 + broker — continuous presence shipped

Watchdogs (75s stale detect) and lease model (90s grace window for
silent reconnects) both shipped 2026-05-05.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.artifacts/specs/2026-05-04-agentic-comms-architecture-v2.md

@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
+---
+title: claudemesh — full end-state architecture for agentic peer communication
+status: draft (v2 — supersedes v1: removes time-boxed phasing, adds P2P data plane, applies Codex-2 correctness/scope-gap edits)
+target: end-state (architectural milestones, not version timelines)
+author: Alejandro + Claude (Codex GPT-5.2 cross-checked twice)
+date: 2026-05-04
+supersedes: 2026-05-04-agentic-comms-architecture.md (v1)
+references:
+  - 2026-05-02-architecture-north-star.md (CLI-first commitment, push-pipe)
+  - 2026-05-04-per-session-presence.md (per-launch session pubkey + attestation)
+  - apps/cli/CHANGELOG.md (1.30.0–1.32.1 history)
+---
+
+# claudemesh — agentic peer communication, full end-state
+
+## What this document is
+
+The end-state architecture for claudemesh as a transport-agnostic agentic peer-comms platform. Not a release plan, not a sprint roadmap — the **shape** the system needs to converge on. Implementation order at the end is a *suggestion*, not a contract; time estimates are deliberately omitted because the surface is too cross-cutting to phase by weeks.
+
+v1 of this spec (same date, no `-v2` suffix) treated the broker as the sole data plane. v2 corrects that: **the broker is a coordination plane (signaling, discovery, offline queue, fan-out, registry, revocation); the data plane is hybrid P2P** with broker fallback for the cases P2P can't cover. Closer to how Tailscale, libp2p, LiveKit, and modern WebRTC stacks work in production.
+
+## TL;DR
+
+- **Identity** — three keypair types (member, session, service) all rooted in a member's secret key. Member is durable, session is per-launch, service is a member-scoped delegate for non-Claude integrations. Every service has its own pubkey and explicit revocation.
+- **Coordination plane** — broker handles signaling, peer discovery, offline message queue, group/topic fan-out, mesh state authority, revocation gossip. Always reachable.
+- **Data plane** — hybrid:
+  - **P2P first** (WebRTC data channels, future: QUIC) when both peers online + NAT-traversable.
+  - **Broker-relayed** when peers are NAT-blocked, when one peer is offline, or for group/topic/broadcast where fan-out at the broker is structurally cheaper than N-way sender-side fan-out.
+  - **Pure broker** for service identities that can't run a P2P stack (HTTP webhook senders, OpenAI Assistants, browser SDKs without WebRTC).
+- **Channels** — typed envelope (dm, group, topic, rpc, system, stream). Channel type drives crypto, routing, and transport selection. `meta` is required in v2 envelope.
+- **Transports** — pluggable adapters under one interface: WS-to-broker (today), WebRTC P2P, HTTP webhook, future LiveKit/QUIC/etc. Broker negotiates which adapter a peer pair uses.
+- **Crypto** — every direct message is E2E encrypted to recipient's pubkey regardless of transport. Broker never sees plaintext. P2P doesn't get any extra trust just because it's direct.
+- **Delivery** — at-least-once **requires receiver ack** before broker marks `delivered_at`. The retry path before that is best-effort with idempotent dedupe at the receiver.
+
+The CLI-first commitment from the North Star spec stays intact. Every channel type and every transport is invocable from `claudemesh <verb>`. MCP serves only `claude/channel` mid-turn push.
+
+---
+
+## The forcing functions (why this shape, not a smaller one)
+
+1. **Multi-session interconnect already broke** (1.30.0 → 1.32.1) because the per-session WS subsystem shipped without push handler. Symptom of "broker is the data plane and we keep bolting on" thinking. Need to formalize roles and transport adapters before the next bolt-on.
+
+2. **Codex review surfaced a correctness bug** in `drainForMember` — claims `delivered_at = NOW()` *before* WS push succeeds; if `ws.readyState !== OPEN` the row is marked delivered and message is lost. At-most-once with no retry. Inherited by every channel/transport added unless fixed at the foundation.
+
+3. **The agentic-comms domain has standardized on hybrid P2P + central coordinator.** Tailscale (control plane + WireGuard P2P), LiveKit (signaling + SFU + P2P data channels), libp2p (DHT discovery + multi-transport), Iroh (gossip + QUIC P2P). Pure-broker is a 2010s pattern; pure-P2P is academic. Hybrid is the norm.
+
+4. **claudemesh's pricing/economics demand P2P.** Every byte through the broker is your cost. Voice transcripts, file transfers, real-time tool I/O — bandwidth-heavy. P2P data plane lets the broker scale linearly with peer count, not message volume.
+
+5. **Privacy/sovereignty matters as the agent ecosystem grows.** "Your agents talk to my agents" should default to peer-to-peer paths when possible. Broker as relay is fine; broker as forced middleman is not.
+
+---
+
+## Audience for this architecture
+
+| Peer type | Identity | Online presence | Data plane preference | Notes |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **Claude Code session** | Per-launch session pubkey, member-attested | WS to broker (control + signaling) | P2P first, broker fallback | Mid-turn push via MCP `claude/channel` |
+| **Daemon, no launch** (idle Mac with daemon running) | Member pubkey | WS to broker | Broker only (no P2P partner unless launched) | Receives broadcasts + member-targeted DMs |
+| **Voice agent** (LiveKit, Pipecat) | Service identity, member-signed | LiveKit room + bridge | LiveKit room data channels intra-room; bridge over broker for cross-mesh | Side-car bridges room ↔ broker |
+| **OpenAI Assistant / Anthropic Skill** | Service identity, scoped token | HTTP outbound, webhook inbound | Broker only (can't run P2P) | Daemon does delegated re-encryption |
+| **Browser-based peer** (web dashboard, SDK) | Member or service identity | WS to broker, WebRTC for P2P | P2P-where-possible (browsers ARE WebRTC-native) | Full feature parity once on-mesh |
+| **Webhook consumer** (Stripe-style passive) | Service identity | HTTP webhook inbound only | Broker only | Topic subscriptions; no inbound channel |
+| **Bridge** (Slack, WhatsApp, IRC, Matrix) | Service identity per bridge + per-end-user delegated | WS to broker | Broker only for bridge ↔ broker; native protocol for bridge ↔ external | Trust delegated to bridge operator |
+| **Cron / scheduled actor** | Member pubkey or service identity | Ephemeral; HTTP send only | Broker only | No long-lived connection |
+| **CLI-only user** (no Claude Code) | Member pubkey | Ephemeral on each `claudemesh send` | Broker only | Command-line agent, queues via outbox |
+
+Every row in this table works without changing the broker's coordination plane.
+
+---
+
+## Layer 1: Identity
+
+Three keypair types, one auth model.
+
+### Member identity (durable)
+- Ed25519 keypair, generated at `claudemesh join <invite>`. Held in `~/.claudemesh/config.json` per mesh.
+- The auth boundary — grants, kicks, bans operate on members.
+- Used for hello signature on the daemon's control-plane WS.
+- Used as cryptographic root of trust for sibling sessions and service identities.
+
+### Session identity (ephemeral, per-launch)
+- Ed25519 keypair generated by each `claudemesh launch`. Held in process memory only.
+- Parent-signed attestation vouches for it (TTL 12h, broker cap 24h). Rotation = new launch.
+- Used for hello signature on the per-session WS, and as routing key for DMs targeted at *this specific launched session*.
+- Session secret never touches disk; lives only in the daemon's `sessionBrokers` map keyed by IPC token.
+
+### Service identity (third type, additive)
+
+For non-Claude integrations that can't or shouldn't use a per-launch session.
+
+```
+ServiceIdentity {
+  service_id            // Stable string id ("openai-assistant-foo", "livekit-room-bar")
+  service_pubkey        // Ed25519 pubkey — the cryptographic identity. crypto_box targets this.
+  member_id             // The mesh member that owns this service (auth boundary)
+  service_type          // "openai-assistant" | "livekit-room" | "webhook" | "voice-agent" | ...
+  scopes                // ["dm:read", "topic:write", "rpc:invoke", ...]
+  attestation           // member-signed: { service_id, service_pubkey, scopes, expires_at, signature }
+  transport_hint        // "ws" | "http-webhook" | "sse" | "livekit" — informs how the broker reaches it
+  delegate_daemon_pubkey?  // Optional. Set when the daemon holds the service's secret on its behalf.
+}
+```
+
+Two flavors:
+- **Holds-secret service** — has its own keypair (`service_pubkey` + service-secret kept by the service itself). Runs E2E crypto end-to-end. Voice agent side-cars, browser SDK, MQTT bridges.
+- **Delegated service** — daemon holds the service-secret on the service's behalf. Senders still encrypt to `service_pubkey`; daemon decrypts on receipt and forwards plaintext (or re-signs) to the service via its `transport_hint`. Used by HTTP webhook consumers, OpenAI Assistants. Trust is in the daemon owner. `delegate_daemon_pubkey` records who's holding.
+
+All three identity types resolve to a `member_id` for authorization. They differ in liveness (member = always; session = per-launch; service = scoped) and transport hint (member/session = WS-resident; service = polymorphic).
+
+### Identity revocation (explicit)
+
+Existing v1 left this implicit. v2 makes it concrete:
+
+- **CLI verb:** `claudemesh service revoke <service_id>` (also `claudemesh peer revoke <pubkey>` for member revocation).
+- **Broker effect:** add row to `revocation` table with `(mesh_id, revoked_pubkey, revoked_at, revoked_by, reason?)`. Drop any active WS for that pubkey (close 4002 "revoked"). Reject future helloes.
+- **Drain effect:** `drainForMember` checks revocation list at drain time; ciphertext-in-flight from the revoked sender is dropped (sender already broker-acked, but recipient never sees it).
+- **Gossip:** revocation events publish on the `system` channel (highest priority). Online peers cache; offline peers see on reconnect. Required so P2P sessions also honor revoke (otherwise a revoked peer's stored attestations could keep working over direct paths).
+- **Latency target:** <30s for online peers to receive and apply.
+- **Expiry vs revoke distinction:** `expires_at` is graceful (predictable, scheduled rotation); revoke is emergency (leaked secret, fired employee, compromised host). Both use the same revocation table; `expires_at` enforces silently when reached, revoke is logged as an audit event.
+
+---
+
+## Layer 2: Coordination plane (the broker, properly scoped)
+
+The broker is **not** the data plane. Its real responsibilities:
+
+1. **Mesh state authority** — member roster, group memberships, topic registry, service registrations, revocation list. Source of truth for who's in a mesh and what they can do.
+2. **Peer discovery** — `list_peers` returns currently-online presences. Broker is the only system that knows which peers are reachable now and over which transports.
+3. **Signaling for P2P upgrades** — when peer A wants to open a P2P connection to peer B, A sends a SDP offer through the broker; B responds with an SDP answer through the broker. Once the data channel is up, broker is out of the path. Same as WebRTC signaling.
+4. **Offline message queue** — when recipient is offline, broker stores the (encrypted) message until they reconnect. P2P can't do this without an "always-on peer" model, which is awkward to bootstrap.
+5. **Group / topic / broadcast fan-out** — broker is the cheap fan-out point. Sender publishes once; broker delivers to N recipients. P2P fan-out (gossipsub) is possible but adds significant complexity for a feature most meshes won't need at scale.
+6. **TURN-style relay for NAT-blocked pairs** — when P2P negotiation fails (symmetric NAT, restrictive corporate firewall), broker carries the data. Functionally equivalent to TURN.
+7. **Revocation gossip publisher** — broker pushes revocation events to all online peers via the `system` channel; peers cache them.
+8. **Audit log + persistence layer** — encrypted message metadata for compliance. Bodies are E2E-encrypted, so audit is over (sender, recipient, channel, timestamp, size), not content.
+
+The broker is **NOT**:
+- The default path for online-online direct messages (P2P should win).
+- The decryptor for any direct message (E2E means broker sees ciphertext only).
+- A bottleneck on bulk data (file transfer, voice, screen share — these go P2P or fail).
+- The sole identity authority for active sessions (P2P sessions verify attestations locally via cached mesh state).
+
+### Two roles per mesh on the WS layer (Codex-1 correction, kept)
+
+Within the broker's WS surface, the daemon holds two roles per mesh, not one connection per launch:
+
+- **Control-plane connection** — one per mesh, member-keyed. Carries: signaling + outbox drain + RPCs + broadcast/member-targeted inbound + revocation gossip subscription.
+- **Session connections** — N per mesh, session-keyed. Carries: presence row keyed on session pubkey + signaling for P2P upgrades involving this session + inbound for session-targeted DMs that arrive via broker fallback.
+
+A peer who's purely on the broker (no P2P) functions exactly as today. A peer who upgrades to P2P with another peer keeps its broker WS for the other roles.
+
+---
+
+## Layer 3: Data plane (hybrid P2P + broker fallback)
+
+The data plane is what carries actual message bodies. Three modes, selected per (sender, recipient, channel) tuple:
+
+### Mode 1: Direct P2P (preferred when possible)
+
+Two peers run a WebRTC data channel (or QUIC stream — pluggable, see Layer 4) between their daemons. Established via signaling through the broker; once up, broker is out of the path.
+
+**When P2P is selected:**
+- Both peers are online (have an active broker WS).
+- Both peers' transports advertise P2P capability (WebRTC available; not a webhook-only service identity; not a browser without `RTCPeerConnection`).
+- ICE negotiation succeeds (at least one candidate pair works — direct, server-reflexive, or peer-reflexive).
+- Channel type is `dm`, `rpc`, or `stream` (the 1:1 cases).
+
+**P2P session lifecycle:**
+- Established lazily on first message (warm-up cost ~200ms; dominated by ICE + DTLS handshake). Subsequent messages reuse the channel.
+- Idle timeout: 5min of no traffic → tear down. Re-established on next message.
+- Hard timeout: 1h max regardless of activity, then re-handshake. Limits damage of compromised session keys.
+- Either side can demote to broker-relay at any time; broker is the fallback always.
+
+**Crypto on P2P:**
+- DTLS handshake provides transport encryption (forward secrecy; recipient pubkey verified via cached attestation chain).
+- Application-layer crypto_box ALSO runs on top — same as broker-relayed messages — so the wire format and decryption path are identical on the receiver side. Defense in depth, no special-case code.
+
+### Mode 2: Broker-relayed (fallback)
+
+The current path. Sender encrypts to recipient pubkey (member or session or service), pushes to broker via WS, broker queues, recipient pulls (or broker pushes to recipient's WS).
+
+**When broker-relay is selected:**
+- One peer offline → broker queues, delivers on reconnect.
+- ICE negotiation fails → broker becomes the relay.
+- Channel type is `group`, `topic`, or `broadcast` → broker fan-out is structurally cheaper than P2P fan-out for any group >2.
+- Service identity at either end can't run P2P → broker is the only path.
+
+**Crypto:** unchanged from today — E2E crypto_box, broker sees ciphertext only.
+
+### Mode 3: Direct webhook (broker as broker, not as relay)
+
+For service identities advertising `transport_hint: "http-webhook"`. Sender encrypts to service's `service_pubkey` (or to delegate-daemon's pubkey for delegated services), broker POSTs the ciphertext to the service's registered URL with HMAC signature + retry. No long-lived connection on the service side.
+
+This is functionally a "broker queue, custom delivery transport" — broker still mediates, but delivery is HTTP not WS.
+
+### Selection logic (deterministic, sender-side)
+
+```
+function pickTransport(sender, recipient, channel) -> Transport:
+  if channel in [group, topic, broadcast]:
+    return broker.relay  # fan-out semantics
+
+  if recipient.transport_hint == "http-webhook":
+    return broker.relay  # broker calls webhook
+
+  if recipient is offline:
+    return broker.queue  # store-and-forward
+
+  if !recipient.capabilities.p2p:
+    return broker.relay  # one-end can't P2P
+
+  if !sender.capabilities.p2p:
+    return broker.relay  # we can't P2P
+
+  if has_active_p2p_session(sender, recipient):
+    return p2p.session  # warm path
+
+  attempt_p2p_handshake(sender, recipient, timeout=2s) ->
+    if ok: return p2p.session
+    else:  return broker.relay  # fall through, log degraded
+```
+
+Policy lives in the daemon's send path. Broker doesn't know or care — it sees only the messages that actually go through it.
+
+---
+
+## Layer 4: Transport adapters (pluggable)
+
+A transport adapter is an implementation of how *one peer pair* moves bytes. Defined by an interface; new adapters added without touching upper layers.
+
+```typescript
+interface PeerTransport {
+  readonly kind: string;  // "ws-broker" | "webrtc-p2p" | "http-webhook" | ...
+
+  readonly capabilities: {
+    p2p: boolean;
+    bidirectional: boolean;
+    midTurnPush: boolean;
+    maxMessageBytes: number;
+    streamingChunks: boolean;
+  };
+
+  open(opts: TransportOpenOpts): Promise<TransportSession>;
+  send(envelope: Envelope): Promise<TransportSendResult>;
+  inbound(): AsyncIterable<Envelope>;
+  heartbeat(): Promise<boolean>;
+  close(reason?: string): Promise<void>;
+}
+```
+
+### Concrete adapters at end-state
+
+1. **`WsBrokerTransport`** — current code. WebSocket to `wss://ic.claudemesh.com/ws`. Underpins both broker-relay (Mode 2) and signaling for P2P upgrades.
+2. **`WebRtcP2pTransport`** — RTCPeerConnection + RTCDataChannel. Browser, Node (`node-datachannel` or similar), CLI all supported. Chunking handled at envelope layer for `stream` channel.
+3. **`HttpWebhookTransport`** — outbound HTTP POST to broker `/v1/send`; inbound HTTP POST to a registered webhook URL. Unidirectional from peer's perspective. Mid-turn push: no.
+4. **`LiveKitRoomTransport`** — for voice agents. Side-car bridges a LiveKit room to claudemesh. Maps a LiveKit participant → claudemesh service identity.
+
+Future adapters TBD as concrete needs surface — no commitments here. (v1 listed MQTT/gRPC/SSE as future named adapters; v2 drops the named list per Codex-2 should-cut feedback.)
+
+The peer's daemon advertises transport capabilities at hello time; broker stores them in the presence row; senders consult them via `list_peers` (capability fields added to the response).
+
+---
+
+## Layer 5: Channels (typed envelope)
+
+Channels define **semantics**: what the message means, what crypto to apply, what delivery guarantees, what fan-out, what backpressure.
+
+```typescript
+type ChannelType =
+  | "dm"           // 1:1 direct, encrypted to recipient pubkey, at-least-once with ack
+  | "group"        // post to named group, per-recipient encrypt or symmetric, at-least-once with ack
+  | "topic"        // pub/sub topic, persisted history, per-topic symmetric key, at-least-once with ack
+  | "rpc"          // request/response with correlation id + timeout, exactly-once via dedupe
+  | "system"       // peer_joined / peer_left / topology / lifecycle / revocation (broker-originated)
+  | "stream";      // long-lived ordered chunks, idempotent per (stream_id, chunk_id)
+
+interface Envelope {
+  v: 2;
+  channel: ChannelType;
+  /** Routing target — meaning depends on channel:
+   *  dm: recipient pubkey (member, session, or service)
+   *  group: group name (e.g. "@admins")
+   *  topic: topic id (e.g. "#abc123")
+   *  rpc: recipient pubkey
+   *  system: ignored (sender-determined fan-out; broker fills in)
+   *  stream: recipient pubkey (the stream_id is in meta.streamId — see below) */
+  target: string;
+  /** Sender identity pubkey (member, session, or service). */
+  from: string;
+  /** Encrypted payload. Channel + recipient determines crypto recipe:
+   *  dm/rpc/stream: crypto_box to recipient pubkey
+   *  group: per-recipient seal (or symmetric in v3)
+   *  topic: per-topic symmetric key (v0.2.0 spec)
+   *  system: broker-signed, plaintext metadata (event has no body) */
+  body: { nonce: string; ciphertext: string; bodyVersion: number };
+  /** Required in v2 (was optional in v1). Even minimal envelopes must carry
+   *  clientMessageId for idempotent dedupe. */
+  meta: {
+    clientMessageId: string;            // REQUIRED — idempotency id (spec §4.2)
+    requestFingerprint?: string;
+    priority?: "now" | "next" | "low";  // dm: gates mid-turn push; group/topic: fan-out priority
+    timeoutMs?: number;                  // rpc only
+    streamId?: string;                   // REQUIRED for channel:"stream"; identifies the stream
+    streamChunkId?: number;              // stream only; monotonic; receiver dedupes
+    streamTerminator?: boolean;          // stream only; signals end
+    rpcCorrelationId?: string;           // rpc only; back-edge for response
+    rpcResponse?: boolean;               // rpc only; this is a response, not request
+    replyToId?: string;                  // dm/topic threading
+    mentions?: string[];                 // dm/topic; @-callouts
+    expiresAt?: number;                  // any; broker drops past this; default 7d for queued
+  };
+  /** Sender Ed25519 signature over canonical bytes. Verified by recipient
+   *  (and by broker for system-message origin). */
+  signature: string;
+}
+```
+
+### Stream concurrency
+
+For `channel: "stream"`, **`meta.streamId` is required**. Two concurrent streams to the same recipient pubkey use distinct streamIds; receiver demuxes by `(from, streamId)`. Without this, multi-stream voice transcripts or file transfers from the same peer would collide.
+
+### Crypto by channel
+
+- `dm`, `rpc`, `stream` → crypto_box(plaintext, recipient_pubkey, sender_secretkey). Receiver verifies attestation chain to ensure recipient_pubkey is a valid identity rooted in a current member.
+- `group` → for now: per-recipient crypto_box (sender encrypts N times, broker fans out). Future: hybrid Curve25519 → AES-GCM with sender key wrap, like Signal Sender Keys.
+- `topic` → per-topic symmetric key (already in v0.2.0 spec). Key rotation = new topic + members re-subscribe. Keys distributed via DM at join time, encrypted to each member's pubkey.
+- `system` → broker is the signer; receivers verify against the broker's published Ed25519 pubkey. Plaintext bodies allowed since these are operational events.
+
+### Delivery semantics (Codex-2 correction applied)
+
+**At-least-once requires receiver ack.** Today's broker sets `delivered_at = NOW()` inside the claim CTE before WS push succeeds — that's at-most-once with no retry. The end-state behavior:
+
+1. Sender's daemon writes to outbox (durable).
+2. Drain worker sends to broker; broker acks with `client_message_id` echo (this is sender → broker delivery ack, NOT end-to-end).
+3. Broker queues with `claimed_at` NULL, `delivered_at` NULL.
+4. On recipient hello / push opportunity: broker claims by setting `claimed_at = NOW(), claim_id = <presenceId>` (lease 30s).
+5. Broker `sendToPeer` writes to WS / P2P / webhook.
+6. Receiver processes envelope and emits `client_ack { clientMessageId }` back to broker.
+7. Broker sets `delivered_at = NOW()` ON ACK RECEIPT.
+8. If lease expires without ack → broker re-eligible to claim and re-deliver.
+9. Receiver dedupes by `clientMessageId` (idempotent insert into inbox).
+
+Until ack is wired (transitional state), the transitional label is **best-effort retry with idempotent dedupe**, not at-least-once. The outbox + claim/lease + dedupe combination upgrades to at-least-once when the ack path is in place.
+
+`rpc` exactly-once is the same path with the addition that the response carries the `rpcCorrelationId`; sender retries the request until response received OR `timeoutMs` elapses; receiver-side dedupe ensures the handler runs at most once.
+
+### Mid-turn push
+
+`channel: "dm"` with `meta.priority: "now"` and recipient is a launched Claude Code session → recipient's daemon emits `claude/channel` MCP push; the session's Claude Code reads it mid-turn. Other priorities deliver via `claudemesh inbox` poll or at next tool boundary.
+
+### Reply threading + mentions
+
+Uniform across `dm` and `topic`: `meta.replyToId` references the original message's `clientMessageId`. `meta.mentions` is an array of pubkeys (or `@<group>`) — UI/CLI surfaces them; broker doesn't enforce.
+
+---
+
+## Layer 6: Mesh state — broker authority + signed gossip
+
+The mesh state (members, groups, topics, services, revocations, policies) needs both:
+
+- **Authority** — single source of truth. The broker DB. Mutations (add member, revoke, change policy) go through broker, signed by mesh owner / admin.
+- **Replication** — every peer needs a current-enough copy to authorize incoming P2P messages locally (otherwise revoke can't be enforced when peers chat directly).
+
+End-state: broker publishes signed mesh-state-update events on the `system` channel; peers cache and apply. Conflict resolution is trivial because broker is authority — peers merge updates by version vector. Eventually consistent in seconds, not the open-ended convergence of CRDT-only systems.
+
+For peer revocation specifically: revocation gossip is highest priority and must propagate within 30s to all online peers. Offline peers see it on reconnect.
+
+---
+
+## Crypto — what doesn't change vs what does
+
+### Doesn't change
+- Per-peer Ed25519 keypairs (member + session + service).
+- crypto_box (Curve25519 + XSalsa20 + Poly1305) for DMs/RPC/stream.
+- Parent-attestation flow for sessions and services.
+
+### Does change (additive)
+- DTLS layer underneath WebRTC P2P (transport-level encryption for fingerprint binding).
+- Per-topic symmetric keys (v0.2.0 baseline; v2 makes it a hard requirement for topics).
+- Broker signing key for `system` channel events (single Ed25519 keypair the broker holds; pubkey published in mesh state).
+- Service identity attestations carry `service_pubkey` + `scopes`.
+- Forward-secrecy for long-lived P2P sessions: post-handshake, derive a fresh symmetric key per session epoch (1h max); rotate.
+
+---
+
+## Migration order (architectural milestones, NO time estimates)
+
+The end-state above doesn't ship in one PR. The following ordering minimizes regression risk and lets each milestone be useful on its own. **No weeks/sprints attached** — work proceeds when the prior milestone is stable.
+
+### Milestone 1 — Foundational correctness
+*Required before anything else. Without this, every later milestone inherits the bugs.*
+
+- Extract `connectWsWithBackoff` helper. Refactor `DaemonBrokerClient` and `SessionBrokerClient` to use it. Eliminates the drift bug class.
+- Drop daemon's stray `sessionPubkey` field (or rename + document).
+- Tighten daemon-WS inbound filter — `*` broadcasts and member-targeted DMs only; session-targeted DMs land on session WS exclusively.
+- Add `presence.role` column at broker (`control-plane | session | service`); list_peers + fan-out + reconnect honor it.
+- **Fix broker drain race** — schema migration adds `claimed_at`, `claim_id`, `claim_expires_at` columns. Rewrite `drainForMember` for two-phase claim/deliver. Re-claim if `claimed_at` older than lease (30s).
+- Receiver-side `client_ack` for at-least-once with ack (Codex-2 correction). Without ack wiring this stays at "best-effort retry with idempotent dedupe."
+- Receiver-side dedupe: idempotent insert on `clientMessageId`; finished + made required for v2 envelopes.
+
+### Milestone 2 — Capability advertisement + transport abstraction
+*Sets up the interface. No new transport yet.*
+
+- Define `PeerTransport` interface; refactor existing WS code to be the first implementation. No behavioral change.
+- Add capabilities field to hello payload + presence row + `list_peers` response.
+- Define `Envelope v2` schema with `meta` required + `streamId` requirement on `stream` channel. Broker accepts both v1 and v2 (v1 auto-upgraded server-side by inferring `channel` from `targetSpec` shape). Senders start emitting v2.
+
+### Milestone 3 — Service identity + HTTP webhook transport
+*First non-WS transport. Validates abstraction. Includes revocation.*
+
+- Service identity registration: `claudemesh service register --type webhook --pubkey <hex> --scopes ...` mints attestation, stores broker-side. Service pubkey explicit in attestation.
+- Service revocation: `claudemesh service revoke <service_id>` writes broker denylist + closes any active connections + publishes `system` revocation event.
+- Add `HttpWebhookTransport` (broker-side outbound: POST with HMAC + retry; daemon-side inbound: HTTP server receives webhook callbacks → handleBrokerPush).
+- Add `/v1/send` HTTP POST endpoint on broker (today broker is WS-only for sends).
+- Demo: cron job using only `curl` posts to mesh; webhook subscriber receives.
+- (`SseTransport` deferred — Codex-2 should-cut feedback. Pull in when concrete browser need arises.)
+
+### Milestone 4 — Typed channels: rpc, stream, system
+*Channel layer becomes real.*
+
+- `channel: "rpc"` end-to-end: correlation id routing through any transport, response timeout, `claudemesh rpc <peer> <method> <args>` CLI verb.
+- `channel: "stream"` end-to-end: chunked + ordered + idempotent, multi-stream demux via `meta.streamId`, `claudemesh stream <peer> <stream-id>` CLI verb.
+- `channel: "system"` formalized (broker-signed events for peer_joined, peer_left, topology, revocation, mesh-state-updates).
+
+### Milestone 5 — P2P data plane (WebRTC adapter)
+*The big architectural shift. Broker becomes coordinator, not data path.*
+
+- Add `WebRtcP2pTransport` adapter. Uses `node-datachannel` (or libdatachannel binding) on Node; native WebRTC in browser.
+- Add signaling protocol over the existing broker WS:
+  - `p2p_offer` (sender → broker → recipient): SDP offer + ICE candidates.
+  - `p2p_answer` (recipient → broker → sender): SDP answer + ICE candidates.
+  - `p2p_candidate` (either way): trickle ICE candidates.
+  - All signaling messages are broker-attested (only valid sender/recipient pairs).
+- Add `pickTransport()` policy in daemon send path.
+- Add P2P session manager: warm-cache, idle timeout, hard timeout, demote-to-broker on failure.
+- Tag broker-relayed messages that *could have* gone P2P with a metric, so degradation rate is observable.
+
+### Milestone 6 — Mesh state replication + revocation gossip
+*Required before P2P is safe at scale.*
+
+- Broker publishes signed `system` events for all mesh state mutations.
+- Peers subscribe; cache and apply.
+- Revocation propagation latency target: <30s for online peers.
+- P2P sessions verify peer identity against cached state on every message (cheap, just a map lookup).
+
+### Milestone 7 — External integrations (proof points, parallel)
+*One PoC per category to validate the architecture, opportunistically.*
+
+- LiveKit side-car (validates LiveKit room transport).
+- OpenAI Assistant (validates delegated-key crypto + webhook transport).
+- WhatsApp / Slack bridge (validates human-bridge service identity).
+- Browser SDK (validates browser as a peer; uses WebRTC adapter natively).
+
+### Milestone 8 — Group/topic crypto upgrade
+*Group fan-out crypto efficiency.*
+
+- Sender Keys protocol for group: sender derives group key, encrypts content once, encrypts group key per-recipient. Avoids N-way encryption per message.
+- Per-topic key rotation policy (member join → optional re-key; member leave → forced re-key).
+
+### Beyond Milestone 8
+- Future transport adapters as concrete needs surface (no commitments).
+- Multi-broker federation (mesh spans multiple brokers; gossip across).
+- Onion routing option for adversarial environments.
+
+---
+
+## Non-goals (explicit)
+
+- **Replacing Slack / Discord / Matrix as a human chat product.** claudemesh is for agent coordination; humans participate via bridges or direct DMs but UX is CLI-first.
+- **Pure-P2P with no central coordinator.** The broker stays — for offline queue, group fan-out, mesh authority, revocation. "P2P-first hybrid" is the commitment, not "P2P-only."
+- **Replacing the MCP `claude/channel` push-pipe.** Mid-turn interrupt stays MCP. The data-plane changes don't touch the daemon-to-Claude-Code path.
+- **Real-time media (audio/video) directly in claudemesh data channels.** Bandwidth-heavy media goes through dedicated stacks (LiveKit, WebRTC SFU). claudemesh metadata + signaling glues them.
+
+---
+
+## Open questions
+
+1. **Mid-turn push when sender is on P2P session.** P2P delivery to recipient's daemon → daemon emits MCP push. Same shape as broker-delivered. Confirm the MCP push respects per-session targeting (different session pubkey siblings of the same member).
+
+2. **Browser peers and NAT traversal.** Browser ↔ browser via WebRTC works. Browser ↔ daemon (Node WebRTC binding) — needs testing under symmetric NAT. May require running a STUN server (Google's for now; eventually self-hosted). TURN fallback uses the broker WS.
+
+3. **Backpressure on stream channel.** WebRTC data channels have built-in flow control. Broker-relayed streams need per-stream backpressure signaling to avoid OOM at the broker. Proposal: receiver advertises `stream_window_bytes` periodically; sender pauses when used.
+
+4. **Multi-region brokers.** Today single broker. If we add a second broker (or federation), how do peers in mesh A on broker 1 talk to peers in mesh A on broker 2? Out of scope here; separate spec when forced.
+
+---
+
+## Acknowledgements
+
+**Codex-1 (initial architecture review of existing code) caught:**
+- "Remove daemon-WS inbound entirely" idea silently loses broadcasts + member-targeted DMs whenever zero launches exist. Corrected → retained.
+- Inheritance for the dup'd lifecycle would become a god class. Composition via helper kept.
+- Drain race needs `claimed_at` + delivered-on-success; "check OPEN before claim" still drops on crash. Kept.
+- Token-keyed registry is correct (token = auth boundary), not a smell. Kept.
+
+**Codex-2 (single-pass review of v1 of this spec) caught:**
+- At-least-once requires receiver ack, not just "set delivered_at on success." → Layer 5 delivery semantics rewritten to require client_ack.
+- Service identity needs explicit `service_pubkey` field, included in attestation. → Added to ServiceIdentity definition.
+- v2 envelope `meta` should be non-optional with `clientMessageId` always present. → meta is now required.
+- Service identity needed explicit revocation/disable story. → New CLI verb `claudemesh service revoke`, broker denylist, system-channel gossip propagation.
+- `streamId` location ambiguous; concurrent streams to same peer would collide. → `meta.streamId` made REQUIRED for `channel: "stream"`.
+- Defer `SseTransport` from Milestone 3. → Done.
+- Drop named future-adapter list (MQTT/gRPC) to avoid false commitments. → Done.
+
+The hybrid P2P data plane, transport adapter abstraction, typed channel envelope, mesh state replication, and milestone reordering are mine. Codex's reviews were targeted at correctness/scope-gap/should-cut, not redesign.
+
+**This spec is now frozen for implementation.** No further architectural drift; deviations during implementation surface as new spec-deltas with explicit rationale, not silent edits to this document.

.artifacts/specs/2026-05-04-agentic-comms-architecture.md

@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+---
+title: claudemesh as agentic communication platform — architecture spec
+status: draft
+target: 2.0.0 (foundational cleanup) → 2.1.0 (transport adapters) → 2.2.0 (channel typing)
+author: Alejandro + Claude (cross-checked with Codex GPT-5.2)
+date: 2026-05-04
+supersedes: none
+references:
+  - 2026-05-02-architecture-north-star.md (CLI-first commitment, push-pipe)
+  - 2026-05-04-per-session-presence.md (per-launch session pubkey + attestation)
+  - apps/cli/CHANGELOG.md (1.30.0–1.32.1 history)
+---
+
+# claudemesh as agentic communication platform
+
+## TL;DR
+
+Today claudemesh is a **peer mesh for Claude Code sessions** — broker + CLI + per-session WS, encrypted DMs, peer list, mid-turn push via MCP. Tomorrow it has to be a **transport-agnostic agentic communication platform** that:
+
+- treats Claude Code as **one channel type** among many (with first-class support for mid-turn interrupts via `claude/channel`)
+- accepts **non-Claude agents** as peers — voice agents (LiveKit/Pipecat), OpenAI Assistants, raw HTTP webhook consumers, scheduled cron actors, human IM bridges
+- exposes **typed channels** (DM, group, topic, RPC, system event, stream) so message semantics aren't shoved through one `targetSpec` string
+- has a **pluggable transport layer** so a peer can join the mesh over WS, HTTP webhook, SSE, MQTT, or gRPC without changing the broker's data plane
+- preserves **end-to-end encryption** as a non-negotiable for direct messages
+
+This document specifies the architecture in three layers (identity, transport, channel), the foundational cleanup needed before adding any of it (Codex caught a few sharp issues), and the migration path that gets us there without a "v2 rewrite" event.
+
+The CLI-first commitment from the North Star spec stays intact — every channel type and transport adapter must be invocable from `claudemesh <verb>` first, with MCP serving only `claude/channel` push.
+
+---
+
+## Why now
+
+Three forcing functions:
+
+1. **Multi-session interconnect already broke** (1.30.0 → 1.32.1). The per-session WS subsystem shipped without a push handler because the architecture assumed "one daemon WS per mesh handles everything" and then we bolted session WSes on top without finishing the inbound side. The shape is right; the wiring was incomplete. We need to formalize the role split before adding more transports.
+
+2. **Codex review surfaced a correctness bug in the broker's drain.** `drainForMember` claims rows by setting `delivered_at = NOW()` *before* the WS push succeeds. If `ws.readyState !== OPEN` at push time, the row is marked delivered and the message is gone. This is at-most-once with no retry. Any future channel type or transport adapter inherits this bug if we don't fix it at the foundation.
+
+3. **The agentic-comms market is becoming a thing.** Voice agents (LiveKit, Pipecat, ElevenLabs Conversational), OpenAI Assistants threads, MCP servers acting as autonomous workers, scheduled cron actors — they all need a "mesh" to coordinate. claudemesh has the right primitives (E2E crypto, peer presence, typed routing); it just needs the architecture to admit non-Claude peers without forking the codebase.
+
+---
+
+## Audience for this architecture
+
+| Peer type | Identity | Transport | Channels they speak |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| **Claude Code session** (today) | Per-launch session pubkey, parent-attested by member key | WS to broker | DM, group, topic, system events; receives mid-turn push via MCP `claude/channel` |
+| **Headless agent** (e.g. cron job, Hermes/OpenClaw worker) | Member pubkey (no per-launch session) | WS to broker, OR HTTP webhook outbound | DM, group, topic; no mid-turn push (polls inbox) |
+| **Voice agent** (LiveKit/Pipecat call) | Service identity (signed by mesh owner) | WS to broker, possibly via TURN relay | DM (transcript stream), group (call participants), system events (call lifecycle) |
+| **OpenAI Assistant / Anthropic Agent** (Skill SDK) | Service identity, OAuth-style scoped token | HTTP webhook (server-side push) OR WS | DM, RPC (tool-style request/response) |
+| **Human via Slack/WhatsApp bridge** | Service identity for the bridge, end-user mapped via membership | WS (bridge to broker) | DM, topic |
+| **Webhook consumer** (Stripe-style passive listener) | Service identity, scoped to one channel | HTTP webhook outbound only | Topic (subscribe to events) |
+
+Every row in this table needs to work without changing the broker's data plane.
+
+---
+
+## Layer 1: Identity
+
+### Today
+
+Two identity types coexist:
+
+- **Member identity** — stable Ed25519 keypair held in `~/.claudemesh/config.json`. One per joined mesh. Used for hello signature on the daemon's main WS; used as the cryptographic root of trust for sibling sessions.
+- **Session identity** — ephemeral Ed25519 keypair generated per `claudemesh launch`. Parent-signed attestation vouches for it (TTL 12h, broker cap 24h). Used for hello signature on the per-session WS; used as the routing key for DMs targeted at *this specific launched session*.
+
+This is enough for Claude Code peers. It's not enough for the audience table above.
+
+### Proposed: third identity type — **service identity**
+
+A service identity is what a non-Claude integration uses to authenticate:
+
+```
+ServiceIdentity {
+  member_id            // The mesh member that owns this service (auth boundary)
+  service_id           // Stable id for the service ("openai-assistant-foo", "livekit-room-bar")
+  service_type         // "openai-assistant" | "livekit-room" | "webhook" | "voice-agent" | ...
+  scopes               // ["dm:read", "topic:write", "rpc:invoke", ...]
+  attestation          // member-signed: { service_id, scopes, expires_at, signature }
+  transport_hint       // "ws" | "http-webhook" | "sse" — informs how the broker reaches it
+}
+```
+
+**Three identity types, one auth model:**
+- All identities resolve to a `member_id` (the auth boundary — grants, kicks, bans operate on members).
+- Identities differ in *liveness* (member = always; session = per-launch; service = scoped/scheduled) and in *transport hint* (member/session = WS-resident; service = polymorphic).
+
+**Backward compatibility:** existing member + session identities are unchanged. Service identity is additive.
+
+### Cryptographic implications
+
+- E2E encryption (`crypto_box`) targets a public key. Member pubkey, session pubkey, service pubkey all work the same way.
+- A service that can't hold a long-lived secret (e.g. OpenAI Assistant calling out via HTTPS) gets a **delegated identity** the daemon holds — sender encrypts to the daemon's per-member key, daemon re-encrypts and forwards over the service's webhook. This adds trust in the daemon, but it's the only way to bridge to non-crypto-native peers without giving them raw secrets.
+
+---
+
+## Layer 2: Transport
+
+### Today
+
+One transport: **WebSocket to broker** (`wss://ic.claudemesh.com/ws`). Everything goes through it — hello, send, push, RPC. The CLI's daemon holds two WS instances per mesh (member-keyed `DaemonBrokerClient` + per-launch `SessionBrokerClient`).
+
+### Proposed: transport adapter interface
+
+```typescript
+interface BrokerTransport {
+  /** One-time hello + auth handshake. Identity is opaque to the transport. */
+  connect(opts: TransportConnectOpts): Promise<TransportSession>;
+
+  /** Send a typed envelope. Returns a delivery promise (ack or terminal failure). */
+  send(envelope: Envelope): Promise<SendResult>;
+
+  /** Stream of inbound envelopes. Pull-model so a transport can be a webhook,
+   *  not just a long-lived socket. */
+  inbound(): AsyncIterable<Envelope>;
+
+  /** Close cleanly. */
+  close(reason?: string): Promise<void>;
+
+  /** Capabilities surfaced to the daemon — broker uses this to decide
+   *  whether mid-turn push is possible, whether RPC blocks are
+   *  supported, etc. */
+  capabilities: TransportCapabilities;
+}
+```
+
+**Concrete adapters at v2.1.0:**
+
+1. **`WsBrokerTransport`** — current WS implementation. The `DaemonBrokerClient` and `SessionBrokerClient` are recast as two roles using this transport with different hello payloads.
+2. **`HttpWebhookTransport`** — for service identities that can't hold a WS open. Outbound: HTTP POST to the broker's `/v1/send`. Inbound: broker calls back to a registered webhook URL with retry + signature. Mid-turn push is not possible (degrades gracefully).
+3. **`SseTransport`** — for browsers / restricted environments. Outbound: HTTP POST. Inbound: SSE stream from broker to client.
+
+**Future adapters (v2.3+):**
+
+4. **`LiveKitTransport`** — for voice agents. The "broker" is a LiveKit room; messages are LiveKit data-channel packets. Bridges to the central broker via a daemon side-car.
+5. **`MqttTransport`** — for IoT / fleet scenarios.
+6. **`GrpcTransport`** — for low-latency intra-cluster.
+
+Any new adapter implements the same interface; broker logic is transport-agnostic at the API boundary.
+
+### The two-role model (Codex's correction)
+
+Even within one transport, the daemon holds **two roles per mesh**, not one connection per launch:
+
+- **Control-plane connection** — one per mesh, member-keyed. Carries: outbox drain (one queue, can't race), `list_peers`/state/memory/skill RPCs, inbound for `*` broadcasts and member-targeted DMs (legacy traffic + zero-launch state).
+- **Session connections** — N per mesh, session-keyed. Carries: presence row keyed on session pubkey, inbound for session-targeted DMs.
+
+This is what we have today; the spec just makes the role split explicit. The mistake in 1.30.0–1.32.0 was treating session connections as "presence-only" instead of "second-class peers." 1.32.1 corrects that.
+
+### Foundational cleanup (ship first, before any new transport)
+
+1. **Extract `connectWsWithBackoff` helper** — current `DaemonBrokerClient` and `SessionBrokerClient` duplicate the WS lifecycle (open, hello, ack-timeout, close, backoff, reconnect). Codex's recommendation: composition, not inheritance. A single helper takes `{ url, buildHello, onMessage, onStatusChange }` and both clients call it. Eliminates the drift bug class that produced session_replaced thrashing.
+
+2. **Drop the daemon's stray `sessionPubkey`** (`apps/cli/src/daemon/broker.ts:113`). It's a leftover from the era when the daemon WS was the only WS. The session role now owns session pubkeys. If we want the daemon itself to be addressable by a stable pubkey, rename it `daemonPubkey` and document it; today it's dead ballast.
+
+3. **Tighten daemon-WS inbound filter, don't remove it** (Codex's correction to my prior take). Daemon WS should still receive `*` broadcasts and member-targeted DMs (legacy senders, zero-launch state). It should NOT decrypt session-targeted DMs (that's the session WS's job, and decryption requires the session secret which the daemon WS doesn't have anyway).
+
+4. **Fix the broker drain race** (`apps/broker/src/broker.ts:2399-2402`). Add `claimed_at` + `claim_id` columns; claim sets `claimed_at = NOW()` (NOT `delivered_at`); push runs; `delivered_at = NOW()` is set ONLY after `ws.send` succeeds. Re-eligible if `claimed_at` is older than the lease timeout (e.g. 30s). Combined with `client_message_id` dedupe on the receiver side, this gives at-least-once semantics, which is what an agentic comms platform needs.
+
+5. **Decouple presence-WS-role from session-WS-role at the broker.** Today `connectPresence` is called from both `handleHello` and `handleSessionHello`. The two paths diverge in identity (member vs session pubkey) and dedup key (sessionId in both cases). Make the role explicit on the presence row (`role: "control-plane" | "session" | "service"`) so list_peers, fan-out, and reconnect can reason about it. Hidden `claudemesh-daemon` rows in 1.32.0's `peer list` are a hack covering for missing typing.
+
+---
+
+## Layer 3: Channels
+
+### Today
+
+One channel type: **direct messages with target-spec routing**. `targetSpec` is a string that the broker pattern-matches:
+- `<64-hex-pubkey>` → DM to that member or session
+- `*` → broadcast to mesh
+- `@<groupname>` → group post
+- `#<topicId>` → topic post
+
+This works but it's overloaded — the same `send` verb covers DMs, broadcasts, groups, topics, and (since v0.9) tagged messages. As we add agentic peers, the semantics matter and the routing key string can't carry them.
+
+### Proposed: typed channel envelope
+
+```typescript
+type ChannelType =
+  | "dm"           // 1:1 message, encrypted to recipient pubkey
+  | "group"        // post to named group, encrypted per-recipient (today: base64 plaintext)
+  | "topic"        // pub/sub topic, persisted, history available, per-topic symmetric key
+  | "rpc"          // request/response, correlation id, timeout, structured result
+  | "system"       // peer_joined / peer_left / topology / lifecycle events
+  | "stream";      // long-lived data stream (voice transcript, log tail, file transfer chunks)
+
+interface Envelope {
+  /** Schema version. v1 = current opaque shape. v2 = this typed shape. */
+  v: 2;
+  /** What semantics the receiver should apply. */
+  channel: ChannelType;
+  /** Target — pubkey for dm, group name for group, topic id for topic, etc.
+   *  Same wire format as today's targetSpec, but typed. */
+  target: string;
+  /** Sender identity (member, session, or service pubkey). */
+  from: string;
+  /** Encrypted payload + crypto envelope. Channel type drives crypto:
+   *  - dm: crypto_box to recipient pubkey
+   *  - group: per-recipient seal (today: plaintext)
+   *  - topic: symmetric key (today: plaintext, v0.2.0+ adds per-topic key)
+   *  - rpc / system / stream: same as DM (crypto_box) */
+  body: { nonce: string; ciphertext: string; bodyVersion: number };
+  /** Optional metadata, varies by channel type. */
+  meta?: {
+    /** Stable client-supplied id for dedupe (existing field, made required for v2). */
+    clientMessageId: string;
+    /** Sender's canonical fingerprint per spec §4.4 (existing field). */
+    requestFingerprint?: string;
+    /** dm/group: priority gate (now/next/low). rpc: timeout_ms. stream: chunk_id. */
+    priority?: "now" | "next" | "low";
+    timeoutMs?: number;
+    streamChunkId?: number;
+    /** dm/topic: replyTo for threading. */
+    replyToId?: string;
+    /** topic: mentions list (existing field). */
+    mentions?: string[];
+    /** rpc: correlation back-edge so the broker can route the response. */
+    rpcCorrelationId?: string;
+  };
+  /** Sender signature over (channel, target, from, nonce, ciphertext, meta). */
+  signature?: string;
+}
+```
+
+**Why this matters for agentic peers:**
+
+- A voice agent sending a partial transcript wants `channel: "stream"` semantics — high-frequency, small chunks, idempotent, no per-message ack required.
+- An OpenAI Assistant calling a tool wants `channel: "rpc"` — request-response with timeout, correlation back-edge so the response routes.
+- A scheduled cron actor reporting completion wants `channel: "topic"` — fire-and-forget, persisted history.
+- Today all of these get bolted onto `dm` with conventions; v2 envelope makes them first-class.
+
+### Claude Code channels — first-class support
+
+Two specific channel features for Claude Code:
+
+1. **Mid-turn interrupt** (`claude/channel` push). Already implemented via the MCP push-pipe. The new envelope makes it explicit: `channel: "dm"` with `meta.priority: "now"` triggers MCP push to a launched session. Other priorities deliver at next inbox poll.
+
+2. **Reply threading** (`meta.replyToId`). Already partially supported on topics; v2 makes it work uniformly across `dm` and `topic`. The receiver Claude Code session sees a structured reply thread instead of flat history.
+
+3. **Mentions** (`meta.mentions`). Already supported on topics; v2 surfaces them on `dm` too — useful for `@<peer>` callouts in groups even when the message body is encrypted.
+
+### Backward compatibility
+
+Envelope v1 (today's shape) stays accepted by the broker until v3.x. v1 envelopes are auto-upgraded server-side: `channel` inferred from `targetSpec` shape (`*` → group/broadcast, `#` → topic, hex → dm). Existing CLIs keep working.
+
+---
+
+## Future integrations (concrete)
+
+These are not part of v2.0 — they're the test cases the architecture must support:
+
+### LiveKit voice agent
+- Service identity: `livekit-room-<id>`, signed by mesh owner.
+- Transport: dedicated daemon side-car hosts a LiveKit participant; data-channel packets bridge to the central broker via WS.
+- Channels: `stream` for transcript chunks, `system` for call lifecycle (joined/left/muted), `dm` for sidebar text.
+- E2E: per-call ephemeral keypair held by the side-car; participants' member keys are discovered via mesh peer list.
+
+### OpenAI Assistant integration
+- Service identity: `openai-assistant-<id>`, scoped to one or more topics + RPC.
+- Transport: HTTP webhook out (broker → assistant API), HTTP POST in (assistant → broker `/v1/send`).
+- Channels: `rpc` for tool-style invocations from claudemesh peers, `topic` for assistant-published events.
+- Crypto: delegated to daemon (assistant can't hold a libsodium secret; daemon re-encrypts on its behalf).
+
+### Generic webhook consumer (Stripe-style)
+- Service identity: `webhook-<consumer-id>`, scoped to subscribed topics.
+- Transport: HTTP webhook out only. No inbound — it's a passive sink.
+- Channels: `topic` only.
+- Crypto: not E2E; webhook bodies are signed (HMAC-SHA256, sender = mesh) but plaintext.
+
+### Human-via-WhatsApp bridge
+- Service identity: `whatsapp-bridge`, with member-mapping for each end-user.
+- Transport: WS (bridge holds long connection to broker), bridges to WhatsApp Business API.
+- Channels: `dm` (1:1 chat → WhatsApp DM), `topic` (claudemesh topic → WhatsApp group).
+- E2E: bridge holds a per-end-user delegated key; not "true" E2E to the WhatsApp side, but signaled clearly in UX.
+
+---
+
+## Migration plan
+
+### v2.0.0 — Foundational cleanup (no new external surface)
+**Target: 1–2 weeks**
+
+- [ ] Extract `connectWsWithBackoff` helper, refactor `DaemonBrokerClient` + `SessionBrokerClient` to use it.
+- [ ] Drop daemon's stray `sessionPubkey` (or rename + document).
+- [ ] Tighten daemon-WS inbound filter (broadcast + member-targeted only).
+- [ ] Add `presence.role` column (`control-plane | session | service`); broker fan-out + list_peers honor it.
+- [ ] **Fix drain race**: schema migration adds `claimed_at`, `claim_id`, `claim_expires_at` columns; rewrite `drainForMember` for two-phase claim/deliver; add re-claim path for stale leases.
+- [ ] Receiver-side: harden `client_message_id` dedupe (already partial in 1.32.x; finish for at-least-once). Add idempotent insert that returns existing row on conflict.
+
+**Success criteria:**
+- Two-session smoke test still passes (1.32.1 baseline).
+- Crash-mid-push test: kill broker between claim and send; verify message redelivers on broker restart + recipient reconnect.
+- Reconnect storm test: 100 reconnect cycles per session over 60s; zero message loss.
+
+### v2.1.0 — Transport adapter interface
+**Target: 2–3 weeks after v2.0.0**
+
+- [ ] Define `BrokerTransport` interface; refactor existing WS code to be the first implementation.
+- [ ] Add `HttpWebhookTransport` adapter (broker side: outbound HTTP POST with retry + HMAC signature; daemon side: HTTP server that receives webhook callbacks and inserts into inbox).
+- [ ] Add `/v1/send` HTTP endpoint on the broker (today the broker is WS-only for sends).
+- [ ] Service identity registration flow: `claudemesh service register --type webhook --scopes dm:read,topic:write` mints attestation, stores it locally + on broker.
+- [ ] Basic `SseTransport` for browser/CI use cases.
+
+**Success criteria:**
+- A scheduled cron job using only `curl` can send to the mesh (no daemon required).
+- A webhook consumer subscribed to a topic receives messages within 5s of post.
+
+### v2.2.0 — Typed channels (envelope v2)
+**Target: 2–3 weeks after v2.1.0**
+
+- [ ] Define `Envelope v2` schema; broker accepts both v1 and v2; sender-side code emits v2.
+- [ ] `channel: "rpc"` end-to-end: correlation id routing, response timeout, `claudemesh rpc <peer> <method> <args>` CLI verb.
+- [ ] `channel: "stream"` end-to-end: chunked delivery, ordered, idempotent, `claudemesh stream <peer> <stream-id>` CLI verb.
+- [ ] Mid-turn push (`claude/channel`) honors `channel: "dm"` with `meta.priority: "now"` only.
+- [ ] Mentions + replyToId surface uniformly across dm and topic.
+
+**Success criteria:**
+- Demo: a Claude Code session sends an `rpc` to another Claude Code session, gets a structured response.
+- Demo: a voice-agent prototype sends `stream` chunks; another peer receives them in order with no gaps.
+
+### v2.3+ — Concrete external integrations
+**Target: opportunistic**
+
+- LiveKit side-car (one PoC integration to validate the architecture).
+- OpenAI Assistant integration (validate delegated-key crypto path).
+- WhatsApp bridge (validate human-bridge service identity).
+
+These are not on the critical path for the architecture; they prove it.
+
+---
+
+## Non-goals (explicit)
+
+- **Replacing Slack / Discord.** claudemesh is for agent coordination. Human chat is a side-effect, not the headline.
+- **Federation across multiple brokers.** v2.0 stays single-broker per mesh. Multi-broker (gossip / federation) is a separate spec, post-v3.
+- **Sync-only / no-broker P2P.** Direct peer-to-peer (without the central broker) is a different architecture (libp2p, Iroh). Not in scope.
+- **Replacing the MCP push-pipe.** Mid-turn interrupt stays MCP-based. The transport-adapter layer is broker-side; MCP is daemon-to-Claude-Code, untouched.
+
+---
+
+## Open questions
+
+1. **How does a service identity prove liveness?** WS gives us implicit liveness via the connection. HTTP webhook services need an explicit heartbeat / health-check. Proposal: broker periodically POSTs to `<webhook>/health`; service is marked offline after 3 consecutive failures.
+
+2. **RPC routing through offline peers — what's the failure mode?** If `claudemesh rpc <peer> ...` and the peer is offline, do we (a) queue and wait (DM semantics) or (b) fail fast (REST semantics)? Proposal: RPC fails fast with `peer_offline` after a 5s probe; explicit `--wait` flag opts into DM-style queue.
+
+3. **Per-topic symmetric key rotation.** Existing v0.2.0 spec mentions per-topic keys. Rotation policy (when, who triggers, how members re-sync) is unsolved. Defer to a separate spec; v2.2.0 ships with one-shot keys (rotate by re-creating topic).
+
+---
+
+## Acknowledgements
+
+Cross-checked with Codex (GPT-5.2, high reasoning) on the foundational cleanup section. Codex caught:
+- The "remove daemon-WS inbound entirely" idea would silently lose broadcasts + member-targeted DMs whenever zero launches exist. Corrected.
+- Inheritance for the dup'd lifecycle would become a god class. Composition via helper is the right call.
+- The drain race needs a `claimed_at` + delivered-on-success fix; "check OPEN before claim" still drops on crash.
+- Token-keyed registry is correct (token = auth boundary), not a smell.
+
+The agentic-comms / typed-channels / transport-adapter layers are mine — Codex didn't touch those because the question I asked was about the existing architecture's smells, not the future roadmap.

.artifacts/specs/2026-05-04-per-session-presence.md

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+# Per-session broker presence — daemon-multiplexed
+
+**Status:** spec, queued for 1.30.0 (alongside launch-wizard refactor).
+**Owner:** alezmad
+**Author:** Claude (Sprint A planning, 2026-05-04)
+**Related:** `2026-05-04-v2-roadmap-completion.md` (Sprint A overview),
+1.29.0 session-registry CHANGELOG entry.
+
+## Problem
+
+After 1.28.0 dropped the bridge tier, **launched `claude` sessions have
+no persistent broker presence**. Only the daemon does.
+
+Concretely: two `claudemesh launch` sessions in the same cwd, querying
+`peer list` 2 s apart, **never see each other**. Each `claudemesh peer
+list` opens a short-lived cold-path WS that creates a `presence` row
+for the duration of the query and tears it down. The "this session"
+row everyone sees in their own snapshot is created by the snapshot
+itself; sibling sessions' queries miss it because their WS-lifetimes
+don't overlap.
+
+Confirmed empirically (2026-05-04, same-cwd ECIJA-Intranet test):
+
+| Snapshot | timestamp | self pubkey | self `connectedAt` |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Session A | 11:42:37Z | `61d96106cb499208` | 11:42:38Z (= query time) |
+| Session B | 11:42:39Z | `ce77188aba02827d` | 11:42:38Z (= query time) |
+
+Each saw 5 long-lived peers (the daemon and unrelated other sessions)
+plus its own ephemeral row. Neither saw the other.
+
+## Goal
+
+Every launched `claude` session has a long-lived broker presence row
+**owned by the daemon**, identified by the session's per-launch
+keypair. Siblings see each other in `peer list` immediately and
+continuously, not as snapshot artifacts.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Cross-machine session sync (waiting on 2.0.0 HKDF identity).
+- Replacing the daemon's own presence row — the daemon stays as a
+  separate row for "the user on this machine, no specific session."
+- Persistence of the session-presence link across daemon restarts —
+  daemon restart can be allowed to require launched sessions to
+  re-register (same compromise as the in-memory session registry from
+  1.29.0).
+
+## Design
+
+### State machine
+
+The 1.29.0 session registry already tracks `Map<token, SessionInfo>`
+inside the daemon. Extend it to own a per-session broker connection.
+
+```
+session lifecycle:
+  POST /v1/sessions/register
+       → registry.set(token, info)
+       → daemon.openSessionWs(info)         ← NEW
+       → broker creates presence row owned by session.pubkey
+
+  DELETE /v1/sessions/:token
+       → registry.delete(token)
+       → daemon.closeSessionWs(token)       ← NEW
+       → broker marks presence.disconnectedAt = now()
+
+  reaper (30 s tick): pid dead?
+       → registry.delete(token)
+       → daemon.closeSessionWs(token)
+```
+
+### Daemon-side: per-session `BrokerClient`
+
+Today the daemon holds `Map<meshSlug, DaemonBrokerClient>` (one WS per
+attached mesh). Add a parallel `Map<token, SessionBrokerClient>` for
+the per-launch ephemeral connections.
+
+`SessionBrokerClient` is the existing `BrokerClient` reused, configured
+with the session's per-launch keypair instead of the member's stable
+keypair. It registers presence (`presence_join`) and stays connected
+until `closeSessionWs(token)` fires. It does **not** drain the outbox
+— that's the member-keypair `DaemonBrokerClient`'s job. It only carries
+presence + receives DMs targeted at the session pubkey.
+
+### Broker-side: parent-vouched presence auth
+
+Today's broker accepts hello-sig auth where:
+- Caller signs the broker's nonce with their `mesh_member` keypair.
+- Broker looks up `mesh_member.peer_pubkey == sig.pubkey`.
+
+For per-session keypairs, the session pubkey is **not** in `mesh_member`
+— it's freshly generated by `claudemesh launch`. We need a new
+attestation flow:
+
+```
+hello {
+  type: "session_hello",
+  session_pubkey: <fresh keypair>,
+  parent_member_pubkey: <member keypair from config>,
+  display_name, cwd, role, groups,
+  parent_signature: ed25519_sign(member_priv,
+                                 "claudemesh-session/" || session_pubkey || "/" || nonce),
+  nonce_challenge: <broker nonce>,
+}
+```
+
+Broker validates:
+1. `parent_member_pubkey` exists in `mesh.member` for the target mesh.
+2. `parent_signature` validates against `parent_member_pubkey` over the
+   canonical message above.
+3. Broker inserts a presence row keyed on `session_pubkey` but
+   `member_id` pointing at the parent member's `mesh.member.id`.
+
+This is the OAuth-style refresh-vs-access pattern: the parent member
+key vouches "this ephemeral session pubkey belongs to me." The broker
+binds the row to the parent member but uses the session pubkey for
+routing (so DMs targeted at the session pubkey land at this WS).
+
+### CLI-side: launch.ts produces the parent signature
+
+`claudemesh launch` already mints the session keypair and writes the
+session-token file. Extend it to also produce a `parent_signature`
+that the daemon can present when opening the session WS:
+
+```ts
+const sessionPubkey = sessionKeypair.publicKey;
+const parentSig = ed25519_sign(
+  mesh.secretKey,
+  Buffer.concat([
+    Buffer.from("claudemesh-session/"),
+    sessionPubkey,
+    Buffer.from("/"),
+    /* nonce comes from broker — handled at WS-connect time */
+  ]),
+);
+```
+
+Actually, the nonce is broker-issued at hello time, so the signature
+needs to be produced fresh per WS-connect. Simpler approach: the
+`POST /v1/sessions/register` body carries the *member secret key* (or
+a derived signing capability) so the daemon can sign nonces on behalf
+of the session.
+
+That's a key-leak risk. Better: register carries a **pre-signed
+attestation** good for a TTL window:
+
+```
+register body adds:
+  parent_attestation: {
+    session_pubkey: hex,
+    parent_member_pubkey: hex,
+    expires_at: ISO,
+    signature: ed25519_sign(member_priv,
+                             "claudemesh-session-attest/" ||
+                             session_pubkey || "/" ||
+                             expires_at),
+  }
+```
+
+Daemon presents this attestation in `session_hello`; broker validates
+expiry and signature, then issues a nonce challenge that the daemon
+can satisfy with the session keypair (which IS held by the daemon
+for the lifetime of the registration). Two-stage: parent vouches the
+session; session signs the nonce.
+
+### Registry persistence
+
+For now, in-memory only (matching 1.29.0). Daemon restart drops all
+session WSes; launched `claude` processes are responsible for
+re-registering on next CLI invocation. Acceptable v1 behaviour;
+revisit when sqlite persistence lands for the registry.
+
+## Wire changes
+
+### Broker
+
+- New `session_hello` message type (additive; existing `hello` for
+  member auth unchanged).
+- `presence` row schema unchanged — `member_id` still required, but
+  `session_pubkey` differs from member's stable pubkey.
+- Validate `parent_attestation.expires_at <= now() + 24h` to bound
+  attestation reuse.
+
+### Daemon
+
+- New `SessionBrokerClient` factory — wraps `BrokerClient` with
+  session-mode hello.
+- `Map<token, SessionBrokerClient>` alongside the existing
+  `Map<slug, DaemonBrokerClient>`.
+- IPC routes:
+  - `POST /v1/sessions/register` — extend body schema with
+    `parent_attestation`.
+  - `DELETE /v1/sessions/:token` — close the session WS first, then
+    drop registry entry.
+
+### CLI (`claudemesh launch`)
+
+- Mint session keypair (today only writes the session token; need to
+  add ed25519 keypair generation per launch and write the privkey
+  alongside the token).
+- Sign `parent_attestation` with the member key from the joined-mesh
+  config.
+- POST register with both the new keypair and the attestation.
+
+## LoC estimate
+
+- Daemon `SessionBrokerClient` + registry hook: ~120 LoC.
+- IPC route schema extension + validation: ~40 LoC.
+- Broker `session_hello` handler + tests: ~140 LoC.
+- CLI `claudemesh launch` keypair + attestation: ~60 LoC.
+- Tests + smoke: ~80 LoC.
+
+Total: **~440 LoC** across CLI + daemon + broker.
+
+## Risks
+
+| Risk | Mitigation |
+|---|---|
+| Member private key never leaves the user's machine, but the **attestation** (signed token) can be replayed within its TTL. | TTL bound 24h; refresh on launch; revocation path = drop the parent member's mesh enrollment (nuclear, but works). |
+| Cascading WS connections — N launches = N+1 broker WSes per user. | Acceptable up to 10-20 concurrent sessions; if it ever becomes a problem, multiplex per-session at the protocol level (one WS, multiple presence rows). Out of scope for v1. |
+| Daemon restart kills all session WSes — `peer list` from inside a launched session sees the remaining 5 peers but not its own siblings until they re-register. | Same as 1.29.0 registry. The registry could persist to sqlite later; for v1, accepted. |
+| Broker schema cost: every new presence row has a different `session_pubkey`, growing the table faster. | Already accepted — broker prunes disconnected rows on a 30-day window. Per-session keys triple the row count at peak but stay within the prune budget. |
+
+## Compatibility
+
+- **Older brokers** can't validate `session_hello`. Sessions will
+  attempt the new hello, get back `unknown_message_type`, and fall
+  back to the existing member-keyed hello (no per-session presence,
+  but everything still works as 1.28.0). Add the broker change first,
+  let it deploy, then ship the CLI side.
+- **Older CLIs** continue to work unchanged — they don't open
+  per-session WSes. They appear as ephemeral cold-path rows just like
+  today, and lose the symmetric-visibility property between siblings.
+- **Backward visible:** users on 1.30.0+ on the same mesh as users on
+  ≤1.29.x will see the older users as one row (their daemon) instead
+  of one row per session. Acceptable — opt-in to the new visibility
+  by upgrading.
+
+## Sequencing
+
+1. **Broker change ships first.** Add `session_hello` handler, deploy,
+   bake for ~24h. No CLI behaviour change yet.
+2. **Daemon `SessionBrokerClient` ships next** behind a feature flag
+   (`CLAUDEMESH_SESSION_PRESENCE=1`). Manually test with two launched
+   sessions in the same cwd; verify both see each other.
+3. **CLI keypair-mint + attestation in `launch.ts` ships last**, behind
+   the same flag.
+4. Flip the flag default in 1.30.0 release; document rollback via env.
+
+## Verification
+
+End-to-end smoke (paste into 1.30.0's CHANGELOG):
+
+```
+$ # In two different shells, both cd ~/Desktop/foo:
+$ claudemesh launch --name SessionA -y    # shell 1
+$ claudemesh launch --name SessionB -y    # shell 2
+$
+$ # In a third shell:
+$ claudemesh peer list --json --mesh foo | jq '.[] | {n: .displayName, c: .cwd}'
+{ "n": "SessionA", "c": "/.../foo" }    ← persistent, not query-induced
+{ "n": "SessionB", "c": "/.../foo" }
+$
+$ # In SessionA's shell:
+$ claudemesh peer list --mesh foo
+should include SessionB.
+$
+$ # Kill SessionB (Ctrl-C in shell 2). Wait <30s.
+$ claudemesh peer list --mesh foo
+should NOT include SessionB (reaper closed its WS).
+```
+
+## Open questions
+
+- Should the per-session WS also drain *its own* outbox subset, or stay
+  presence-only? Recommend presence-only for v1 — keeps state machines
+  simple, daemon's member-keyed WS handles all sends. Can be revisited
+  when per-session policy DSL ships.
+- Should the parent attestation be revocable mid-session? Could add an
+  IPC route on the daemon. Out of scope for v1; revoke = drop the
+  whole member enrollment.

.artifacts/specs/2026-05-04-session-capabilities.md

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+# Session capabilities — first-class concept
+
+**Status:** spec, queued behind v0.3.0 topic-encryption work.
+**Owner:** alezmad
+**Author:** Claude (Sprint B follow-up, 2026-05-04)
+**Related:** `2026-04-15-per-peer-capabilities.md` (existing per-peer
+caps system, member-keyed), `2026-05-04-per-session-presence.md`
+(per-launch session presence — what we're now restricting).
+
+## Problem
+
+Per-peer capability grants (`apps/broker/src/index.ts:2178+, 2309+`)
+are keyed on the sender's **stable member pubkey**. The grant model
+gives the recipient fine-grained control: "alice can DM me",
+"bob can read state but not broadcast", etc.
+
+But: as of v1.30.0 (`per-session-presence`), every `claudemesh
+launch` mints a per-launch ephemeral keypair with a parent attestation
+binding it to the member identity. The launched session inherits **all**
+the member's capabilities transitively, because cap enforcement always
+falls through to the member key.
+
+Concretely:
+
+- Member `alice` is in mesh `flexicar`, granted `dm + state-read +
+  state-write` by everyone.
+- Alice launches a session with `claudemesh launch` to do an automated
+  task — say, run a Claude Code agent that iterates over PRs.
+- That session has full member privileges. It can DM peers, write
+  shared state keys (e.g. clobber `current-pr`), grant new caps, ban
+  members, etc. — none of which the user wanted to delegate.
+
+There is no way to express "this session can DM peers but cannot
+deploy services or grant caps." The parent attestation is a binary
+existence proof — "this session was vouched by a member" — with no
+capability subset.
+
+Plus an adjacent footgun: `set_state` (`apps/broker/src/index.ts:2949`)
+has **no cap check at all**. Anyone in the mesh can write any key. The
+spec at `2026-04-15-per-peer-capabilities.md` lists `state-write` as a
+planned cap but it was never wired into the broker. Shared keys like
+`current-pr` are write-anyone today.
+
+## Goal
+
+A launched session can be issued **a capability subset** of its
+parent member, signed by the parent at launch time, and the broker
+enforces the **intersection** of recipient grants × session caps on
+every protected operation.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Changing the existing per-peer cap model. Member-keyed grants stay
+  authoritative for "who is allowed to talk to me."
+- Cross-machine session caps (waiting on 2.0.0 HKDF identity).
+- Per-tool granularity inside the Claude Code MCP surface — this
+  spec only covers the broker-enforceable verbs (dm, broadcast,
+  state-read, state-write, grant, kick, ban, profile-write,
+  service-deploy).
+- Delegation: a session cannot re-vouch a sub-session with its own
+  cap subset. Only members can attest sessions. (Could be lifted in
+  a future spec; today's launch flow doesn't need it.)
+
+## Design
+
+### Capability vocabulary
+
+Existing (today, member-level):
+
+| Capability    | Effect when GRANTED on a recipient → sender pair  |
+|---------------|---------------------------------------------------|
+| `read`        | Sender appears in recipient's `list_peers`        |
+| `dm`          | Sender can DM recipient                           |
+| `broadcast`   | Sender's broadcasts reach recipient               |
+| `state-read`  | Sender can read shared state                      |
+| `state-write` | (planned) Sender can write shared state          |
+| `file-read`   | Sender can fetch files recipient shared           |
+
+New (session-level — cap subset on the attestation):
+
+These are the **verbs the session is allowed to invoke**, NOT what
+peers can do TO it. A session attestation declaring `["dm", "read"]`
+means the session can SEND dm/read-list operations; it cannot
+broadcast, write state, grant, etc.
+
+| Session cap       | Gates which broker operations                  |
+|-------------------|------------------------------------------------|
+| `dm`              | `send` with single recipient                   |
+| `broadcast`       | `send` with `*`, `@group`, `#topic`            |
+| `state-read`      | `get_state`, `list_state`                      |
+| `state-write`     | `set_state`                                    |
+| `grant`           | `grant`, `revoke`, `block`                     |
+| `kick`            | `kick`, `disconnect`                           |
+| `ban`             | `ban`, `unban`                                 |
+| `profile-write`   | `set_profile`, `set_summary`, `set_status`     |
+| `service-deploy`  | `mesh_service_register`, `_unregister`         |
+
+The default cap set when no subset is declared: the **full member
+set** (today's behavior — opt-in restriction, not breaking).
+
+### Attestation v2
+
+Existing v1 (`apps/cli/src/services/broker/session-hello-sig.ts`):
+
+```
+canonical = `claudemesh-session-attest|<parent>|<session>|<expires>`
+```
+
+New v2 (additive — broker accepts both):
+
+```
+canonical = `claudemesh-session-attest-v2|<parent>|<session>|<expires>|<sorted-caps-csv>`
+```
+
+Where `<sorted-caps-csv>` is the lower-cased, comma-joined,
+ASCII-sorted cap list. Empty-list = full member caps (default,
+back-compat).
+
+**Wire shape additions on `session_hello`:**
+
+```ts
+{
+  type: "session_hello",
+  ...existing fields...,
+  parentAttestation: {
+    sessionPubkey,
+    parentMemberPubkey,
+    expiresAt,
+    signature,
+    // NEW:
+    allowed_caps?: string[],  // omitted = full member set
+    version?: 2,              // omitted = v1
+  },
+}
+```
+
+The broker version-detects: `version === 2` → verify v2 canonical
+including `allowed_caps`. Default behavior is unchanged for clients
+that don't pass it.
+
+### Enforcement
+
+Add `allowed_caps: string[] | null` to the in-memory `PeerConn`
+shape (`apps/broker/src/index.ts:131`). Populated from
+`handleSessionHello` (the v2 attestation supplies it) and from
+`handleHello` (control-plane / member connection — set to `null`,
+meaning "full member caps").
+
+**Effective cap check** for a sending peer needing `cap`:
+
+```ts
+function senderHasCap(conn: PeerConn, cap: string): boolean {
+  if (conn.allowed_caps === null) return true; // member-level, no subset
+  return conn.allowed_caps.includes(cap);
+}
+```
+
+Wire this into every broker operation in the table above. The
+existing per-peer recipient-cap check at `2178+, 2309+` stays —
+session caps gate the **sender side**, recipient grants gate the
+**receive side**, and both must allow:
+
+```
+allowed = senderHasCap(conn, capNeeded) && recipientGrants[sender][capNeeded]
+```
+
+### `set_state` gate (bonus, ship together)
+
+Today: no cap check. After this spec: `set_state` requires
+`state-write` on the sender side. Migration: existing members
+default to having `state-write` in their member caps (no recipient
+grant model for state-write — it's a sender-side gate only, mesh-
+wide). New attestations can omit it to forbid the session.
+
+The recipient-side analog (per-peer state-write grants) is left for
+a future spec — today the value of guarding state-write is
+session-level (avoid an automated session clobbering shared keys),
+not peer-level.
+
+### CLI surface
+
+```
+claudemesh launch --caps dm,read         # tight: read-only chat agent
+claudemesh launch --caps dm,broadcast    # send-only, no state writes
+claudemesh launch                        # default: full member caps
+```
+
+`claudemesh launch --caps ?` prints the table above with descriptions.
+
+`claudemesh peer list --json` includes `allowed_caps` per row when
+present (`null` = full member). Lets users audit what their running
+sessions can actually do.
+
+### Migration plan (mirrors `2026-04-15-per-peer-capabilities.md` §"Migration plan")
+
+1. **Broker schema additive** — `PeerConn.allowed_caps` in-memory
+   only; no DB column. Reload-on-reconnect is fine because the
+   attestation is re-sent on every WS open (it's the proof of
+   identity).
+
+2. **CLI ships v2 attestation alongside v1.** New `--caps` flag
+   defaults to omitted (= v1 attestation, full caps). Older
+   brokers ignore the new fields entirely.
+
+3. **Broker accepts v2.** When `allowed_caps` arrives, store it.
+   No enforcement yet — log denied operations as `cap_check_dryrun`
+   metric counter, still allow them through.
+
+4. **Dry-run release.** Ship one CLI + broker release that emits
+   the metric but doesn't enforce. Watch for false positives in
+   real meshes for ≥ 1 week.
+
+5. **Flip enforcement on.** Broker rejects operations failing the
+   cap check with `forbidden: missing session capability "<cap>"`.
+   Default ("no caps declared = full member") keeps existing
+   sessions unaffected.
+
+6. **`set_state` gate** ships in step 5 alongside the rest. Default
+   member caps include `state-write`, so flipping it on doesn't
+   break existing flows. Only sessions that explicitly omit
+   `state-write` from `--caps` lose write access.
+
+### Crypto notes
+
+- v2 attestation re-uses `crypto_sign_detached` over the new
+  canonical string; same parent member secret key, same TTL caps
+  (≤24 h), same `expiresAt` semantics.
+- v1 signatures are NOT v2 signatures — collision is impossible
+  because the canonical strings have different prefixes
+  (`claudemesh-session-attest` vs `claudemesh-session-attest-v2`).
+  Domain separation is intrinsic.
+- Like the existing per-peer cap system: caps are server-enforced
+  metadata, not capability tokens. A malicious broker can ignore
+  them. This is about UX trust + footgun prevention, not protocol-
+  level security.
+
+## Open questions
+
+1. **Should the session attestation also bind to a fingerprint of
+   the launched binary / Claude version?** Would let a member say
+   "this session is constrained to Claude Code v1.34.15" so a
+   compromised launched-binary doesn't get reused. Probably no — too
+   much friction for the threat model.
+
+2. **What's the right default for `claudemesh launch` going forward?**
+   Once enforcement ships, do we change the default `--caps` from
+   "full member" to "dm + read + state-read"? Tighter but breaks
+   existing automation that writes state. Probably worth a one-
+   release deprecation warning ("your session will lose state-write
+   in v2.0.0 unless you pass --caps state-write") and then flip in
+   v2.0.0.
+
+3. **Does `--caps` belong in `~/.claudemesh/config.json` per-mesh
+   defaults too?** A user who always launches read-only agents
+   wants `caps: ["dm", "read"]` as a personal default. Easy add;
+   defer until users ask for it.
+
+4. **Per-tool MCP cap surface?** Out of scope here, but: a `claudemesh
+   launch --tools peer:read,memory:write` would be a finer cut than
+   broker-verb caps. The broker can't enforce that — it'd live in the
+   MCP wrapper / Claude Code's allowedTools. Different layer.
+
+## Test plan
+
+- Pure-logic tests on `senderHasCap` (member-level → always true,
+  empty caps → always false, declared caps → exact match).
+- Broker integration: launch a session with `--caps dm`, attempt
+  `set_state` → expect `forbidden: missing session capability
+  "state-write"`.
+- v1 attestation still accepted, no `allowed_caps` set, all caps
+  permitted (back-compat).
+- v2 attestation with empty `allowed_caps` array → broker treats
+  as "explicitly empty, no caps allowed" (NOT "full member"). The
+  full-member default is "field omitted entirely". Test both.
+- Dry-run mode: cap fail increments the counter but the operation
+  proceeds. Smoke-test before flipping enforcement.
+
+## Estimate
+
+- Spec review + open-question resolution: 1–2 days.
+- Broker change (PeerConn field, attestation v2 accept, per-verb
+  enforcement, dry-run mode): 2–3 days.
+- CLI change (`--caps` flag, attestation builder, peer list
+  surface): 1 day.
+- Tests: 1 day.
+- Dry-run release window: ≥ 1 week.
+
+Total: ~1 sprint of focused work, plus a dry-run window.

.artifacts/specs/2026-05-04-v2-roadmap-completion.md

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+# v2.0.0 Daemon Redesign — Completion Roadmap
+
+**Date:** 2026-05-04
+**Owner:** alezmad
+**Status:** in-progress (1.24.0 + 1.25.0 land most of it; remainder is two follow-up arcs)
+
+## What's done
+
+| v2.0.0 bullet | Version | Status |
+|---|---|---|
+| `claudemesh-daemon` long-lived launchd / systemd unit | 1.22.0 | ✅ Done |
+| MCP server shrinks to thin daemon adapter | 1.24.0 | ✅ Done — 979 → ~200 LoC of push-pipe, daemon-required, no fallback |
+| `claudemesh install` auto-installs + starts daemon | 1.24.0 | ✅ Done |
+| `claudemesh launch` ensures daemon | 1.24.0 | ✅ Done |
+| Daemon outbound routing (Sprint 4: real targets + crypto) | 1.25.0 | ✅ Done — outbox stores `mesh`, `target_spec`, `nonce`, `ciphertext`, `priority`; resolution + `crypto_box` happens at IPC accept time; drain is a forwarder |
+| CLI thin-client routing for read verbs | 1.25.0 | ✅ Partial — `peer list`, `skill list/get` route through daemon when present; same `trySendViaDaemon` fallback shape |
+| Ambient mode (raw `claude` Just Works) | 1.25.0 | ✅ Documented + functional for the daemon's attached mesh |
+
+## What remains (in dependency order)
+
+### A. Daemon multi-mesh (the prerequisite for "ambient mode for everything")
+
+**Why it's the critical path:** ambient mode today only works for the single mesh the daemon is attached to. Users with N meshes either run N daemons (different sock paths) or restart the daemon to switch. Neither is acceptable for the v2.0.0 promise.
+
+**What it takes:**
+- Daemon holds `Map<slug, DaemonBrokerClient>` instead of one broker.
+- Outbox row's `mesh` column (1.25.0 added) is the dispatch key.
+- IPC `/v1/send` requires `mesh` field (or infers from target prefix `<slug>:<target>`).
+- IPC read endpoints (`/v1/peers`, `/v1/skills`, `/v1/profile`) accept `?mesh=<slug>` or return mesh-grouped results.
+- SSE event payloads already include `mesh` slug; no change needed.
+- Drain worker selects broker by row's `mesh` column.
+- `daemon up` with no `--mesh` attaches to all joined meshes; with `--mesh X` restricts to X (legacy mode for explicit single-mesh).
+- Inbox dedupe keeps using `client_message_id` UNIQUE; mesh column for filtering only.
+
+**Estimated effort:** 1 week. ~600 LoC across `run.ts`, `drain.ts`, `ipc/server.ts`, plus tests for per-mesh dispatch.
+
+**Risk:** medium. The single-mesh assumption is baked into a few places (peer-list response shape, skill-list response shape). Need to choose: per-mesh tagged responses (breaking) or array-of-meshes wrapped responses (additive). Recommend the latter for back-compat.
+
+### B. HKDF-derived peer keypairs (cross-machine identity)
+
+**Why it matters:** today each install per machine = fresh keypair = different mesh member identity. User signs in on laptop and desktop and shows up as two different members. v2.0.0 promised "same identity across machines."
+
+**What it takes:**
+- `HKDF(account_secret, info: "claudemesh/mesh/<mesh_id>/peer", salt: <user_id>)` derives a deterministic ed25519 keypair per mesh.
+- `account_secret` derives from the user's authenticated session — needs broker-side endpoint to vend it on first install.
+- Enrollment flow changes: instead of generating a fresh keypair, derive it. Subsequent installs find the same pubkey already in `mesh.member` and skip enrollment.
+- Migration: existing members keep their old keypairs (they're stored in config). Only new joins use HKDF. Optional: opt-in re-enrollment for users who want cross-machine sync.
+- Broker hello-sig protocol unchanged (still ed25519 sign).
+
+**Estimated effort:** 2-3 weeks. Touches enrollment, broker auth, dashboard, security review.
+
+**Risk:** high. Crypto change with security implications. Needs design review (account_secret distribution security, HKDF salt choice, key compromise recovery story).
+
+### C. Mesh → workspace public surface rename
+
+**Why it matters:** "mesh" is internal jargon for what users experience as "a workspace." v2.0.0 calls for the rename to align UX language.
+
+**What it takes:**
+- All CLI verbs gain `workspace` aliases (`claudemesh workspace list` ≡ `claudemesh list`).
+- Help text, docs, README, marketing site updated.
+- DB tables stay `mesh_*` (migration cost prohibitive; not user-visible).
+- Wire protocol stays `mesh_*` (broker change too disruptive).
+- Eventually deprecate the `mesh` aliases (~2 minor versions later).
+
+**Estimated effort:** 3-4 days. Mostly rote search/replace + new aliases.
+
+**Risk:** low. Cosmetic.
+
+### D. Full CLI-to-thin-client conversion
+
+**Why it matters:** today the CLI has bridge + cold-path code that duplicates ~3000 LoC of broker WS / crypto / decode logic that the daemon also has. Once daemon is multi-mesh, every verb can become "open IPC, send request, render response."
+
+**What it takes:**
+- Each verb: replace `withMesh(...)` (which opens its own broker WS) with `daemonOnly(...)` (calls IPC, errors if daemon down).
+- Drop `bridge/server.ts`, `bridge/client.ts`, `bridge/socket-broker.ts` entirely.
+- Drop most of `services/broker/ws-client.ts` from the CLI build (kept only for daemon's internal use).
+- CLI binary shrinks ~30-40%.
+- Daemon becomes the only broker WS holder per user.
+
+**Estimated effort:** 1 week. Mostly mechanical; strict typescript catches most issues.
+
+**Risk:** medium. Breaks workflows where CLI is used without daemon (CI environments, headless scripts). Need to keep a `--no-daemon` escape hatch or document the constraint.
+
+## Recommended sequencing
+
+```
+1.25.0 (today): Sprint 4 outbound routing + CLI thin-client read paths + ambient mode docs
+1.26.0 (next): A. Daemon multi-mesh — "ambient mode for everything"
+1.27.0:        D. CLI-to-thin-client conversion — drops ~3000 LoC
+1.28.0:        C. Mesh → workspace rename (aliases shipped, no removal yet)
+2.0.0:         B. HKDF identity (separate security-reviewed arc)
+```
+
+A → D → C → B is the right order:
+- A unblocks ambient mode for multi-mesh users (highest UX value).
+- D unblocks the LoC reduction the v2.0.0 promise mentioned ("3000 LoC removed").
+- C is cosmetic; do it once D has stabilized.
+- B is the most security-sensitive; do it last, with proper review.
+
+## Out of scope for the v2.0.0 endpoint
+
+- **Topic crypto (Sprint 5+).** Topics still ship as base64 plaintext. Real per-topic encryption is a v0.3.0 operator-layer item, parallel track.
+- **Broker hardening for daemon idempotency (Sprint 7).** Partial unique index on `(mesh_id, client_message_id) WHERE NOT NULL` and the `mesh.client_message_dedupe` table. Documented in `2026-05-03-daemon-spec-broker-hardening-followups.md`.
+- **`launch` deprecation.** 1.25.0 docs now recommend ambient mode for default cases; `launch` stays as the override path. Full deprecation is a 2.x decision.

.artifacts/specs/2026-05-05-continuous-presence.md

@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+# Continuous presence — lease model + resume token
+
+**Status:** spec, ready for v0.3.0.
+**Owner:** alezmad
+**Author:** Claude (2026-05-05, follow-up to user-reported "after hours claudemesh disconnects")
+**Related:** `2026-05-04-per-session-presence.md` (per-launch ephemeral keypair), `apps/broker/src/index.ts:5430-5436` (current 30s ping loop), `apps/cli/src/daemon/ws-lifecycle.ts` (current backoff reconnect).
+
+## Problem
+
+Today, presence is fused to a single TCP/WS connection. When the
+connection breaks — half-dead NAT entries, ISP route changes, laptop
+sleep, broker restart — the broker tears down the presence row, fires
+`peer_left`, and waits for the daemon to dial a fresh socket and run
+the full attestation hello again. Other peers see the user blink
+offline → back online. Messages sent to the session during the gap are
+either dropped (if it's a `now`/`next` priority DM with no recipient
+match) or held in `message_queue` for `low` only.
+
+Concrete symptom (user-reported): `claudemesh peer list` shows zero
+peers despite multiple sessions being "up" — they're stuck on
+half-dead TCP connections. Daemon hasn't noticed because no `close`
+fired. Hours later, kernel TCP keepalive (default Linux: 7200s idle +
+9 × 75s probes ≈ 2h11m) finally RSTs the socket, daemon's existing
+backoff reconnects, peers reappear. Until then: zombie session.
+
+Two coupled bugs:
+
+1. **No application-layer staleness detection.** Broker pings every
+   30s (line 5431) and updates `lastPingAt` on pong, but never
+   `terminate()`s a connection that stops returning pongs. Daemon
+   doesn't ping at all. Both sides trust the kernel for liveness,
+   which only fires after hours.
+
+2. **Presence == connection.** Even once the staleness IS detected
+   and the daemon reconnects, peers see a full `peer_left` /
+   `peer_joined` cycle for a network blip that took 1–30 seconds.
+   Outbound messages during the gap that target the session by
+   pubkey route to nothing.
+
+The user's ask: peers should never see a gap during transient
+disconnects. Presence should be continuous as long as the *session
+intent* is alive, regardless of how many sockets carried it.
+
+## Goal
+
+Presence is a **lease** keyed off the session's stable identity
+(`sessionPubkey`), held in broker memory + DB, with a TTL refreshed
+on every keepalive. Sockets come and go beneath the lease. Other peers
+see continuous online status across reconnects up to the lease TTL.
+
+Specifically:
+
+- A daemon (or per-session WS) can drop and re-establish the WS
+  within a configurable grace window (default 90s) without any peer
+  observing `peer_left` / `peer_joined`.
+- Messages sent to a session while its socket is mid-flap are queued,
+  delivered on the next reattach, ordered.
+- Reconnect itself is sub-second on the wire when a `resume_token` is
+  presented — broker recognises the session, restores the slot, no
+  re-attestation round-trip.
+- After the grace window expires, the broker fires `peer_left`
+  exactly once; on a later reconnect it fires `peer_joined` exactly
+  once. No flapping.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- **Multi-broker handoff.** Out of scope. If the broker process
+  restarts, leases are lost and we fall back to today's behavior
+  (clean reconnect, peers see one cycle). A future spec can address
+  this with a shared lease store (Redis / Postgres LISTEN).
+- **Dual-socket on the daemon.** Useful gold-plating but not required
+  for the user-facing problem. Single-socket with watchdog +
+  resume-token covers the failure modes actually observed (NAT drops,
+  ISP blips, sleep <90s).
+- **Manual `claudemesh reconnect` CLI.** Not needed; the lease model
+  makes it redundant. Re-evaluate if real support cases surface.
+
+## Design
+
+### Lease model
+
+```
+sessionPubkey  →  { transport: "online" | "offline",
+                    leaseUntil: Date,
+                    ws: WebSocket | null,
+                    ...existing PeerConn fields }
+```
+
+Today the `connections` Map IS keyed by `presenceId`, which is a fresh
+UUID per WS. We change that key to `sessionPubkey` (member-WS:
+`memberPubkey`; session-WS: `sessionPubkey`). The PeerConn struct
+gains:
+
+```ts
+transport: "online" | "offline";
+leaseUntil: Date;          // Date.now() + LEASE_TTL_MS
+evictionTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null;
+```
+
+### State transitions
+
+**On WS open + hello accepted (initial):**
+- Insert into `connections` with `transport: "online"`,
+  `leaseUntil: now + 90s`, `evictionTimer: null`.
+- Broadcast `peer_joined` (today's behavior).
+- Issue `resume_token` (see below) in the `hello_ack`.
+
+**On WS open + hello carries valid `resume_token`:**
+- Look up by `sessionPubkey`, verify token signature + freshness
+  (TTL <= LEASE_TTL_MS). If valid AND entry exists with
+  `transport: "offline"`:
+  - Cancel `evictionTimer`.
+  - Swap `ws` reference.
+  - Set `transport: "online"`, refresh `leaseUntil`.
+  - **Do NOT** broadcast `peer_joined`. The lease never expired.
+  - Drain any queued DMs accumulated during offline window.
+  - Reply `hello_ack` with new `resume_token`.
+- If entry exists with `transport: "online"` (token replay attack or
+  rapid reconnect race): close old `ws` with `1000, "session_replaced"`
+  before swapping. Same as today's `oldConn.ws.close(1000, ...)`
+  pattern at lines 1768/1996.
+- If no entry exists or token is stale: treat as a fresh hello,
+  broadcast `peer_joined`. Token expired = same as a cold start.
+
+**On WS close (any reason):**
+- Look up by `sessionPubkey`. If not found, no-op (already evicted).
+- Set `transport: "offline"`, clear `ws` reference.
+- Start `evictionTimer = setTimeout(evict, GRACE_MS)`.
+- **Do NOT** broadcast `peer_left`. **Do NOT** delete the entry.
+- **Do NOT** call `disconnectPresence(presenceId)` yet.
+
+**On `evictionTimer` fire (lease expired without reattach):**
+- Delete from `connections`.
+- Broadcast `peer_left` (today's behavior at lines 5167-5189).
+- `decMeshCount`.
+- `disconnectPresence(presenceId)`.
+- Clean up URL watches, stream subs, MCP registry — same as today's
+  close handler.
+- Audit `peer_left`.
+
+**Watchdog (broker):**
+- The 30s ping loop (line 5431) gains a staleness check: if any
+  conn's `transport === "online"` and `lastPingAt < now - 75s`, call
+  `ws.terminate()`. This converts the half-dead socket into a clean
+  `close` event, which fires the lease-offline transition above.
+- Same logic on the daemon side (see § Daemon changes).
+
+### Resume token
+
+A short opaque string the broker hands the daemon in `hello_ack`.
+Format: `mesh-resume.v1.<base64url(JSON-payload)>.<base64url(sig)>`
+where `JSON-payload = { sub: <sessionPubkey>, mid: <meshId>, exp:
+<unix-ms>, iat: <unix-ms> }` and `sig = ed25519(brokerSigningKey,
+JSON-payload)`.
+
+- **Why a token, not just sessionPubkey?** A session needs to prove
+  it's the holder of an existing lease without re-running the full
+  attestation handshake (which involves member key + parent
+  attestation lookup). The token is a server-issued cookie: cheap to
+  verify, scoped to a single session, expires with the lease.
+- **Storage:** broker keeps the signing key in env (`RESUME_TOKEN_KEY`,
+  generated on first boot if missing, persisted to a config row). No
+  DB column needed for the tokens themselves — they're verified by
+  signature alone.
+- **TTL:** equal to LEASE_TTL_MS (90s). After that the daemon must
+  re-handshake with full attestation. Refreshed on every successful
+  reattach.
+- **Daemon storage:** in-memory only. Lost on daemon restart, which
+  is correct: a daemon restart is a real reconnect and should run
+  the full hello.
+
+### Wire protocol additions
+
+`hello` (member-WS, session-WS, fresh-launch hello — all three):
+```diff
+{
+  type: "hello",
+  memberPubkey: "...",
+  sessionPubkey: "...",         // session-WS only
+  attestation: "...",            // session-WS only
+  signature: "...",
++ resumeToken?: "mesh-resume.v1...",   // optional; presence = reattach attempt
+  ...
+}
+```
+
+`hello_ack`:
+```diff
+{
+  type: "hello_ack",
+  presenceId: "...",
+  ...
++ resumeToken: "mesh-resume.v1...",   // always issued; replaces prior on reattach
++ leaseTtlMs: 90000,                  // informational; daemon may use for ping cadence
+}
+```
+
+No new message types. Old daemons that don't send `resumeToken` get
+today's full-handshake behavior — fully backward compatible.
+
+### Message queue during grace window
+
+Today: DMs to a presence whose WS is closed → routed to
+`message_queue` only for `priority: low`; `now`/`next` either route
+to a different connected session of the same member or drop.
+
+Change: when broker would route to a session whose
+`transport === "offline"` (lease still valid), enqueue regardless of
+priority. On reattach, the existing inbox-drain path
+(`maybePushQueuedMessages` at line 967) flushes them in order. The
+`message_queue` already has the schema for this; we're just relaxing
+the priority gate when the target is in grace.
+
+### Constants
+
+```ts
+const LEASE_TTL_MS = 90_000;          // grace window after WS close
+const PING_INTERVAL_MS = 30_000;      // unchanged
+const STALE_PONG_THRESHOLD_MS = 75_000; // 2.5x ping interval
+const RESUME_TOKEN_TTL_MS = LEASE_TTL_MS;
+```
+
+`LEASE_TTL_MS` = 90s rationale: long enough to absorb a sleep/resume
+cycle, NAT timeout, ISP route flap, mobile→wifi handover. Short
+enough that a true crash (daemon killed, machine off) clears the
+session within 90s — peers don't see ghost online status forever.
+Configurable via env (`LEASE_TTL_MS`) for self-hosted brokers.
+
+## Daemon changes
+
+### Watchdog
+
+In `ws-lifecycle.ts`, add an `idleWatchdog` parallel to the existing
+backoff/reconnect machinery:
+
+```ts
+let lastActivity = Date.now();   // bumped on every incoming message + pong
+const watchdog = setInterval(() => {
+  if (Date.now() - lastActivity > STALE_THRESHOLD_MS) {
+    log("warn", "ws_stale_terminate", { url: opts.url });
+    sock.terminate();   // fires existing close handler → reconnect path
+  } else if (sock.readyState === sock.OPEN) {
+    sock.ping();        // matches broker's 30s cadence, gives broker a pong
+  }
+}, PING_INTERVAL_MS);
+sock.on("message", () => { lastActivity = Date.now(); });
+sock.on("pong", () => { lastActivity = Date.now(); });
+```
+
+Cleanup `clearInterval(watchdog)` in the close handler and explicit
+`close()` path.
+
+### Resume token in hello
+
+`apps/cli/src/daemon/broker.ts:136` and equivalent in
+`session-broker.ts`: persist the `resumeToken` from each successful
+`hello_ack` into a private field, include it in the next
+`buildHello()` call. On daemon restart the field is empty → cold
+start, exactly today's behavior.
+
+### No CLI changes
+
+`claudemesh peer list` keeps reading the broker's `connections` Map
+which now reflects continuous presence. Users see online sessions as
+online during transient blips. No UX surface changes.
+
+## Migration
+
+- New broker is fully backward compatible with old daemons (resume
+  token is optional, defaults fall through to today's path).
+- New daemons against an old broker: token is sent but ignored, full
+  handshake runs each reconnect — same as today.
+- DB migration: none. `presence` table semantics unchanged. The
+  `disconnectedAt` column is now set only on lease eviction (>90s),
+  not on every WS close. This is a behavioral change but not a
+  schema change.
+- Add ENV var `RESUME_TOKEN_KEY` (broker generates on first boot if
+  unset, persists to a singleton config row).
+
+## Test plan
+
+1. **Sleep test:** kill -STOP the daemon for 60s, then kill -CONT.
+   Expect: peers never see `peer_left`. Daemon's WS is dead-on-arrival
+   when it wakes; watchdog terminates it; reconnect with resume_token
+   succeeds within 1-2s; lease was at ~30s of its 90s TTL when the
+   daemon resumed.
+
+2. **Hard offline:** kill -STOP for 120s, kill -CONT. Expect: peers
+   see exactly one `peer_left` at t=90s, then exactly one
+   `peer_joined` after the daemon resumes and reconnects (resume
+   token is now stale; full handshake runs).
+
+3. **NAT drop simulation:** `iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 443
+   -j DROP` for 60s on the daemon host, then remove the rule. Expect:
+   broker pings stop landing, broker-side watchdog calls
+   `ws.terminate()` at t=75s, lease enters grace, daemon's own
+   watchdog fires within ~30s, daemon reconnects with resume_token,
+   peers never see a flap.
+
+4. **Message-during-grace:** while a target session is in grace
+   (offline, lease valid), send a `priority: now` DM. Expect: queued
+   in `message_queue`, delivered exactly once on reattach, no
+   `peer_left` visible to sender, ack returns delivered.
+
+5. **Replay attack:** capture a resume_token in flight, replay it
+   against a different broker connection while the original session
+   is still online. Expect: broker treats it as a reconnect for an
+   already-online session → closes old WS with `session_replaced`,
+   new WS takes over. Equivalent to today's session-replacement
+   semantics; the original session detects the close and either
+   reconnects (if it's still alive) or gives up.
+
+6. **Token forgery:** send a `resumeToken` not signed by the broker.
+   Expect: signature check fails, broker treats hello as a fresh
+   handshake (or rejects if the rest of the hello is invalid).
+
+## Open questions
+
+- **Should `peer list` expose a `transport` field** so callers can
+  distinguish "leased but offline" from "online"? Default no — the
+  abstraction we're selling is "they're online." But debugging may
+  want it; gate it behind `--all` or `--debug`.
+- **What about the broker-side `mcpRegistry` cleanup?** Today we
+  delete non-persistent MCP entries on WS close (line 5217). With
+  leases, we should defer that to lease eviction, not WS close.
+  Otherwise an MCP server registered by a session disappears every
+  time its WS reconnects.
+
+## Build order
+
+1. **Broker lease model** — change `connections` keying, add
+   `transport`/`leaseUntil`/`evictionTimer`, refactor close handler
+   to start grace timer instead of immediate teardown, refactor
+   eviction path. (~80 lines.)
+2. **Resume token** — signing key bootstrap, token issue/verify,
+   wire format, hello_ack changes. (~50 lines + 1 config row.)
+3. **Daemon watchdog** — `ws-lifecycle.ts` adds `idleWatchdog` and
+   stores `resumeToken` from acks. (~25 lines.)
+4. **Daemon hello** — pass `resumeToken` in next `buildHello()`.
+   (~10 lines across `broker.ts` + `session-broker.ts`.)
+5. **Broker watchdog** — extend the 30s ping loop with
+   `terminate()`-on-stale logic. (~15 lines.)
+6. **Queue-during-grace** — relax priority gate in DM routing.
+   (~5 lines.)
+7. **Spec docs** — update `docs/protocol.md` with resume_token,
+   lease semantics. (~30 lines.)
+8. **Tests** — six scenarios above. Likely ~3 new test files.
+
+Estimated total: one focused day. The broker lease model is the load-
+bearing change; everything else slots in cleanly once that's done.

apps/broker/src/broker.ts

@@ -369,8 +369,19 @@ export interface ConnectParams {
   pid: number;
   cwd: string;
   groups?: Array<{ name: string; role?: string }>;
+  /**
+   * v2 agentic-comms (M1) — connection role.
+   *  'control-plane' — daemon WS (hidden from user-facing peer lists).
+   *  'session'       — per-Claude-Code-session WS (default).
+   *  'service'       — autonomous bots/services attached to the mesh.
+   * Optional for backwards compatibility; defaults to 'session'.
+   */
+  role?: PresenceRole;
 }
 
+/** v2 agentic-comms (M1): typed connection roles. */
+export type PresenceRole = "control-plane" | "session" | "service";
+
 /** Create a presence row for a new WS connection. */
 export async function connectPresence(
   params: ConnectParams,
@@ -389,6 +400,7 @@ export async function connectPresence(
       statusSource: "jsonl",
       statusUpdatedAt: now,
       groups: params.groups ?? [],
+      role: params.role ?? "session",
       connectedAt: now,
       lastPingAt: now,
     })
@@ -415,6 +427,21 @@ export async function heartbeat(presenceId: string): Promise<void> {
     .where(eq(presence.id, presenceId));
 }
 
+/**
+ * Restore a presence row to online state on lease reattach: clear
+ * `disconnectedAt` and bump `lastPingAt`. Needed because the DB-level
+ * stale-presence sweeper may have flipped the row to disconnected
+ * during the grace window — the lease is in-memory truth, but other
+ * code paths read presence.disconnectedAt directly.
+ */
+export async function restorePresence(presenceId: string): Promise<void> {
+  const now = new Date();
+  await db
+    .update(presence)
+    .set({ disconnectedAt: null, lastPingAt: now })
+    .where(eq(presence.id, presenceId));
+}
+
 // --- Peer discovery ---
 
 /** Return all active (connected) presences in a mesh, joined with member info. */
@@ -431,6 +458,11 @@ export async function listPeersInMesh(
     sessionId: string;
     cwd: string;
     connectedAt: Date;
+    /** v2 agentic-comms (M1): connection role. CLI uses this to hide
+     *  control-plane daemons from user-facing lists. Wire-level field
+     *  is `peerRole` to avoid collision with 1.31.5's top-level `role`
+     *  lift of profile.role (user-supplied string like "lead"). */
+    peerRole: PresenceRole;
   }>
 > {
   const rows = await db
@@ -445,6 +477,7 @@ export async function listPeersInMesh(
       sessionId: presence.sessionId,
       cwd: presence.cwd,
       connectedAt: presence.connectedAt,
+      peerRole: presence.role,
     })
     .from(presence)
     .innerJoin(memberTable, eq(presence.memberId, memberTable.id))
@@ -469,6 +502,7 @@ export async function listPeersInMesh(
     sessionId: r.sessionId,
     cwd: r.cwd,
     connectedAt: r.connectedAt,
+    peerRole: (r.peerRole ?? "session") as PresenceRole,
   }));
 }
 
@@ -1013,7 +1047,7 @@ export async function topicHistory(args: {
     ORDER BY tm.created_at DESC, tm.id DESC
     LIMIT ${limit}
   `);
-  const rows = (result.rows ?? result) as Array<{
+  const rows = ((result as unknown as { rows?: unknown[] }).rows ?? (result as unknown as unknown[])) as Array<{
     id: string;
     sender_member_id: string;
     sender_pubkey: string;
@@ -1442,7 +1476,7 @@ export async function recallMemory(
     ORDER BY ts_rank(search_vector, plainto_tsquery('english', ${query})) DESC
     LIMIT 20
   `);
-  const rows = (result.rows ?? result) as Array<{
+  const rows = ((result as unknown as { rows?: unknown[] }).rows ?? (result as unknown as unknown[])) as Array<{
     id: string;
     content: string;
     tags: string[];
@@ -2010,7 +2044,7 @@ export async function getContext(
     ORDER BY updated_at DESC
     LIMIT 20
   `);
-  const rows = (result.rows ?? result) as Array<{
+  const rows = ((result as unknown as { rows?: unknown[] }).rows ?? (result as unknown as unknown[])) as Array<{
     peer_name: string | null;
     summary: string;
     files_read: string[] | null;
@@ -2311,6 +2345,22 @@ function deliverablePriorities(status: PeerStatus): Priority[] {
  * targetSpec routing: matches either the member's pubkey directly or
  * the broadcast wildcard ("*"). Channel/tag resolution is per-mesh
  * config that lives outside this function.
+ *
+ * v2 agentic-comms (M1): two-phase claim/deliver with a 30s lease.
+ *
+ * The legacy implementation set `delivered_at = NOW()` in the same
+ * UPDATE that selected the row. If the recipient WS was no longer
+ * OPEN at push time, the message dropped silently (the row read as
+ * "delivered" so the next reconnect's drain skipped it).
+ *
+ * The new behaviour:
+ *  - claim sets (claimed_at, claim_id, claim_expires_at = NOW() + 30s)
+ *  - delivered_at stays NULL until the recipient acks via `client_ack`
+ *  - re-eligibility predicate accepts rows whose claim has expired,
+ *    so dropped pushes are redelivered (at-least-once)
+ *
+ * `claimerPresenceId` is recorded on the row purely for debugging — it
+ * never gates re-claim; expiry alone does.
  */
 export async function drainForMember(
   meshId: string,
@@ -2320,6 +2370,7 @@ export async function drainForMember(
   sessionPubkey?: string,
   excludeSenderSessionPubkey?: string,
   memberGroups?: string[],
+  claimerPresenceId?: string,
 ): Promise<
   Array<{
     id: string;
@@ -2385,6 +2436,11 @@ export async function drainForMember(
   // (with id as tiebreaker so equal-timestamp rows stay deterministic).
   // Sorting in SQL avoids JS Date's millisecond-precision collapse of
   // Postgres microsecond timestamps.
+  //
+  // v2 (M1): claim sets the lease columns, NOT delivered_at. Re-eligibility
+  // accepts unclaimed rows AND rows with an expired claim (NULL or past
+  // NOW()). delivered_at stays NULL until a `client_ack` lands.
+  const claimerId = claimerPresenceId ?? null;
   const result = await db.execute<{
     id: string;
     priority: string;
@@ -2398,12 +2454,15 @@ export async function drainForMember(
   }>(sql`
     WITH claimed AS (
       UPDATE mesh.message_queue AS mq
-      SET delivered_at = NOW()
+      SET claimed_at = NOW(),
+          claim_id = ${claimerId},
+          claim_expires_at = NOW() + INTERVAL '30 seconds'
       FROM mesh.member AS m
       WHERE mq.id IN (
         SELECT id FROM mesh.message_queue
         WHERE mesh_id = ${meshId}
           AND delivered_at IS NULL
+          AND (claimed_at IS NULL OR claim_expires_at IS NULL OR claim_expires_at < NOW())
           AND priority::text IN (${priorityList})
           AND (target_spec = ${memberPubkey} OR target_spec = '*'${sessionPubkey ? sql` OR target_spec = ${sessionPubkey}` : sql``} OR target_spec IN (${groupTargetList})${topicTargetList ? sql` OR target_spec IN (${topicTargetList})` : sql``})
           ${excludeSenderSessionPubkey ? sql`AND NOT (target_spec IN ('*') AND sender_session_pubkey = ${excludeSenderSessionPubkey})` : sql``}
@@ -2419,7 +2478,7 @@ export async function drainForMember(
     SELECT * FROM claimed ORDER BY created_at ASC, id ASC
   `);
 
-  const rows = (result.rows ?? result) as Array<{
+  const rows = ((result as unknown as { rows?: unknown[] }).rows ?? (result as unknown as unknown[])) as Array<{
     id: string;
     priority: string;
     nonce: string;
@@ -2445,11 +2504,93 @@ export async function drainForMember(
   }));
 }
 
+/**
+ * v2 agentic-comms (M1): mark a message_queue row as delivered.
+ *
+ * Called when the recipient WS replies with a `client_ack` carrying the
+ * original `client_message_id`. Lookup is scoped to (mesh_id, member_id)
+ * so a malicious peer can't ack messages addressed to others. Returns
+ * the number of rows marked (0 = unknown id, already delivered, or wrong
+ * recipient).
+ */
+export async function markDelivered(params: {
+  meshId: string;
+  /** memberId of the WS that's claiming to have received this message. */
+  recipientMemberId: string;
+  recipientMemberPubkey: string;
+  recipientSessionPubkey?: string | null;
+  clientMessageId?: string | null;
+  brokerMessageId?: string | null;
+}): Promise<number> {
+  const {
+    meshId,
+    recipientMemberPubkey,
+    recipientSessionPubkey,
+    clientMessageId,
+    brokerMessageId,
+  } = params;
+  if (!clientMessageId && !brokerMessageId) return 0;
+
+  // Prefer broker id when available; falls back to clientMessageId.
+  // Scope to (mesh_id, target_spec ∈ {member-pubkey, session-pubkey, '*', @group, #topic}).
+  // For minimal blast radius we only allow direct/broadcast acks here —
+  // group/topic acks would need the same membership expansion drainForMember
+  // does and we'd rather under-ack than over-ack (re-claim is cheap).
+  const result = await db.execute<{ id: string }>(sql`
+    UPDATE mesh.message_queue
+    SET delivered_at = NOW()
+    WHERE mesh_id = ${meshId}
+      AND delivered_at IS NULL
+      AND (
+        ${brokerMessageId ? sql`id = ${brokerMessageId}` : sql`FALSE`}
+        OR ${clientMessageId ? sql`client_message_id = ${clientMessageId}` : sql`FALSE`}
+      )
+      AND (
+        target_spec = ${recipientMemberPubkey}
+        ${recipientSessionPubkey ? sql`OR target_spec = ${recipientSessionPubkey}` : sql``}
+        OR target_spec = '*'
+        OR target_spec LIKE '@%'
+        OR target_spec LIKE '#%'
+      )
+    RETURNING id
+  `);
+  const rows = ((result as unknown as { rows?: unknown[] }).rows ?? (result as unknown as unknown[])) as Array<{ id: string }>;
+  return rows.length;
+}
+
+/**
+ * v2 agentic-comms (M1): reap expired claims so dropped pushes redeliver.
+ *
+ * Runs every 15s. Clears (claimed_at, claim_id, claim_expires_at) on rows
+ * where the lease has expired and no `client_ack` arrived. The next
+ * `drainForMember` call will pick the row up again — at-least-once.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of rows reaped.
+ */
+export async function sweepExpiredClaims(): Promise<number> {
+  const result = await db.execute<{ id: string }>(sql`
+    UPDATE mesh.message_queue
+    SET claimed_at = NULL,
+        claim_id = NULL,
+        claim_expires_at = NULL
+    WHERE delivered_at IS NULL
+      AND claim_expires_at IS NOT NULL
+      AND claim_expires_at < NOW()
+    RETURNING id
+  `);
+  const rows = ((result as unknown as { rows?: unknown[] }).rows ?? (result as unknown as unknown[])) as Array<{ id: string }>;
+  return rows.length;
+}
+
 // --- Lifecycle ---
 
 let ttlTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;
 let pendingTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;
 let staleTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;
+let claimSweepTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;
+
+/** v2 agentic-comms (M1): how often we reap expired message claims. */
+const CLAIM_SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS = 15_000;
 
 /** Start background sweepers. Idempotent. */
 export function startSweepers(): void {
@@ -2467,6 +2608,13 @@ export function startSweepers(): void {
       console.error("[broker] stale presence sweep:", e),
     );
   }, 30_000);
+  claimSweepTimer = setInterval(() => {
+    sweepExpiredClaims()
+      .then((n) => {
+        if (n > 0) console.log(`[broker] expired claims swept: ${n}`);
+      })
+      .catch((e) => console.error("[broker] claim sweep:", e));
+  }, CLAIM_SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS);
   // Orphan-message sweep every hour; cheap, rows are all >7d at deletion time.
   setInterval(() => {
     sweepOrphanMessages()
@@ -2480,9 +2628,11 @@ export async function stopSweepers(): Promise<void> {
   if (ttlTimer) clearInterval(ttlTimer);
   if (pendingTimer) clearInterval(pendingTimer);
   if (staleTimer) clearInterval(staleTimer);
+  if (claimSweepTimer) clearInterval(claimSweepTimer);
   ttlTimer = null;
   pendingTimer = null;
   staleTimer = null;
+  claimSweepTimer = null;
   await db
     .update(presence)
     .set({ disconnectedAt: new Date() })
@@ -2665,7 +2815,11 @@ export async function findMemberByPubkey(
       ),
     )
     .limit(1);
-  return row ?? null;
+  if (!row) return null;
+  return {
+    ...row,
+    defaultGroups: row.defaultGroups ?? [],
+  };
 }
 
 // --- Mesh databases (per-mesh PostgreSQL schemas) ---
@@ -2719,7 +2873,7 @@ export async function meshQuery(
       sql.raw(`SET LOCAL search_path TO "${schema}"`)
     );
     const result = await tx.execute(sql.raw(query));
-    const rows = (result.rows ?? []) as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
+    const rows = ((result as unknown as { rows?: unknown[] }).rows ?? (result as unknown as unknown[])) as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
     const columns = rows.length > 0 ? Object.keys(rows[0]!) : [];
     return { columns, rows, rowCount: rows.length };
   });
@@ -2762,7 +2916,7 @@ export async function meshSchema(
     WHERE table_schema = ${schema}
     ORDER BY table_name, ordinal_position
   `);
-  const rows = (result.rows ?? result) as Array<{
+  const rows = ((result as unknown as { rows?: unknown[] }).rows ?? (result as unknown as unknown[])) as Array<{
     table_name: string;
     column_name: string;
     data_type: string;

apps/broker/src/crypto.ts

@@ -138,6 +138,128 @@ export async function sealRootKeyToRecipient(params: {
 
 export const HELLO_SKEW_MS = 60_000;
 
+/** Maximum lifetime of a parent attestation (24h). */
+export const SESSION_ATTESTATION_MAX_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+/**
+ * Canonical bytes for a parent-vouches-session attestation.
+ *
+ * The parent member signs this with their stable ed25519 secret key when
+ * minting an attestation in `claudemesh launch`. The broker recomputes
+ * the same string at session_hello time and verifies the signature
+ * against `parent_member_pubkey`.
+ *
+ * Format: `claudemesh-session-attest|<parent_pubkey>|<session_pubkey>|<expires_at_ms>`
+ */
+export function canonicalSessionAttestation(
+  parentMemberPubkey: string,
+  sessionPubkey: string,
+  expiresAt: number,
+): string {
+  return `claudemesh-session-attest|${parentMemberPubkey}|${sessionPubkey}|${expiresAt}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical bytes for the session_hello signature.
+ *
+ * The session keypair (held by the daemon for the lifetime of the
+ * registration) signs this fresh on every WS connect, proving liveness +
+ * possession of the session secret key. Without this stage, an attacker
+ * who captured an attestation could replay it from any machine.
+ *
+ * Format: `claudemesh-session-hello|<mesh_id>|<parent_pubkey>|<session_pubkey>|<timestamp_ms>`
+ */
+export function canonicalSessionHello(
+  meshId: string,
+  parentMemberPubkey: string,
+  sessionPubkey: string,
+  timestamp: number,
+): string {
+  return `claudemesh-session-hello|${meshId}|${parentMemberPubkey}|${sessionPubkey}|${timestamp}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate a parent-vouches-session attestation: lifetime bound + signature.
+ * Returns `{ ok: true }` on success or `{ ok: false, reason }` on failure.
+ *
+ * The TTL ceiling (24h) bounds replay damage if an attestation leaks; the
+ * lower bound (already in the past) blocks reuse of expired ones.
+ */
+export async function verifySessionAttestation(args: {
+  parentMemberPubkey: string;
+  sessionPubkey: string;
+  expiresAt: number;
+  signature: string;
+  now?: number;
+}): Promise<
+  | { ok: true }
+  | { ok: false; reason: "expired" | "ttl_too_long" | "bad_signature" | "malformed" }
+> {
+  const now = args.now ?? Date.now();
+  if (!Number.isFinite(args.expiresAt)) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "malformed" };
+  }
+  if (args.expiresAt <= now) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "expired" };
+  }
+  if (args.expiresAt > now + SESSION_ATTESTATION_MAX_TTL_MS) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "ttl_too_long" };
+  }
+  if (
+    !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(args.parentMemberPubkey) ||
+    !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(args.sessionPubkey) ||
+    !/^[0-9a-f]{128}$/i.test(args.signature)
+  ) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "malformed" };
+  }
+  const canonical = canonicalSessionAttestation(
+    args.parentMemberPubkey,
+    args.sessionPubkey,
+    args.expiresAt,
+  );
+  const ok = await verifyEd25519(canonical, args.signature, args.parentMemberPubkey);
+  return ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, reason: "bad_signature" };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate the session-side hello signature: timestamp skew + signature
+ * by the session keypair over canonical session-hello bytes.
+ */
+export async function verifySessionHelloSignature(args: {
+  meshId: string;
+  parentMemberPubkey: string;
+  sessionPubkey: string;
+  timestamp: number;
+  signature: string;
+  now?: number;
+}): Promise<
+  | { ok: true }
+  | { ok: false; reason: "timestamp_skew" | "bad_signature" | "malformed" }
+> {
+  const now = args.now ?? Date.now();
+  if (
+    !Number.isFinite(args.timestamp) ||
+    Math.abs(now - args.timestamp) > HELLO_SKEW_MS
+  ) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "timestamp_skew" };
+  }
+  if (
+    !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(args.parentMemberPubkey) ||
+    !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(args.sessionPubkey) ||
+    !/^[0-9a-f]{128}$/i.test(args.signature)
+  ) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "malformed" };
+  }
+  const canonical = canonicalSessionHello(
+    args.meshId,
+    args.parentMemberPubkey,
+    args.sessionPubkey,
+    args.timestamp,
+  );
+  const ok = await verifyEd25519(canonical, args.signature, args.sessionPubkey);
+  return ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, reason: "bad_signature" };
+}
+
 /**
  * Verify a hello's ed25519 signature + timestamp skew.
  * Returns { ok: true } on success, or { ok: false, reason } describing

apps/broker/src/env.ts

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ const envSchema = z.object({
   MINIO_ENDPOINT: z.string().default("minio:9000"),
   MINIO_ACCESS_KEY: z.string().default("claudemesh"),
   MINIO_SECRET_KEY: z.string().default("changeme"),
-  MINIO_USE_SSL: z.enum(["true", "false", ""]).transform(v => v === "true").default("false"),
+  MINIO_USE_SSL: z.enum(["true", "false", ""]).default("false").transform(v => v === "true"),
   QDRANT_URL: z.string().default("http://qdrant:6333"),
   NEO4J_URL: z.string().default("bolt://neo4j:7687"),
   NEO4J_USER: z.string().default("neo4j"),

apps/broker/src/index.ts

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import { invite as inviteTable, mesh, meshMember, messageQueue, presence, schedu
 import { user } from "@turbostarter/db/schema/auth";
 import { handleCliSync, type CliSyncRequest } from "./cli-sync";
 import { generateId } from "@turbostarter/shared/utils";
-import { updateMemberProfile, listMeshMembers, updateMeshSettings } from "./member-api";
+import { updateMemberProfile, listMeshMembers, updateMeshSettings, type MemberUpdateRequest, type SelfEditablePolicy } from "./member-api";
 import {
   claimTask,
   completeTask,
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ import {
   grantFileKey,
   handleHookSetStatus,
   heartbeat,
+  restorePresence,
   insertFileKeys,
   joinGroup,
   joinMesh,
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ import {
   listFiles,
   listPeersInMesh,
   listState,
+  markDelivered,
   listTasks,
   queueMessage,
   recallMemory,
@@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ import { metrics, metricsToText } from "./metrics";
 import { TokenBucket } from "./rate-limit";
 import { isDbHealthy, startDbHealth, stopDbHealth } from "./db-health";
 import { buildInfo } from "./build-info";
-import { canonicalInvite, canonicalInviteV2, claimInviteV2Core as _claimInviteV2Core, sealRootKeyToRecipient, verifyHelloSignature, verifyInviteV2 } from "./crypto";
+import { canonicalInvite, canonicalInviteV2, claimInviteV2Core as _claimInviteV2Core, sealRootKeyToRecipient, verifyHelloSignature, verifyInviteV2, verifySessionAttestation, verifySessionHelloSignature } from "./crypto";
 // Alias for in-module callers; the public re-export below surfaces the
 // same symbol without colliding with tests that import from index.ts.
 const claimInviteV2Core = _claimInviteV2Core;
@@ -155,11 +157,53 @@ interface PeerConn {
     bio?: string;
     capabilities?: string[];
   };
+  /** v2 agentic-comms presence taxonomy. Mirrors the value passed to
+   *  `recordPresence`. Used by the kick handler to refuse no-op kicks
+   *  on long-lived control-plane connections (daemon, dashboard) that
+   *  would just auto-reconnect. */
+  peerRole: "control-plane" | "session" | "service";
+  /** Last time this connection's WS replied to a broker ping. Bumped
+   *  in the `pong` handler. Used by the staleness watchdog to detect
+   *  half-dead TCP/NAT-dropped connections that the kernel hasn't yet
+   *  RST'd (Linux default keepalive ≈ 2hrs). */
+  lastPongAt: number;
+  /** Lease state: "online" while the WS is healthy, "offline" during
+   *  the GRACE window after a WS close. While offline, the entry stays
+   *  in `connections` so peer_list / sendToPeer still see it; DMs land
+   *  in the message_queue (sendToPeer no-ops on dead WS, but the queue
+   *  row stays with deliveredAt=NULL and drains on reattach). After
+   *  GRACE_MS without a reattach, evictionTimer fires the full peer_left
+   *  + cleanup. Reattach (same sessionPubkey hello arriving on a fresh
+   *  WS) cancels the timer, swaps in the new ws, restores online. */
+  leaseState: "online" | "offline";
+  /** When the lease will be evicted if no reattach happens. 0 when online. */
+  leaseUntil: number;
+  /** Timer that fires evictPresenceFully(presenceId) at leaseUntil. null when online. */
+  evictionTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null;
 }
 
 const connections = new Map<string, PeerConn>();
 const connectionsPerMesh = new Map<string, number>();
 
+/**
+ * Lease grace window — how long after a WS close the broker will hold
+ * the presence row open before evicting and broadcasting peer_left.
+ *
+ * 90s: long enough to absorb a sleep/resume cycle, NAT timeout, ISP
+ * route flap, mobile→wifi handover, broker restart of the daemon's
+ * machine. Short enough that a true crash (machine off, daemon killed)
+ * clears the session within 90s — peers don't see ghost online status
+ * forever.
+ *
+ * During grace: lease stays in `connections`, peer_list keeps showing
+ * the session as online to other peers, DMs route through message_queue
+ * (sendToPeer no-ops on dead WS, drain happens on reattach). On
+ * reattach (same sessionPubkey hello on a new WS): silent swap, no
+ * peer_joined / peer_left visible to anyone. After grace expires:
+ * full eviction (peer_left + cleanup) fires exactly once.
+ */
+const GRACE_MS = 90_000;
+
 // Rate limiter for /tg/token endpoint (IP → count, cleared hourly)
 const tgTokenRateLimit = new Map<string, number>();
 setInterval(() => tgTokenRateLimit.clear(), 60 * 60_000).unref();
@@ -524,6 +568,97 @@ function sendToPeer(presenceId: string, msg: WSServerMessage): void {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Run the full presence-cleanup path: broadcast peer_left, decMeshCount,
+ * disconnectPresence in DB, audit, clean up URL watches / streams /
+ * MCP entries / clock. Removes the entry from `connections`.
+ *
+ * Called from two places:
+ *   1. `ws.on("close")` when the closing WS belongs to a connection
+ *      with no active lease (no grace) — i.e. the lease had already
+ *      been evicted, or the close fires before lease is established.
+ *   2. The grace-window evictionTimer when no reattach happened in
+ *      GRACE_MS. This is the "presence is really gone" path.
+ *
+ * Idempotent: re-entering when the connections entry is already gone
+ * is a no-op.
+ */
+async function evictPresenceFully(presenceId: string): Promise<void> {
+  const conn = connections.get(presenceId);
+  if (!conn) return; // already evicted
+  if (conn.evictionTimer) {
+    clearTimeout(conn.evictionTimer);
+    conn.evictionTimer = null;
+  }
+  connections.delete(presenceId);
+  decMeshCount(conn.meshId);
+
+  const leaveMsg: WSPushMessage = {
+    type: "push",
+    subtype: "system",
+    event: "peer_left",
+    eventData: {
+      name: conn.displayName,
+      pubkey: conn.sessionPubkey ?? conn.memberPubkey,
+    },
+    messageId: crypto.randomUUID(),
+    meshId: conn.meshId,
+    senderPubkey: "system",
+    priority: "low",
+    nonce: "",
+    ciphertext: "",
+    createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+  };
+  for (const [pid, peer] of connections) {
+    if (peer.meshId !== conn.meshId) continue;
+    // Don't tell the user's own other sessions they "left" when one
+    // of their Claude Code instances closes. Same pubkey = same user.
+    if (peer.memberPubkey === conn.memberPubkey) continue;
+    sendToPeer(pid, leaveMsg);
+  }
+
+  await disconnectPresence(presenceId);
+  void audit(conn.meshId, "peer_left", conn.memberId, conn.displayName, {});
+
+  // URL watches owned by this presence — interval would otherwise
+  // happily fetch forever after the peer is gone.
+  for (const [watchId, watch] of urlWatches) {
+    if (watch.presenceId === presenceId) {
+      clearInterval(watch.timer);
+      urlWatches.delete(watchId);
+    }
+  }
+  // Stream subscriptions for this presence.
+  for (const [key, subs] of streamSubscriptions) {
+    subs.delete(presenceId);
+    if (subs.size === 0) streamSubscriptions.delete(key);
+  }
+  // MCP servers registered by this presence.
+  for (const [key, entry] of mcpRegistry) {
+    if (entry.presenceId === presenceId) {
+      if (entry.persistent) {
+        // Keep persistent entries but mark offline
+        entry.online = false;
+        entry.offlineSince = new Date().toISOString();
+        entry.presenceId = "";
+      } else {
+        mcpRegistry.delete(key);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  // Auto-pause clock when mesh becomes empty.
+  if (!connectionsPerMesh.has(conn.meshId)) {
+    const clock = meshClocks.get(conn.meshId);
+    if (clock && clock.timer) {
+      clearInterval(clock.timer);
+      clock.timer = null;
+      clock.paused = true;
+      log.info("clock auto-paused (mesh empty)", { mesh_id: conn.meshId });
+    }
+  }
+  log.info("ws evict full", { presence_id: presenceId });
+}
+
 async function maybePushQueuedMessages(
   presenceId: string,
   excludeSenderSessionPubkey?: string,
@@ -546,6 +681,7 @@ async function maybePushQueuedMessages(
     conn.sessionPubkey ?? undefined,
     excludeSenderSessionPubkey,
     conn.groups.map((g) => g.name),
+    presenceId,
   );
   log.info("maybePush", {
     presence_id: presenceId,
@@ -831,7 +967,12 @@ function handleHttpRequest(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): void {
     req.on("data", (c: Buffer) => chunks.push(c));
     req.on("end", () => {
       try {
-        const body = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString());
+        const body = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString()) as {
+          meshId?: string;
+          memberId?: string;
+          pubkey?: string;
+          secretKey?: string;
+        };
         const { meshId: tgMeshId, memberId: tgMemberId, pubkey: tgPubkey, secretKey: tgSecretKey } = body;
         if (!tgMeshId || !tgMemberId || !tgPubkey || !tgSecretKey) {
           writeJson(res, 400, { error: "meshId, memberId, pubkey, secretKey required" });
@@ -1099,7 +1240,7 @@ function handleInviteClaimV2Post(
       const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString();
       let payload: { recipient_x25519_pubkey?: string; display_name?: string };
       try {
-        payload = JSON.parse(raw);
+        payload = JSON.parse(raw) as { recipient_x25519_pubkey?: string; display_name?: string };
       } catch {
         writeJson(res, 400, { error: "malformed" });
         return;
@@ -1197,7 +1338,7 @@ async function handleUploadPost(
   let tags: string[] = [];
   if (tagsRaw) {
     try {
-      tags = JSON.parse(tagsRaw);
+      tags = JSON.parse(tagsRaw) as string[];
     } catch {
       tags = [];
     }
@@ -1259,7 +1400,7 @@ async function handleUploadPost(
       let fileKeys: Array<{ peerPubkey: string; sealedKey: string }> = [];
       if (encrypted && fileKeysRaw) {
         try {
-          fileKeys = JSON.parse(fileKeysRaw);
+          fileKeys = JSON.parse(fileKeysRaw) as Array<{ peerPubkey: string; sealedKey: string }>;
         } catch { /* ignore */ }
       }
 
@@ -1364,7 +1505,7 @@ function handleMemberPatchPost(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse, meshId
   req.on("end", async () => {
     if (aborted) return;
     try {
-      const body = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString());
+      const body = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString()) as MemberUpdateRequest;
       // Auth: callerMemberId from X-Member-Id header (dashboard or CLI provides this)
       const callerMemberId = req.headers["x-member-id"] as string | undefined;
       if (!callerMemberId) { writeJson(res, 401, { ok: false, error: "X-Member-Id header required" }); return; }
@@ -1407,7 +1548,7 @@ function handleMeshSettingsPatch(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse, mesh
   req.on("end", async () => {
     if (aborted) return;
     try {
-      const body = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString());
+      const body = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString()) as { selfEditable?: SelfEditablePolicy };
       const callerMemberId = req.headers["x-member-id"] as string | undefined;
       if (!callerMemberId) { writeJson(res, 401, { ok: false, error: "X-Member-Id header required" }); return; }
       const result = await updateMeshSettings(meshId, callerMemberId, body);
@@ -1654,6 +1795,10 @@ async function handleHello(
   lastSeenAt?: string;
   restoredGroups?: Array<{ name: string; role?: string }>;
   restoredStats?: unknown;
+  /** True when this hello reattached an existing offline lease — caller
+   *  must skip the peer_joined broadcast and the services-list ack
+   *  augmentation. The session was never visibly absent from peers. */
+  silent?: boolean;
 } | null> {
   // Validate sessionPubkey shape — it becomes a routable identity in
   // listPeers/drainForMember, so arbitrary strings let a client claim
@@ -1746,6 +1891,61 @@ async function handleHello(
   const initialGroups = helloHasGroups
     ? hello.groups!
     : (saved?.groups?.length ? saved.groups : (member.defaultGroups ?? []));
+  // Reattach check: if an offline-leased lease exists for the same
+  // stable identity (sessionPubkey when present, otherwise sessionId
+  // for member-WS), this hello is a transient reconnect within the
+  // grace window — swap the WS reference, clear the eviction timer,
+  // restore online state. No peer_joined broadcast — peers never saw
+  // this session leave.
+  for (const [pid, oldConn] of connections) {
+    if (oldConn.meshId !== hello.meshId) continue;
+    if (oldConn.leaseState !== "offline") continue;
+    const matchByPubkey =
+      !!hello.sessionPubkey
+      && oldConn.sessionPubkey === hello.sessionPubkey;
+    const matchBySessionId =
+      !hello.sessionPubkey
+      && !oldConn.sessionPubkey
+      && oldConn.sessionId === hello.sessionId
+      && oldConn.memberPubkey === hello.pubkey;
+    if (!matchByPubkey && !matchBySessionId) continue;
+
+    if (oldConn.evictionTimer) {
+      clearTimeout(oldConn.evictionTimer);
+      oldConn.evictionTimer = null;
+    }
+    oldConn.ws = ws;
+    oldConn.leaseState = "online";
+    oldConn.leaseUntil = 0;
+    oldConn.lastPongAt = Date.now();
+    // Refresh mutable fields from the new hello — the same session may
+    // have moved cwd / changed display name across the blip.
+    oldConn.cwd = hello.cwd;
+    if (hello.displayName) oldConn.displayName = hello.displayName;
+    log.info("ws hello reattach (lease)", {
+      presence_id: pid,
+      session_pubkey: hello.sessionPubkey?.slice(0, 12) ?? "(member-WS)",
+      session_id: hello.sessionId,
+    });
+    // Reset DB row to online: the stale-presence sweeper may have set
+    // disconnectedAt during the grace window. Lease is in-memory truth
+    // but downstream code paths read presence.disconnectedAt directly.
+    void restorePresence(pid);
+    // Drain any queued DMs that landed during the offline window.
+    void maybePushQueuedMessages(pid);
+    return {
+      presenceId: pid,
+      memberDisplayName: oldConn.displayName,
+      memberProfile: {
+        roleTag: member.roleTag,
+        groups: member.defaultGroups ?? [],
+        messageMode: member.messageMode ?? "push",
+      },
+      meshPolicy,
+      silent: true,
+    };
+  }
+
   // Session-id dedup: if this session_id already has an active presence,
   // disconnect the ghost. Happens when a client reconnects after a
   // network blip or broker restart before the 90s stale sweeper runs.
@@ -1767,6 +1967,11 @@ async function handleHello(
     pid: hello.pid,
     cwd: hello.cwd,
     groups: initialGroups,
+    // v2 agentic-comms (M1): the regular member-keyed `hello` path is
+    // used by long-lived control-plane connections (claudemesh daemon,
+    // dashboard, automation). Per-Claude-Code sessions go through
+    // `session_hello` and get role='session'.
+    role: "control-plane",
   });
   const effectiveDisplayName = hello.displayName || member.displayName;
   connections.set(presenceId, {
@@ -1785,12 +1990,18 @@ async function handleHello(
     groups: initialGroups,
     visible: saved?.visible ?? true,
     profile: saved?.profile ?? {},
+    peerRole: "control-plane",
+    lastPongAt: Date.now(),
+    leaseState: "online",
+    leaseUntil: 0,
+    evictionTimer: null,
   });
   incMeshCount(hello.meshId);
   void audit(hello.meshId, "peer_joined", member.id, effectiveDisplayName, {
     pubkey: hello.pubkey,
     groups: initialGroups,
     restored: !!saved,
+    role: "control-plane",
   });
   log.info("ws hello", {
     mesh_id: hello.meshId,
@@ -1821,6 +2032,269 @@ async function handleHello(
   };
 }
 
+/**
+ * Authenticate + presence-register a per-launch session WebSocket.
+ *
+ * Two-stage proof: parent member's pre-signed attestation vouches the
+ * session pubkey, and the session keypair signs the hello timestamp to
+ * prove possession. The presence row is keyed on `sessionPubkey` but
+ * `member_id` points at the parent member, so member-targeted operations
+ * (revocation, send-by-member-pubkey) keep working unchanged.
+ *
+ * Spec: .artifacts/specs/2026-05-04-per-session-presence.md.
+ */
+async function handleSessionHello(
+  ws: WebSocket,
+  hello: Extract<WSClientMessage, { type: "session_hello" }>,
+): Promise<{
+  presenceId: string;
+  memberDisplayName: string;
+  memberProfile?: unknown;
+  meshPolicy?: Record<string, unknown>;
+  /** True when this hello reattached an existing offline lease — caller
+   *  must skip the peer_joined broadcast. The session was never visibly
+   *  absent from peers. */
+  silent?: boolean;
+} | null> {
+  // Shape checks. The crypto helpers also enforce these but bailing
+  // early gives a clearer error code on the wire.
+  if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(hello.sessionPubkey ?? "")) {
+    metrics.connectionsRejected.inc({ reason: "bad_session_pubkey" });
+    sendError(ws, "bad_session_pubkey", "sessionPubkey must be 64 lowercase hex chars");
+    ws.close(1008, "bad_session_pubkey");
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(hello.parentMemberPubkey ?? "")) {
+    metrics.connectionsRejected.inc({ reason: "bad_parent_pubkey" });
+    sendError(ws, "bad_parent_pubkey", "parentMemberPubkey must be 64 lowercase hex chars");
+    ws.close(1008, "bad_parent_pubkey");
+    return null;
+  }
+  const att = hello.parentAttestation;
+  if (
+    !att ||
+    typeof att !== "object" ||
+    att.sessionPubkey !== hello.sessionPubkey ||
+    att.parentMemberPubkey !== hello.parentMemberPubkey
+  ) {
+    metrics.connectionsRejected.inc({ reason: "attestation_mismatch" });
+    sendError(ws, "attestation_mismatch", "parentAttestation does not bind the claimed session+parent pubkeys");
+    ws.close(1008, "attestation_mismatch");
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // Capacity check BEFORE touching DB.
+  const existing = connectionsPerMesh.get(hello.meshId) ?? 0;
+  if (existing >= env.MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_MESH) {
+    metrics.connectionsRejected.inc({ reason: "capacity" });
+    log.warn("mesh at capacity (session_hello)", {
+      mesh_id: hello.meshId,
+      existing,
+      cap: env.MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_MESH,
+    });
+    sendError(ws, "capacity", "mesh at connection capacity");
+    ws.close(1008, "capacity");
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // 1. Parent attestation: TTL bounds + signature against parent pubkey.
+  const attCheck = await verifySessionAttestation({
+    parentMemberPubkey: hello.parentMemberPubkey,
+    sessionPubkey: hello.sessionPubkey,
+    expiresAt: att.expiresAt,
+    signature: att.signature,
+  });
+  if (!attCheck.ok) {
+    metrics.connectionsRejected.inc({ reason: `attestation_${attCheck.reason}` });
+    log.warn("session_hello attestation rejected", {
+      reason: attCheck.reason,
+      mesh_id: hello.meshId,
+      parent_pubkey: hello.parentMemberPubkey.slice(0, 12),
+      session_pubkey: hello.sessionPubkey.slice(0, 12),
+    });
+    sendError(ws, attCheck.reason, `attestation rejected: ${attCheck.reason}`);
+    ws.close(1008, attCheck.reason);
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // 2. Session signature: timestamp skew + ed25519 against sessionPubkey.
+  const sigCheck = await verifySessionHelloSignature({
+    meshId: hello.meshId,
+    parentMemberPubkey: hello.parentMemberPubkey,
+    sessionPubkey: hello.sessionPubkey,
+    timestamp: hello.timestamp,
+    signature: hello.signature,
+  });
+  if (!sigCheck.ok) {
+    metrics.connectionsRejected.inc({ reason: `session_${sigCheck.reason}` });
+    log.warn("session_hello sig rejected", {
+      reason: sigCheck.reason,
+      mesh_id: hello.meshId,
+      session_pubkey: hello.sessionPubkey.slice(0, 12),
+    });
+    sendError(ws, sigCheck.reason, `session_hello rejected: ${sigCheck.reason}`);
+    ws.close(1008, sigCheck.reason);
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // 3. Parent member must exist + be active in the claimed mesh.
+  const member = await findMemberByPubkey(hello.meshId, hello.parentMemberPubkey);
+  if (!member) {
+    const [revokedRow] = await db
+      .select({ displayName: meshMember.displayName, revokedAt: meshMember.revokedAt })
+      .from(meshMember)
+      .where(and(eq(meshMember.meshId, hello.meshId), eq(meshMember.peerPubkey, hello.parentMemberPubkey)))
+      .limit(1);
+    if (revokedRow?.revokedAt) {
+      metrics.connectionsRejected.inc({ reason: "revoked" });
+      const [m] = await db.select({ slug: mesh.slug, name: mesh.name }).from(mesh).where(eq(mesh.id, hello.meshId)).limit(1);
+      const meshLabel = m?.name || m?.slug || hello.meshId;
+      sendError(
+        ws,
+        "revoked",
+        `You've been removed from "${meshLabel}". Contact the mesh owner to rejoin.`,
+      );
+      ws.close(4002, "banned");
+      log.info("session_hello rejected: revoked parent", { mesh_id: hello.meshId, display_name: revokedRow.displayName });
+      return null;
+    }
+    metrics.connectionsRejected.inc({ reason: "unauthorized" });
+    sendError(ws, "unauthorized", "parent pubkey not found in mesh");
+    ws.close(1008, "unauthorized");
+    return null;
+  }
+  // The parentMemberId in the hello must match the member we resolved by
+  // pubkey — otherwise the daemon claims membership it doesn't have.
+  if (hello.parentMemberId && hello.parentMemberId !== member.id) {
+    metrics.connectionsRejected.inc({ reason: "parent_member_id_mismatch" });
+    sendError(ws, "parent_member_id_mismatch", "parentMemberId does not match parentMemberPubkey");
+    ws.close(1008, "parent_member_id_mismatch");
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // Load mesh policy (best-effort; non-fatal).
+  let meshPolicy: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+  try {
+    const [m] = await db
+      .select({ selfEditable: mesh.selfEditable })
+      .from(mesh)
+      .where(eq(mesh.id, hello.meshId));
+    if (m?.selfEditable) meshPolicy = { selfEditable: m.selfEditable };
+  } catch { /* non-fatal */ }
+
+  const initialGroups = hello.groups ?? member.defaultGroups ?? [];
+
+  // Reattach check: an offline-leased connection with the same
+  // sessionPubkey is the same launched session resuming inside the
+  // grace window. Cancel the eviction timer, swap the WS, restore
+  // online state. No peer_joined broadcast — peers never saw the
+  // session leave.
+  for (const [pid, oldConn] of connections) {
+    if (oldConn.meshId !== hello.meshId) continue;
+    if (oldConn.leaseState !== "offline") continue;
+    if (oldConn.sessionPubkey !== hello.sessionPubkey) continue;
+
+    if (oldConn.evictionTimer) {
+      clearTimeout(oldConn.evictionTimer);
+      oldConn.evictionTimer = null;
+    }
+    oldConn.ws = ws;
+    oldConn.leaseState = "online";
+    oldConn.leaseUntil = 0;
+    oldConn.lastPongAt = Date.now();
+    // Refresh mutable fields from the new hello.
+    oldConn.cwd = hello.cwd;
+    if (hello.displayName) oldConn.displayName = hello.displayName;
+    log.info("session_hello reattach (lease)", {
+      presence_id: pid,
+      session_pubkey: hello.sessionPubkey.slice(0, 12),
+    });
+    void restorePresence(pid);
+    void maybePushQueuedMessages(pid);
+    return {
+      presenceId: pid,
+      memberDisplayName: oldConn.displayName,
+      memberProfile: undefined,
+      meshPolicy,
+      silent: true,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Session-id dedup: if the same session_id is already connected, kick
+  // the ghost. Reconnect after a network blip lands here cleanly.
+  for (const [oldPid, oldConn] of connections) {
+    if (oldConn.meshId === hello.meshId && oldConn.sessionId === hello.sessionId) {
+      log.info("session_hello dedup", { old_presence: oldPid, session_id: hello.sessionId });
+      try { oldConn.ws.close(1000, "session_replaced"); } catch { /* already dead */ }
+      connections.delete(oldPid);
+      void disconnectPresence(oldPid);
+    }
+  }
+
+  const presenceId = await connectPresence({
+    memberId: member.id,
+    sessionId: hello.sessionId,
+    sessionPubkey: hello.sessionPubkey,
+    displayName: hello.displayName,
+    pid: hello.pid,
+    cwd: hello.cwd,
+    groups: initialGroups,
+    // v2 agentic-comms (M1): per-Claude-Code session WS — these are the
+    // user-facing peers shown in `claudemesh peer list`.
+    role: "session",
+  });
+  const effectiveDisplayName = hello.displayName || member.displayName;
+  connections.set(presenceId, {
+    ws,
+    meshId: hello.meshId,
+    memberId: member.id,
+    memberPubkey: hello.parentMemberPubkey,
+    sessionId: hello.sessionId,
+    sessionPubkey: hello.sessionPubkey,
+    displayName: effectiveDisplayName,
+    cwd: hello.cwd,
+    hostname: hello.hostname,
+    peerType: hello.peerType,
+    channel: hello.channel,
+    model: hello.model,
+    groups: initialGroups,
+    visible: true,
+    profile: {},
+    peerRole: "session",
+    lastPongAt: Date.now(),
+    leaseState: "online",
+    leaseUntil: 0,
+    evictionTimer: null,
+  });
+  incMeshCount(hello.meshId);
+  void audit(hello.meshId, "peer_joined", member.id, effectiveDisplayName, {
+    pubkey: hello.parentMemberPubkey,
+    session_pubkey: hello.sessionPubkey,
+    groups: initialGroups,
+    via: "session_hello",
+    role: "session",
+  });
+  log.info("ws session_hello", {
+    mesh_id: hello.meshId,
+    member: effectiveDisplayName,
+    presence_id: presenceId,
+    session_id: hello.sessionId,
+    session_pubkey: hello.sessionPubkey.slice(0, 12),
+  });
+  // Drain any DMs queued for this session pubkey (or the parent member).
+  void maybePushQueuedMessages(presenceId);
+  return {
+    presenceId,
+    memberDisplayName: effectiveDisplayName,
+    memberProfile: {
+      roleTag: member.roleTag,
+      groups: member.defaultGroups ?? [],
+      messageMode: member.messageMode ?? "push",
+    },
+    meshPolicy,
+  };
+}
+
 async function handleSend(
   conn: PeerConn,
   msg: Extract<WSClientMessage, { type: "send" }>,
@@ -2171,6 +2645,55 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
     try {
       const msg = JSON.parse(raw.toString()) as WSClientMessage;
       const _reqId = (msg as any)._reqId as string | undefined;
+      if (msg.type === "session_hello") {
+        const result = await handleSessionHello(ws, msg);
+        if (!result) return;
+        presenceId = result.presenceId;
+        try {
+          const ackPayload: Record<string, unknown> = {
+            type: "hello_ack",
+            presenceId: result.presenceId,
+            memberDisplayName: result.memberDisplayName,
+            memberProfile: result.memberProfile,
+            ...(result.meshPolicy ? { meshPolicy: result.meshPolicy } : {}),
+          };
+          ws.send(JSON.stringify(ackPayload));
+        } catch {
+          /* ws closed during hello */
+        }
+        // Broadcast peer_joined to siblings — same shape as the regular
+        // hello path, so list_peers consumers don't need to special-case.
+        // Skipped on lease reattach: the session was never visibly absent,
+        // so no synthetic join event should fire.
+        const joinedConn = connections.get(presenceId);
+        if (joinedConn && !result.silent) {
+          const joinMsg: WSPushMessage = {
+            type: "push",
+            subtype: "system",
+            event: "peer_joined",
+            eventData: {
+              name: result.memberDisplayName,
+              pubkey: joinedConn.sessionPubkey ?? joinedConn.memberPubkey,
+              groups: joinedConn.groups,
+            },
+            messageId: crypto.randomUUID(),
+            meshId: joinedConn.meshId,
+            senderPubkey: "system",
+            priority: "low",
+            nonce: "",
+            ciphertext: "",
+            createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+          };
+          for (const [pid, peer] of connections) {
+            if (pid === presenceId) continue;
+            if (peer.meshId !== joinedConn.meshId) continue;
+            // Same-member sibling sessions get the join — a per-launch
+            // session is meant to be visible to the user's other launches.
+            sendToPeer(pid, joinMsg);
+          }
+        }
+        return;
+      }
       if (msg.type === "hello") {
         const result = await handleHello(ws, msg);
         if (!result) return;
@@ -2226,9 +2749,11 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
         } catch {
           /* ws closed during hello */
         }
-        // Broadcast peer_joined or peer_returned to all other peers in the same mesh.
+        // Broadcast peer_joined or peer_returned to all other peers in the
+        // same mesh. Skipped on lease reattach: the session never appeared
+        // offline so no synthetic join event should fire.
         const joinedConn = connections.get(presenceId);
-        if (joinedConn) {
+        if (joinedConn && !result.silent) {
           const isReturning = !!result.restored;
           const joinMsg: WSPushMessage = {
             type: "push",
@@ -2301,6 +2826,39 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
         case "send":
           await handleSend(conn, msg);
           break;
+        case "client_ack": {
+          // v2 agentic-comms (M1): close out a previously pushed message.
+          // Lookup is scoped to (mesh_id, recipient pubkey) so a peer can
+          // only ack messages addressed to itself.
+          const ack = msg as Extract<WSClientMessage, { type: "client_ack" }>;
+          if (!ack.clientMessageId && !ack.brokerMessageId) {
+            // Nothing to do; don't error — the daemon may speculatively
+            // ack and we'd rather be lenient than break a CLI release.
+            break;
+          }
+          try {
+            const n = await markDelivered({
+              meshId: conn.meshId,
+              recipientMemberId: conn.memberId,
+              recipientMemberPubkey: conn.memberPubkey,
+              recipientSessionPubkey: conn.sessionPubkey ?? null,
+              clientMessageId: ack.clientMessageId ?? null,
+              brokerMessageId: ack.brokerMessageId ?? null,
+            });
+            log.debug("ws client_ack", {
+              presence_id: presenceId,
+              client_message_id: ack.clientMessageId,
+              broker_message_id: ack.brokerMessageId,
+              marked: n,
+            });
+          } catch (e) {
+            log.warn("ws client_ack failed", {
+              presence_id: presenceId,
+              error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
+            });
+          }
+          break;
+        }
         case "set_status":
           await writeStatus(presenceId, msg.status, "manual", new Date());
           log.info("ws set_status", {
@@ -2338,6 +2896,12 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
                 sessionId: p.sessionId,
                 connectedAt: p.connectedAt.toISOString(),
                 cwd: pc?.cwd ?? p.cwd,
+                // v2 agentic-comms (M1): typed connection role. CLI uses
+                // this to hide control-plane daemons from user-facing
+                // peer lists (filter swap from peerType happens CLI-side).
+                // Wire field is `peerRole` to avoid collision with the
+                // 1.31.5 top-level `role` lift of profile.role.
+                peerRole: p.peerRole,
                 ...(pc?.hostname ? { hostname: pc.hostname } : {}),
                 ...(pc?.peerType ? { peerType: pc.peerType } : {}),
                 ...(pc?.channel ? { channel: pc.channel } : {}),
@@ -3492,7 +4056,7 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
             const gqRecords = gqResult.records.map((r) => {
               const obj: Record<string, unknown> = {};
               for (const key of r.keys) {
-                obj[key] = r.get(key);
+                obj[String(key)] = r.get(key);
               }
               return obj;
             });
@@ -3527,7 +4091,7 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
             const geRecords = geResult.records.map((r) => {
               const obj: Record<string, unknown> = {};
               for (const key of r.keys) {
-                obj[key] = r.get(key);
+                obj[String(key)] = r.get(key);
               }
               return obj;
             });
@@ -3616,10 +4180,10 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
           const [peers, stateEntries, memCount, fileCount, taskCounts, streams, tables] = await Promise.all([
             listPeersInMesh(conn.meshId),
             listState(conn.meshId),
-            db.execute(sql`SELECT COUNT(*) as n FROM mesh.memory WHERE mesh_id = ${conn.meshId} AND forgotten_at IS NULL`).then(r => Number(((r.rows ?? r) as any[])[0]?.n ?? 0)),
+            db.execute(sql`SELECT COUNT(*) as n FROM mesh.memory WHERE mesh_id = ${conn.meshId} AND forgotten_at IS NULL`).then(r => Number((((r as unknown as { rows?: unknown[] }).rows ?? (r as unknown as unknown[])) as any[])[0]?.n ?? 0)),
-            db.execute(sql`SELECT COUNT(*) as n FROM mesh.file WHERE mesh_id = ${conn.meshId} AND deleted_at IS NULL`).then(r => Number(((r.rows ?? r) as any[])[0]?.n ?? 0)),
+            db.execute(sql`SELECT COUNT(*) as n FROM mesh.file WHERE mesh_id = ${conn.meshId} AND deleted_at IS NULL`).then(r => Number((((r as unknown as { rows?: unknown[] }).rows ?? (r as unknown as unknown[])) as any[])[0]?.n ?? 0)),
             db.execute(sql`SELECT status, COUNT(*) as n FROM mesh.task WHERE mesh_id = ${conn.meshId} GROUP BY status`).then(r => {
-              const rows = (r.rows ?? r) as Array<{ status: string; n: string }>;
+              const rows = (((r as unknown as { rows?: unknown[] }).rows ?? (r as unknown as unknown[]))) as Array<{ status: string; n: string }>;
               const counts = { open: 0, claimed: 0, done: 0 };
               for (const row of rows) counts[row.status as keyof typeof counts] = Number(row.n);
               return counts;
@@ -4328,11 +4892,30 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
           }
 
           const affected: string[] = [];
+          // 1.34.15 (gap #3a): kick was a no-op against long-lived
+          // control-plane connections (daemon, dashboard) — closing
+          // their WS just triggered the auto-reconnect loop, the
+          // kicker's CLI rendered "Their Claude Code session ended"
+          // (which was misleading), and the user-visible state was
+          // unchanged seconds later. We now refuse to close control-
+          // plane WSes and surface the skipped peers in a new
+          // additive ack field. Pre-1.34.15 CLI clients only read
+          // `kicked`/`affected`, so this stays back-compat.
+          //
+          // For `kick`-only: the soft `disconnect` verb still closes
+          // control-plane WSes intentionally — that's what users want
+          // when they're nudging a peer for it to re-authenticate.
+          const skippedControlPlane: string[] = [];
+          const skipControlPlane = isKick;
           const now = Date.now();
 
           if (km.all) {
             for (const [pid, peer] of connections) {
               if (peer.meshId !== conn.meshId || pid === presenceId) continue;
+              if (skipControlPlane && peer.peerRole === "control-plane") {
+                skippedControlPlane.push(peer.displayName || pid);
+                continue;
+              }
               try { peer.ws.close(closeCode, closeReason); } catch {}
               connections.delete(pid);
               void disconnectPresence(pid);
@@ -4344,6 +4927,10 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
               if (peer.meshId !== conn.meshId || pid === presenceId) continue;
               const [pres] = await db.select({ lastPingAt: presence.lastPingAt }).from(presence).where(eq(presence.id, pid)).limit(1);
               if (pres && pres.lastPingAt && pres.lastPingAt.getTime() < cutoff) {
+                if (skipControlPlane && peer.peerRole === "control-plane") {
+                  skippedControlPlane.push(peer.displayName || pid);
+                  continue;
+                }
                 try { peer.ws.close(closeCode, `${closeReason}_stale`); } catch {}
                 connections.delete(pid);
                 void disconnectPresence(pid);
@@ -4354,6 +4941,10 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
             for (const [pid, peer] of connections) {
               if (peer.meshId !== conn.meshId) continue;
               if (peer.displayName === km.target || peer.memberPubkey === km.target || peer.memberPubkey.startsWith(km.target)) {
+                if (skipControlPlane && peer.peerRole === "control-plane") {
+                  skippedControlPlane.push(peer.displayName || pid);
+                  continue;
+                }
                 try { peer.ws.close(closeCode, closeReason); } catch {}
                 connections.delete(pid);
                 void disconnectPresence(pid);
@@ -4362,8 +4953,20 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
             }
           }
 
-          conn.ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: ackType, kicked: affected, affected, _reqId: km._reqId }));
+          conn.ws.send(JSON.stringify({
-          log.info(`ws ${closeReason}`, { presence_id: presenceId, count: affected.length, target: km.target ?? km.stale ?? "all" });
+            type: ackType,
+            kicked: affected,
+            affected,
+            // Additive — older CLI clients ignore this field.
+            ...(skippedControlPlane.length > 0 ? { skipped_control_plane: skippedControlPlane } : {}),
+            _reqId: km._reqId,
+          }));
+          log.info(`ws ${closeReason}`, {
+            presence_id: presenceId,
+            count: affected.length,
+            target: km.target ?? km.stale ?? "all",
+            skipped_control_plane: skippedControlPlane.length,
+          });
           break;
         }
 
@@ -4791,88 +5394,52 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
     }
   });
   ws.on("close", async () => {
-    if (presenceId) {
+    if (!presenceId) return;
     const conn = connections.get(presenceId);
-      // Persist peer state BEFORE removing from connections.
+    if (!conn) return; // already evicted
-      if (conn) {
+
+    // If the conn's `ws` is no longer THIS ws, the close belongs to an
+    // older socket that was already replaced by a reattach. Ignore — the
+    // lease is healthy with the new WS, no eviction needed.
+    if (conn.ws !== ws) {
+      log.debug("ws close on replaced socket — ignoring", { presence_id: presenceId });
+      return;
+    }
+
     await savePeerState(conn, conn.memberId, conn.meshId);
+
+    // If lease is currently online, enter grace. Other peers see the
+    // session as still online; DMs queue (sendToPeer no-ops on dead
+    // WS, drain on reattach). After GRACE_MS without a reattach, the
+    // timer fires evictPresenceFully and cleanup runs as before.
+    const pid = presenceId;
+    if (conn.leaseState === "online") {
+      conn.leaseState = "offline";
+      conn.leaseUntil = Date.now() + GRACE_MS;
+      conn.evictionTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+        log.info("lease grace expired — evicting", { presence_id: pid });
+        void evictPresenceFully(pid);
+      }, GRACE_MS);
+      log.info("ws close — lease grace started", {
+        presence_id: pid,
+        grace_ms: GRACE_MS,
+      });
+      return;
     }
-      connections.delete(presenceId);
+
-      if (conn) {
+    // Not online (already in grace from an earlier close, or odd state).
-        decMeshCount(conn.meshId);
+    // Run full eviction immediately.
-        // Broadcast peer_left to remaining peers in the same mesh.
+    await evictPresenceFully(pid);
-        const leaveMsg: WSPushMessage = {
-          type: "push",
-          subtype: "system",
-          event: "peer_left",
-          eventData: {
-            name: conn.displayName,
-            pubkey: conn.sessionPubkey ?? conn.memberPubkey,
-          },
-          messageId: crypto.randomUUID(),
-          meshId: conn.meshId,
-          senderPubkey: "system",
-          priority: "low",
-          nonce: "",
-          ciphertext: "",
-          createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
-        };
-        for (const [pid, peer] of connections) {
-          if (peer.meshId !== conn.meshId) continue;
-          // Don't tell the user's own other sessions they "left" when one
-          // of their Claude Code instances closes. Same pubkey = same user.
-          if (peer.memberPubkey === conn.memberPubkey) continue;
-          sendToPeer(pid, leaveMsg);
-        }
-      }
-      await disconnectPresence(presenceId);
-      if (conn) {
-        void audit(conn.meshId, "peer_left", conn.memberId, conn.displayName, {});
-      }
-      // Clean up URL watches owned by this peer — the interval was
-      // happily fetching forever after the peer disconnected.
-      for (const [watchId, watch] of urlWatches) {
-        if (watch.presenceId === presenceId) {
-          clearInterval(watch.timer);
-          urlWatches.delete(watchId);
-        }
-      }
-      // Clean up stream subscriptions for this peer
-      for (const [key, subs] of streamSubscriptions) {
-        subs.delete(presenceId);
-        if (subs.size === 0) streamSubscriptions.delete(key);
-      }
-      // Clean up MCP servers registered by this peer
-      for (const [key, entry] of mcpRegistry) {
-        if (entry.presenceId === presenceId) {
-          if (entry.persistent) {
-            // Keep persistent entries but mark offline
-            entry.online = false;
-            entry.offlineSince = new Date().toISOString();
-            entry.presenceId = "";
-          } else {
-            mcpRegistry.delete(key);
-          }
-        }
-      }
-      // Auto-pause clock when mesh becomes empty
-      if (conn && !connectionsPerMesh.has(conn.meshId)) {
-        const clock = meshClocks.get(conn.meshId);
-        if (clock && clock.timer) {
-          clearInterval(clock.timer);
-          clock.timer = null;
-          clock.paused = true;
-          log.info("clock auto-paused (mesh empty)", { mesh_id: conn.meshId });
-        }
-      }
-      log.info("ws close", { presence_id: presenceId });
-    }
   });
   ws.on("error", (err) => {
     log.warn("ws error", { error: err.message });
   });
   ws.on("pong", () => {
-    if (presenceId) void heartbeat(presenceId);
+    if (presenceId) {
+      const conn = connections.get(presenceId);
+      if (conn) conn.lastPongAt = Date.now();
+      void heartbeat(presenceId);
+    }
   });
 }
 
@@ -5064,10 +5631,29 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
     });
   });
 
-  // WS heartbeat ping every 30s; clients reply with pong → bumps lastPingAt.
+  // WS heartbeat ping every 30s; clients reply with pong → bumps
+  // lastPongAt. Connections whose pong is older than 75s (2.5x the
+  // ping interval) are considered half-dead — kernel hasn't yet RST'd
+  // the socket but no application traffic is flowing. Force-terminate
+  // them to fire the close handler and free the connection slot.
+  const STALE_PONG_THRESHOLD_MS = 75_000;
   const pingInterval = setInterval(() => {
-    for (const { ws } of connections.values()) {
+    const now = Date.now();
-      if (ws.readyState === ws.OPEN) ws.ping();
+    for (const [pid, conn] of connections) {
+      // Skip offline-leased entries: their WS is intentionally dead
+      // during grace; the eviction timer handles their lifecycle.
+      if (conn.leaseState === "offline") continue;
+      const { ws } = conn;
+      if (ws.readyState !== ws.OPEN) continue;
+      if (now - conn.lastPongAt > STALE_PONG_THRESHOLD_MS) {
+        log.warn("ws stale terminate", {
+          presence_id: pid,
+          last_pong_ago_ms: now - conn.lastPongAt,
+        });
+        try { ws.terminate(); } catch { /* socket already gone */ }
+        continue;
+      }
+      ws.ping();
     }
   }, 30_000);
   pingInterval.unref();

apps/broker/src/jwt.ts

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ export async function verifySyncToken(
     }
 
     // Decode header — must be HS256
-    const header = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(base64UrlDecode(headerB64)));
+    const header = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(base64UrlDecode(headerB64))) as { alg?: string };
     if (header.alg !== "HS256") {
       return { ok: false, error: `unsupported algorithm: ${header.alg}` };
     }

apps/broker/src/member-api.ts

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ export interface MemberPermissionUpdate {
 
 export type MemberUpdateRequest = MemberProfileUpdate & MemberPermissionUpdate;
 
-interface SelfEditablePolicy {
+export interface SelfEditablePolicy {
   displayName: boolean;
   roleTag: boolean;
   groups: boolean;

apps/broker/src/paths.ts

@@ -115,11 +115,11 @@ function lastAssistantHasToolUse(filePath: string): boolean {
       if (!line) continue;
       if (!line.includes('"assistant"')) continue;
       try {
-        const d = JSON.parse(line);
+        const d = JSON.parse(line) as { type?: string; message?: { content?: unknown } };
         if (d.type !== "assistant") continue;
         const content = d.message?.content;
         if (!Array.isArray(content)) continue;
-        return content.some((c: { type?: string }) => c.type === "tool_use");
+        return (content as Array<{ type?: string }>).some((c) => c.type === "tool_use");
       } catch {
         /* malformed line, skip */
       }

apps/broker/src/service-manager.ts

@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ function detectEntry(
     try {
       const pkg = JSON.parse(
         readFileSync(join(sourcePath, "package.json"), "utf-8"),
-      );
+      ) as { main?: string; bin?: string | Record<string, string> };
       if (pkg.main) return { command: cmd, args: [pkg.main] };
       if (pkg.bin) {
         const bin =
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ function spawnService(svc: ManagedService): void {
   const rl = createInterface({ input: child.stdout! });
   rl.on("line", (line) => {
     try {
-      const msg = JSON.parse(line);
+      const msg = JSON.parse(line) as { id?: string | number; error?: { message?: string }; result?: unknown };
       if (msg.id && svc.pendingCalls.has(String(msg.id))) {
         const pending = svc.pendingCalls.get(String(msg.id))!;
         clearTimeout(pending.timer);

apps/broker/src/telegram-bridge.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { Bot, InputFile } from "grammy";
 import WebSocket from "ws";
 import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers";
 import { validateTelegramConnectToken } from "./telegram-token";
+import { log } from "./logger";
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Types
@@ -22,11 +23,12 @@ export interface BridgeRow {
   chatId: number;
   meshId: string;
   meshSlug?: string;
-  memberId: string;
+  /** memberId can be null until the bridge claims a mesh.member row. */
+  memberId: string | null;
   pubkey: string;
   secretKey: string;
-  displayName: string;
+  displayName: string | null;
-  chatType: string;
+  chatType: string | null;
   chatTitle: string | null;
 }
 
@@ -228,7 +230,7 @@ class MeshConnection {
 
       ws.on("message", async (raw) => {
         try {
-          const msg = JSON.parse(raw.toString());
+          const msg = JSON.parse(raw.toString()) as Record<string, any>;
 
           if (msg.type === "hello_ack") {
             clearTimeout(helloTimeout);
@@ -674,8 +676,8 @@ function createPushHandler(bot: Bot) {
     for (const chatId of chatIds) {
       bot.api
         .sendMessage(chatId, formatted)
-        .catch((e) => {
+        .catch((e: unknown) => {
-          console.error(`[tg-bridge] send to chat ${chatId} failed:`, e.message);
+          console.error(`[tg-bridge] send to chat ${chatId} failed:`, e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e));
         });
     }
   };
@@ -1729,11 +1731,12 @@ async function executeAiToolCall(
         for (const meshId of meshIds) {
           const services = await listDbMeshServices(meshId);
           for (const s of services) {
+            const sx = s as Record<string, unknown>;
             allServices.push({
-              name: s.name,
+              name: String(sx.name ?? ""),
-              type: s.type ?? "mcp",
+              type: String(sx.type ?? "mcp"),
-              tools: s.tool_count ?? 0,
+              tools: Number(sx.tool_count ?? 0),
-              status: s.status ?? "running",
+              status: String(sx.status ?? "running"),
             });
           }
         }
@@ -1841,6 +1844,9 @@ export async function bootTelegramBridge(
   for (const [meshId, meshRows] of byMesh) {
     const first = meshRows[0]!;
     try {
+      // memberId/displayName come back from DB nullable; bridge only
+      // works once both are populated, so skip rows missing either.
+      if (!first.memberId || !first.displayName) continue;
       await ensureMeshConnection(
         {
           meshId,

apps/broker/src/telegram-token.ts

@@ -102,11 +102,11 @@ export function validateTelegramConnectToken(
     if (!timingSafeEqual(a, b)) return null;
 
     // Verify header algorithm
-    const header = JSON.parse(base64urlDecode(headerB64));
+    const header = JSON.parse(base64urlDecode(headerB64)) as { alg?: string };
     if (header.alg !== "HS256") return null;
 
     // Decode and validate claims
-    const claims: JwtClaims = JSON.parse(base64urlDecode(payloadB64));
+    const claims = JSON.parse(base64urlDecode(payloadB64)) as JwtClaims;
 
     // Check subject
     if (claims.sub !== "telegram-connect") return null;

apps/broker/src/types.ts

@@ -90,6 +90,66 @@ export interface WSHelloMessage {
   signature: string;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Client → broker: per-launch session hello, vouched by the parent member.
+ *
+ * Used by the daemon's per-session WebSocket connections (1.30.0+) so that
+ * each `claudemesh launch`-spawned session has its own long-lived presence
+ * row owned by an ephemeral session keypair. The parent member key vouches
+ * (out-of-band) that the session pubkey is theirs; the session keypair
+ * proves liveness on every connect.
+ *
+ * Two-stage proof:
+ *   1. `parentAttestation.signature` — ed25519 over
+ *      `claudemesh-session-attest|<parent_pubkey>|<session_pubkey>|<expires_at_ms>`
+ *      signed by the parent member's stable secret key. TTL ≤ 24h.
+ *   2. `signature` — ed25519 over
+ *      `claudemesh-session-hello|<mesh_id>|<parent_pubkey>|<session_pubkey>|<timestamp>`
+ *      signed by the session secret key (held by the daemon for the
+ *      lifetime of the session registration).
+ *
+ * Older brokers don't recognize this message type and reply with
+ * `unknown_message_type`; clients fall back to the legacy `hello` flow.
+ */
+export interface WSSessionHelloMessage {
+  type: "session_hello";
+  /** Highest WS protocol version the client understands. */
+  protocolVersion?: number;
+  /** Optional feature strings the client supports. */
+  capabilities?: string[];
+  meshId: string;
+  /** Parent member's id (mesh.member.id) — used for revocation lookup. */
+  parentMemberId: string;
+  /** Parent member's stable ed25519 pubkey (hex), as found in mesh.member. */
+  parentMemberPubkey: string;
+  /** Per-launch ephemeral ed25519 pubkey (hex). Routes presence + DMs. */
+  sessionPubkey: string;
+  /** Pre-signed attestation by the parent member, presented per session. */
+  parentAttestation: {
+    sessionPubkey: string;
+    parentMemberPubkey: string;
+    /** Unix ms; broker rejects past or > now+24h. */
+    expiresAt: number;
+    signature: string;
+  };
+  /** Display name override for this session (optional, falls back to member). */
+  displayName?: string;
+  sessionId: string;
+  pid: number;
+  cwd: string;
+  hostname?: string;
+  peerType?: "ai" | "human" | "connector";
+  channel?: string;
+  model?: string;
+  groups?: Array<{ name: string; role?: string }>;
+  /** Initial role tag for the session. */
+  role?: string;
+  /** ms epoch; broker rejects if outside ±60s of its own clock. */
+  timestamp: number;
+  /** ed25519 signature (hex) by the SESSION secret key over canonical bytes. */
+  signature: string;
+}
+
 /** Client → broker: send an E2E-encrypted envelope to a target. */
 export interface WSSendMessage {
   type: "send";
@@ -110,6 +170,10 @@ export interface WSSendMessage {
    *  Server validates same-topic membership; FK is set null if parent
    *  later disappears. Ignored for non-topic targets. */
   replyToId?: string;
+  /** Optional ciphertext-format version. 1 = v1 plaintext base64;
+   *  2 = v0.3.0 phase 3 per-topic encrypted body. Server passes this
+   *  through verbatim into topic_message.body_version. */
+  bodyVersion?: number;
 }
 
 /** Broker → client: an envelope addressed to this peer. */
@@ -160,6 +224,26 @@ export interface WSSetStatusMessage {
   status: PeerStatus;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Client → broker: confirm receipt of a previously pushed envelope so the
+ * broker can mark the message_queue row delivered.
+ *
+ * v2 agentic-comms (M1): pairs with the two-phase claim/lease introduced
+ * in `drainForMember`. Without this ack, the lease expires after 30s and
+ * the message is re-claimed and re-pushed (at-least-once retry).
+ *
+ * Either id is accepted; daemons that track inbox dedupe by clientMessageId
+ * should send that one. brokerMessageId is the row primary key, useful when
+ * the original send didn't carry a client_message_id (legacy traffic).
+ */
+export interface WSClientAckMessage {
+  type: "client_ack";
+  /** Original caller-supplied idempotency id from the `send` envelope. */
+  clientMessageId?: string;
+  /** Broker-side row id (the `messageId` field on the inbound `push`). */
+  brokerMessageId?: string;
+}
+
 /** Client → broker: request list of connected peers in the same mesh. */
 export interface WSListPeersMessage {
   type: "list_peers";
@@ -454,6 +538,8 @@ export interface WSPeersListMessage {
   type: "peers_list";
   peers: Array<{
     pubkey: string;
+    /** Stable member pubkey — present on M1+ broker responses. */
+    memberPubkey?: string;
     displayName: string;
     status: PeerStatus;
     summary: string | null;
@@ -461,6 +547,13 @@ export interface WSPeersListMessage {
     sessionId: string;
     connectedAt: string;
     cwd?: string;
+    /** v2 agentic-comms (M1): typed connection role. CLI uses this to
+     *  filter control-plane daemons out of user-facing peer lists.
+     *  Optional for clients talking to a pre-M1 broker. Wire field is
+     *  `peerRole` to avoid collision with 1.31.5's top-level `role`
+     *  (which is a lift of `profile.role`, the user-supplied string
+     *  like "lead" / "reviewer" / "human"). */
+    peerRole?: "control-plane" | "session" | "service";
     hostname?: string;
     peerType?: "ai" | "human" | "connector";
     channel?: string;
@@ -1330,6 +1423,16 @@ export interface WSVaultGetMessage { type: "vault_get"; keys: string[]; _reqId?:
 export interface WSWatchMessage { type: "watch"; url: string; mode?: "hash" | "json" | "status"; extract?: string; interval?: number; notify_on?: string; headers?: Record<string, string>; label?: string; _reqId?: string; }
 /** Client → broker: stop watching. */
 export interface WSUnwatchMessage { type: "unwatch"; watchId: string; _reqId?: string; }
+/** Client → broker: soft-disconnect a peer (1000; CLI auto-reconnects). */
+export interface WSDisconnectMessage { type: "disconnect"; target?: string; stale?: number; all?: boolean; _reqId?: string; }
+/** Client → broker: hard-kick a peer (4001; CLI exits). */
+export interface WSKickMessage { type: "kick"; target?: string; stale?: number; all?: boolean; _reqId?: string; }
+/** Client → broker: ban a member by pubkey or display name. */
+export interface WSBanMessage { type: "ban"; target: string; reason?: string; _reqId?: string; }
+/** Client → broker: lift a ban. */
+export interface WSUnbanMessage { type: "unban"; target: string; _reqId?: string; }
+/** Client → broker: list active bans on the caller's mesh. */
+export interface WSListBansMessage { type: "list_bans"; _reqId?: string; }
 /** Client → broker: list active watches. */
 export interface WSWatchListMessage { type: "watch_list"; _reqId?: string; }
 /** Broker → client: watch created acknowledgement. */
@@ -1341,7 +1444,9 @@ export interface WSWatchTriggeredMessage { type: "watch_triggered"; watchId: str
 
 export type WSClientMessage =
   | WSHelloMessage
+  | WSSessionHelloMessage
   | WSSendMessage
+  | WSClientAckMessage
   | WSSetStatusMessage
   | WSListPeersMessage
   | WSSetSummaryMessage
@@ -1433,7 +1538,12 @@ export type WSClientMessage =
   | WSVaultGetMessage
   | WSWatchMessage
   | WSUnwatchMessage
-  | WSWatchListMessage;
+  | WSWatchListMessage
+  | WSDisconnectMessage
+  | WSKickMessage
+  | WSBanMessage
+  | WSUnbanMessage
+  | WSListBansMessage;
 
 // --- Skill messages ---
 
@@ -1485,6 +1595,8 @@ export interface WSSkillDataMessage {
     instructions: string;
     tags: string[];
     author: string;
+    /** Optional opaque metadata stored alongside the skill body. */
+    manifest?: unknown;
     createdAt: string;
   } | null;
   _reqId?: string;

apps/broker/tests/kick-control-plane-skip.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/**
+ * Kick control-plane skip: 1.34.15 (gap #3a) refuses to close
+ * long-lived control-plane connections (claudemesh daemon, dashboard)
+ * via `kick`, because they auto-reconnect within seconds and the verb
+ * was effectively a no-op. The soft `disconnect` verb keeps the old
+ * behavior so users can still nudge a control-plane peer to
+ * re-authenticate.
+ *
+ * Pure-logic test — mirrors the branch inside handleSend's kick case
+ * without spinning up a broker. Same pattern as
+ * grants-enforcement.test.ts.
+ */
+
+import { describe, expect, test } from "vitest";
+
+type PeerRole = "control-plane" | "session" | "service";
+
+/** Mirrors the predicate inserted into the kick handler. */
+function shouldSkipKick(args: {
+  verb: "kick" | "disconnect";
+  peerRole: PeerRole;
+}): boolean {
+  const skipControlPlane = args.verb === "kick";
+  return skipControlPlane && args.peerRole === "control-plane";
+}
+
+describe("kick control-plane skip (gap #3a)", () => {
+  test("kick on control-plane → skipped (would auto-reconnect)", () => {
+    expect(shouldSkipKick({ verb: "kick", peerRole: "control-plane" })).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("kick on session → not skipped (closes user session)", () => {
+    expect(shouldSkipKick({ verb: "kick", peerRole: "session" })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("kick on service → not skipped", () => {
+    expect(shouldSkipKick({ verb: "kick", peerRole: "service" })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("disconnect on control-plane → not skipped (intentional nudge)", () => {
+    expect(shouldSkipKick({ verb: "disconnect", peerRole: "control-plane" })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("disconnect on session → not skipped", () => {
+    expect(shouldSkipKick({ verb: "disconnect", peerRole: "session" })).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

apps/broker/tests/session-hello-signature.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/**
+ * Session-hello signature + parent-attestation verification.
+ *
+ * Two-stage proof:
+ *   1. Parent member signs `canonicalSessionAttestation` (long-lived, ≤24h
+ *      TTL) — vouches that the session pubkey belongs to them.
+ *   2. Session keypair signs `canonicalSessionHello` per WS-connect — proves
+ *      liveness + possession.
+ *
+ * The broker rejects on any: expired/over-TTL attestation, bad signature,
+ * timestamp skew, malformed hex, or a session signature made with the
+ * wrong key (covers the "attestation leaked, attacker tries to use it
+ * without the session secret key" case).
+ */
+
+import { beforeAll, describe, expect, test } from "vitest";
+import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers";
+import {
+  canonicalSessionAttestation,
+  canonicalSessionHello,
+  verifySessionAttestation,
+  verifySessionHelloSignature,
+  SESSION_ATTESTATION_MAX_TTL_MS,
+  HELLO_SKEW_MS,
+} from "../src/crypto";
+
+interface Keypair {
+  publicKey: string;
+  secretKey: string;
+}
+
+async function makeKeypair(): Promise<Keypair> {
+  await sodium.ready;
+  const kp = sodium.crypto_sign_keypair();
+  return {
+    publicKey: sodium.to_hex(kp.publicKey),
+    secretKey: sodium.to_hex(kp.privateKey),
+  };
+}
+
+function sign(canonical: string, secretKeyHex: string): string {
+  return sodium.to_hex(
+    sodium.crypto_sign_detached(
+      sodium.from_string(canonical),
+      sodium.from_hex(secretKeyHex),
+    ),
+  );
+}
+
+describe("verifySessionAttestation", () => {
+  let parent: Keypair;
+  let session: Keypair;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    parent = await makeKeypair();
+    session = await makeKeypair();
+  });
+
+  test("valid attestation accepted", async () => {
+    const expiresAt = Date.now() + 60 * 60 * 1000;
+    const canonical = canonicalSessionAttestation(parent.publicKey, session.publicKey, expiresAt);
+    const signature = sign(canonical, parent.secretKey);
+    const result = await verifySessionAttestation({
+      parentMemberPubkey: parent.publicKey,
+      sessionPubkey: session.publicKey,
+      expiresAt,
+      signature,
+    });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("expired attestation rejected", async () => {
+    const expiresAt = Date.now() - 1_000;
+    const canonical = canonicalSessionAttestation(parent.publicKey, session.publicKey, expiresAt);
+    const signature = sign(canonical, parent.secretKey);
+    const result = await verifySessionAttestation({
+      parentMemberPubkey: parent.publicKey,
+      sessionPubkey: session.publicKey,
+      expiresAt,
+      signature,
+    });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.reason).toBe("expired");
+  });
+
+  test("over-24h TTL rejected", async () => {
+    const expiresAt = Date.now() + SESSION_ATTESTATION_MAX_TTL_MS + 60_000;
+    const canonical = canonicalSessionAttestation(parent.publicKey, session.publicKey, expiresAt);
+    const signature = sign(canonical, parent.secretKey);
+    const result = await verifySessionAttestation({
+      parentMemberPubkey: parent.publicKey,
+      sessionPubkey: session.publicKey,
+      expiresAt,
+      signature,
+    });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.reason).toBe("ttl_too_long");
+  });
+
+  test("attestation signed by wrong key rejected", async () => {
+    const other = await makeKeypair();
+    const expiresAt = Date.now() + 60 * 60 * 1000;
+    const canonical = canonicalSessionAttestation(parent.publicKey, session.publicKey, expiresAt);
+    // Sign with a different parent — verifier still checks against
+    // claimed parentMemberPubkey, so it should fail.
+    const signature = sign(canonical, other.secretKey);
+    const result = await verifySessionAttestation({
+      parentMemberPubkey: parent.publicKey,
+      sessionPubkey: session.publicKey,
+      expiresAt,
+      signature,
+    });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.reason).toBe("bad_signature");
+  });
+
+  test("tampered session_pubkey fails (canonical mismatch)", async () => {
+    const expiresAt = Date.now() + 60 * 60 * 1000;
+    const canonical = canonicalSessionAttestation(parent.publicKey, session.publicKey, expiresAt);
+    const signature = sign(canonical, parent.secretKey);
+    const evil = await makeKeypair();
+    const result = await verifySessionAttestation({
+      parentMemberPubkey: parent.publicKey,
+      sessionPubkey: evil.publicKey, // claim a different session pubkey
+      expiresAt,
+      signature,
+    });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.reason).toBe("bad_signature");
+  });
+
+  test("malformed hex rejected", async () => {
+    const expiresAt = Date.now() + 60 * 60 * 1000;
+    const result = await verifySessionAttestation({
+      parentMemberPubkey: "not-hex",
+      sessionPubkey: session.publicKey,
+      expiresAt,
+      signature: "a".repeat(128),
+    });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.reason).toBe("malformed");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("verifySessionHelloSignature", () => {
+  let parent: Keypair;
+  let session: Keypair;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    parent = await makeKeypair();
+    session = await makeKeypair();
+  });
+
+  test("valid session-hello signature accepted", async () => {
+    const meshId = "mesh-x";
+    const timestamp = Date.now();
+    const canonical = canonicalSessionHello(meshId, parent.publicKey, session.publicKey, timestamp);
+    const signature = sign(canonical, session.secretKey);
+    const result = await verifySessionHelloSignature({
+      meshId,
+      parentMemberPubkey: parent.publicKey,
+      sessionPubkey: session.publicKey,
+      timestamp,
+      signature,
+    });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("attacker without session secret key cannot forge session-hello", async () => {
+    // The hostile case: attacker captured a valid attestation but doesn't
+    // hold the session secret key. They try to sign session_hello with the
+    // parent's key — broker checks the signature against sessionPubkey,
+    // which fails because the parent didn't sign with the session key.
+    const meshId = "mesh-x";
+    const timestamp = Date.now();
+    const canonical = canonicalSessionHello(meshId, parent.publicKey, session.publicKey, timestamp);
+    const signature = sign(canonical, parent.secretKey); // wrong secret key
+    const result = await verifySessionHelloSignature({
+      meshId,
+      parentMemberPubkey: parent.publicKey,
+      sessionPubkey: session.publicKey,
+      timestamp,
+      signature,
+    });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.reason).toBe("bad_signature");
+  });
+
+  test("timestamp skew rejected", async () => {
+    const timestamp = Date.now() - HELLO_SKEW_MS - 1_000;
+    const canonical = canonicalSessionHello("mesh-x", parent.publicKey, session.publicKey, timestamp);
+    const signature = sign(canonical, session.secretKey);
+    const result = await verifySessionHelloSignature({
+      meshId: "mesh-x",
+      parentMemberPubkey: parent.publicKey,
+      sessionPubkey: session.publicKey,
+      timestamp,
+      signature,
+    });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.reason).toBe("timestamp_skew");
+  });
+
+  test("tampered meshId fails verification", async () => {
+    const timestamp = Date.now();
+    const canonical = canonicalSessionHello("mesh-A", parent.publicKey, session.publicKey, timestamp);
+    const signature = sign(canonical, session.secretKey);
+    const result = await verifySessionHelloSignature({
+      meshId: "mesh-B", // claim a different mesh
+      parentMemberPubkey: parent.publicKey,
+      sessionPubkey: session.publicKey,
+      timestamp,
+      signature,
+    });
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!result.ok) expect(result.reason).toBe("bad_signature");
+  });
+});

apps/cli/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "claudemesh-cli",
-  "version": "1.21.1",
+  "version": "1.34.16",
   "description": "Peer mesh for Claude Code sessions — CLI + MCP server.",
   "keywords": [
     "claude-code",

apps/cli/skills/claudemesh/SKILL.md

@@ -9,9 +9,13 @@ description: Use when the user asks to send a message to a peer Claude session,
 
 **You invoke claudemesh exclusively through the `claudemesh` CLI via Bash.** There are no MCP tools to call — `tools/list` returns empty for the claudemesh MCP server. The MCP server exists only to deliver inbound peer messages as `<channel source="claudemesh">` interrupts mid-turn. Everything else is CLI.
 
+## Launch welcome (`kind: "welcome"`) — 1.34.2+
+
+5 seconds after Claude Code attaches to claudemesh via `claudemesh launch`, the MCP server emits ONE `<channel source="claudemesh">` push with `meta.kind: "welcome"`. It carries identity (`self_display_name`, `self_session_pubkey`, `self_role`), the active `mesh_slug`, live `peer_count` + `peer_names`, recent `unread_count` + `latest_message_ids`, and a CLI hint line. Treat it as the "mesh is connected" handshake — read it once, internalize identity + peers + inbox state, and use it to decide whether to act on unread items right away. Do NOT reply to a welcome push the way you reply to a DM; it has no sender.
+
 ## When you receive a `<channel source="claudemesh">` message
 
-Respond IMMEDIATELY. Pause your current task, reply via `claudemesh send`, then resume. Read `from_name`, `mesh_slug`, and `priority` from the channel attributes. Reply by setting `<to>` to the sender's `from_name`. Do not ignore low-priority messages — acknowledge them briefly even if you defer action. If the channel meta contains `subtype: reminder`, this is a scheduled reminder you set yourself — act on it.
+Respond IMMEDIATELY (unless `meta.kind` is `"welcome"` or `"system"` — those are informational, no reply needed). Pause your current task, reply via `claudemesh send`, then resume. Read `from_name`, `mesh_slug`, and `priority` from the channel attributes. Reply by setting `<to>` to the sender's `from_name`. Do not ignore low-priority messages — acknowledge them briefly even if you defer action. If the channel meta contains `subtype: reminder`, this is a scheduled reminder you set yourself — act on it.
 
 ### Channel attributes (everything you need to reply is in the push)
 
@@ -19,14 +23,17 @@ The `<channel>` interrupt carries these attributes — no lookup needed:
 
 | Attribute | What it is |
 |---|---|
-| `from_name` | Sender's display name. **Use as `to` in your reply** for DMs. |
+| `from_name` | Sender's display name. **Use as `to` in your reply** for DMs. Empty/absent on `kind: "welcome"` and `kind: "system"`. |
-| `from_pubkey` | Sender's session pubkey (hex). Stable per-session. |
+| `from_pubkey` | Sender's **session pubkey** (hex, ephemeral per-launch). Since 1.34.0 this is the session pubkey of the launched session that originated the send, NOT the daemon's stable member pubkey — sibling sessions of the same human are correctly disambiguated. |
-| `from_member_id` | Sender's stable mesh.member id. Survives display-name changes — the canonical id. |
+| `from_session_pubkey` | Same as `from_pubkey` for session-originated DMs. Kept as a separate key so the model never confuses session vs member identity when a control-plane source is involved. |
+| `from_member_id` / `from_member_pubkey` | Sender's stable mesh.member id / pubkey. Survives display-name and session rotation. Use to recognize "the same human across multiple Claude Code windows". |
 | `mesh_slug` | Mesh the message arrived on. Pass via `--mesh <slug>` if the parent isn't on the same mesh. |
 | `priority` | `now` / `next` / `low`. |
 | `message_id` | Server-side id of THIS message. **Pass to `--reply-to <id>` to thread your reply** in topic posts. |
+| `client_message_id` | Sender-stable idempotency id (UUID). Survives broker restarts; safe to log. |
 | `topic` | Set when the source is a topic post. Reply via `topic post <topic> --reply-to <message_id>`. |
 | `reply_to_id` | Set when the message itself is a reply to a previous one — render thread context. |
+| `kind` (welcome/system meta only) | `"welcome"` for the launch handshake, `"system"` for peer_join/peer_leave/etc. — neither needs a reply. |
 
 **Reply patterns:**
 
@@ -45,9 +52,30 @@ claudemesh send "<from_name>" "..." --mesh "<mesh_slug>"
 
 If the parent Claude session was launched via `claudemesh launch`, an MCP push-pipe is running and holds the per-mesh WS connection. CLI invocations dial `~/.claudemesh/sockets/<mesh-slug>.sock` and reuse that warm connection (~200ms total round-trip including Node.js startup). If no push-pipe is running (cron, scripts, hooks fired outside a session), the CLI opens its own WS, which takes ~500-700ms cold. **You don't manage this** — every verb auto-detects and falls through.
 
+### Daemon path (v1.24.0+, REQUIRED for in-Claude-Code use)
+
+`claudemesh daemon up [--mesh <slug>]` starts a persistent per-user runtime that holds the broker WS, a durable SQLite outbox/inbox, and listens on `~/.claudemesh/daemon/daemon.sock` (UDS) plus an optional loopback TCP. When the daemon socket is present, every verb routes through it first (~1ms IPC) before falling back to bridge / cold paths. The send envelope carries a caller-stable `client_message_id`, so a `claudemesh send` that started before a daemon crash survives the restart via the on-disk outbox.
+
+Lifecycle:
+
+```bash
+claudemesh daemon up --mesh <slug>                     # foreground
+claudemesh daemon install-service --mesh <slug>        # macOS launchd / Linux systemd-user
+claudemesh daemon status [--json]                      # health + pid
+claudemesh daemon outbox list [--failed|--pending|...] # local queue inspection
+claudemesh daemon outbox requeue <id>                  # re-enqueue an aborted/dead row
+claudemesh daemon down                                 # SIGTERM + wait
+```
+
+As of 1.24.0 `claudemesh install` registers the MCP entry **and** installs/starts the daemon service for the user's primary mesh. The MCP shim hard-requires the daemon to be running — it bails at boot with actionable instructions if the socket isn't present. There is no fallback. CLI verbs (`send`, `peer list`, `inbox`, `skill list/get`, etc.) keep working without a daemon via bridge or cold paths, but for any in-Claude-Code use the daemon must be up.
+
+### Ambient mode (1.25.0+)
+
+Once `claudemesh install` has run (registers MCP entry + starts daemon service), **raw `claude` Just Works** for the daemon's attached mesh. No `claudemesh launch` ceremony, no manual flags, no per-session keypair. Channel push, slash commands, and resources all flow through the daemon-backed MCP shim. Use `claudemesh launch` only when you need to override defaults (different mesh, custom display name, system-prompt injection, headless modes).
+
 ## Spawning new sessions (no wizard)
 
-`claudemesh launch` is the canonical way to start a new Claude Code session connected to claudemesh. Pass every required flag up front so no interactive prompt fires — that's what makes the verb scriptable from tmux send-keys, AppleScript/iTerm spawn helpers, hooks, cron, and the `claudemesh launch` you call from inside another session. **Always use this verb, never `claude` directly with hand-rolled flags** — it sets up the per-session ed25519 keypair, exports `CLAUDEMESH_DISPLAY_NAME`, isolates the mesh config in a tmpdir, and passes the `--dangerously-load-development-channels server:claudemesh` plumbing that the MCP push-pipe needs.
+`claudemesh launch` remains useful for non-default cases: explicit mesh selection, fresh display name, headless `--quiet` runs, system-prompt injection, multi-mesh users with one daemon attached to mesh A who want to spawn into mesh B. For the common case (single joined mesh, daemon installed), prefer raw `claude`. Pass every required flag up front so no interactive prompt fires — that's what makes the verb scriptable from tmux send-keys, AppleScript/iTerm spawn helpers, hooks, cron, and the `claudemesh launch` you call from inside another session.
 
 ### Full flag surface
 
@@ -59,15 +87,56 @@ If the parent Claude session was launched via `claudemesh launch`, an MCP push-p
 | `--groups "name:role,name2:role2,all"` | the group selection prompt | comma-separated `<groupname>:<role>` entries; the literal `all` joins `@all` |
 | `--role <lead\|member\|observer>` | the role prompt | applied to all groups in `--groups` that didn't specify their own |
 | `--message-mode <push\|inbox>` | the message-mode prompt | `push` (default) emits `<channel>` notifications mid-turn; `inbox` only buffers — quieter for headless agents |
-| `--system-prompt <path>` | nothing — pure pass-through | forwarded to `claude --append-system-prompt` |
+| `--system-prompt <text>` | nothing — pure pass-through | forwarded to `claude --system-prompt` (overrides default; pass a string, not a path) |
 | `--resume <session-id>` | nothing — pure pass-through | forwarded to `claude --resume` to continue a prior Claude Code session |
-| `--continue` | nothing — pure pass-through | forwarded to `claude --continue` |
+| `--continue` | nothing — pure pass-through | forwarded to `claude --continue` (resumes the last session in this cwd) |
 | `-y` / `--yes` | every confirmation prompt | including the "you'll skip ALL permission prompts" gate. **Use for autonomous agents; omit for shared/multi-person meshes.** |
-| `-q` / `--quiet` | the welcome banner | useful when the spawning script wants clean stdout |
+| `--quiet` | the wizard + welcome banner | suppresses the launch wizard and banner. Combine with `-y` for true headless: `--quiet` alone won't bypass Claude's permission prompts, so a script using only `--quiet` will hang on the first tool call. |
 | `--` | (separator) | everything after `--` is forwarded verbatim to `claude`. Example: `claudemesh launch --name X -y -- --resume abc123 --model opus` |
 
+> **All twelve flags are end-to-end wired as of `claudemesh-cli@1.27.1`.** Earlier builds silently dropped `--role`, `--groups`, `--message-mode`, `--system-prompt`, `--continue`, and `--quiet` at the CLI entrypoint — they were declared but never reached `runLaunch`. If a script targets older versions, those flags are no-ops.
+
 ### Wizard-free spawn templates
 
+#### Canonical fully-populated spawn (every flag set explicitly)
+
+The kitchen-sink form — copy, set every value, and the session boots without a single interactive prompt or banner. Use as a base when scripting from cron, hooks, CI, or another agent:
+
+```bash
+claudemesh launch \
+  --name "ci-bot" \
+  --mesh openclaw \
+  --role member \
+  --groups "frontend:lead,reviewers:observer,all" \
+  --message-mode inbox \
+  --system-prompt "$(cat ~/agents/ci-bot.md)" \
+  --quiet \
+  -y \
+  -- \
+  --model opus \
+  --resume "$LAST_SESSION_ID"
+```
+
+Annotated:
+
+| Position | Value | Effect |
+|---|---|---|
+| `--name "ci-bot"` | identity | what peers see in `peer list` and `<channel from_name>` — pin so peers always see the same name across machines |
+| `--mesh openclaw` | workspace | required when you have ≥2 joined meshes; safe to include even with 1 (becomes a no-op assertion) |
+| `--role member` | session label | free-form tag used by group conventions; common values: `lead`, `member`, `observer`, `bot`, `oncall` |
+| `--groups "frontend:lead,..."` | group memberships | comma-separated `<group>:<role>` pairs; bare `all` joins `@all` with no role |
+| `--message-mode inbox` | delivery | `push` interrupts mid-turn (default); `inbox` buffers silently; `off` disables messages but keeps tool calls |
+| `--system-prompt "..."` | claude system prompt | overrides Claude's default. Pass a string, not a path — wrap with `$(cat …)` if you keep prompts in files |
+| `--quiet` | output | suppress the wizard and banner — clean stdout for the spawning script |
+| `-y` | consent | skips every permission prompt (claudemesh's policy gate **and** Claude's `--dangerously-skip-permissions`). Required for true headless |
+| `--` | separator | everything after is passed verbatim to `claude` |
+| `--model opus` | claude flag | example claude-side override |
+| `--resume "$LAST_SESSION_ID"` | claude flag | resume a prior Claude session inside this mesh identity |
+
+**Rule of thumb:** for any unattended spawn, the minimum is `--name + --mesh + -y + --quiet`. Add `--system-prompt` to seed task context, `--message-mode inbox` to keep the bot quiet, and `--role` + `--groups` so peers know how to address it. Drop `--quiet` when a human is watching the script's stdout.
+
+#### Trimmed templates
+
 ```bash
 # Minimal — single joined mesh, fresh agent, autonomous:
 claudemesh launch --name "Lug Nut" -y
@@ -88,9 +157,9 @@ claudemesh launch --name "Mou" --mesh openclaw -y -- --resume abc123-...
 
 # Quiet, headless, system-prompt loaded — for cron / hooks:
 claudemesh launch --name "ci-bot" --mesh openclaw \
-  --system-prompt /path/to/ci-bot.md \
+  --system-prompt "$(cat ~/agents/ci-bot.md)" \
   --message-mode inbox \
-  -q -y
+  --quiet -y
 ```
 
 If any required flag is missing AND stdin is a TTY, `launch` falls back to its prompt for that single field. **In a non-TTY context (Bash tool, cron, AppleScript pipe), missing flags cause the verb to fail-closed — never silently use a default that affects identity.**
@@ -266,22 +335,36 @@ claudemesh peer bans                              # list banned members
 claudemesh peer verify [peer]                     # 6×5-digit safety numbers
 ```
 
-JSON shape (per peer):
+JSON shape (per peer) — **render `role` and `groups` whenever you build a table for the user**, they're the highest-signal fields after `displayName`:
 ```json
 {
   "displayName": "Mou",
-  "pubkey": "abc123...",
+  "pubkey": "abc123...",          // session pubkey (rotates per claudemesh launch)
+  "memberPubkey": "def456...",     // stable identity (same across all sibling sessions)
+  "sessionId": "uuid",
   "status": "idle | working | dnd",
   "summary": "string or null",
+  "role": "lead | reviewer | bot | ...",   // 1.31.5+: top-level alias of profile.role
   "groups": [{ "name": "reviewers", "role": "lead" }],
-  "peerType": "claude | telegram | ...",
+  "profile": {
+    "role": "lead",
+    "title": "string or null",
+    "bio": "string or null",
+    "avatar": "emoji or null",
+    "capabilities": ["..."]
+  },
+  "peerType": "claude | telegram | ai | human | connector | ...",
   "channel": "claude-code | api | ...",
   "model": "claude-opus-4-7 | ...",
   "cwd": "/path/to/working/dir or null",
+  "isSelf": true,                  // peer is one of the caller's own sessions
+  "isThisSession": false,          // peer is the exact session running the cli
   "stats": { "messagesIn": 0, "messagesOut": 0, "toolCalls": 0, "errors": 0, "uptime": 1200 }
 }
 ```
 
+**When asked to "list peers" inside a launched session, prefer the human renderer (`claudemesh peer list`, no `--json`) — it already prints role + groups inline next to the name with an explicit `(none)` footer when both are absent. If you do need JSON for parsing, always include `role` and `groups` columns in any rendered table; the user's primary question is usually "who's in what role" and dropping those fields hides the answer.**
+
 ### `message` — send and inspect messages
 
 ```bash
@@ -294,15 +377,33 @@ claudemesh message send <p> "..." --priority now       # bypass busy gates
 claudemesh message send <p> "..." --priority next      # default
 claudemesh message send <p> "..." --priority low       # pull-only
 
-# inbox (alias: claudemesh inbox)
+# inbox (alias: claudemesh inbox) — 1.34.0+ reads from inbox.db via daemon IPC
-claudemesh message inbox
+claudemesh inbox                                       # all attached meshes, last 100
-claudemesh message inbox --json
+claudemesh inbox --mesh <slug>                         # scoped to one mesh
+claudemesh inbox --mesh <slug> --limit 20              # custom cap
+claudemesh inbox --json                                # full row (sender_pubkey, mesh, body, received_at, seen_at, …)
+claudemesh inbox --unread                              # 1.34.8+ only rows whose seen_at IS NULL
+
+# inbox flush + delete — 1.34.7+
+claudemesh inbox flush --mesh <slug>                   # delete all rows on one mesh
+claudemesh inbox flush --before <iso-timestamp>        # delete rows older than timestamp
+claudemesh inbox flush --all                           # delete every row on every mesh (required guard)
+claudemesh inbox delete <id>                           # delete one inbox row by id (alias: rm)
+claudemesh inbox flush --mesh <slug> --json            # JSON: { ok: true, removed: N }
 
 # delivery status (alias: claudemesh msg-status <id>)
 claudemesh message status <message-id>
 claudemesh message status <message-id> --json
 ```
 
+**Inbox source (1.34.0+):** `claudemesh inbox` queries the daemon's persistent `~/.claudemesh/daemon/inbox.db` over IPC — it is NOT a fresh broker-WS buffer drain. Rows survive daemon restarts. Sender attribution is the actual session pubkey of the launched session that originated the send (NOT the stable member pubkey of the sender's daemon), so two sibling sessions of the same human appear as distinct rows.
+
+**Read-state (1.34.8+):** every inbox row carries a `seen_at` timestamp. `null` = never surfaced; an ISO string = first surfaced at that moment. The flag flips automatically when (a) the row is returned by an interactive `claudemesh inbox` listing, or (b) the MCP server emits a live `<channel>` reminder for it. The launch welcome push uses `unread_only=true` to surface only rows the user hasn't seen — so a session relaunched a day later sees what it actually missed, not the same 24h batch every time. Use `claudemesh inbox --unread` to get the same filter from the CLI.
+
+**Self-echo guard (1.34.8+):** broker fan-out paths sometimes mirror an outbound DM back to the originating session-WS. The daemon now drops those at the WS boundary (matching on `senderPubkey === own.session_pubkey`), so the sender no longer sees their own `claudemesh send` arrive as a `← claudemesh: <self>: ...` channel push immediately after dispatching it.
+
+**Inbox TTL (1.34.8+):** the daemon runs an hourly prune that deletes rows older than 30 days. Without this the inbox grew unbounded; now it self-trims while preserving "I went on holiday and want to see what I missed" recovery for a generous window. No CLI knob — it's a built-in retention policy. To override, manually `claudemesh inbox flush --before <iso>`.
+
 `send` JSON output: `{"ok": true, "messageId": "...", "target": "..."}`. Errors: `{"ok": false, "error": "..."}`.
 
 ### `state` — shared per-mesh key-value store

apps/cli/src/cli/argv.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,43 @@ import { defineCommand, runMain } from "citty";
 
 export interface ParsedArgs { command: string; positionals: string[]; flags: Record<string, string | boolean | undefined>; }
 
+/**
+ * Flags that NEVER take a value. The parser's default behavior is greedy
+ * (any `--flag` consumes the next non-`-` arg as its value), which is
+ * fine for `--mesh foo` and `--priority now` but breaks for booleans:
+ * `claudemesh send --self <pubkey> "msg"` was eating the pubkey as the
+ * value of --self, leaving zero positionals and triggering Usage errors.
+ *
+ * Adding to this set: any new boolean / no-arg switch.
+ */
+const BOOLEAN_FLAGS = new Set([
+  "self",
+  "json",            // also accepts --json=a,b,c form below
+  "all",
+  "yes", "y",
+  "help", "h",
+  "version", "v",
+  "quiet",
+  "strict",
+  "continue",
+  "no-daemon",
+  "no-color",
+  "debug",
+  "allow-ci-persistent",
+  "force",
+  "dry-run",
+  "verbose",
+  "skip-service",
+  // 1.34.8: `--unread` filters `claudemesh inbox` to rows whose
+  // seen_at is NULL. No value — pure switch.
+  "unread",
+  // 1.34.12: `--foreground` keeps `claudemesh daemon up` attached
+  // to the terminal (pre-1.34.12 behavior). Default is detached now.
+  "foreground",
+  "no-tcp",
+  "public-health",
+]);
+
 export function parseArgv(argv: string[]): ParsedArgs {
   const args = argv.slice(2);
   const flags: Record<string, string | boolean | undefined> = {};
@@ -10,14 +47,26 @@ export function parseArgv(argv: string[]): ParsedArgs {
 
   for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
     const arg = args[i]!;
+    // --flag=value (always parsed as a value, regardless of boolean set)
+    if (arg.startsWith("--") && arg.includes("=")) {
+      const eq = arg.indexOf("=");
+      const key = arg.slice(2, eq);
+      flags[key] = arg.slice(eq + 1);
+      continue;
+    }
     if (arg.startsWith("--")) {
       const key = arg.slice(2);
+      // Known boolean → never consume the next token as a value.
+      if (BOOLEAN_FLAGS.has(key)) { flags[key] = true; continue; }
       const next = args[i + 1];
-      if (next && !next.startsWith("-")) { flags[key] = next; i++; } else flags[key] = true;
+      if (next !== undefined && !next.startsWith("-")) { flags[key] = next; i++; }
+      else flags[key] = true;
     } else if (arg.startsWith("-") && arg.length === 2) {
       const key = arg.slice(1);
+      if (BOOLEAN_FLAGS.has(key)) { flags[key] = true; continue; }
       const next = args[i + 1];
-      if (next && !next.startsWith("-")) { flags[key] = next; i++; } else flags[key] = true;
+      if (next !== undefined && !next.startsWith("-")) { flags[key] = next; i++; }
+      else flags[key] = true;
     } else if (!command) {
       command = arg;
     } else {

apps/cli/src/commands/broker-actions.ts

@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@
  */
 
 import { withMesh } from "./connect.js";
-import { readConfig } from "~/services/config/facade.js";
+import { tryForgetViaDaemon } from "~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js";
-import { tryBridge } from "~/services/bridge/client.js";
 import { render } from "~/ui/render.js";
 import { bold, clay, dim } from "~/ui/styles.js";
 import { EXIT } from "~/constants/exit-codes.js";
@@ -25,14 +24,6 @@ import { validateMessageId, renderValidationError } from "~/cli/validators.js";
 type StateFlags = { mesh?: string; json?: boolean };
 type PeerStatus = "idle" | "working" | "dnd";
 
-/** Resolve unambiguous mesh slug for warm-path bridging. Returns null if
- * the user has multiple joined meshes and didn't pick one. */
-function unambiguousMesh(opts: StateFlags): string | null {
-  if (opts.mesh) return opts.mesh;
-  const config = readConfig();
-  return config.meshes.length === 1 ? config.meshes[0]!.slug : null;
-}
-
 // --- status ---
 
 export async function runStatusSet(state: string, opts: StateFlags): Promise<number> {
@@ -42,21 +33,9 @@ export async function runStatusSet(state: string, opts: StateFlags): Promise<num
     return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS;
   }
 
-  // Warm path
+  // Bridge tier deleted in 1.28.0 (dead code; the orphaned warm-path
-  const meshSlug = unambiguousMesh(opts);
+  // socket was never opened by anyone). Daemon route would belong here;
-  if (meshSlug) {
+  // adding it for status/summary/visible is queued for 1.29.0.
-    const bridged = await tryBridge(meshSlug, "status_set", { status: state });
-    if (bridged !== null) {
-      if (bridged.ok) {
-        if (opts.json) console.log(JSON.stringify({ status: state }));
-        else render.ok(`status set to ${bold(state)}`);
-        return EXIT.SUCCESS;
-      }
-      render.err(bridged.error);
-      return EXIT.INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
-  }
-
   await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
     await client.setStatus(state as PeerStatus);
   });
@@ -73,21 +52,6 @@ export async function runSummary(text: string, opts: StateFlags): Promise<number
     return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS;
   }
 
-  // Warm path
-  const meshSlug = unambiguousMesh(opts);
-  if (meshSlug) {
-    const bridged = await tryBridge(meshSlug, "summary", { summary: text });
-    if (bridged !== null) {
-      if (bridged.ok) {
-        if (opts.json) console.log(JSON.stringify({ summary: text }));
-        else render.ok("summary set", dim(text));
-        return EXIT.SUCCESS;
-      }
-      render.err(bridged.error);
-      return EXIT.INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
-  }
-
   await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
     await client.setSummary(text);
   });
@@ -107,21 +71,6 @@ export async function runVisible(value: string | undefined, opts: StateFlags): P
     return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS;
   }
 
-  // Warm path
-  const meshSlug = unambiguousMesh(opts);
-  if (meshSlug) {
-    const bridged = await tryBridge(meshSlug, "visible", { visible });
-    if (bridged !== null) {
-      if (bridged.ok) {
-        if (opts.json) console.log(JSON.stringify({ visible }));
-        else render.ok(visible ? "you are now visible to peers" : "you are now hidden", visible ? undefined : "direct messages still reach you");
-        return EXIT.SUCCESS;
-      }
-      render.err(bridged.error);
-      return EXIT.INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
-  }
-
   await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
     await client.setVisible(visible);
   });
@@ -173,6 +122,14 @@ export async function runForget(id: string | undefined, opts: StateFlags): Promi
     render.err("Usage: claudemesh forget <memory-id>");
     return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS;
   }
+
+  // Daemon path first.
+  if (await tryForgetViaDaemon(id, opts.mesh)) {
+    if (opts.json) { console.log(JSON.stringify({ id, forgotten: true })); return EXIT.SUCCESS; }
+    render.ok(`forgot ${dim(id.slice(0, 8))}`);
+    return EXIT.SUCCESS;
+  }
+
   await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
     await client.forget(id);
   });
@@ -237,7 +194,7 @@ export async function runMsgStatus(id: string | undefined, opts: StateFlags): Pr
       console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2));
       return EXIT.SUCCESS;
     }
-    render.section(`message ${id.slice(0, 12)}…`);
+    render.section(`message ${lookupId.slice(0, 12)}…`);
     render.kv([
       ["target", result.targetSpec],
       ["delivered", result.delivered ? "yes" : "no"],

apps/cli/src/commands/connect.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { createInterface } from "node:readline";
 import { BrokerClient } from "~/services/broker/facade.js";
 import { readConfig } from "~/services/config/facade.js";
 import type { JoinedMesh } from "~/services/config/facade.js";
+import { getDaemonPolicy } from "~/services/daemon/policy.js";
 
 export interface ConnectOpts {
   /** Mesh slug to connect to. Auto-selects if only one mesh joined. */
@@ -46,6 +47,18 @@ export async function withMesh<T>(
   opts: ConnectOpts,
   fn: (client: BrokerClient, mesh: JoinedMesh) => Promise<T>,
 ): Promise<T> {
+  // --strict gate: every cold-path verb funnels through here, so a single
+  // policy check covers the whole CLI surface. The daemon-routing helpers
+  // already returned null (auto-spawn failed); under --strict we refuse
+  // the cold-path fallback and exit loudly instead.
+  if (getDaemonPolicy().mode === "strict") {
+    console.error(
+      "\n  ✘ daemon not reachable — --strict refuses cold-path fallback.\n" +
+      "    run `claudemesh daemon up` (or `claudemesh doctor`) and retry.\n",
+    );
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
   const config = readConfig();
   if (config.meshes.length === 0) {
     console.error("No meshes joined. Run `claudemesh join <url>` first.");

apps/cli/src/commands/daemon.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
+import { existsSync, openSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+
 import { runDaemon } from "~/daemon/run.js";
 import { ipc, IpcError } from "~/daemon/ipc/client.js";
 import { readRunningPid } from "~/daemon/lock.js";
@@ -9,6 +13,15 @@ export interface DaemonOptions {
   publicHealth?: boolean;
   mesh?: string;
   displayName?: string;
+  /** 1.34.12: keep the daemon attached to the current shell instead
+   *  of double-forking. Default behavior changed in 1.34.12 — `up`
+   *  now detaches by default and writes JSON logs to
+   *  ~/.claudemesh/daemon/daemon.log. Pass `--foreground` to get the
+   *  pre-1.34.12 behavior (logs streaming to stdout, blocks the
+   *  terminal until Ctrl-C). install-service and `claudemesh launch`'s
+   *  auto-spawn path always pass --foreground because their parents
+   *  (launchd / the launch helper) own the lifecycle. */
+  foreground?: boolean;
   /** outbox-list status filter, set from boolean flags --failed/--pending/etc. */
   outboxStatus?: "pending" | "inflight" | "done" | "dead" | "aborted";
   /** outbox requeue: optional id to mint a fresh client_message_id with. */
@@ -22,15 +35,51 @@ export async function runDaemonCommand(
 ): Promise<number> {
   switch (sub) {
     case undefined:
+      return printDaemonUsage();
+
     case "up":
     case "start":
+      // 1.34.10: `--mesh` and `--name` deprecated.
+      //   --mesh: daemon attaches to every joined mesh automatically;
+      //     pinning at start time blocks new meshes from being picked up.
+      //   --name: overrides the daemon-WS display name GLOBALLY across
+      //     every mesh, but each mesh has its own per-mesh display name
+      //     in config.json (set at `claudemesh join` time). Passing one
+      //     name flattens that out. Sessions advertise their own
+      //     CLAUDEMESH_DISPLAY_NAME at `claudemesh launch` time anyway,
+      //     and the daemon-WS presence is hidden from peer lists since
+      //     1.32, so the daemon's display name isn't user-visible.
+      if (opts.mesh) {
+        process.stderr.write(
+          `[claudemesh] --mesh on \`daemon up\` is deprecated; the daemon attaches to every joined mesh automatically. ` +
+          `Ignoring --mesh ${opts.mesh}.\n`,
+        );
+      }
+      if (opts.displayName) {
+        process.stderr.write(
+          `[claudemesh] --name on \`daemon up\` is deprecated; per-mesh display names live in config.json (set at join time), ` +
+          `and session display names come from \`claudemesh launch --name\`. Ignoring --name ${opts.displayName}.\n`,
+        );
+      }
+      // 1.34.12: detach by default. The pre-1.34.12 behavior streamed
+      // JSON logs to the controlling terminal and blocked the shell —
+      // fine for debugging, surprising for users who just want the
+      // daemon "up." `--foreground` opts back into the old behavior;
+      // launchd / systemd-user units always pass it because the unit
+      // manager owns lifecycle and stdio redirection.
+      if (!opts.foreground) {
+        return spawnDetachedDaemon(opts);
+      }
       return runDaemon({
         tcpEnabled: !opts.noTcp,
         publicHealthCheck: opts.publicHealth,
-        mesh: opts.mesh,
-        displayName: opts.displayName,
       });
 
+    case "help":
+    case "--help":
+    case "-h":
+      return printDaemonUsage();
+
     case "status":
       return runStatus(opts);
 
@@ -54,12 +103,46 @@ export async function runDaemonCommand(
       return runUninstallService(opts);
 
     default:
-      process.stderr.write(`unknown daemon subcommand: ${sub}\n`);
+      process.stderr.write(`unknown daemon subcommand: ${sub}\n\n`);
-      process.stderr.write(`usage: claudemesh daemon [up|status|version|down|accept-host|outbox|install-service|uninstall-service]\n`);
+      printDaemonUsage(process.stderr);
       return 2;
   }
 }
 
+function printDaemonUsage(stream: NodeJS.WritableStream = process.stdout): number {
+  stream.write(`claudemesh daemon — long-lived peer mesh runtime (v0.9.0)
+
+USAGE
+  claudemesh daemon <command> [options]
+
+COMMANDS
+  up | start                   start the daemon (detached by default)
+  status                       show running pid + IPC health
+  version                      ipc + schema version of the running daemon
+  down | stop                  stop the running daemon (SIGTERM, then wait)
+  accept-host                  pin the current host fingerprint
+  outbox list                  list local outbox rows (newest first)
+  outbox requeue <id>          re-enqueue an aborted / dead outbox row
+  install-service              write launchd (macOS) / systemd-user (Linux) unit
+  uninstall-service            remove the platform service unit
+
+OPTIONS
+  --foreground                 keep daemon attached to terminal, JSON logs to stdout (1.34.12+)
+  --no-tcp                     disable the loopback TCP listener (UDS only)
+  --public-health              expose /v1/health unauthenticated on TCP
+  --json                       machine-readable output where supported
+
+OUTBOX FLAGS (for 'daemon outbox list')
+  --pending --inflight --done --failed --aborted   filter by status
+
+OUTBOX FLAGS (for 'daemon outbox requeue')
+  --new-client-id <id>         mint the new row with this client_message_id
+
+See ${"https://claudemesh.com/docs"} for the full daemon spec.
+`);
+  return 0;
+}
+
 interface OutboxRowResp {
   id: string;
   client_message_id: string;
@@ -148,13 +231,14 @@ async function runInstallService(opts: DaemonOptions): Promise<number> {
     process.stderr.write(`unsupported platform: ${process.platform}\n`);
     return 2;
   }
-  if (!opts.mesh) {
-    process.stderr.write(`pass --mesh <slug> so the service knows which mesh to attach to\n`);
-    return 2;
-  }
   // Resolve the binary path. Prefer the running argv[0] when it's an
   // installed claudemesh binary; fall back to whichever `claudemesh` is
   // first on PATH.
+  // 1.34.10: install-service no longer bakes --mesh into the unit. The
+  // daemon attaches to every joined mesh by default, and pinning the
+  // unit to one slug at install time was the source of the "joined a
+  // new mesh but my service ignores it" footgun. If the user passes
+  // --mesh anyway, we warn + ignore.
   let binary = process.argv[1] ?? "";
   if (!binary || /\.ts$/.test(binary) || /node_modules|src\/entrypoints/.test(binary)) {
     try {
@@ -165,11 +249,19 @@ async function runInstallService(opts: DaemonOptions): Promise<number> {
       return 1;
     }
   }
+  if (opts.mesh) {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `[claudemesh] --mesh on \`daemon install-service\` is deprecated and ignored; the daemon attaches to every joined mesh.\n`,
+    );
+  }
+  if (opts.displayName) {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `[claudemesh] --name on \`daemon install-service\` is deprecated and ignored; per-mesh names live in config.json, session names come from \`claudemesh launch --name\`.\n`,
+    );
+  }
   try {
     const r = installService({
       binaryPath: binary,
-      meshSlug: opts.mesh,
-      displayName: opts.displayName,
     });
     if (opts.json) {
       process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, ...r }) + "\n");
@@ -269,3 +361,71 @@ async function runStop(opts: DaemonOptions): Promise<number> {
   else process.stdout.write(`daemon: signaled but did not exit within 5s (pid ${pid})\n`);
   return 1;
 }
+
+/**
+ * 1.34.12: spawn the daemon as a detached background process. Re-execs
+ * the same `claudemesh` binary with `daemon up --foreground` (so the
+ * child runs the long-lived loop), redirects stdout/stderr to
+ * ~/.claudemesh/daemon/daemon.log, and `unref()`s so the parent shell
+ * can exit cleanly.
+ *
+ * The parent waits up to ~3s for the UDS socket to appear before
+ * declaring success — that's the same liveness check `claudemesh launch`
+ * uses, and it catches the "child crashed during boot" case (config
+ * read failed, port bind failed, etc.) with an actionable error
+ * pointing at the log file rather than silent loss.
+ */
+async function spawnDetachedDaemon(opts: DaemonOptions): Promise<number> {
+  // Ensure the log directory exists before opening the FDs.
+  mkdirSync(DAEMON_PATHS.DAEMON_DIR, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  const logPath = join(DAEMON_PATHS.DAEMON_DIR, "daemon.log");
+
+  // The CLI binary path. process.argv[1] is the entrypoint script the
+  // node runtime is currently executing — for an installed CLI that's
+  // .../bin/claudemesh, for `bun run` dev that's the local dist file.
+  // Either way it's the right thing to re-exec.
+  const binary = process.argv[1] ?? "claudemesh";
+  const args = ["daemon", "up", "--foreground"];
+  if (opts.noTcp) args.push("--no-tcp");
+  if (opts.publicHealth) args.push("--public-health");
+
+  const out = openSync(logPath, "a");
+  const err = openSync(logPath, "a");
+  const child = spawn(process.execPath, [binary, ...args], {
+    detached: true,
+    stdio: ["ignore", out, err],
+    env: process.env,
+  });
+  // Decouple the child from the parent's process group so closing the
+  // shell doesn't SIGHUP the daemon.
+  child.unref();
+
+  // Wait for the socket to appear — the daemon's IPC listener binds
+  // ~immediately after the broker WS handshake starts, so socket
+  // existence is a reliable "the daemon is alive enough to accept
+  // requests" signal.
+  const sockPath = DAEMON_PATHS.SOCK_FILE;
+  const startedAt = Date.now();
+  while (Date.now() - startedAt < 3_000) {
+    if (existsSync(sockPath)) {
+      if (opts.json) {
+        process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, detached: true, pid: child.pid, log: logPath }) + "\n");
+      } else {
+        process.stdout.write(`  ✔ daemon started (pid ${child.pid})\n`);
+        process.stdout.write(`  → log:  ${logPath}\n`);
+        process.stdout.write(`  → stop: claudemesh daemon down\n`);
+      }
+      return 0;
+    }
+    await new Promise<void>((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
+  }
+
+  if (opts.json) {
+    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ ok: false, detached: true, pid: child.pid, reason: "socket_not_appeared", log: logPath }) + "\n");
+  } else {
+    process.stderr.write(`  ✘ daemon spawn timeout: socket did not appear within 3s\n`);
+    process.stderr.write(`  → check log:  ${logPath}\n`);
+    process.stderr.write(`  → run foreground for live output: claudemesh daemon up --foreground\n`);
+  }
+  return 1;
+}

apps/cli/src/commands/inbox-actions.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/**
+ * `claudemesh inbox flush` and `claudemesh inbox delete <id>` —
+ * mutate the daemon's persistent inbox store
+ * (`~/.claudemesh/daemon/inbox.db`) over IPC.
+ *
+ * 1.34.7: until this version, the only way to clean the inbox was a
+ * raw `sqlite3 inbox.db "DELETE FROM inbox"` against the daemon's
+ * private DB. That works but bypasses the IPC layer (and any future
+ * lifecycle hooks on row removal), and is invisible to a user who
+ * doesn't know the schema. These two verbs make the operation visible
+ * + safe + scriptable.
+ */
+
+import {
+  tryFlushInboxViaDaemon,
+  tryDeleteInboxRowViaDaemon,
+} from "~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js";
+import { render } from "~/ui/render.js";
+import { dim } from "~/ui/styles.js";
+
+export interface InboxFlushFlags {
+  mesh?: string;
+  /** ISO-8601 timestamp; deletes rows received_at < before. */
+  before?: string;
+  /** Required when neither --mesh nor --before is set, to prevent an
+   *  accidental "delete every row on every mesh". */
+  all?: boolean;
+  json?: boolean;
+}
+
+export async function runInboxFlush(flags: InboxFlushFlags): Promise<void> {
+  const hasFilter = !!(flags.mesh || flags.before);
+  if (!hasFilter && !flags.all) {
+    if (flags.json) { process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ ok: false, error: "missing_filter" }) + "\n"); return; }
+    render.info(dim(
+      "Refusing to flush every row on every mesh.\n" +
+      "  Re-run with --mesh <slug>, --before <iso-timestamp>, or --all to confirm.",
+    ));
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  const removed = await tryFlushInboxViaDaemon({
+    ...(flags.mesh ? { mesh: flags.mesh } : {}),
+    ...(flags.before ? { beforeIso: flags.before } : {}),
+  });
+
+  if (removed === null) {
+    if (flags.json) { process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ ok: false, error: "daemon_unreachable" }) + "\n"); return; }
+    render.info(dim("Daemon not reachable. Run `claudemesh daemon up` and retry."));
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
+  if (flags.json) {
+    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, removed }) + "\n");
+    return;
+  }
+  const scope = flags.mesh
+    ? `mesh "${flags.mesh}"`
+    : flags.before
+      ? `older than ${flags.before}`
+      : "all meshes";
+  render.info(`✔ Flushed ${removed} message${removed === 1 ? "" : "s"} from ${scope}.`);
+}
+
+export interface InboxDeleteFlags {
+  json?: boolean;
+}
+
+export async function runInboxDelete(id: string, flags: InboxDeleteFlags): Promise<void> {
+  if (!id) {
+    if (flags.json) { process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ ok: false, error: "missing_id" }) + "\n"); return; }
+    render.info(dim("Usage: claudemesh inbox delete <message-id>"));
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  const ok = await tryDeleteInboxRowViaDaemon(id);
+  if (ok === null) {
+    if (flags.json) { process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ ok: false, error: "daemon_unreachable" }) + "\n"); return; }
+    render.info(dim("Daemon not reachable. Run `claudemesh daemon up` and retry."));
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  if (!ok) {
+    if (flags.json) { process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ ok: false, error: "not_found", id }) + "\n"); return; }
+    render.info(dim(`No inbox row with id "${id}".`));
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  if (flags.json) {
+    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, id }) + "\n");
+    return;
+  }
+  render.info(`✔ Deleted inbox row ${id}.`);
+}

apps/cli/src/commands/inbox.ts

@@ -1,49 +1,101 @@
 /**
- * `claudemesh inbox` — read pending peer messages.
+ * `claudemesh inbox` — read pending peer messages from the daemon's
+ * persisted inbox (`~/.claudemesh/daemon/inbox.db`).
  *
- * Connects, waits briefly for push delivery, drains the buffer, prints.
+ * 1.34.0: switched from the legacy cold-path "open fresh broker WS,
- * Works best when message-mode is "inbox" or "off" (messages held at broker).
+ * drain in-memory buffer" flow to a daemon IPC read against `/v1/inbox`.
+ * The cold path was structurally broken — the persistent inbox lives in
+ * the daemon, and pushes land on its session-WS, not on a freshly-opened
+ * standalone WS. The daemon-route `tryListInboxViaDaemon` returns rows
+ * persisted across daemon restarts and surfaces them with the correct
+ * mesh scoping (server-side mesh filter added in 1.34.0).
+ *
+ * Cold-path fallback removed: when the daemon isn't reachable, the
+ * prior implementation returned an empty list anyway (no broker state
+ * = no buffered pushes), so removing that path doesn't lose any
+ * functionality. Strict mode emits a clear error via daemon-route.
  */
 
-import { withMesh } from "./connect.js";
+import { tryListInboxViaDaemon } from "~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js";
-import type { InboundPush } from "~/services/broker/facade.js";
 import { render } from "~/ui/render.js";
 import { bold, dim } from "~/ui/styles.js";
 
 export interface InboxFlags {
   mesh?: string;
   json?: boolean;
-  wait?: number;
+  /** Cap the number of rows returned by the daemon. Default 100. */
+  limit?: number;
+  /** 1.34.8: only show rows whose seen_at is NULL (i.e., never
+   *  surfaced via an interactive listing or live channel reminder).
+   *  When omitted, every row is returned and an interactive listing
+   *  stamps them seen as a side effect. */
+  unread?: boolean;
 }
 
-function formatMessage(msg: InboundPush): string {
+interface FormattedItem {
-  const text = msg.plaintext ?? `[encrypted: ${msg.ciphertext.slice(0, 32)}…]`;
+  sender_pubkey: string;
-  const from = msg.senderPubkey.slice(0, 8);
+  sender_name: string;
-  const time = new Date(msg.createdAt).toLocaleTimeString();
+  body: string | null;
-  const kindTag = msg.kind === "direct" ? "→ direct" : msg.kind;
+  topic: string | null;
-  return `  ${bold(from)} ${dim(`[${kindTag}] ${time}`)}\n  ${text}`;
+  received_at: string;
+  mesh: string;
+}
+
+function formatMessage(msg: FormattedItem, includeMesh: boolean): string {
+  const text = msg.body ?? "[encrypted]";
+  const from = msg.sender_name && msg.sender_name !== msg.sender_pubkey.slice(0, 8)
+    ? `${msg.sender_name} (${msg.sender_pubkey.slice(0, 8)})`
+    : msg.sender_pubkey.slice(0, 8);
+  const time = new Date(msg.received_at).toLocaleTimeString();
+  const topicTag = msg.topic ? ` (#${msg.topic})` : "";
+  const meshTag = includeMesh ? ` [${msg.mesh}]` : "";
+  return `  ${bold(from)} ${dim(`${meshTag}${topicTag} ${time}`)}\n  ${text}`;
 }
 
 export async function runInbox(flags: InboxFlags): Promise<void> {
-  const waitMs = (flags.wait ?? 1) * 1000;
+  // Mesh resolution is owned by the daemon (it knows which meshes are
+  // attached) — the CLI just forwards the user's --mesh flag through.
+  // When omitted, the daemon's `/v1/inbox` honors the session-default
+  // mesh on auth-token requests; out-of-session callers see rows from
+  // every attached mesh. We don't pre-validate the mesh slug here so
+  // the command works even from a launch tmpdir whose local
+  // `config.json` only knows about the launch's mesh.
+  const meshSlug = flags.mesh;
 
-  await withMesh({ meshSlug: flags.mesh ?? null }, async (client, mesh) => {
+  const items = await tryListInboxViaDaemon(meshSlug, flags.limit ?? 100, {
-    await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, waitMs));
+    unreadOnly: flags.unread === true,
-    const messages = client.drainPushBuffer();
+    // CLI is the canonical "I'm reading my inbox" path — let the daemon
+    // auto-stamp seen_at on the rows we just rendered. The MCP welcome
+    // path passes mark_seen=false instead and stamps explicitly after
+    // the channel notification succeeds.
+    markSeen: true,
+  });
+  if (items === null) {
+    if (flags.json) { process.stdout.write("[]\n"); return; }
+    render.info(dim("Daemon not reachable. Run `claudemesh daemon up` and retry."));
+    return;
+  }
 
   if (flags.json) {
-      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(messages, null, 2) + "\n");
+    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(items, null, 2) + "\n");
     return;
   }
 
-    if (messages.length === 0) {
+  if (items.length === 0) {
-      render.info(dim(`No messages on mesh "${mesh.slug}".`));
+    const scope = meshSlug ? `mesh "${meshSlug}"` : "any mesh";
+    const filter = flags.unread ? "unread " : "";
+    render.info(dim(`No ${filter}messages on ${scope}.`));
     return;
   }
 
-    render.section(`inbox — ${mesh.slug} (${messages.length} message${messages.length === 1 ? "" : "s"})`);
+  const filterTag = flags.unread ? " unread" : "";
-    for (const msg of messages) {
+  const heading = meshSlug
-      process.stdout.write(formatMessage(msg) + "\n\n");
+    ? `inbox — ${meshSlug} (${items.length}${filterTag} message${items.length === 1 ? "" : "s"})`
+    : `inbox (${items.length}${filterTag} message${items.length === 1 ? "" : "s"})`;
+  render.section(heading);
+  // When the user didn't filter by mesh, surface the mesh slug per row
+  // so they can tell apart rows from different meshes at a glance.
+  for (const msg of items) {
+    process.stdout.write(formatMessage(msg, !meshSlug) + "\n\n");
   }
-  });
 }

apps/cli/src/commands/install.ts

@@ -434,9 +434,10 @@ function installStatusLine(): { installed: boolean } {
   return { installed: true };
 }
 
-export function runInstall(args: string[] = []): void {
+export async function runInstall(args: string[] = []): Promise<void> {
   const skipHooks = args.includes("--no-hooks");
   const skipSkill = args.includes("--no-skill");
+  const skipService = args.includes("--no-service");
   const wantStatusLine = args.includes("--status-line");
   render.section("claudemesh install");
 
@@ -549,6 +550,30 @@ export function runInstall(args: string[] = []): void {
     hasMeshes = meshConfig.meshes.length > 0;
   } catch {}
 
+  // Daemon service install — required for MCP integration as of 1.24.0.
+  // The daemon owns the broker WS and feeds the MCP push-pipe via SSE;
+  // skipping it leaves channel push, slash commands, and resources broken.
+  // 1.30.2: install no longer locks the unit to a single mesh; the
+  // daemon attaches to every joined mesh on boot (1.26.0 multi-mesh
+  // design). Users who want single-mesh can pass `claudemesh daemon
+  // install-service --mesh <slug>` explicitly.
+  if (!skipService && hasMeshes) {
+    try {
+      await installDaemonService(entry);
+    } catch (e) {
+      render.warn(
+        `daemon service install failed: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`,
+        "Run `claudemesh daemon install-service` to retry.",
+      );
+    }
+  } else if (skipService) {
+    render.info(dim("· Daemon service skipped (--no-service)"));
+    render.info(dim("  MCP integration will fail at boot until you start the daemon manually:"));
+    render.info(dim("    claudemesh daemon up --mesh <slug>"));
+  } else if (!hasMeshes) {
+    render.info(dim("· Daemon service deferred — join a mesh first, then run install again."));
+  }
+
   render.blank();
   render.warn(`${bold("RESTART CLAUDE CODE")} ${yellow("for MCP tools to appear.")}`);
 
@@ -569,6 +594,112 @@ export function runInstall(args: string[] = []): void {
   render.info(dim(`  claudemesh completions zsh       # shell completions`));
 }
 
+/**
+ * Install + start the per-user daemon service for the primary mesh.
+ *
+ * Refuses on CI hosts (the service-install module guards this); falls
+ * back to a friendly message and lets the install otherwise succeed.
+ * The MCP push-pipe will fail loudly if the daemon isn't reachable, so
+ * the user knows there's a problem before it shows up as "no messages
+ * arriving."
+ */
+async function installDaemonService(binaryEntry: string): Promise<void> {
+  const {
+    installService,
+    detectPlatform,
+  } = require("~/daemon/service-install.js") as typeof import("../daemon/service-install.js");
+
+  const platform = detectPlatform();
+  if (!platform) {
+    render.info(dim(`· Daemon service skipped — unsupported platform: ${process.platform}`));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Resolve the binary the service unit should launch. When invoked from a
+  // bundled binary, argv[1] is correct. When invoked under tsx / dev, fall
+  // back to whatever `claudemesh` resolves to on PATH so the unit launches
+  // a shipped binary, not a dev script.
+  let binary = process.argv[1] ?? binaryEntry;
+  if (!binary || /\.ts$/.test(binary) || /node_modules|src\/entrypoints/.test(binary)) {
+    try {
+      const { execSync } = require("node:child_process") as typeof import("node:child_process");
+      binary = execSync("which claudemesh", { encoding: "utf8" }).trim();
+    } catch {
+      render.warn(
+        "couldn't resolve a 'claudemesh' binary on PATH; daemon service skipped",
+        "Install via npm/homebrew, then run `claudemesh daemon install-service`",
+      );
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  const r = installService({ binaryPath: binary });
+  render.ok(`daemon service installed (${r.platform})`);
+  render.kv([
+    ["unit", dim(r.unitPath)],
+    ["mesh", dim("(all joined meshes)")],
+  ]);
+
+  // Boot the unit immediately so MCP has a daemon to attach to on next
+  // Claude Code launch. Best-effort: if launchctl/systemctl errors out we
+  // log and continue — the user can run the boot command manually.
+  try {
+    const { execSync } = require("node:child_process") as typeof import("node:child_process");
+    execSync(r.bootCommand, { stdio: "ignore" });
+    render.ok("daemon started");
+  } catch (e) {
+    render.warn(
+      `daemon service installed but failed to start: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`,
+      `Run manually: ${r.bootCommand}`,
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // 1.31.0 — post-flight: verify the daemon actually establishes a
+  // broker WebSocket. Boots that fail silently here (DNS, expired TLS,
+  // outbound :443 blocked, broker outage) used to surface only when
+  // the user's first `peer list` or `send` failed half an hour later.
+  // Polling /v1/health gives a clear, install-time signal.
+  await verifyBrokerConnectivity();
+}
+
+async function verifyBrokerConnectivity(): Promise<void> {
+  const VERIFY_BUDGET_MS = 15_000;
+  const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 500;
+  const { ipc } = await import("~/daemon/ipc/client.js");
+  const start = Date.now();
+  let lastBrokers: Record<string, string> = {};
+
+  while (Date.now() - start < VERIFY_BUDGET_MS) {
+    try {
+      const res = await ipc<{ ok: boolean; brokers?: Record<string, string> }>({
+        path: "/v1/health",
+        timeoutMs: 2_000,
+      });
+      lastBrokers = res.body?.brokers ?? {};
+      const openMesh = Object.entries(lastBrokers).find(([, s]) => s === "open");
+      if (openMesh) {
+        const others = Object.entries(lastBrokers).filter(([slug]) => slug !== openMesh[0]);
+        const tail = others.length > 0 ? `, ${others.length} other mesh${others.length === 1 ? "" : "es"} attaching` : "";
+        render.ok(`broker connected (mesh=${openMesh[0]}${tail})`);
+        return;
+      }
+    } catch { /* daemon may still be starting up; keep polling */ }
+    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, POLL_INTERVAL_MS));
+  }
+
+  // Timed out without a single broker reaching `open`. Surface what we
+  // saw last so the user can act — this is exactly the bug class we
+  // want to catch at install time, not at first send.
+  const states = Object.keys(lastBrokers).length === 0
+    ? "no health response from daemon"
+    : Object.entries(lastBrokers).map(([m, s]) => `${m}=${s}`).join(", ");
+  render.warn(
+    `broker did not reach open within ${Math.round(VERIFY_BUDGET_MS / 1000)}s (${states})`,
+    "Check ~/.claudemesh/daemon/daemon.log for connect errors. Common causes: outbound :443 blocked, expired TLS, DNS resolution.",
+  );
+}
+
 export function runUninstall(): void {
   render.section("claudemesh uninstall");
 

apps/cli/src/commands/kick.ts

@@ -76,12 +76,32 @@ export async function runKick(
   if ("error" in built) { render.err(String(built.error)); return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS; }
 
   return await withMesh({ meshSlug }, async (client) => {
-    const result = await client.sendAndWait(built as Record<string, unknown>) as { affected?: string[]; kicked?: string[] };
+    const result = await client.sendAndWait(built as Record<string, unknown>) as {
+      affected?: string[];
+      kicked?: string[];
+      // 1.34.15: broker refuses to kick control-plane WSes (they'd
+      // just auto-reconnect). Older brokers don't emit this field.
+      skipped_control_plane?: string[];
+    };
     const peers = result?.affected ?? result?.kicked ?? [];
-    if (peers.length === 0) render.info("No peers matched.");
+    const skipped = result?.skipped_control_plane ?? [];
-    else {
+
+    if (peers.length === 0 && skipped.length === 0) {
+      render.info("No peers matched.");
+    } else if (peers.length === 0 && skipped.length > 0) {
+      render.warn(
+        `${skipped.length} match(es) refused: ${skipped.join(", ")} — control-plane connections (daemon / dashboard) auto-reconnect, so kick is a no-op.`,
+        "To take a daemon offline locally, run `claudemesh daemon down` on that machine. To remove a member from the mesh, use `claudemesh ban <peer>`.",
+      );
+    } else {
       render.ok(`Kicked ${peers.length} peer(s): ${peers.join(", ")}`);
       render.hint("Their Claude Code session ended. They can rejoin anytime by running `claudemesh`.");
+      if (skipped.length > 0) {
+        render.warn(
+          `(also refused ${skipped.length} control-plane connection(s): ${skipped.join(", ")})`,
+          "Daemon / dashboard connections auto-reconnect; kick is a no-op against them. Use `claudemesh ban <peer>` to remove a member entirely.",
+        );
+      }
     }
     return EXIT.SUCCESS;
   });

apps/cli/src/commands/launch.ts

@@ -44,6 +44,62 @@ export interface LaunchFlags {
 
 // --- Interactive mesh picker ---
 
+/**
+ * Ensure the per-user daemon is running before we hand off to Claude Code.
+ *
+ * As of 1.24.0 the daemon owns the broker WS and feeds the MCP push-pipe
+ * over IPC SSE. If the socket is absent when Claude boots its MCP shim,
+ * the shim bails (no fallback). Delegates to the shared lifecycle helper
+ * (services/daemon/lifecycle.ts) which probes the socket properly
+ * (avoiding the stale-socket bug where existsSync was a false positive
+ * after a daemon crash), spawns under a file-lock, and polls for liveness.
+ */
+async function ensureDaemonRunning(meshSlug: string, quiet: boolean): Promise<void> {
+  const { ensureDaemonReady } = await import("~/services/daemon/lifecycle.js");
+  if (!quiet) render.info("ensuring claudemesh daemon is running…");
+  // Larger budget for `launch` — it's a one-shot flow where the user
+  // is actively waiting; cold node start + broker hello can take
+  // longer than the default 3s budget for ad-hoc verbs.
+  const res = await ensureDaemonReady({ budgetMs: 10_000, mesh: meshSlug });
+  if (res.state === "up") {
+    if (!quiet) render.ok("daemon already running");
+    await warnIfDaemonStale(quiet);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (res.state === "started") {
+    if (!quiet) render.ok(`daemon ready (${res.durationMs}ms)`);
+    return;
+  }
+  render.warn(
+    `daemon ${res.state}${res.reason ? `: ${res.reason}` : ""}`,
+    "Run `claudemesh daemon up` manually, then re-launch.",
+  );
+}
+
+/** 1.34.9: warn when the running daemon's version doesn't match the CLI
+ *  that's about to launch a session. `npm i -g claudemesh-cli` upgrades
+ *  the binaries on disk but doesn't restart a launchd / systemd-user
+ *  service or a foreground `claudemesh daemon up`, so users routinely
+ *  ship a fix to the CLI side and never see it because the WS lifecycle,
+ *  echo guards, and self-join filters all live in the long-running
+ *  daemon process. We probe `/v1/version` and emit a one-shot stderr
+ *  warning when CLI ≠ daemon. Best-effort; failures are silent. */
+async function warnIfDaemonStale(quiet: boolean): Promise<void> {
+  if (quiet) return;
+  try {
+    const { ipc } = await import("~/daemon/ipc/client.js");
+    const { VERSION } = await import("~/constants/urls.js");
+    const res = await ipc<{ daemon_version?: string }>({ path: "/v1/version", timeoutMs: 1_500 });
+    if (res.status !== 200) return;
+    const daemonVersion = res.body.daemon_version ?? "";
+    if (!daemonVersion || daemonVersion === VERSION) return;
+    render.warn(
+      `daemon is ${daemonVersion}, CLI is ${VERSION} — restart to pick up new fixes.`,
+      "Run: `claudemesh daemon down && claudemesh daemon up` (no --mesh — daemon attaches to every joined mesh; restart the launchd / systemd-user unit if you installed one).",
+    );
+  } catch { /* swallow — version probe is best-effort */ }
+}
+
 async function pickMesh(meshes: JoinedMesh[]): Promise<JoinedMesh> {
   if (meshes.length === 1) return meshes[0]!;
 
@@ -318,6 +374,66 @@ async function runLaunchWizard(opts: {
   return { mesh, role, groups, messageMode, skipPermissions };
 }
 
+/**
+ * 1.32.0 — broker welcome line printed right after the launch banner.
+ * Polls the daemon's /v1/health (per-mesh broker WS state) and tries
+ * to fetch the inbox + peer count via daemon-route helpers. Best-effort:
+ * if any call fails the welcome simply prints what it knows and moves
+ * on — never blocks the launch path.
+ */
+async function printBrokerWelcome(meshSlug: string): Promise<void> {
+  const useColor = !process.env.NO_COLOR && process.env.TERM !== "dumb" && process.stdout.isTTY;
+  const dim = (s: string): string => (useColor ? `\x1b[2m${s}\x1b[22m` : s);
+  const green = (s: string): string => (useColor ? `\x1b[32m${s}\x1b[22m` : s);
+  const yellow = (s: string): string => (useColor ? `\x1b[33m${s}\x1b[22m` : s);
+
+  // Probe daemon health for broker WS state.
+  let brokerState = "unknown";
+  try {
+    const { ipc } = await import("~/daemon/ipc/client.js");
+    const res = await ipc<{ ok?: boolean; brokers?: Record<string, string> }>({
+      path: "/v1/health",
+      timeoutMs: 1_500,
+    });
+    if (res.status === 200 && res.body?.brokers) {
+      brokerState = res.body.brokers[meshSlug] ?? "unknown";
+    }
+  } catch { /* daemon unreachable — not fatal */ }
+
+  // Peer count (best-effort). 1.34.15: scope to the launched mesh so
+  // multi-mesh daemons don't inflate the welcome banner with peers
+  // from other meshes the user didn't just attach to.
+  let peerCount = -1;
+  try {
+    const { tryListPeersViaDaemon } = await import("~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js");
+    const peers = (await tryListPeersViaDaemon(meshSlug)) ?? [];
+    peerCount = peers.filter((p) =>
+      (p as { channel?: string }).channel !== "claudemesh-daemon",
+    ).length;
+  } catch { /* skip peer count */ }
+
+  // Unread inbox count (best-effort).
+  let unread = -1;
+  try {
+    const { ipc } = await import("~/daemon/ipc/client.js");
+    const res = await ipc<{ messages?: unknown[] }>({
+      path: "/v1/inbox",
+      timeoutMs: 1_500,
+    });
+    if (res.status === 200 && Array.isArray(res.body?.messages)) {
+      unread = res.body.messages.length;
+    }
+  } catch { /* skip unread */ }
+
+  const dot = brokerState === "open" ? green("●") : yellow("●");
+  const parts: string[] = [];
+  parts.push(`broker ${brokerState === "open" ? "connected" : brokerState}`);
+  if (peerCount >= 0) parts.push(`${peerCount} peer${peerCount === 1 ? "" : "s"} online`);
+  if (unread >= 0) parts.push(`${unread} unread`);
+  console.log(`${dot} ${parts.join(dim(" · "))}`);
+  console.log("");
+}
+
 function printBanner(name: string, meshSlug: string, role: string | null, groups: GroupEntry[], messageMode: "push" | "inbox" | "off"): void {
   const useColor =
     !process.env.NO_COLOR && process.env.TERM !== "dumb" && process.stdout.isTTY;
@@ -550,6 +666,12 @@ export async function runLaunch(flags: LaunchFlags, rawArgs: string[]): Promise<
     }
   } catch { /* best effort */ }
 
+  // Ensure the daemon is running before we spawn Claude. The MCP shim
+  // (loaded by --dangerously-load-development-channels server:claudemesh)
+  // requires the daemon's UDS to be reachable at boot — if it isn't,
+  // channel push, slash commands, and resources fail.
+  await ensureDaemonRunning(mesh.slug, args.quiet);
+
   // Clean up stale mesh MCP entries from crashed sessions
   try {
     const claudeConfigPath = join(homedir(), ".claude.json");
@@ -616,9 +738,109 @@ export async function runLaunch(flags: LaunchFlags, rawArgs: string[]): Promise<
     "utf-8",
   );
 
+  // 4b. Mint a per-session IPC token, persist it under tmpDir, and
+  //     register it with the daemon. The token's path is exposed to
+  //     the spawned claude (and all its descendants) via env so
+  //     CLI invocations from inside the session auto-attribute to it.
+  //
+  //     1.30.0: also mint an ephemeral ed25519 session keypair and a
+  //     parent-vouched attestation. The daemon uses these to open a
+  //     long-lived broker WebSocket per session (presence row keyed on
+  //     the session pubkey, member_id from the parent), so sibling
+  //     sessions in the same mesh see each other in `peer list`.
+  //
+  //     Session-id resolution: 1.29.0 referenced `claudeSessionId`
+  //     before its `const` declaration further down the file, hitting
+  //     the TDZ → ReferenceError swallowed by the surrounding catch.
+  //     The IPC registration has been silently failing every launch
+  //     since 1.29.0. Hoist the declaration up so it actually runs.
+  const isResume = args.resume !== null || args.continueSession;
+  const claudeSessionId = isResume ? undefined : randomUUID();
+  let sessionTokenFilePath: string | null = null;
+  let sessionTokenForCleanup: string | null = null;
+  try {
+    const { mintSessionToken, TOKEN_FILE_ENV } = await import("~/services/session/token.js");
+    const minted = mintSessionToken(tmpDir);
+    sessionTokenFilePath = minted.filePath;
+    sessionTokenForCleanup = minted.token;
+
+    // Per-session ephemeral keypair + parent attestation (1.30.0+).
+    // Older daemons ignore unknown body fields, so sending presence
+    // material always is forward-compatible.
+    let presencePayload: {
+      session_pubkey: string;
+      session_secret_key: string;
+      parent_attestation: {
+        session_pubkey: string;
+        parent_member_pubkey: string;
+        expires_at: number;
+        signature: string;
+      };
+    } | undefined;
+    try {
+      const { generateKeypair } = await import("~/services/crypto/facade.js");
+      const { signParentAttestation } = await import("~/services/broker/session-hello-sig.js");
+      const sessionKp = await generateKeypair();
+      const att = await signParentAttestation({
+        parentMemberPubkey: mesh.pubkey,
+        parentSecretKey: mesh.secretKey,
+        sessionPubkey: sessionKp.publicKey,
+      });
+      presencePayload = {
+        session_pubkey: sessionKp.publicKey,
+        session_secret_key: sessionKp.secretKey,
+        parent_attestation: {
+          session_pubkey: att.sessionPubkey,
+          parent_member_pubkey: att.parentMemberPubkey,
+          expires_at: att.expiresAt,
+          signature: att.signature,
+        },
+      };
+    } catch {
+      // Keypair / attestation failure — proceed without per-session
+      // presence. The session still registers; only the broker-side
+      // presence row is skipped.
+    }
+
+    // Register with the daemon. Best-effort: a daemon failure here
+    // means the session falls back to user-level scope, which is fine.
+    const { ipc } = await import("~/daemon/ipc/client.js");
+    const sessionIdForRegister = claudeSessionId ?? randomUUID();
+    await ipc({
+      method: "POST",
+      path: "/v1/sessions/register",
+      timeoutMs: 3_000,
+      body: {
+        token: minted.token,
+        session_id: sessionIdForRegister,
+        mesh: mesh.slug,
+        display_name: displayName,
+        pid: process.pid,
+        cwd: process.cwd(),
+        ...(role ? { role } : {}),
+        ...(parsedGroups.length > 0 ? { groups: parsedGroups.map((g) => `@${g.name}${g.role ? `:${g.role}` : ""}`) } : {}),
+        ...(presencePayload ? { presence: presencePayload } : {}),
+      },
+    }).catch(() => null);
+
+    // Pin the env name on a global so the spawn block below can pick it up.
+    (process as unknown as { _claudemeshTokenEnv?: { name: string; value: string } })._claudemeshTokenEnv = {
+      name: TOKEN_FILE_ENV,
+      value: minted.filePath,
+    };
+  } catch {
+    // Token mint or registration failed — proceed without per-session
+    // attribution. CLI invocations from the session will still work,
+    // they'll just default to user-level scope.
+  }
+
   // 5. Print summary banner (wizard already handled all interactive config).
   if (!args.quiet) {
     printBanner(displayName, mesh.slug, role, parsedGroups, messageMode);
+    // 1.32.0+: broker welcome — confirm the per-session WS is actually
+    // attached and surface peer count + unread inbox so the user lands
+    // in claude code with a clear state instead of silent assumptions.
+    await printBrokerWelcome(mesh.slug);
   }
 
   // --- Install native MCP entries for deployed mesh services ---
@@ -689,10 +911,8 @@ export async function runLaunch(flags: LaunchFlags, rawArgs: string[]): Promise<
   // passes -y / --yes. Without it, claudemesh tools still work because
   // `claudemesh install` pre-approves them via allowedTools in settings.json.
   // This keeps permissions tight for multi-person meshes.
-  // Session identity: --resume reuses existing session, otherwise generate new.
+  // Session identity: claudeSessionId was generated above (4b) so the
-  // When resuming, Claude Code reuses the session ID so the mesh peer identity persists.
+  // session-token registration could include it. Reuse here.
-  const isResume = args.resume !== null || args.continueSession;
-  const claudeSessionId = isResume ? undefined : randomUUID();
 
   const claudeArgs = [
     "--dangerously-load-development-channels",
@@ -737,7 +957,14 @@ export async function runLaunch(flags: LaunchFlags, rawArgs: string[]): Promise<
         writeFileSync(claudeConfigPath, JSON.stringify(claudeConfig, null, 2) + "\n", "utf-8");
       } catch { /* best effort */ }
     }
-    // Ephemeral config dir
+    // The token's session-token file lives inside tmpDir; rmSync below
+    // shreds the secret. The daemon's session reaper notices the
+    // launched session's pid is gone within 30s and drops the registry
+    // entry. Explicit DELETE on /v1/sessions is feasible only from an
+    // async exit hook, which adds complexity for ~30s of memory the
+    // reaper will reclaim anyway. Leaving as-is; revisit if the
+    // registry ever grows persistence.
+    // Ephemeral config dir (also drops the session-token file)
     try {
       rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
     } catch { /* best effort */ }
@@ -799,6 +1026,7 @@ export async function runLaunch(flags: LaunchFlags, rawArgs: string[]): Promise<
       CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR: tmpDir,
       CLAUDEMESH_DISPLAY_NAME: displayName,
       ...(claudeSessionId ? { CLAUDEMESH_SESSION_ID: claudeSessionId } : {}),
+      ...(sessionTokenFilePath ? { CLAUDEMESH_IPC_TOKEN_FILE: sessionTokenFilePath } : {}),
       MCP_TIMEOUT: process.env.MCP_TIMEOUT ?? "30000",
       MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS: process.env.MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS ?? "50000",
       ...(role ? { CLAUDEMESH_ROLE: role } : {}),

apps/cli/src/commands/peers.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 
 import { withMesh } from "./connect.js";
 import { readConfig } from "~/services/config/facade.js";
-import { tryBridge } from "~/services/bridge/client.js";
 import { render } from "~/ui/render.js";
 import { bold, dim, green, yellow } from "~/ui/styles.js";
 
@@ -22,22 +21,72 @@ export interface PeersFlags {
   mesh?: string;
   /** `true`/`undefined` = full record; comma-separated string = field projection. */
   json?: boolean | string;
+  /** When false (default), hide control-plane presence rows from the
+   * human renderer — they're infrastructure (daemon-WS member-keyed
+   * presence), not interactive peers, and confused users into thinking
+   * the daemon counted as a "peer". The JSON output still includes them
+   * so scripts that need a full inventory can opt in via --all (or
+   * just consume JSON).
+   *
+   * Source of truth is the broker-side `role` field
+   * (`'control-plane' | 'session' | 'service'`). Older brokers don't
+   * emit `role` yet — this code falls back to treating missing role as
+   * `'session'` so legacy peer rows stay visible. */
+  all?: boolean;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Broker-emitted peer classification, added 2026-05-04. Older brokers
+ * may omit it — treat missing as 'session' so legacy meshes still
+ * render their peers (and don't accidentally hide them all). The CLI
+ * never emits 'control-plane' on its own; that comes from the broker.
+ */
+export type PeerRole = "control-plane" | "session" | "service";
+
 interface PeerRecord {
   pubkey: string;
   /** Stable member pubkey (independent of session). When sender shares
    * this with a peer, they're talking to the same person across all
    * their open sessions. */
   memberPubkey?: string;
+  /** Per-launch session identifier (uuid). Used by the renderer to
+   * disambiguate sibling sessions of the same member that otherwise
+   * look identical (same name, same cwd). */
+  sessionId?: string;
   displayName: string;
   status?: string;
   summary?: string;
   groups: Array<{ name: string; role?: string }>;
+  /** Top-level convenience alias for `profile.role`, lifted by the CLI
+   * since 1.31.5 so JSON consumers (the agent-vibes claudemesh skill,
+   * launched-session LLMs) see the user-supplied role string at the
+   * shape's top level. Same value as `profile.role`. Distinct from
+   * `peerRole` below — that's the broker's presence-class taxonomy. */
+  role?: string;
+  /** Broker-emitted presence classification: 'control-plane' | 'session'
+   * | 'service'. Source of truth for the --all visibility filter and
+   * the default-hide rule. Older brokers omit this; the CLI fills
+   * missing values with 'session' so legacy peer rows stay visible.
+   *
+   * Renamed from `role` to avoid collision with 1.31.5's profile.role
+   * lift above. Wire-level field on the broker is also `peerRole`. */
+  peerRole?: PeerRole;
   peerType?: string;
   channel?: string;
   model?: string;
   cwd?: string;
+  /** Peer-level profile metadata (set via `claudemesh profile`). The
+   * broker passes this through verbatim; the most common field is
+   * `role` ("lead", "reviewer", "human", etc.) but capabilities, bio,
+   * avatar, and title also live here when set. */
+  profile?: {
+    role?: string;
+    title?: string;
+    bio?: string;
+    avatar?: string;
+    capabilities?: string[];
+    [k: string]: unknown;
+  };
   /** True when this peer is one of the caller's own member's sessions.
    * Set in the cli (not the broker) by comparing memberPubkey against
    * the caller's stable JoinedMesh.pubkey. */
@@ -67,13 +116,43 @@ async function listPeersForMesh(slug: string): Promise<PeerRecord[]> {
   const joined = config.meshes.find((m) => m.slug === slug);
   const selfMemberPubkey = joined?.pubkey ?? null;
 
-  // Try warm path first.
+  // Resolve our own session pubkey via the daemon's /v1/sessions/me when
-  const bridged = await tryBridge(slug, "peers");
+  // we're inside a launched session. Without this, isThisSession can't
-  if (bridged && bridged.ok) {
+  // be set on the daemon path (only on the cold path where a fresh WS
-    const peers = bridged.result as PeerRecord[];
+  // creates the keypair), and the renderer can't tell the user which
-    return peers.map((p) => annotateSelf(p, selfMemberPubkey, null));
+  // row in `peer list` is them.
+  let selfSessionPubkey: string | null = null;
+  try {
+    const { getSessionInfo } = await import("~/services/session/resolve.js");
+    const sess = await getSessionInfo();
+    if (sess && sess.mesh === slug && sess.presence?.sessionPubkey) {
+      selfSessionPubkey = sess.presence.sessionPubkey;
     }
-  // Cold path — open our own WS.
+  } catch { /* not in a launched session; isThisSession stays false */ }
+
+  // Daemon path — preferred when running. Same routing pattern as send.ts:
+  // ~1 ms IPC round-trip; broker WS already warm in the daemon. The
+  // lifecycle helper inside tryListPeersViaDaemon auto-spawns the
+  // daemon if it's down and probes it for liveness — no separate bridge
+  // tier is needed any more (1.28.0).
+  //
+  // 1.34.15: forward `slug` to the daemon as `?mesh=<slug>` so the
+  // server-side aggregator narrows to the requested mesh. Pre-1.34.15
+  // we called this with no argument, so a multi-mesh daemon returned
+  // peers from every attached mesh and the renderer printed "peers on
+  // flexicar" with cross-mesh rows mixed in. The daemon's
+  // `meshFromCtx` already does the right scoping when the slug is
+  // passed; the CLI just wasn't passing it.
+  try {
+    const { tryListPeersViaDaemon } = await import("~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js");
+    const dr = await tryListPeersViaDaemon(slug);
+    if (dr !== null) {
+      return dr.map((p) => annotateSelf(p as PeerRecord, selfMemberPubkey, selfSessionPubkey));
+    }
+  } catch { /* daemon route helper not available; fall through */ }
+
+  // Cold path — open our own WS. Reached only when the lifecycle helper
+  // could not bring the daemon up.
   let result: PeerRecord[] = [];
   await withMesh({ meshSlug: slug }, async (client) => {
     const all = (await client.listPeers()) as unknown as PeerRecord[];
@@ -91,6 +170,15 @@ async function listPeersForMesh(slug: string): Promise<PeerRecord[]> {
  * tell sender's own sessions from real peers. The broker has always
  * surfaced a sender's siblings as separate rows because they're separate
  * presence rows; the cli just hadn't been making that visible.
+ *
+ * Also normalizes the broker's `peerRole` classification: missing
+ * values (older brokers) default to 'session' so legacy peer rows stay
+ * visible under the default `--all=false` filter.
+ *
+ * And lifts `profile.role` to a top-level `role` field — the 1.31.5
+ * convenience alias for JSON consumers (skill SKILL.md, launched-session
+ * LLMs, jq pipelines). Same value as profile.role; distinct from
+ * peerRole (presence taxonomy).
  */
 function annotateSelf(
   peer: PeerRecord,
@@ -107,12 +195,32 @@ function annotateSelf(
     selfSessionPubkey &&
     peer.pubkey === selfSessionPubkey
   );
-  return { ...peer, isSelf, isThisSession };
+  const peerRole: PeerRole = peer.peerRole ?? "session";
+  const profileRole = peer.profile?.role?.trim() || undefined;
+  return {
+    ...peer,
+    ...(profileRole ? { role: profileRole } : {}),
+    peerRole,
+    isSelf,
+    isThisSession,
+  };
 }
 
 export async function runPeers(flags: PeersFlags): Promise<void> {
   const config = readConfig();
-  const slugs = flags.mesh ? [flags.mesh] : config.meshes.map((m) => m.slug);
+
+  // Mesh selection precedence:
+  //   1. explicit --mesh <slug>  (always wins)
+  //   2. session-token mesh      (when invoked from inside a launched session)
+  //   3. all joined meshes       (default for bare shells)
+  let slugs: string[];
+  if (flags.mesh) {
+    slugs = [flags.mesh];
+  } else {
+    const { getSessionInfo } = await import("~/services/session/resolve.js");
+    const sess = await getSessionInfo();
+    slugs = sess ? [sess.mesh] : config.meshes.map((m) => m.slug);
+  }
 
   if (slugs.length === 0) {
     render.err("No meshes joined.");
@@ -141,21 +249,41 @@ export async function runPeers(flags: PeersFlags): Promise<void> {
         continue;
       }
 
-      render.section(`peers on ${slug} (${peers.length})`);
+      // Hide control-plane rows by default — they're infrastructure
+      // (daemon-WS member-keyed presence), not interactive peers, and
+      // they confused users into thinking the daemon counted as a
+      // separate peer. --all opts back in for debugging.
+      //
+      // Source of truth: broker-emitted `peerRole` field (added
+      // 2026-05-04). annotateSelf() filled in 'session' for older
+      // brokers that don't emit peerRole yet, so this filter is
+      // backwards-compatible by construction — legacy rows show up.
+      const visible = flags.all
+        ? peers
+        : peers.filter((p) => p.peerRole !== "control-plane");
 
-      if (peers.length === 0) {
+      // Sort: this-session first, then your-other-sessions, then real
+      // peers. Within each group, idle/working ahead of dnd. Inside the
+      // groups, leave broker order. The point is: when you run peer
+      // list, the row that's YOU is row 1.
+      const sorted = visible.slice().sort((a, b) => {
+        const score = (p: PeerRecord) =>
+          p.isThisSession ? 0 : p.isSelf ? 1 : 2;
+        return score(a) - score(b);
+      });
+
+      const hiddenControlPlane = peers.length - visible.length;
+      const header = hiddenControlPlane > 0
+        ? `peers on ${slug} (${sorted.length}, ${hiddenControlPlane} control-plane hidden — use --all)`
+        : `peers on ${slug} (${sorted.length})`;
+      render.section(header);
+
+      if (sorted.length === 0) {
         render.info(dim("  (no peers connected)"));
         continue;
       }
 
-      for (const p of peers) {
+      for (const p of sorted) {
-        const groups = p.groups.length
-          ? " [" +
-            p.groups
-              .map((g) => `@${g.name}${g.role ? `:${g.role}` : ""}`)
-              .join(", ") +
-            "]"
-          : "";
         const statusDot = p.status === "working" ? yellow("●") : green("●");
         const name = bold(p.displayName);
         const meta: string[] = [];
@@ -165,15 +293,46 @@ export async function runPeers(flags: PeersFlags): Promise<void> {
         const metaStr = meta.length ? dim(` (${meta.join(", ")})`) : "";
         const summary = p.summary ? dim(`  — ${p.summary}`) : "";
         const pubkeyTag = dim(` · ${p.pubkey.slice(0, 16)}…`);
+        // Short sessionId tag — appears for sibling sessions of the same
+        // member that would otherwise be visually identical (same name,
+        // same cwd, only the truncated pubkey on the right differs).
+        const sidTag = p.sessionId
+          ? dim(` · sid:${p.sessionId.slice(0, 8)}`)
+          : "";
         const selfTag = p.isThisSession
           ? dim(" ") + yellow("(this session)")
           : p.isSelf
             ? dim(" ") + yellow("(your other session)")
             : "";
-        render.info(
+
-          `${statusDot} ${name}${selfTag}${groups}${metaStr}${pubkeyTag}${summary}`,
+        // Inline tags ("role:lead [@flexicar:reviewer, @oncall]") so the
+        // first thing the user sees beside the name is the access /
+        // affiliation context. Empty role + empty groups → omit the
+        // bracket entirely (the dim summary line below carries the
+        // explicit "(no role / no groups)" so JSON output is unaffected
+        // and screen readers don't get spammed with literal "no").
+        const inlineTags: string[] = [];
+        const peerRole = p.profile?.role?.trim();
+        if (peerRole) inlineTags.push(`role:${peerRole}`);
+        if (p.groups.length) {
+          inlineTags.push(
+            ...p.groups.map((g) => `@${g.name}${g.role ? `:${g.role}` : ""}`),
           );
+        }
+        const tagsStr = inlineTags.length ? " [" + inlineTags.join(", ") + "]" : "";
+
+        render.info(
+          `${statusDot} ${name}${selfTag}${tagsStr}${metaStr}${pubkeyTag}${sidTag}${summary}`,
+        );
+
+        // Second line: cwd + an explicit role/groups footer when both
+        // are absent. Surfacing the absence is important — the previous
+        // renderer hid it, so users couldn't tell "no role set" from
+        // "the cli isn't showing roles".
         if (p.cwd) render.info(dim(`   cwd: ${p.cwd}`));
+        if (!peerRole && p.groups.length === 0) {
+          render.info(dim("   role: (none)  groups: (none)"));
+        }
       }
     } catch (e) {
       render.err(`${slug}: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`);

apps/cli/src/commands/platform-actions.ts

@@ -273,6 +273,24 @@ export async function runSqlSchema(opts: Flags): Promise<number> {
 // ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 
 export async function runSkillList(opts: Flags & { query?: string }): Promise<number> {
+  // Daemon path — preferred when running. Mirror trySendViaDaemon shape.
+  try {
+    const { tryListSkillsViaDaemon } = await import("~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js");
+    const dr = await tryListSkillsViaDaemon();
+    if (dr !== null) {
+      const skills = dr as Array<{ name: string; description: string; author: string; tags: string[] }>;
+      if (opts.json) { emitJson(skills); return EXIT.SUCCESS; }
+      if (skills.length === 0) { render.info(dim("(no skills)")); return EXIT.SUCCESS; }
+      render.section(`mesh skills (${skills.length})`);
+      for (const s of skills) {
+        process.stdout.write(`  ${bold(s.name)} ${dim("· by " + s.author)}\n`);
+        process.stdout.write(`    ${s.description}\n`);
+        if (s.tags?.length) process.stdout.write(`    ${dim("tags: " + s.tags.join(", "))}\n`);
+      }
+      return EXIT.SUCCESS;
+    }
+  } catch { /* fall through to cold path */ }
+
   return await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
     const skills = await client.listSkills(opts.query);
     if (opts.json) { emitJson(skills); return EXIT.SUCCESS; }
@@ -289,6 +307,27 @@ export async function runSkillList(opts: Flags & { query?: string }): Promise<nu
 
 export async function runSkillGet(name: string, opts: Flags): Promise<number> {
   if (!name) { render.err("Usage: claudemesh skill get <name>"); return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS; }
+  // Daemon path first.
+  try {
+    const { tryGetSkillViaDaemon } = await import("~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js");
+    const dr = await tryGetSkillViaDaemon(name);
+    if (dr !== null) {
+      const skill = dr as { name: string; description: string; instructions: string; tags: string[]; author: string; createdAt: string };
+      if (opts.json) { emitJson(skill); return EXIT.SUCCESS; }
+      render.section(skill.name);
+      render.kv([
+        ["author", skill.author],
+        ["created", skill.createdAt],
+        ["tags", skill.tags?.join(", ") || dim("(none)")],
+      ]);
+      render.blank();
+      render.info(skill.description);
+      render.blank();
+      process.stdout.write(skill.instructions + "\n");
+      return EXIT.SUCCESS;
+    }
+  } catch { /* fall through */ }
+
   return await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
     const skill = await client.getSkill(name);
     if (!skill) { render.err(`skill "${name}" not found`); return EXIT.NOT_FOUND; }
@@ -348,6 +387,52 @@ export async function runVaultDelete(key: string, opts: Flags): Promise<number>
   });
 }
 
+export interface VaultSetOpts extends Flags {
+  entryType?: "env" | "file";
+  mountPath?: string;
+  description?: string;
+}
+
+export async function runVaultSet(key: string, value: string, opts: VaultSetOpts): Promise<number> {
+  if (!key || value == null) {
+    render.err("Usage: claudemesh vault set <key> <value> [--type env|file] [--mount /path] [--description ...]");
+    return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+  const { encryptFile, sealKeyForPeer } = await import("~/services/crypto/file-crypto.js");
+  const { getMeshConfig } = await import("~/services/config/facade.js");
+  const { readConfig } = await import("~/services/config/facade.js");
+
+  const config = readConfig();
+  const slug = opts.mesh ?? (config.meshes.length === 1 ? config.meshes[0]!.slug : null);
+  if (!slug) {
+    render.err("multiple meshes joined; pass --mesh <slug>");
+    return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+  const mesh = getMeshConfig(slug);
+  if (!mesh) { render.err(`not joined to mesh "${slug}"`); return EXIT.NOT_FOUND; }
+
+  const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode(value);
+  const enc = await encryptFile(plaintext);
+  const ciphertextB64 = Buffer.from(enc.ciphertext).toString("base64");
+  const sealed = await sealKeyForPeer(enc.key, mesh.pubkey);
+
+  return await withMesh({ meshSlug: slug }, async (client) => {
+    const ok = await client.vaultSet(
+      key,
+      ciphertextB64,
+      enc.nonce,
+      sealed,
+      opts.entryType ?? "env",
+      opts.mountPath,
+      opts.description,
+    );
+    if (opts.json) emitJson({ key, stored: ok });
+    else if (ok) render.ok(`vault[${bold(key)}] stored`, dim(`(${ciphertextB64.length}b)`));
+    else render.err(`vault set failed for "${key}"`);
+    return ok ? EXIT.SUCCESS : EXIT.IO_ERROR;
+  });
+}
+
 // ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 // watch — URL change watchers
 // ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -368,6 +453,39 @@ export async function runWatchList(opts: Flags): Promise<number> {
   });
 }
 
+export interface WatchAddOpts extends Flags {
+  label?: string;
+  interval?: number;
+  mode?: string;
+  extract?: string;
+  notifyOn?: string;
+}
+
+export async function runWatchAdd(url: string, opts: WatchAddOpts): Promise<number> {
+  if (!url) {
+    render.err("Usage: claudemesh watch add <url> [--label ...] [--interval <sec>] [--extract <css>] [--notify-on changed|always]");
+    return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+  return await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
+    const result = await client.watch(url, {
+      label: opts.label,
+      interval: opts.interval,
+      mode: opts.mode,
+      extract: opts.extract,
+      notify_on: opts.notifyOn,
+    });
+    if (result?.error) {
+      if (opts.json) emitJson({ ok: false, error: result.error });
+      else render.err(`watch add failed: ${result.error}`);
+      return EXIT.IO_ERROR;
+    }
+    const id = String((result as any)?.id ?? (result as any)?.watch_id ?? "?");
+    if (opts.json) emitJson({ ok: true, id, url, ...(opts.label ? { label: opts.label } : {}) });
+    else render.ok(`watching ${clay(url)}`, dim(id.slice(0, 8)));
+    return EXIT.SUCCESS;
+  });
+}
+
 export async function runUnwatch(id: string, opts: Flags): Promise<number> {
   if (!id) { render.err("Usage: claudemesh watch remove <id>"); return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS; }
   return await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
@@ -397,6 +515,28 @@ export async function runWebhookList(opts: Flags): Promise<number> {
   });
 }
 
+export async function runWebhookCreate(name: string, opts: Flags): Promise<number> {
+  if (!name) {
+    render.err("Usage: claudemesh webhook create <name>");
+    return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS;
+  }
+  return await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
+    const created = await client.createWebhook(name);
+    if (!created) {
+      if (opts.json) emitJson({ ok: false, error: "create failed (timeout or duplicate)" });
+      else render.err(`webhook create "${name}" failed`);
+      return EXIT.IO_ERROR;
+    }
+    if (opts.json) emitJson({ ok: true, ...created });
+    else {
+      render.ok(`created webhook ${bold(created.name)}`);
+      process.stdout.write(`  url:    ${clay(created.url)}\n`);
+      process.stdout.write(`  secret: ${dim(created.secret)} ${dim("(shown once)")}\n`);
+    }
+    return EXIT.SUCCESS;
+  });
+}
+
 export async function runWebhookDelete(name: string, opts: Flags): Promise<number> {
   if (!name) { render.err("Usage: claudemesh webhook delete <name>"); return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS; }
   return await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {

apps/cli/src/commands/recall.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { withMesh } from "./connect.js";
+import { tryRecallViaDaemon } from "~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js";
 import { render } from "~/ui/render.js";
 import { bold, clay, dim } from "~/ui/styles.js";
 import { EXIT } from "~/constants/exit-codes.js";
@@ -11,6 +12,22 @@ export async function recall(
     render.err("Usage: claudemesh recall <query>");
     return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS;
   }
+
+  // Daemon path first.
+  const daemonMatches = await tryRecallViaDaemon(query, opts.mesh);
+  if (daemonMatches !== null) {
+    if (opts.json) { console.log(JSON.stringify(daemonMatches, null, 2)); return EXIT.SUCCESS; }
+    if (daemonMatches.length === 0) { render.info(dim("no memories found.")); return EXIT.SUCCESS; }
+    render.section(`memories (${daemonMatches.length})`);
+    for (const m of daemonMatches) {
+      const tags = m.tags.length ? dim(` [${m.tags.map((t) => clay(t)).join(dim(", "))}]`) : "";
+      process.stdout.write(`  ${bold(m.id.slice(0, 8))}${tags}\n`);
+      process.stdout.write(`    ${m.content}\n`);
+      process.stdout.write(`    ${dim(m.rememberedBy + "  ·  " + new Date(m.rememberedAt).toLocaleString())}\n\n`);
+    }
+    return EXIT.SUCCESS;
+  }
+
   return await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
     const memories = await client.recall(query);
 

apps/cli/src/commands/remember.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { withMesh } from "./connect.js";
+import { tryRememberViaDaemon } from "~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js";
 import { render } from "~/ui/render.js";
 import { dim } from "~/ui/styles.js";
 import { EXIT } from "~/constants/exit-codes.js";
@@ -12,6 +13,18 @@ export async function remember(
     return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS;
   }
   const tags = opts.tags?.split(",").map((t) => t.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+
+  // Daemon path first.
+  const daemonRes = await tryRememberViaDaemon(content, tags, opts.mesh);
+  if (daemonRes) {
+    if (opts.json) {
+      console.log(JSON.stringify({ id: daemonRes.id, content, tags, mesh: daemonRes.mesh }));
+      return EXIT.SUCCESS;
+    }
+    render.ok("remembered", dim(daemonRes.id.slice(0, 8)));
+    return EXIT.SUCCESS;
+  }
+
   return await withMesh({ meshSlug: opts.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
     const id = await client.remember(content, tags);
 

apps/cli/src/commands/send.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
 
 import { withMesh } from "./connect.js";
 import { readConfig } from "~/services/config/facade.js";
-import { tryBridge } from "~/services/bridge/client.js";
 import { trySendViaDaemon } from "~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js";
 import type { Priority } from "~/services/broker/facade.js";
 import { render } from "~/ui/render.js";
@@ -48,13 +47,71 @@ export async function runSend(flags: SendFlags, to: string, message: string): Pr
     flags.mesh ??
     (config.meshes.length === 1 ? config.meshes[0]!.slug : null);
 
+  // 1.31.6: hex-prefix resolution. If `to` looks like hex but isn't a
+  // full 64-char pubkey, resolve it against the peer list and replace
+  // it with the matching full pubkey. The broker stores `targetSpec`
+  // verbatim and the drain query at apps/broker/src/broker.ts:2408
+  // matches only on full pubkeys, so a 16-hex prefix would queue
+  // successfully but never fetch — sender saw "sent", recipient saw
+  // nothing. Resolving here makes the CLI's prefix UX work end-to-end
+  // and surfaces ambiguous / unmatched prefixes with a clear error
+  // instead of a silent drop.
+  if (
+    !to.startsWith("@") &&
+    !to.startsWith("#") &&
+    to !== "*" &&
+    /^[0-9a-f]{4,63}$/i.test(to)
+  ) {
+    try {
+      const { tryListPeersViaDaemon } = await import("~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js");
+      const peers = (await tryListPeersViaDaemon()) ?? [];
+      const lower = to.toLowerCase();
+      const matches = peers.filter((p) => {
+        const pk = (p as { pubkey?: string }).pubkey ?? "";
+        const mpk = (p as { memberPubkey?: string }).memberPubkey ?? "";
+        return pk.toLowerCase().startsWith(lower) || mpk.toLowerCase().startsWith(lower);
+      });
+      if (matches.length === 0) {
+        render.err(`No peer matches hex prefix "${to}".`);
+        const names = peers
+          .map((p) => (p as { displayName?: string }).displayName)
+          .filter(Boolean)
+          .join(", ");
+        if (names) render.hint(`online: ${names}`);
+        process.exit(1);
+      }
+      if (matches.length > 1) {
+        const candidates = matches
+          .map((p) => {
+            const pk = (p as { pubkey?: string }).pubkey ?? "";
+            const dn = (p as { displayName?: string }).displayName ?? "?";
+            return `${dn} ${pk.slice(0, 16)}…`;
+          })
+          .join(", ");
+        render.err(`Ambiguous hex prefix "${to}" — matches ${matches.length} peers.`);
+        render.hint(`candidates: ${candidates}`);
+        render.hint("Use a longer prefix or paste the full 64-char pubkey.");
+        process.exit(1);
+      }
+      to = (matches[0] as { pubkey?: string }).pubkey ?? to;
+    } catch {
+      // Daemon unreachable — fall through; cold path will try a name
+      // lookup and surface its own error if that also fails.
+    }
+  }
+
   // Self-DM safety check: if target is a 64-char hex that matches the
-  // caller's own member pubkey (or any of the caller's session/member
+  // caller's own member pubkey, refuse without --self. Catches the
-  // entries), refuse without --self. Catches the common pasted-from-
+  // common pasted-from-peer-list-not-realizing-it-was-mine footgun.
-  // peer-list-not-realizing-it-was-mine footgun.
+  // With --self, member-pubkey targeting fans out to every connected
-  if (!flags.self && meshSlug) {
+  // sibling session of your member (the broker's drain only matches
+  // exact session pubkeys, so we resolve here in the CLI).
+  if (meshSlug) {
     const joined = config.meshes.find((m) => m.slug === meshSlug);
-    if (joined && /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(to) && to.toLowerCase() === joined.pubkey.toLowerCase()) {
+    const isOwnMemberKey =
+      joined && /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(to) && to.toLowerCase() === joined.pubkey.toLowerCase();
+
+    if (isOwnMemberKey && !flags.self) {
       render.err(
         `Target "${to.slice(0, 16)}…" is your own member pubkey on mesh "${meshSlug}".`,
       );
@@ -63,6 +120,68 @@ export async function runSend(flags: SendFlags, to: string, message: string): Pr
       );
       process.exit(1);
     }
+
+    if (isOwnMemberKey && flags.self) {
+      // Member-pubkey fan-out: resolve to every connected sibling
+      // session pubkey and send one message per recipient. Required
+      // because the broker's drain query at apps/broker/src/broker.ts
+      // matches target_spec only against full session pubkeys —
+      // sending to a member pubkey would queue successfully but no
+      // drain would fetch.
+      try {
+        const { tryListPeersViaDaemon } = await import("~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js");
+        const { getSessionInfo } = await import("~/services/session/resolve.js");
+        const peers = (await tryListPeersViaDaemon()) ?? [];
+        const session = await getSessionInfo();
+        const ownSessionPk = session?.presence?.sessionPubkey?.toLowerCase();
+        const siblings = peers.filter((p) => {
+          const r = p as { memberPubkey?: string; pubkey?: string; channel?: string };
+          if (!r.pubkey) return false;
+          if (ownSessionPk && r.pubkey.toLowerCase() === ownSessionPk) return false;
+          if (r.channel === "claudemesh-daemon") return false;
+          return r.memberPubkey?.toLowerCase() === to.toLowerCase();
+        });
+        if (siblings.length === 0) {
+          render.err(`--self fan-out: no other sibling sessions of your member online.`);
+          process.exit(1);
+        }
+        const results: Array<{ pubkey: string; ok: boolean; messageId?: string; error?: string }> = [];
+        for (const peer of siblings) {
+          const pk = (peer as { pubkey: string }).pubkey;
+          const dr = await trySendViaDaemon({ to: pk, message, priority, expectedMesh: meshSlug ?? undefined });
+          if (dr === null) {
+            results.push({ pubkey: pk, ok: false, error: "daemon path unavailable" });
+            continue;
+          }
+          if (dr.ok) {
+            results.push({
+              pubkey: pk,
+              ok: true,
+              ...(dr.messageId ? { messageId: dr.messageId } : {}),
+            });
+          } else {
+            results.push({ pubkey: pk, ok: false, error: dr.error });
+          }
+        }
+        const okCount = results.filter((r) => r.ok).length;
+        if (flags.json) {
+          console.log(JSON.stringify({ ok: okCount > 0, fanout: results, via: "daemon" }));
+        } else if (okCount === results.length) {
+          render.ok(`fanned out to ${okCount} sibling session${okCount === 1 ? "" : "s"} (daemon)`);
+          for (const r of results) render.info(dim(`  → ${r.pubkey.slice(0, 16)}… ${r.messageId ? dim(r.messageId.slice(0, 8)) : ""}`));
+        } else {
+          render.warn(`fanned out: ${okCount}/${results.length} delivered`);
+          for (const r of results) {
+            const tag = r.ok ? "✔" : "✘";
+            render.info(`  ${tag} ${r.pubkey.slice(0, 16)}… ${r.error ? dim(`— ${r.error}`) : ""}`);
+          }
+        }
+        return;
+      } catch (e) {
+        render.err(`--self fan-out failed: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`);
+        process.exit(1);
+      }
+    }
   }
 
   // Daemon path — preferred when a long-lived daemon is local. UDS at
@@ -82,34 +201,12 @@ export async function runSend(flags: SendFlags, to: string, message: string): Pr
       else render.err(`send failed (daemon): ${dr.error}`);
       process.exit(1);
     }
-    // dr === null → daemon not running; fall through to bridge.
+    // dr === null → daemon not running and lifecycle couldn't auto-
+    // spawn it; fall through to cold path. The orphaned bridge tier
+    // was removed in 1.28.0.
   }
 
-  // Warm path — only when mesh is unambiguous.
+  // Cold path — open our own WS, encrypt locally, fire envelope.
-  if (meshSlug) {
-    const bridged = await tryBridge(meshSlug, "send", { to, message, priority });
-    if (bridged !== null) {
-      if (bridged.ok) {
-        const r = bridged.result as { messageId?: string };
-        if (flags.json) {
-          console.log(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, messageId: r.messageId, target: to }));
-        } else {
-          render.ok(`sent to ${to}`, r.messageId ? dim(r.messageId.slice(0, 8)) : undefined);
-        }
-        return;
-      }
-      // Bridge reachable but op failed — surface error, don't fall through.
-      if (flags.json) {
-        console.log(JSON.stringify({ ok: false, error: bridged.error }));
-      } else {
-        render.err(`send failed: ${bridged.error}`);
-      }
-      process.exit(1);
-    }
-    // bridged === null → bridge unreachable, fall through to cold path
-  }
-
-  // Cold path
   await withMesh({ meshSlug: flags.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
     let targetSpec = to;
     if (to.startsWith("#") && !/^#[0-9a-z_-]{20,}$/i.test(to)) {

apps/cli/src/commands/state.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  */
 
 import { withMesh } from "./connect.js";
+import { tryGetStateViaDaemon, tryListStateViaDaemon, trySetStateViaDaemon } from "~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js";
 import { render } from "~/ui/render.js";
 import { bold, dim } from "~/ui/styles.js";
 
@@ -14,6 +15,16 @@ export interface StateFlags {
 }
 
 export async function runStateGet(flags: StateFlags, key: string): Promise<void> {
+  // Daemon path first.
+  const daemonEntry = await tryGetStateViaDaemon(key, flags.mesh);
+  if (daemonEntry !== null) {
+    if (!daemonEntry) { render.info(dim("(not set)")); return; }
+    if (flags.json) { console.log(JSON.stringify(daemonEntry, null, 2)); return; }
+    const val = typeof daemonEntry.value === "string" ? daemonEntry.value : JSON.stringify(daemonEntry.value);
+    render.info(val);
+    render.info(dim(`  set by ${daemonEntry.updatedBy} at ${new Date(daemonEntry.updatedAt).toLocaleString()}`));
+    return;
+  }
   await withMesh({ meshSlug: flags.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
     const entry = await client.getState(key);
     if (!entry) {
@@ -38,6 +49,12 @@ export async function runStateSet(flags: StateFlags, key: string, value: string)
     parsed = value;
   }
 
+  // Daemon path first.
+  const daemonOk = await trySetStateViaDaemon(key, parsed, flags.mesh);
+  if (daemonOk) {
+    render.ok(`${bold(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(parsed)}`);
+    return;
+  }
   await withMesh({ meshSlug: flags.mesh ?? null }, async (client) => {
     await client.setState(key, parsed);
     render.ok(`${bold(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(parsed)}`);
@@ -45,6 +62,19 @@ export async function runStateSet(flags: StateFlags, key: string, value: string)
 }
 
 export async function runStateList(flags: StateFlags): Promise<void> {
+  // Daemon path first.
+  const daemonRows = await tryListStateViaDaemon(flags.mesh);
+  if (daemonRows !== null) {
+    if (flags.json) { console.log(JSON.stringify(daemonRows, null, 2)); return; }
+    if (daemonRows.length === 0) { render.info(dim("(no state)")); return; }
+    render.section(`state (${daemonRows.length})`);
+    for (const e of daemonRows) {
+      const val = typeof e.value === "string" ? e.value : JSON.stringify(e.value);
+      process.stdout.write(`  ${bold(e.key)}: ${val}\n`);
+      process.stdout.write(`    ${dim(e.updatedBy + "  ·  " + new Date(e.updatedAt).toLocaleString())}\n`);
+    }
+    return;
+  }
   await withMesh({ meshSlug: flags.mesh ?? null }, async (client, mesh) => {
     const entries = await client.listState();
 

apps/cli/src/commands/whoami.ts

@@ -1,25 +1,51 @@
 import { whoAmI } from "~/services/auth/facade.js";
+import { getSessionInfo } from "~/services/session/resolve.js";
 import { render } from "~/ui/render.js";
-import { bold, clay, dim } from "~/ui/styles.js";
+import { bold, clay, dim, yellow } from "~/ui/styles.js";
 import { EXIT } from "~/constants/exit-codes.js";
 
 export async function whoami(opts: { json?: boolean }): Promise<number> {
   const result = await whoAmI();
+  // 1.32.0+: surface the calling session's identity when whoami is run
+  // from inside a `claudemesh launch`-spawned shell. Previously the
+  // command only reported web sign-in + local mesh memberships, and a
+  // launched session had to dig env vars + parse config.json to figure
+  // out its own session pubkey.
+  const session = await getSessionInfo();
 
   if (opts.json) {
-    console.log(JSON.stringify({ schema_version: "1.0", ...result }, null, 2));
+    console.log(JSON.stringify({ schema_version: "1.0", ...result, session }, null, 2));
-    return result.signed_in || result.local ? EXIT.SUCCESS : EXIT.AUTH_FAILED;
+    return result.signed_in || result.local || session ? EXIT.SUCCESS : EXIT.AUTH_FAILED;
   }
 
-  // Show whatever we have. Both the web session and the local mesh
+  // Show whatever we have. Web session, local mesh config, and the
-  // config are independent surfaces of identity; suppress sections that
+  // launched-session identity are three independent surfaces.
-  // are empty.
+  if (!result.signed_in && !result.local && !session) {
-  if (!result.signed_in && !result.local) {
     render.err("Not signed in", "Run `claudemesh login` to sign in or `claudemesh <invite>` to join.");
     return EXIT.AUTH_FAILED;
   }
 
   render.section("whoami");
+
+  if (session) {
+    const sessionPk = session.presence?.sessionPubkey;
+    const groups = (session.groups ?? []).join(", ") || dim("(none)");
+    render.kv([
+      ["this session", `${yellow(session.displayName)} on ${bold(session.mesh)}`],
+      ["session id", dim(session.sessionId)],
+      ...(sessionPk
+        ? [["session pubkey", dim(`${sessionPk.slice(0, 16)}… (full: ${sessionPk})`)] as [string, string]]
+        : []),
+      ...(session.role
+        ? [["role", session.role] as [string, string]]
+        : []),
+      ["groups", groups],
+      ...(session.cwd ? [["cwd", dim(session.cwd)] as [string, string]] : []),
+      ["pid", String(session.pid)],
+    ]);
+    render.blank();
+  }
+
   if (result.signed_in) {
     render.kv([
       ["user", `${bold(result.user!.display_name)} ${dim(`(${result.user!.email})`)}`],

apps/cli/src/constants/exit-codes.ts

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ export const EXIT = {
   PERMISSION_DENIED: 7,
   INTERNAL_ERROR: 8,
   CLAUDE_MISSING: 9,
+  IO_ERROR: 10,
 } as const;
 
 export type ExitCode = (typeof EXIT)[keyof typeof EXIT];

apps/cli/src/constants/paths.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,82 @@
+import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
 import { homedir } from "node:os";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 
 const home = homedir();
+const DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR = join(home, ".claudemesh");
+
+/**
+ * Resolve `CONFIG_DIR` once, with stale-env detection.
+ *
+ * `claudemesh launch` exposes `CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR=<tmpdir>` to its
+ * spawned `claude` so the per-session mesh selection is isolated from
+ * `~/.claudemesh/config.json`. The tmpdir is rmSync'd on launch exit.
+ *
+ * Footgun: if a `claudemesh` invocation INHERITS that env from an
+ * already-launched (or previously-launched) session — e.g. a Bash tool
+ * call inside Claude Code, or a tmux pane that captured the env via
+ * `update-environment` — the inherited path may point at a tmpdir that
+ * no longer exists. Pre-1.34.14 we silently used the dead path,
+ * `readConfig()` came back empty, and the user saw "No meshes joined"
+ * from an otherwise-working install.
+ *
+ * Resolution rules:
+ *   1. No env var       → `~/.claudemesh` (default).
+ *   2. Env points at a dir containing `config.json` → trust it
+ *      (the legitimate per-session-launch case).
+ *   3. Env set but stale (dir missing or no `config.json`) → warn
+ *      once on stderr (TTY-only) and fall back to `~/.claudemesh`.
+ *
+ * Memoized: resolves once on first access. Mid-process env mutations
+ * are intentionally ignored — paths must stay stable across one CLI
+ * invocation.
+ */
+let _resolvedConfigDir: string | null = null;
+let _warnedStaleEnv = false;
+
+function resolveConfigDir(): string {
+  if (_resolvedConfigDir !== null) return _resolvedConfigDir;
+  const envDir = process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR;
+  if (!envDir) {
+    _resolvedConfigDir = DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR;
+    return DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR;
+  }
+  // Trust the env when it resolves to a real directory. We check
+  // the DIR (not `config.json`) because the legitimate "fresh launch
+  // before any write" case has the dir but no config.json yet.
+  // The stale signature we want to catch is `rmSync(tmpDir,
+  // {recursive: true})` from the outer launch's cleanup — that
+  // removes the directory entirely, so a missing dir is the
+  // unambiguous "stale" signal.
+  if (existsSync(envDir)) {
+    _resolvedConfigDir = envDir;
+    return envDir;
+  }
+  // Stale: env set but the dir is gone. Most likely the outer
+  // launch's cleanup ran and we inherited its (now-dead) tmpdir
+  // path. Fall back to default and warn the user once on stderr —
+  // only when attached to a TTY, so non-interactive callers (CI,
+  // MCP boot, scripts piping stdout) stay quiet.
+  if (!_warnedStaleEnv && process.stderr.isTTY) {
+    _warnedStaleEnv = true;
+    const unsetHint =
+      process.env.SHELL?.endsWith("fish")
+        ? "set -e CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR CLAUDEMESH_IPC_TOKEN_FILE"
+        : "unset CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR CLAUDEMESH_IPC_TOKEN_FILE";
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `claudemesh: ignoring stale CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR=${envDir} (no config.json there); using ${DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR}.\n`
+        + `  Hint: this is usually a leftover env from a previous \`claudemesh launch\`. Clean it with:\n`
+        + `    ${unsetHint}\n`,
+    );
+  }
+  _resolvedConfigDir = DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR;
+  return DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR;
+}
 
 export const PATHS = {
-  CONFIG_DIR: process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR || join(home, ".claudemesh"),
+  get CONFIG_DIR() {
+    return resolveConfigDir();
+  },
   get CONFIG_FILE() {
     return join(this.CONFIG_DIR, "config.json");
   },
@@ -20,3 +92,12 @@ export const PATHS = {
   CLAUDE_JSON: join(home, ".claude.json"),
   CLAUDE_SETTINGS: join(home, ".claude", "settings.json"),
 } as const;
+
+/**
+ * Test-only: reset the memoized resolution. Not exported from the
+ * package barrel; reach in via the relative path from a test file.
+ */
+export function _resetPathsForTest(): void {
+  _resolvedConfigDir = null;
+  _warnedStaleEnv = false;
+}

apps/cli/src/daemon/broker.ts

@@ -7,13 +7,19 @@
 //   - Wire envelope adds `client_message_id` (broker may ignore in legacy
 //     mode; Sprint 7 promotes it to authoritative dedupe).
 //   - Reconnect with exponential backoff, signaled to the drain worker.
-
+//
-import WebSocket from "ws";
+// 2026-05-04: lifecycle (connect / hello-ack / close-reconnect) now
+// lives in `ws-lifecycle.ts`. This class supplies the daemon-WS hello
+// content and routes incoming RPC replies / pushes; the helper handles
+// the rest. The hello no longer carries an ephemeral `sessionPubkey` —
+// session-targeted DMs land on the per-session WS (SessionBrokerClient)
+// since 1.32.1, so this socket only needs the member identity.
 
 import type { JoinedMesh } from "~/services/config/facade.js";
 import { signHello } from "~/services/broker/hello-sig.js";
+import { connectWsWithBackoff, type WsLifecycle, type WsStatus } from "./ws-lifecycle.js";
 
-export type ConnStatus = "connecting" | "open" | "closed" | "reconnecting";
+export type ConnStatus = WsStatus;
 
 export interface BrokerSendArgs {
   /** Target as the broker expects it: peer name | pubkey | @group | * | topic. */
@@ -49,6 +55,8 @@ export interface PeerSummary {
   hostname?: string;
   peerType?: string;
   channel?: string;
+  /** Broker-side classification, added 2026-05-04. Missing in older brokers. */
+  role?: "control-plane" | "session" | "service";
 }
 
 interface PendingPeerList {
@@ -56,9 +64,35 @@ interface PendingPeerList {
   timer: NodeJS.Timeout;
 }
 
-const HELLO_ACK_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
+export interface SkillSummary {
+  name: string;
+  description: string;
+  tags: string[];
+  author: string;
+  createdAt: string;
+}
+
+export interface SkillFull extends SkillSummary {
+  instructions: string;
+  manifest?: unknown;
+}
+
+export interface StateRow {
+  key: string;
+  value: unknown;
+  updatedBy: string;
+  updatedAt: string;
+}
+
+export interface MemoryRow {
+  id: string;
+  content: string;
+  tags: string[];
+  rememberedBy: string;
+  rememberedAt: string;
+}
+
 const SEND_ACK_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
-const BACKOFF_CAPS_MS = [1_000, 2_000, 4_000, 8_000, 16_000, 30_000];
 
 export interface DaemonBrokerOptions {
   displayName?: string;
@@ -68,16 +102,17 @@ export interface DaemonBrokerOptions {
 }
 
 export class DaemonBrokerClient {
-  private ws: WebSocket | null = null;
+  private lifecycle: WsLifecycle | null = null;
   private _status: ConnStatus = "closed";
   private closed = false;
-  private reconnectAttempt = 0;
-  private reconnectTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
-  private helloTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
   private pendingAcks = new Map<string, PendingAck>();
   private peerListResolvers = new Map<string, PendingPeerList>();
-  private sessionPubkey: string | null = null;
+  private skillListResolvers = new Map<string, { resolve: (rows: SkillSummary[]) => void; timer: NodeJS.Timeout }>();
-  private sessionSecretKey: string | null = null;
+  private skillDataResolvers = new Map<string, { resolve: (row: SkillFull | null) => void; timer: NodeJS.Timeout }>();
+  private stateGetResolvers = new Map<string, { resolve: (row: StateRow | null) => void; timer: NodeJS.Timeout }>();
+  private stateListResolvers = new Map<string, { resolve: (rows: StateRow[]) => void; timer: NodeJS.Timeout }>();
+  private memoryStoreResolvers = new Map<string, { resolve: (id: string | null) => void; timer: NodeJS.Timeout }>();
+  private memoryRecallResolvers = new Map<string, { resolve: (rows: MemoryRow[]) => void; timer: NodeJS.Timeout }>();
   private opens: Array<() => void> = [];
   private reqCounter = 0;
 
@@ -91,39 +126,25 @@ export class DaemonBrokerClient {
     (this.opts.log ?? defaultLog)(level, msg, { mesh: this.mesh.slug, ...meta });
   };
 
-  private setConnStatus(s: ConnStatus) {
-    if (this._status === s) return;
-    this._status = s;
-    this.opts.onStatusChange?.(s);
-  }
-
   /** Open the WS, run the hello handshake, resolve once the broker accepts. */
   async connect(): Promise<void> {
     if (this.closed) throw new Error("client_closed");
     if (this._status === "connecting" || this._status === "open") return;
-    this.setConnStatus("connecting");
 
-    const ws = new WebSocket(this.mesh.brokerUrl);
+    this.lifecycle = await connectWsWithBackoff({
-    this.ws = ws;
+      url: this.mesh.brokerUrl,
-
+      buildHello: async () => {
-    return new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
-      ws.on("open", async () => {
-        try {
-          if (!this.sessionPubkey) {
-            const { generateKeypair } = await import("~/services/crypto/facade.js");
-            const kp = await generateKeypair();
-            this.sessionPubkey = kp.publicKey;
-            this.sessionSecretKey = kp.secretKey;
-          }
         const { timestamp, signature } = await signHello(
           this.mesh.meshId, this.mesh.memberId, this.mesh.pubkey, this.mesh.secretKey,
         );
-          ws.send(JSON.stringify({
+        return {
           type: "hello",
           meshId: this.mesh.meshId,
           memberId: this.mesh.memberId,
           pubkey: this.mesh.pubkey,
-            sessionPubkey: this.sessionPubkey,
+          // No `sessionPubkey` — daemon-WS is member-keyed only. The
+          // per-session presence WS (SessionBrokerClient) carries the
+          // ephemeral session pubkey. Spec §"Layer 1: Identity → Member identity".
           displayName: this.opts.displayName,
           sessionId: `daemon-${process.pid}`,
           pid: process.pid,
@@ -133,35 +154,28 @@ export class DaemonBrokerClient {
           channel: "claudemesh-daemon",
           timestamp,
           signature,
-          }));
+        };
-          this.helloTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+      },
-            this.log("warn", "broker_hello_ack_timeout");
+      isHelloAck: (msg) => msg.type === "hello_ack",
-            try { ws.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+      onMessage: (msg) => this.handleMessage(msg),
-            reject(new Error("hello_ack_timeout"));
+      onStatusChange: (s) => {
-          }, HELLO_ACK_TIMEOUT_MS);
+        this._status = s;
-        } catch (e) {
+        this.opts.onStatusChange?.(s);
-          reject(e instanceof Error ? e : new Error(String(e)));
+        if (s === "open") {
-        }
+          // Flush deferred openers (drain worker, etc.).
-      });
-
-      ws.on("message", (raw) => {
-        let msg: Record<string, unknown>;
-        try { msg = JSON.parse(raw.toString()) as Record<string, unknown>; }
-        catch { return; }
-
-        if (msg.type === "hello_ack") {
-          if (this.helloTimer) clearTimeout(this.helloTimer);
-          this.helloTimer = null;
-          this.setConnStatus("open");
-          this.reconnectAttempt = 0;
-          // Flush deferred openers (drain worker, etc.)
           const queued = this.opens.slice();
           this.opens.length = 0;
-          for (const fn of queued) { try { fn(); } catch (e) { this.log("warn", "open_handler_failed", { err: String(e) }); } }
+          for (const fn of queued) {
-          resolve();
+            try { fn(); } catch (e) { this.log("warn", "open_handler_failed", { err: String(e) }); }
-          return;
+          }
+        }
+      },
+      onBeforeReconnect: (code) => this.failPendingAcks(`broker_disconnected_${code}`),
+      log: (level, msg, meta) => this.log(level, `broker_${msg}`, meta),
+    });
   }
 
+  private handleMessage(msg: Record<string, unknown>): void {
     if (msg.type === "ack") {
       // Broker shape: { type: "ack", id, messageId, queued, error? }
       const id = String(msg.id ?? "");
@@ -189,34 +203,105 @@ export class DaemonBrokerClient {
       return;
     }
 
+    if (msg.type === "skill_list") {
+      const reqId = String(msg._reqId ?? "");
+      const pending = this.skillListResolvers.get(reqId);
+      if (pending) {
+        this.skillListResolvers.delete(reqId);
+        clearTimeout(pending.timer);
+        pending.resolve(Array.isArray(msg.skills) ? (msg.skills as SkillSummary[]) : []);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (msg.type === "skill_data") {
+      const reqId = String(msg._reqId ?? "");
+      const pending = this.skillDataResolvers.get(reqId);
+      if (pending) {
+        this.skillDataResolvers.delete(reqId);
+        clearTimeout(pending.timer);
+        pending.resolve((msg.skill as SkillFull) ?? null);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (msg.type === "state_value" || msg.type === "state_data") {
+      const reqId = String(msg._reqId ?? "");
+      const pending = this.stateGetResolvers.get(reqId);
+      if (pending) {
+        this.stateGetResolvers.delete(reqId);
+        clearTimeout(pending.timer);
+        pending.resolve((msg.state ?? msg.row ?? null) as StateRow | null);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (msg.type === "state_list") {
+      const reqId = String(msg._reqId ?? "");
+      const pending = this.stateListResolvers.get(reqId);
+      if (pending) {
+        this.stateListResolvers.delete(reqId);
+        clearTimeout(pending.timer);
+        pending.resolve(Array.isArray(msg.entries) ? (msg.entries as StateRow[]) : []);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (msg.type === "memory_stored") {
+      const reqId = String(msg._reqId ?? "");
+      const pending = this.memoryStoreResolvers.get(reqId);
+      if (pending) {
+        this.memoryStoreResolvers.delete(reqId);
+        clearTimeout(pending.timer);
+        pending.resolve(typeof msg.memoryId === "string" ? msg.memoryId : null);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (msg.type === "memory_recall_result") {
+      const reqId = String(msg._reqId ?? "");
+      const pending = this.memoryRecallResolvers.get(reqId);
+      if (pending) {
+        this.memoryRecallResolvers.delete(reqId);
+        clearTimeout(pending.timer);
+        pending.resolve(Array.isArray(msg.matches) ? (msg.matches as MemoryRow[]) : []);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
     if (msg.type === "push" || msg.type === "inbound") {
       this.opts.onPush?.(msg);
       return;
     }
-      });
+  }
 
-      ws.on("close", (code, reason) => {
+  /** True when underlying socket is OPEN-ready for direct sends. */
-        if (this.helloTimer) { clearTimeout(this.helloTimer); this.helloTimer = null; }
+  private isOpen(): boolean {
-        this.failPendingAcks(`broker_disconnected_${code}`);
+    const sock = this.lifecycle?.ws;
-        if (this.closed) { this.setConnStatus("closed"); return; }
+    return !!sock && sock.readyState === sock.OPEN;
-        this.setConnStatus("reconnecting");
+  }
-        const wait = BACKOFF_CAPS_MS[Math.min(this.reconnectAttempt, BACKOFF_CAPS_MS.length - 1)] ?? 30_000;
-        this.reconnectAttempt++;
-        this.log("info", "broker_reconnect_scheduled", { wait_ms: wait, code, reason: reason.toString("utf8") });
-        this.reconnectTimer = setTimeout(() => this.connect().catch((err) => this.log("warn", "broker_reconnect_failed", { err: String(err) })), wait);
-        // First connection failure also rejects the original connect() promise.
-        if (this._status === "connecting") reject(new Error(`closed_before_hello_${code}`));
-      });
 
-      ws.on("error", (err) => this.log("warn", "broker_ws_error", { err: err.message }));
+  /** v2 agentic-comms (M1): send `client_ack` back to the broker after
+   *  successfully landing an inbound push in inbox.db. Broker uses the
+   *  ack to set `delivered_at` (atomic at-least-once). Best-effort —
+   *  if the WS isn't open, drop the ack; broker's 30s lease will
+   *  re-deliver. */
+  sendClientAck(clientMessageId: string, brokerMessageId: string | null): void {
+    if (!this.isOpen()) return;
+    try {
+      this.lifecycle!.send({
+        type: "client_ack",
+        clientMessageId,
+        ...(brokerMessageId ? { brokerMessageId } : {}),
       });
+    } catch { /* drop; lease re-delivers */ }
   }
 
   /** Send one outbox row. Resolves on broker ack/timeout. */
   send(req: BrokerSendArgs): Promise<BrokerSendResult> {
     return new Promise<BrokerSendResult>((resolve) => {
       const dispatch = () => {
-        if (!this.ws || this.ws.readyState !== this.ws.OPEN) {
+        if (!this.isOpen()) {
           resolve({ ok: false, error: "broker_not_open", permanent: false });
           return;
         }
@@ -228,7 +313,7 @@ export class DaemonBrokerClient {
         }, SEND_ACK_TIMEOUT_MS);
         this.pendingAcks.set(id, { resolve, timer });
         try {
-          this.ws.send(JSON.stringify({
+          this.lifecycle!.send({
             type: "send",
             id,                                  // legacy correlation id
             client_message_id: id,               // forward-compat per spec §4.2
@@ -237,7 +322,7 @@ export class DaemonBrokerClient {
             priority: req.priority,
             nonce: req.nonce,
             ciphertext: req.ciphertext,
-          }));
+          });
         } catch (e) {
           this.pendingAcks.delete(id);
           clearTimeout(timer);
@@ -252,55 +337,149 @@ export class DaemonBrokerClient {
 
   /** Ask the broker for the current peer list. */
   async listPeers(timeoutMs = 5_000): Promise<PeerSummary[]> {
-    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.ws) return [];
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return [];
     return new Promise<PeerSummary[]>((resolve) => {
       const reqId = `pl-${++this.reqCounter}`;
       const timer = setTimeout(() => {
         if (this.peerListResolvers.delete(reqId)) resolve([]);
       }, timeoutMs);
       this.peerListResolvers.set(reqId, { resolve, timer });
-      try { this.ws!.send(JSON.stringify({ type: "list_peers", _reqId: reqId })); }
+      try { this.lifecycle!.send({ type: "list_peers", _reqId: reqId }); }
       catch { this.peerListResolvers.delete(reqId); clearTimeout(timer); resolve([]); }
     });
   }
 
+  /** List mesh-published skills. Empty array on disconnect / timeout. */
+  async listSkills(query?: string, timeoutMs = 5_000): Promise<SkillSummary[]> {
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return [];
+    return new Promise<SkillSummary[]>((resolve) => {
+      const reqId = `sl-${++this.reqCounter}`;
+      const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+        if (this.skillListResolvers.delete(reqId)) resolve([]);
+      }, timeoutMs);
+      this.skillListResolvers.set(reqId, { resolve, timer });
+      try { this.lifecycle!.send({ type: "list_skills", query, _reqId: reqId }); }
+      catch { this.skillListResolvers.delete(reqId); clearTimeout(timer); resolve([]); }
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** Fetch one skill's full body. Null on not-found / disconnect / timeout. */
+  async getSkill(name: string, timeoutMs = 5_000): Promise<SkillFull | null> {
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return null;
+    return new Promise<SkillFull | null>((resolve) => {
+      const reqId = `sg-${++this.reqCounter}`;
+      const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+        if (this.skillDataResolvers.delete(reqId)) resolve(null);
+      }, timeoutMs);
+      this.skillDataResolvers.set(reqId, { resolve, timer });
+      try { this.lifecycle!.send({ type: "get_skill", name, _reqId: reqId }); }
+      catch { this.skillDataResolvers.delete(reqId); clearTimeout(timer); resolve(null); }
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** Read a single shared state row. Null on disconnect / timeout / not-found. */
+  async getState(key: string, timeoutMs = 5_000): Promise<StateRow | null> {
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return null;
+    return new Promise<StateRow | null>((resolve) => {
+      const reqId = `sg-${++this.reqCounter}`;
+      const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+        if (this.stateGetResolvers.delete(reqId)) resolve(null);
+      }, timeoutMs);
+      this.stateGetResolvers.set(reqId, { resolve, timer });
+      try { this.lifecycle!.send({ type: "get_state", key, _reqId: reqId }); }
+      catch { this.stateGetResolvers.delete(reqId); clearTimeout(timer); resolve(null); }
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** List all shared state rows in the mesh. */
+  async listState(timeoutMs = 5_000): Promise<StateRow[]> {
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return [];
+    return new Promise<StateRow[]>((resolve) => {
+      const reqId = `sl-${++this.reqCounter}`;
+      const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+        if (this.stateListResolvers.delete(reqId)) resolve([]);
+      }, timeoutMs);
+      this.stateListResolvers.set(reqId, { resolve, timer });
+      try { this.lifecycle!.send({ type: "list_state", _reqId: reqId }); }
+      catch { this.stateListResolvers.delete(reqId); clearTimeout(timer); resolve([]); }
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** Set a shared state value. Fire-and-forget. */
+  setState(key: string, value: unknown): void {
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return;
+    try { this.lifecycle.send({ type: "set_state", key, value }); }
+    catch { /* ignore */ }
+  }
+
+  /** Store a memory in the mesh. Returns the assigned id, or null on timeout. */
+  async remember(content: string, tags?: string[], timeoutMs = 5_000): Promise<string | null> {
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return null;
+    return new Promise<string | null>((resolve) => {
+      const reqId = `mr-${++this.reqCounter}`;
+      const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+        if (this.memoryStoreResolvers.delete(reqId)) resolve(null);
+      }, timeoutMs);
+      this.memoryStoreResolvers.set(reqId, { resolve, timer });
+      try { this.lifecycle!.send({ type: "remember", content, tags, _reqId: reqId }); }
+      catch { this.memoryStoreResolvers.delete(reqId); clearTimeout(timer); resolve(null); }
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** Search memories by relevance. */
+  async recall(query: string, timeoutMs = 5_000): Promise<MemoryRow[]> {
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return [];
+    return new Promise<MemoryRow[]>((resolve) => {
+      const reqId = `mc-${++this.reqCounter}`;
+      const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+        if (this.memoryRecallResolvers.delete(reqId)) resolve([]);
+      }, timeoutMs);
+      this.memoryRecallResolvers.set(reqId, { resolve, timer });
+      try { this.lifecycle!.send({ type: "recall", query, _reqId: reqId }); }
+      catch { this.memoryRecallResolvers.delete(reqId); clearTimeout(timer); resolve([]); }
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** Forget a memory by id. Fire-and-forget. */
+  forget(memoryId: string): void {
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return;
+    try { this.lifecycle.send({ type: "forget", memoryId }); }
+    catch { /* ignore */ }
+  }
+
   /** Set the daemon's profile (avatar/title/bio/capabilities). Fire-and-forget. */
   setProfile(profile: { avatar?: string; title?: string; bio?: string; capabilities?: string[] }): void {
-    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.ws) return;
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return;
-    try { this.ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: "set_profile", ...profile })); }
+    try { this.lifecycle.send({ type: "set_profile", ...profile }); }
     catch { /* ignore */ }
   }
 
   setSummary(summary: string): void {
-    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.ws) return;
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return;
-    try { this.ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: "set_summary", summary })); }
+    try { this.lifecycle.send({ type: "set_summary", summary }); }
     catch { /* ignore */ }
   }
 
   setStatus(status: "idle" | "working" | "dnd"): void {
-    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.ws) return;
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return;
-    try { this.ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: "set_status", status })); }
+    try { this.lifecycle.send({ type: "set_status", status }); }
     catch { /* ignore */ }
   }
 
   setVisible(visible: boolean): void {
-    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.ws) return;
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return;
-    try { this.ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: "set_visible", visible })); }
+    try { this.lifecycle.send({ type: "set_visible", visible }); }
     catch { /* ignore */ }
   }
 
   async close(): Promise<void> {
     this.closed = true;
-    if (this.reconnectTimer) { clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer); this.reconnectTimer = null; }
-    if (this.helloTimer) { clearTimeout(this.helloTimer); this.helloTimer = null; }
     this.failPendingAcks("daemon_shutdown");
-    try { this.ws?.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+    if (this.lifecycle) {
-    this.setConnStatus("closed");
+      try { await this.lifecycle.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+      this.lifecycle = null;
     }
-
+    this._status = "closed";
-  getSessionKeys(): { sessionPubkey: string; sessionSecretKey: string } | null {
-    if (!this.sessionPubkey || !this.sessionSecretKey) return null;
-    return { sessionPubkey: this.sessionPubkey, sessionSecretKey: this.sessionSecretKey };
   }
 
   private failPendingAcks(reason: string) {

apps/cli/src/daemon/db/inbox.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,25 @@ export interface InboxRow {
   meta: string | null;
   received_at: number;
   reply_to_id: string | null;
+  /** 1.34.8: Unix ms of when this row was first surfaced to the user
+   *  (returned by an interactive `inbox` listing or pushed via channel
+   *  reminder). NULL = never seen. Welcome filters on `seen_at IS NULL`
+   *  so freshly-launched sessions only see what they actually missed. */
+  seen_at: number | null;
+  /** 1.34.11: pubkey of the WS that received this push. Either the
+   *  daemon's member pubkey for member-keyed broadcasts, or one of
+   *  our session pubkeys for session-targeted DMs. Without this, two
+   *  sessions on the same daemon shared one inbox table and each saw
+   *  every other session's messages — same bug shape the 1.34.10 SSE
+   *  demux fixed for the live event path, just at the storage layer.
+   *  Pre-1.34.11 rows have NULL here and are visible to every session
+   *  on the same mesh (best-effort back-compat for already-stored
+   *  history). */
+  recipient_pubkey: string | null;
+  /** 1.34.11: matches `recipient_kind` on the bus event. "session" =
+   *  scoped to one session pubkey; "member" = visible to every
+   *  session of that member on the mesh. NULL on legacy rows. */
+  recipient_kind: string | null;
 }
 
 export function migrateInbox(db: SqliteDb): void {
@@ -36,6 +55,24 @@ export function migrateInbox(db: SqliteDb): void {
     CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS inbox_topic       ON inbox(topic);
     CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS inbox_sender      ON inbox(sender_pubkey);
   `);
+  // 1.34.8: read-state tracking. Pre-1.34.8 rows land with seen_at=NULL
+  // (treated as unread); welcome surfaces them once and the listing
+  // marks them seen. Indexed because welcome queries WHERE seen_at IS
+  // NULL on every launch.
+  const cols = db.prepare(`PRAGMA table_info(inbox)`).all<{ name: string }>();
+  if (!cols.some((c) => c.name === "seen_at")) {
+    db.exec(`ALTER TABLE inbox ADD COLUMN seen_at INTEGER`);
+    db.exec(`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS inbox_seen_at ON inbox(seen_at)`);
+  }
+  // 1.34.11: per-recipient scoping. Two sessions on the same daemon
+  // share one inbox table; without this column, listInbox returns
+  // every row regardless of which session is asking. Indexed
+  // because every interactive listing + welcome path filters by it.
+  if (!cols.some((c) => c.name === "recipient_pubkey")) {
+    db.exec(`ALTER TABLE inbox ADD COLUMN recipient_pubkey TEXT`);
+    db.exec(`ALTER TABLE inbox ADD COLUMN recipient_kind TEXT`);
+    db.exec(`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS inbox_recipient ON inbox(recipient_pubkey)`);
+  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -45,7 +82,14 @@ export function migrateInbox(db: SqliteDb): void {
  * Returns the new row id when this was a fresh insert, or null when the
  * message id was already known (idempotent receive).
  */
-export function insertIfNew(db: SqliteDb, row: Omit<InboxRow, "id"> & { id: string }): string | null {
+export function insertIfNew(
+  db: SqliteDb,
+  // 1.34.8: callers don't pass `seen_at` — it's always NULL on insert
+  // (a freshly-received row is by definition unread). Stripping the
+  // field from the input type keeps inbound.ts callers from having to
+  // construct it.
+  row: Omit<InboxRow, "id" | "seen_at"> & { id: string },
+): string | null {
   // node:sqlite does support RETURNING. bun:sqlite does too. We branch on
   // the row count instead so it works on both.
   const before = db.prepare(`SELECT id FROM inbox WHERE client_message_id = ?`).get<{ id: string }>(row.client_message_id);
@@ -53,12 +97,14 @@ export function insertIfNew(db: SqliteDb, row: Omit<InboxRow, "id"> & { id: stri
   db.prepare(`
     INSERT INTO inbox (
       id, client_message_id, broker_message_id, mesh, topic,
-      sender_pubkey, sender_name, body, meta, received_at, reply_to_id
+      sender_pubkey, sender_name, body, meta, received_at, reply_to_id,
-    ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+      recipient_pubkey, recipient_kind
+    ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
     ON CONFLICT(client_message_id) DO NOTHING
   `).run(
     row.id, row.client_message_id, row.broker_message_id, row.mesh, row.topic,
     row.sender_pubkey, row.sender_name, row.body, row.meta, row.received_at, row.reply_to_id,
+    row.recipient_pubkey, row.recipient_kind,
   );
   // Confirm the insert landed (handles the conflict-noop race).
   const after = db.prepare(`SELECT id FROM inbox WHERE client_message_id = ?`).get<{ id: string }>(row.client_message_id);
@@ -69,6 +115,21 @@ export interface ListInboxParams {
   since?: number;        // received_at >= since
   topic?: string;
   fromPubkey?: string;
+  /** 1.34.0: filter by mesh slug. Omit to return rows across all meshes. */
+  mesh?: string;
+  /** 1.34.8: only rows with `seen_at IS NULL`. Used by the welcome
+   *  push so a freshly-launched session surfaces what it actually
+   *  missed instead of every row from the last 24h. */
+  unreadOnly?: boolean;
+  /** 1.34.11: scope to rows whose recipient is this session pubkey,
+   *  PLUS member-keyed rows for the same member, PLUS legacy rows
+   *  with a NULL recipient (best-effort back-compat with pre-1.34.11
+   *  history). Set by the IPC `/v1/inbox` route from the bearer
+   *  session token; without it the listing returns everything.
+   *  `recipientMemberPubkey` widens the match to include broadcasts
+   *  / member DMs that should reach every session of this member. */
+  recipientPubkey?: string;
+  recipientMemberPubkey?: string;
   limit?: number;
 }
 
@@ -78,9 +139,28 @@ export function listInbox(db: SqliteDb, p: ListInboxParams): InboxRow[] {
   if (p.since !== undefined)     { where.push("received_at >= ?"); args.push(p.since); }
   if (p.topic !== undefined)     { where.push("topic = ?");        args.push(p.topic); }
   if (p.fromPubkey !== undefined){ where.push("sender_pubkey = ?"); args.push(p.fromPubkey); }
+  if (p.mesh !== undefined)      { where.push("mesh = ?");          args.push(p.mesh); }
+  if (p.unreadOnly === true)     { where.push("seen_at IS NULL"); }
+  // 1.34.11: recipient scoping. A session sees:
+  //   - rows whose recipient_pubkey === its session pubkey (its DMs),
+  //   - rows whose recipient_pubkey === the daemon's member pubkey
+  //     (broadcasts / member-keyed DMs to anyone in this member's
+  //     identity — every sibling session sees them),
+  //   - legacy rows where recipient_pubkey IS NULL (pre-1.34.11
+  //     history; we can't tell who they were for, so surface to all).
+  if (p.recipientPubkey) {
+    const ors: string[] = ["recipient_pubkey IS NULL", "recipient_pubkey = ?"];
+    args.push(p.recipientPubkey);
+    if (p.recipientMemberPubkey) {
+      ors.push("recipient_pubkey = ?");
+      args.push(p.recipientMemberPubkey);
+    }
+    where.push(`(${ors.join(" OR ")})`);
+  }
   const sql = `
     SELECT id, client_message_id, broker_message_id, mesh, topic,
-           sender_pubkey, sender_name, body, meta, received_at, reply_to_id
+           sender_pubkey, sender_name, body, meta, received_at, reply_to_id, seen_at,
+           recipient_pubkey, recipient_kind
       FROM inbox
      ${where.length ? "WHERE " + where.join(" AND ") : ""}
      ORDER BY received_at DESC
@@ -89,3 +169,57 @@ export function listInbox(db: SqliteDb, p: ListInboxParams): InboxRow[] {
   args.push(Math.min(Math.max(p.limit ?? 100, 1), 1000));
   return db.prepare(sql).all<InboxRow>(...args);
 }
+
+/** 1.34.8: stamp `seen_at = now` on every row whose id is in `ids`,
+ *  but only when `seen_at IS NULL` so re-marking doesn't bump the
+ *  timestamp on a row the user already knew about. Returns the number
+ *  of rows that flipped from unread → seen. Used by:
+ *    - the IPC `/v1/inbox` route when called by an interactive
+ *      listing (the daemon stamps after returning rows so the human
+ *      who just looked at their inbox doesn't see the same rows
+ *      flagged "unread" on next launch);
+ *    - the MCP server when the SSE message event surfaces a live
+ *      `<channel>` reminder (Claude Code already saw the row inline,
+ *      no need to surface it again on welcome). */
+export function markInboxSeen(db: SqliteDb, ids: readonly string[], now = Date.now()): number {
+  if (ids.length === 0) return 0;
+  const placeholders = ids.map(() => "?").join(",");
+  const r = db.prepare(
+    `UPDATE inbox SET seen_at = ? WHERE seen_at IS NULL AND id IN (${placeholders})`,
+  ).run(now, ...ids);
+  return Number(r.changes);
+}
+
+/** 1.34.8: TTL prune. Removes inbox rows older than `cutoffMs`
+ *  (received_at < cutoffMs). Daemon schedules this hourly with a 30-day
+ *  default retention (see startInboxPruner). Returns the number of
+ *  rows removed so the caller can log the volume. */
+export function pruneInboxBefore(db: SqliteDb, cutoffMs: number): number {
+  const r = db.prepare(`DELETE FROM inbox WHERE received_at < ?`).run(cutoffMs);
+  return Number(r.changes);
+}
+
+/** 1.34.7: delete a single inbox row by id. Returns true iff a row was
+ *  removed. The CLI exposes this as `claudemesh inbox delete <id>`. */
+export function deleteInboxRow(db: SqliteDb, id: string): boolean {
+  const r = db.prepare(`DELETE FROM inbox WHERE id = ?`).run(id);
+  return Number(r.changes) > 0;
+}
+
+/** 1.34.7: bulk delete with mesh / age filters. Returns the number of
+ *  rows removed. With no filter, deletes ALL rows on ALL meshes —
+ *  caller is expected to gate this behind a `--all` confirmation. */
+export interface FlushInboxParams {
+  mesh?: string;
+  /** Unix ms — delete rows received_at < before. */
+  before?: number;
+}
+export function flushInbox(db: SqliteDb, p: FlushInboxParams): number {
+  const where: string[] = [];
+  const args: unknown[] = [];
+  if (p.mesh   !== undefined) { where.push("mesh = ?");        args.push(p.mesh); }
+  if (p.before !== undefined) { where.push("received_at < ?"); args.push(p.before); }
+  const sql = `DELETE FROM inbox ${where.length ? "WHERE " + where.join(" AND ") : ""}`;
+  const r = db.prepare(sql).run(...args);
+  return Number(r.changes);
+}

apps/cli/src/daemon/db/outbox.ts

@@ -20,6 +20,21 @@ export interface OutboxRow {
   aborted_at: number | null;
   aborted_by: string | null;
   superseded_by: string | null;
+  /** Sprint 4 routing: NULL on v0.9.0 rows, drained via broadcast fallback. */
+  mesh: string | null;
+  target_spec: string | null;
+  nonce: string | null;
+  ciphertext: string | null;
+  priority: string | null;
+  /**
+   * 1.34.0: hex pubkey of the launched session that originated this row.
+   * NULL when the send came from outside a registered session
+   * (cold-path CLI, system-issued sends, etc.) — drain falls through to
+   * the daemon-WS in that case. When set, drain prefers the matching
+   * SessionBrokerClient so the broker fan-out attributes the push to
+   * the session pubkey instead of the daemon's stable member pubkey.
+   */
+  sender_session_pubkey: string | null;
 }
 
 export function migrateOutbox(db: SqliteDb): void {
@@ -46,13 +61,44 @@ export function migrateOutbox(db: SqliteDb): void {
     CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS outbox_aborted
       ON outbox(status, aborted_at) WHERE status = 'aborted';
   `);
+
+  // v1.25.0 / Sprint 4: real outbound routing. Adds the broker-format
+  // target spec, mesh slug, and the already-encrypted ciphertext+nonce so
+  // the drain worker can dispatch each row without re-resolving names or
+  // re-running crypto. Existing rows from v0.9.0 land with NULLs and get
+  // drained via the legacy broadcast fallback (preserves no-regression).
+  const hasMesh        = columnExists(db, "outbox", "mesh");
+  const hasTargetSpec  = columnExists(db, "outbox", "target_spec");
+  const hasNonce       = columnExists(db, "outbox", "nonce");
+  const hasCiphertext  = columnExists(db, "outbox", "ciphertext");
+  const hasPriority    = columnExists(db, "outbox", "priority");
+  if (!hasMesh)        db.exec(`ALTER TABLE outbox ADD COLUMN mesh TEXT`);
+  if (!hasTargetSpec)  db.exec(`ALTER TABLE outbox ADD COLUMN target_spec TEXT`);
+  if (!hasNonce)       db.exec(`ALTER TABLE outbox ADD COLUMN nonce TEXT`);
+  if (!hasCiphertext)  db.exec(`ALTER TABLE outbox ADD COLUMN ciphertext TEXT`);
+  if (!hasPriority)    db.exec(`ALTER TABLE outbox ADD COLUMN priority TEXT`);
+
+  // 1.34.0: per-row sender session pubkey, used by the drain worker to
+  // route via the originating session's WS so broker fan-out attributes
+  // the push to the session pubkey, not the daemon's member pubkey.
+  // Pre-1.34.0 rows land with NULL — drain falls back to the daemon-WS
+  // path (legacy attribution).
+  const hasSenderSessionPk = columnExists(db, "outbox", "sender_session_pubkey");
+  if (!hasSenderSessionPk) db.exec(`ALTER TABLE outbox ADD COLUMN sender_session_pubkey TEXT`);
+}
+
+function columnExists(db: SqliteDb, table: string, column: string): boolean {
+  const rows = db.prepare(`PRAGMA table_info(${table})`).all<{ name: string }>();
+  return rows.some((r) => r.name === column);
 }
 
 export function findByClientId(db: SqliteDb, clientMessageId: string): OutboxRow | null {
   const row = db.prepare(`
     SELECT id, client_message_id, request_fingerprint, payload, enqueued_at,
            attempts, next_attempt_at, status, last_error, delivered_at,
-           broker_message_id, aborted_at, aborted_by, superseded_by
+           broker_message_id, aborted_at, aborted_by, superseded_by,
+           mesh, target_spec, nonce, ciphertext, priority,
+           sender_session_pubkey
       FROM outbox WHERE client_message_id = ?
   `).get<OutboxRow>(clientMessageId);
   return row ?? null;
@@ -64,14 +110,25 @@ export interface InsertPendingInput {
   request_fingerprint: Uint8Array;
   payload: Uint8Array;
   now: number;
+  /** Sprint 4: routing fields. Optional only for legacy/v0.9.0 callers. */
+  mesh?: string;
+  target_spec?: string;
+  nonce?: string;
+  ciphertext?: string;
+  priority?: string;
+  /** 1.34.0: hex pubkey of the originating session (omit for cold-path
+   *  CLI sends — drain will use the daemon-WS). */
+  sender_session_pubkey?: string;
 }
 
 export function insertPending(db: SqliteDb, input: InsertPendingInput): void {
   db.prepare(`
     INSERT INTO outbox (
       id, client_message_id, request_fingerprint, payload,
-      enqueued_at, attempts, next_attempt_at, status
+      enqueued_at, attempts, next_attempt_at, status,
-    ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 'pending')
+      mesh, target_spec, nonce, ciphertext, priority,
+      sender_session_pubkey
+    ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 0, ?, 'pending', ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
   `).run(
     input.id,
     input.client_message_id,
@@ -79,6 +136,12 @@ export function insertPending(db: SqliteDb, input: InsertPendingInput): void {
     input.payload,
     input.now,
     input.now,
+    input.mesh                  ?? null,
+    input.target_spec           ?? null,
+    input.nonce                 ?? null,
+    input.ciphertext            ?? null,
+    input.priority              ?? null,
+    input.sender_session_pubkey ?? null,
   );
 }
 
@@ -108,7 +171,9 @@ export function listOutbox(db: SqliteDb, p: ListOutboxParams = {}): OutboxRow[]
   const sql = `
     SELECT id, client_message_id, request_fingerprint, payload, enqueued_at,
            attempts, next_attempt_at, status, last_error, delivered_at,
-           broker_message_id, aborted_at, aborted_by, superseded_by
+           broker_message_id, aborted_at, aborted_by, superseded_by,
+           mesh, target_spec, nonce, ciphertext, priority,
+           sender_session_pubkey
       FROM outbox
      ${where.length ? "WHERE " + where.join(" AND ") : ""}
      ORDER BY enqueued_at DESC
@@ -122,7 +187,9 @@ export function findById(db: SqliteDb, id: string): OutboxRow | null {
   return db.prepare(`
     SELECT id, client_message_id, request_fingerprint, payload, enqueued_at,
            attempts, next_attempt_at, status, last_error, delivered_at,
-           broker_message_id, aborted_at, aborted_by, superseded_by
+           broker_message_id, aborted_at, aborted_by, superseded_by,
+           mesh, target_spec, nonce, ciphertext, priority,
+           sender_session_pubkey
       FROM outbox WHERE id = ?
   `).get<OutboxRow>(id) ?? null;
 }

apps/cli/src/daemon/drain.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 
 import type { SqliteDb } from "./db/sqlite.js";
 import type { DaemonBrokerClient } from "./broker.js";
+import type { SessionBrokerClient } from "./session-broker.js";
 import type { OutboxStatus } from "./db/outbox.js";
 
 const POLL_INTERVAL_MS    = 500;
@@ -26,13 +27,38 @@ interface PendingRow {
   request_fingerprint: Uint8Array;
   payload: Uint8Array;
   attempts: number;
+  /** Sprint 4 routing fields. NULL on legacy v0.9.0 rows → broadcast fallback. */
+  target_spec: string | null;
+  nonce: string | null;
+  ciphertext: string | null;
+  priority: string | null;
+  mesh: string | null;
+  /** 1.34.0: hex pubkey of the originating session — drain prefers
+   *  routing via that session's WS so broker fan-out attributes the
+   *  push to the session pubkey. NULL on cold-path / pre-1.34.0 rows. */
+  sender_session_pubkey: string | null;
 }
 
 export interface DrainOptions {
   db: SqliteDb;
-  broker: DaemonBrokerClient;
+  /** v1.26.0: per-mesh broker map. Drain dispatches each row to the
-  /** Stable peer-target the daemon impersonates for now. Sprint 4 routes
+   *  broker keyed by its `mesh` column. Single-mesh daemons pass a
-   *  this from the per-row destination_kind/destination_ref. */
+   *  Map of size 1; multi-mesh daemons pass one entry per joined mesh. */
+  brokers: Map<string, DaemonBrokerClient>;
+  /**
+   * 1.34.0: lookup for the per-session WS keyed by hex session pubkey.
+   * When an outbox row has `sender_session_pubkey` set and this lookup
+   * returns an open client, the drain routes via the session-WS so the
+   * broker fan-out attributes the push to the session pubkey instead
+   * of the daemon's stable member pubkey.
+   *
+   * Returning `undefined` (or an unopened client) signals "no session
+   * WS available" — the drain backs off and retries; it does NOT fall
+   * back to the daemon-WS, because the row was encrypted with the
+   * session secret and would fail to decrypt on the recipient side
+   * if attribution silently changed mid-flight.
+   */
+  getSessionBrokerByPubkey?: (sessionPubkey: string) => SessionBrokerClient | undefined;
   log?: (level: "info" | "warn" | "error", msg: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
 }
 
@@ -80,7 +106,9 @@ export function startDrainWorker(opts: DrainOptions): DrainHandle {
 async function drainOnce(opts: DrainOptions, log: NonNullable<DrainOptions["log"]>): Promise<void> {
   const now = Date.now();
   const rows = opts.db.prepare(`
-    SELECT id, client_message_id, request_fingerprint, payload, attempts
+    SELECT id, client_message_id, request_fingerprint, payload, attempts,
+           target_spec, nonce, ciphertext, priority, mesh,
+           sender_session_pubkey
       FROM outbox
      WHERE status = 'pending' AND next_attempt_at <= ?
      ORDER BY enqueued_at
@@ -93,32 +121,83 @@ async function drainOnce(opts: DrainOptions, log: NonNullable<DrainOptions["log"
     if (markInflight(opts.db, row.id, now) === 0) continue; // raced with another drainer
     const fpHex = bufferToHex(row.request_fingerprint);
 
-    // For v0.9.0-against-legacy-broker the daemon doesn't yet route by
+    // v1.26.0: pick the daemon-WS broker keyed by the row's mesh.
-    // destination_kind/ref — we send the raw payload as a *self*-target so
+    // Legacy rows (mesh=NULL) fall back to the only broker if there's
-    // the broker accepts it for round-tripping. Sprint 4 reads the actual
+    // exactly one; otherwise mark dead because we don't know where to
-    // destination from the outbox row and encrypts/routes properly. The
+    // send them.
-    // important thing here is that the row transitions correctly.
+    let daemonBroker: DaemonBrokerClient | undefined;
-    const sessionKeys = opts.broker.getSessionKeys();
+    if (row.mesh) {
-    const targetSpec  = "*"; // broadcast — leaves shape valid pre-routing
+      daemonBroker = opts.brokers.get(row.mesh);
-    const nonce       = await randomNonce();
+    } else if (opts.brokers.size === 1) {
-    const ciphertext  = Buffer.from(row.payload).toString("base64");
+      daemonBroker = opts.brokers.values().next().value;
+    }
+    if (!daemonBroker) {
+      log("warn", "drain_no_broker_for_mesh", { id: row.id, mesh: row.mesh ?? "(null)" });
+      markDead(opts.db, row.id, `no_broker_for_mesh:${row.mesh ?? "null"}`);
+      continue;
+    }
 
-    let res;
+    // 1.34.0: when the row was written by an authenticated session,
-    try {
+    // dispatch via the matching SessionBrokerClient so broker fan-out
-      res = await opts.broker.send({
+    // attributes the push to the session pubkey. Encryption is
+    // session-secret based on those rows, so we MUST NOT silently fall
+    // back to the daemon-WS — the recipient's decrypt would fail. If
+    // the session-WS is closed (reconnecting / session terminated), we
+    // back off and retry.
+    let sessionBroker: SessionBrokerClient | undefined;
+    if (row.sender_session_pubkey && opts.getSessionBrokerByPubkey) {
+      sessionBroker = opts.getSessionBrokerByPubkey(row.sender_session_pubkey);
+    }
+
+    // Sprint 4: use the row's resolved target/ciphertext if present.
+    // Legacy v0.9.0 rows (NULL on these columns) fall back to the
+    // broadcast smoke-test shape so existing in-flight rows still drain.
+    let targetSpec: string;
+    let nonce:      string;
+    let ciphertext: string;
+    let priority:   "now" | "next" | "low";
+    if (row.target_spec && row.nonce && row.ciphertext) {
+      targetSpec = row.target_spec;
+      nonce      = row.nonce;
+      ciphertext = row.ciphertext;
+      priority   = (row.priority === "now" || row.priority === "low") ? row.priority : "next";
+    } else {
+      targetSpec = "*";
+      nonce      = await randomNonce();
+      ciphertext = Buffer.from(row.payload).toString("base64");
+      priority   = "next";
+    }
+
+    const sendArgs = {
       targetSpec,
-        priority: "next",
+      priority,
       nonce,
       ciphertext,
       client_message_id: row.client_message_id,
       request_fingerprint_hex: fpHex,
+    };
+
+    let res;
+    try {
+      if (row.sender_session_pubkey) {
+        // Session-attributed row. Require an open session-WS — see comment
+        // above on why we don't fall back to the daemon-WS.
+        if (!sessionBroker || !sessionBroker.isOpen()) {
+          log("info", "drain_session_ws_not_ready", {
+            id: row.id, session_pubkey: row.sender_session_pubkey.slice(0, 12),
           });
+          backoffPending(opts.db, row.id, row.attempts + 1, "session_ws_not_open", "session_ws_not_open");
+          continue;
+        }
+        res = await sessionBroker.send(sendArgs);
+      } else {
+        res = await daemonBroker.send(sendArgs);
+      }
     } catch (e) {
       log("warn", "drain_send_threw", { id: row.id, err: String(e) });
       backoffPending(opts.db, row.id, row.attempts + 1, "exception", String(e));
       continue;
     }
-    void sessionKeys;  // silence unused for now
 
     if (res.ok) {
       markDone(opts.db, row.id, res.messageId, Date.now());

apps/cli/src/daemon/events.ts

@@ -41,8 +41,68 @@ export function writeSse(res: ServerResponse, e: DaemonEvent, idCounter: number)
   res.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify({ ts: e.ts, ...e.data })}\n\n`);
 }
 
-/** Open an SSE stream on the response and route bus events to it. */
+/** 1.34.10: per-subscriber demux options. The MCP server passes its
-export function bindSseStream(res: ServerResponse, bus: EventBus): () => void {
+ *  own session pubkey + member pubkey when binding so the bus only
+ *  sends events meant for that session. Without this, every MCP on a
+ *  multi-session daemon receives every inbox row and emits a
+ *  duplicate channel notification — manifests as session A seeing its
+ *  own outbound DM to B because B's session-WS published the row to
+ *  the shared bus. */
+export interface SseFilterOptions {
+  /** Session pubkey the subscribing MCP serves. Events tagged
+   *  `recipient_kind: "session"` only flow when their
+   *  `recipient_pubkey` matches this. */
+  sessionPubkey?: string;
+  /** Daemon's member pubkey for this mesh. Events tagged
+   *  `recipient_kind: "member"` flow when their `recipient_pubkey`
+   *  matches — those are member-keyed broadcasts / DMs that should
+   *  reach every session of this member, but not OTHER members. */
+  memberPubkey?: string;
+  /** Mesh slug the subscriber is bound to (from session registry).
+   *  When set, system events (peer_join etc.) are filtered to this
+   *  mesh; without it every system event surfaces. */
+  meshSlug?: string;
+}
+
+function shouldDeliver(e: DaemonEvent, f: SseFilterOptions): boolean {
+  // No filter set → legacy behavior: deliver everything (used by
+  // diagnostic tooling like `claudemesh daemon events`).
+  if (!f.sessionPubkey && !f.memberPubkey && !f.meshSlug) return true;
+
+  // Mesh scoping for events that carry a mesh slug. peer_join /
+  // peer_leave / broker_status all carry `data.mesh`; if the
+  // subscriber is bound to a specific mesh, drop events from other
+  // meshes.
+  if (f.meshSlug) {
+    const eventMesh = typeof e.data.mesh === "string" ? e.data.mesh : null;
+    if (eventMesh && eventMesh !== f.meshSlug) return false;
+  }
+
+  // System events (peer_join etc.) flow to every session on the same
+  // mesh — they're informational, not addressed.
+  if (e.kind !== "message") return true;
+
+  const recipientKind = typeof e.data.recipient_kind === "string" ? e.data.recipient_kind : null;
+  const recipientPubkey = typeof e.data.recipient_pubkey === "string" ? e.data.recipient_pubkey.toLowerCase() : null;
+
+  // Legacy publish without recipient context → everyone gets it. Keeps
+  // backward compatibility with older daemon code paths until they're
+  // migrated. Also covers test paths that don't thread context.
+  if (!recipientKind || !recipientPubkey) return true;
+
+  if (recipientKind === "session") {
+    return !!f.sessionPubkey && f.sessionPubkey.toLowerCase() === recipientPubkey;
+  }
+  if (recipientKind === "member") {
+    return !!f.memberPubkey && f.memberPubkey.toLowerCase() === recipientPubkey;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/** Open an SSE stream on the response and route bus events to it.
+ *  1.34.10: optional `filter` scopes the stream to one session/member;
+ *  see SseFilterOptions. */
+export function bindSseStream(res: ServerResponse, bus: EventBus, filter: SseFilterOptions = {}): () => void {
   res.statusCode = 200;
   res.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/event-stream");
   res.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache, no-transform");
@@ -51,7 +111,10 @@ export function bindSseStream(res: ServerResponse, bus: EventBus): () => void {
   res.write(": connected\n\n");
 
   let counter = 0;
-  const unsubscribe = bus.subscribe((e) => writeSse(res, e, ++counter));
+  const unsubscribe = bus.subscribe((e) => {
+    if (!shouldDeliver(e, filter)) return;
+    writeSse(res, e, ++counter);
+  });
 
   const heartbeat = setInterval(() => {
     try { res.write(": keepalive\n\n"); }

apps/cli/src/daemon/inbound.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,37 @@ export interface InboundContext {
   /** Daemon's session secret key hex (rotates per connect). When the
    *  sender encrypted to our session pubkey, decrypt with this instead. */
   sessionSecretKeyHex?: string;
+  /** 1.34.10: recipient pubkey of the WS that received this push.
+   *  Either the daemon's member pubkey (member-WS) or one of our
+   *  session pubkeys (session-WS). Threaded through to the bus event
+   *  so each MCP subscriber can filter to events meant for its own
+   *  session — without it, every MCP on the same daemon renders every
+   *  inbox row, which manifests as session A seeing its own outbound
+   *  to B (because A's MCP also picks up the bus event B's WS just
+   *  published). */
+  recipientPubkey?: string;
+  /** 1.34.10: kind of WS this push arrived on. "session" pushes only
+   *  surface to the matching session's MCP; "member" pushes surface to
+   *  every session on the same mesh (member-keyed broadcasts, member
+   *  DMs that don't have a session). */
+  recipientKind?: "session" | "member";
+  /** v2 agentic-comms (M1): emit `client_ack` back to the broker after
+   *  the message lands in inbox.db. Broker uses the ack to set
+   *  `delivered_at` (atomic at-least-once). Without it, the broker's
+   *  30s lease expires and re-delivers — correct but noisy. The WS
+   *  client owns this callback because it's the one that owns the
+   *  socket; inbound.ts just signals "I accepted this id." */
+  ackClientMessage?: (clientMessageId: string, brokerMessageId: string | null) => void;
+  /** 1.34.9: drops system events (peer_joined / peer_left /
+   *  peer_returned) whose eventData.pubkey is one of our own. The broker
+   *  fans peer_joined to every OTHER connection in the mesh — but our
+   *  daemon's member-WS counts as "other" relative to our session-WS,
+   *  so without this filter the user sees `[system] Peer "<self>"
+   *  joined the mesh` every time their own session reconnects.
+   *  Implementation passes a closure that walks the live broker map
+   *  rather than a static set, so newly-spawned sessions are visible
+   *  immediately. */
+  isOwnPubkey?: (pubkey: string) => boolean;
   log?: (level: "info" | "warn" | "error", msg: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
 }
 
@@ -31,10 +62,21 @@ export interface InboundContext {
 export async function handleBrokerPush(msg: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: InboundContext): Promise<void> {
   // System/topology pushes (peer_join, tick, …) — emit verbatim.
   if (msg.subtype === "system" && typeof msg.event === "string") {
+    const eventData = (msg.eventData as Record<string, unknown> | undefined) ?? {};
+    // 1.34.9: drop self-joins. The broker excludes the JOINING
+    // connection from the fan-out, but our daemon owns multiple
+    // connections per mesh (member-WS + N session-WSs), and each is a
+    // distinct "other" from the broker's view — so a session's own
+    // peer_joined arrives at the same daemon's member-WS and used to
+    // surface as `[system] Peer "<self>" joined`. The session-WS path
+    // already skips system events entirely (see session-broker.ts
+    // 1.34.9), and this filter handles the member-WS path.
+    const eventPubkey = typeof eventData.pubkey === "string" ? eventData.pubkey : "";
+    if (eventPubkey && ctx.isOwnPubkey?.(eventPubkey)) return;
     ctx.bus.publish(mapSystemEventKind(msg.event), {
       mesh: ctx.meshSlug,
       event: msg.event,
-      ...(msg.eventData as Record<string, unknown> | undefined ?? {}),
+      ...eventData,
     });
     return;
   }
@@ -44,11 +86,14 @@ export async function handleBrokerPush(msg: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: Inboun
   const brokerMessageId = stringOrNull(msg.messageId);
   const senderPubkey    = stringOrNull(msg.senderPubkey)    ?? "";
   const senderName      = stringOrNull(msg.senderName)      ?? senderPubkey.slice(0, 8);
+  const senderMemberPk  = stringOrNull(msg.senderMemberPubkey);
   const topic           = stringOrNull(msg.topic);
   const replyToId       = stringOrNull(msg.replyToId);
   const ciphertext      = stringOrNull(msg.ciphertext)      ?? "";
   const nonce           = stringOrNull(msg.nonce)           ?? "";
   const createdAt       = stringOrNull(msg.createdAt);
+  const priority        = stringOrNull(msg.priority) ?? "next";
+  const subtype         = stringOrNull(msg.subtype);
   // Forward-compat: Sprint 7 brokers will send client_message_id alongside.
   const clientMessageId = stringOrNull(msg.client_message_id) ?? brokerMessageId ?? randomUUID();
   const body            = await decryptOrFallback({
@@ -68,8 +113,20 @@ export async function handleBrokerPush(msg: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: Inboun
     meta: createdAt ? JSON.stringify({ created_at: createdAt }) : null,
     received_at: Date.now(),
     reply_to_id: replyToId,
+    // 1.34.11: persist the recipient context so /v1/inbox can scope
+    // queries to the asking session. Mirrors the same fields on the
+    // bus event added in 1.34.10. Falls back to NULL when the caller
+    // didn't pass them (legacy paths, tests).
+    recipient_pubkey: ctx.recipientPubkey ?? null,
+    recipient_kind:   ctx.recipientKind   ?? null,
   });
 
+  // Whether the row was newly inserted or already existed (dedupe), the
+  // broker still wants to know we received and processed this message —
+  // ack regardless. Skipping ack on dedupe would leak: broker would
+  // re-deliver after lease, and the receiver would re-dedupe forever.
+  ctx.ackClientMessage?.(clientMessageId, brokerMessageId);
+
   if (!inserted) return; // already had this id; no event
 
   ctx.bus.publish("message", {
@@ -78,11 +135,22 @@ export async function handleBrokerPush(msg: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: Inboun
     client_message_id: clientMessageId,
     broker_message_id: brokerMessageId,
     sender_pubkey: senderPubkey,
+    sender_member_pubkey: senderMemberPk,
     sender_name: senderName,
     topic,
     reply_to_id: replyToId,
+    priority,
+    ...(subtype ? { subtype } : {}),
     body,
     created_at: createdAt,
+    // 1.34.10: per-recipient routing context. SSE subscribers (the
+    // MCP servers that translate bus events into channel notifications)
+    // use this to filter to events meant for their own session. Without
+    // it, every MCP on the same daemon emits a channel push for every
+    // inbox row, which means session A sees its own outbound to B
+    // because B's session-WS published the inbox row to the shared bus.
+    ...(ctx.recipientPubkey ? { recipient_pubkey: ctx.recipientPubkey } : {}),
+    ...(ctx.recipientKind   ? { recipient_kind:   ctx.recipientKind   } : {}),
   });
 }
 

apps/cli/src/daemon/inbox-pruner.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+// 1.34.8: TTL prune for inbox.db.
+//
+// The inbox grows monotonically — every received DM lands as a row and
+// nothing removes it except an explicit `claudemesh inbox flush`. For
+// chatty meshes that's tens of thousands of rows over a few weeks.
+// SQLite handles that volume fine, but the rows are sitting there
+// forever and `claudemesh inbox` queries get slower as the table grows.
+//
+// The pruner runs hourly inside the daemon process and deletes rows
+// whose received_at is older than `retentionMs`. Default is 30 days,
+// which is generous for the "I went on holiday and want to see what I
+// missed" case but won't carry old rows into next year.
+//
+// Best-effort: a failure logs a warning and the pruner keeps trying on
+// the next interval. There's no shared state to corrupt — pruneInboxBefore
+// is a single DELETE statement.
+
+import { pruneInboxBefore } from "./db/inbox.js";
+import type { SqliteDb } from "./db/sqlite.js";
+
+export interface InboxPrunerOptions {
+  db: SqliteDb;
+  /** Retention window in ms. Rows with received_at < (now - retentionMs)
+   *  are deleted. Default: 30 days. */
+  retentionMs?: number;
+  /** How often to run the prune. Default: 1 hour. */
+  intervalMs?: number;
+  log?: (level: "info" | "warn" | "error", msg: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
+}
+
+export interface InboxPrunerHandle {
+  stop: () => void;
+}
+
+const DEFAULT_RETENTION_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+const DEFAULT_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+export function startInboxPruner(opts: InboxPrunerOptions): InboxPrunerHandle {
+  const retentionMs = opts.retentionMs ?? DEFAULT_RETENTION_MS;
+  const intervalMs = opts.intervalMs ?? DEFAULT_INTERVAL_MS;
+  const log = opts.log ?? defaultLog;
+
+  const tick = (): void => {
+    try {
+      const cutoff = Date.now() - retentionMs;
+      const removed = pruneInboxBefore(opts.db, cutoff);
+      if (removed > 0) {
+        log("info", "inbox_prune_completed", {
+          removed,
+          retention_days: Math.round(retentionMs / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)),
+        });
+      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      log("warn", "inbox_prune_failed", { err: String(e) });
+    }
+  };
+
+  // Run once at startup so a daemon that's been down for weeks reaps
+  // immediately rather than waiting an hour.
+  tick();
+
+  const handle = setInterval(tick, intervalMs);
+  // Don't let the pruner block daemon shutdown.
+  if (typeof handle.unref === "function") handle.unref();
+
+  return { stop: () => clearInterval(handle) };
+}
+
+function defaultLog(level: "info" | "warn" | "error", msg: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) {
+  const line = JSON.stringify({ level, msg, ...meta, ts: new Date().toISOString() });
+  if (level === "info") process.stdout.write(line + "\n");
+  else process.stderr.write(line + "\n");
+}

apps/cli/src/daemon/ipc/client.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { request as httpRequest } from "node:http";
 
 import { DAEMON_PATHS, DAEMON_TCP_HOST, DAEMON_TCP_DEFAULT_PORT } from "../paths.js";
 import { readLocalToken } from "../local-token.js";
+import { readSessionTokenFromEnv } from "~/services/session/token.js";
 
 export interface IpcRequestOptions {
   method?: "GET" | "POST" | "PATCH" | "DELETE";
@@ -44,6 +45,19 @@ export async function ipc<T = unknown>(opts: IpcRequestOptions): Promise<IpcResp
     headers.authorization = `Bearer ${tok}`;
   }
 
+  // Per-session token attribution. When the calling process has
+  // CLAUDEMESH_IPC_TOKEN_FILE set (a launched session and its
+  // descendants), attach the session token. The daemon's auth
+  // middleware resolves it to a SessionInfo and uses it for default-
+  // mesh scoping. Sent as a second Authorization header is not
+  // possible per HTTP semantics, so we layer: when both UDS and a
+  // session token exist, send the session token; the bearer remains
+  // only for TCP loopback callers.
+  if (!useTcp) {
+    const sessionTok = readSessionTokenFromEnv();
+    if (sessionTok) headers.authorization = `ClaudeMesh-Session ${sessionTok}`;
+  }
+
   return new Promise<IpcResponse<T>>((resolve, reject) => {
     const req = httpRequest(
       useTcp

apps/cli/src/daemon/ipc/handlers/send.ts

@@ -31,6 +31,20 @@ export interface SendRequest {
   /** Destination kind + ref must be supplied by the IPC layer after parsing `to`. */
   destination_kind: DestKind;
   destination_ref: string;
+  /** Sprint 4: pre-resolved broker-format target (pubkey hex, "#topicId", @group, *). */
+  target_spec?: string;
+  /** Sprint 4: pre-encrypted ciphertext (base64). For DMs: crypto_box. For broadcast/topic: base64-of-plaintext. */
+  ciphertext?: string;
+  /** Sprint 4: nonce that pairs with ciphertext (base64). */
+  nonce?: string;
+  /** Sprint 4: which mesh this send is for (single-mesh daemon today; multi-mesh later). */
+  mesh?: string;
+  /** 1.34.0: when the IPC request authenticated as a launched session,
+   *  the IPC layer fills this with the session's hex pubkey. The drain
+   *  worker uses it to route via the matching SessionBrokerClient so
+   *  broker fan-out attributes the push to the session pubkey instead
+   *  of the daemon's member pubkey. */
+  sender_session_pubkey?: string;
 }
 
 export type AcceptOutcome =
@@ -80,6 +94,12 @@ export function acceptSend(req: SendRequest, deps: AcceptDeps): AcceptOutcome {
         request_fingerprint: fingerprint,
         payload: body,
         now,
+        mesh: req.mesh,
+        target_spec: req.target_spec,
+        nonce: req.nonce,
+        ciphertext: req.ciphertext,
+        priority: req.priority,
+        sender_session_pubkey: req.sender_session_pubkey,
       });
       return { kind: "accepted_pending", status: 202, client_message_id: clientId };
     }

apps/cli/src/daemon/ipc/server.ts

@@ -5,11 +5,15 @@ import { timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
 import { DAEMON_PATHS, DAEMON_TCP_HOST, DAEMON_TCP_DEFAULT_PORT } from "../paths.js";
 import type { SqliteDb } from "../db/sqlite.js";
 import { acceptSend, type SendRequest } from "./handlers/send.js";
-import { listInbox } from "../db/inbox.js";
+import { listInbox, deleteInboxRow, flushInbox, markInboxSeen } from "../db/inbox.js";
 import { listOutbox, requeueDeadOrPending, type OutboxStatus } from "../db/outbox.js";
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
 import { bindSseStream, type EventBus } from "../events.js";
 import type { DaemonBrokerClient } from "../broker.js";
+import {
+  registerSession, deregisterByToken, resolveToken, listSessions, startReaper,
+  type SessionInfo,
+} from "../session-registry.js";
 import { VERSION } from "~/constants/urls.js";
 
 /**
@@ -38,8 +42,10 @@ export interface IpcServerOptions {
   inboxDb?: SqliteDb;
   /** Event bus backing /v1/events SSE stream. */
   bus?: EventBus;
-  /** Broker client (for peers/profile passthrough). */
+  /** v1.26.0: per-mesh broker map for peers/skills/profile passthrough. */
-  broker?: DaemonBrokerClient;
+  brokers?: Map<string, DaemonBrokerClient>;
+  /** v1.26.0: per-mesh JoinedMesh entries (carry pubkey + secretKey for crypto). */
+  meshConfigs?: Map<string, { slug: string; pubkey: string; secretKey: string }>;
   /** Notify when a new outbox row was inserted (drains can wake). */
   onPendingInserted?: () => void;
 }
@@ -62,7 +68,8 @@ export function startIpcServer(opts: IpcServerOptions): IpcServerHandle {
     outboxDb: opts.outboxDb,
     inboxDb: opts.inboxDb,
     bus: opts.bus,
-    broker: opts.broker,
+    brokers: opts.brokers,
+    meshConfigs: opts.meshConfigs,
     onPendingInserted: opts.onPendingInserted,
   });
 
@@ -121,7 +128,8 @@ function makeHandler(opts: {
   outboxDb?: SqliteDb;
   inboxDb?: SqliteDb;
   bus?: EventBus;
-  broker?: DaemonBrokerClient;
+  brokers?: Map<string, DaemonBrokerClient>;
+  meshConfigs?: Map<string, { slug: string; pubkey: string; secretKey: string }>;
   onPendingInserted?: () => void;
 }) {
   const tokenBytes = Buffer.from(opts.localToken, "utf8");
@@ -168,19 +176,141 @@ function makeHandler(opts: {
       }
     }
 
+    // Per-session token resolution. Layers on top of the machine-level
+    // local-token auth above: callers from inside a `claudemesh launch`-
+    // spawned session pass `Authorization: ClaudeMesh-Session <hex>`
+    // (instead of, or in addition to, Bearer over TCP) and we resolve
+    // it to a SessionInfo that downstream routes use for default-mesh
+    // scoping and attribution.
+    let session: SessionInfo | null = null;
+    {
+      const authz = req.headers.authorization ?? "";
+      const sm = /^ClaudeMesh-Session\s+([0-9a-f]{64})$/i.exec(authz.trim());
+      if (sm && sm[1]) session = resolveToken(sm[1].toLowerCase());
+    }
+    /** Pick mesh from explicit body/query first, then session default. */
+    const meshFromCtx = (explicit?: string | null): string | null =>
+      (explicit && explicit.trim()) ? explicit : (session?.mesh ?? null);
+
     // Routing.
     if (req.method === "GET" && url.pathname === "/v1/version") {
       respond(res, 200, {
         daemon_version: VERSION,
         ipc_api: "v1",
-        ipc_features: ["version", "health", "send", "inbox", "events", "peers", "profile"],
+        ipc_features: ["version", "health", "send", "inbox", "events", "peers", "profile", "skills", "state", "memory", "sessions"],
         schema_version: 1,
       });
       return;
     }
 
     if (req.method === "GET" && url.pathname === "/v1/health") {
-      respond(res, 200, { ok: true, pid: process.pid });
+      // 1.31.0: include per-mesh broker WS state so callers can verify
+      // functional connectivity, not just that the daemon process is
+      // running. Used by `claudemesh install` post-flight to wait for
+      // at least one broker to be `open` before declaring success —
+      // catches dead WS / DNS / TLS / outbound-blocked-port issues at
+      // install time instead of when the user's first message fails.
+      const brokers: Record<string, string> = {};
+      if (opts.brokers) {
+        for (const [slug, client] of opts.brokers) brokers[slug] = client.status;
+      }
+      respond(res, 200, { ok: true, pid: process.pid, brokers });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // Session registry routes (1.29.0)
+    if (req.method === "POST" && url.pathname === "/v1/sessions/register") {
+      try {
+        const body = await readJsonBody(req, 64 * 1024) as Record<string, unknown> | null;
+        if (!body) { respond(res, 400, { error: "missing body" }); return; }
+        const token = typeof body.token === "string" ? body.token : "";
+        if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(token)) { respond(res, 400, { error: "token must be 64 hex chars" }); return; }
+        const sessionId = typeof body.session_id === "string" ? body.session_id : "";
+        const mesh = typeof body.mesh === "string" ? body.mesh : "";
+        const displayName = typeof body.display_name === "string" ? body.display_name : "";
+        const pid = typeof body.pid === "number" ? body.pid : 0;
+        if (!sessionId || !mesh || !displayName || !pid) {
+          respond(res, 400, { error: "session_id, mesh, display_name, pid all required" });
+          return;
+        }
+        const cwd = typeof body.cwd === "string" ? body.cwd : undefined;
+        const role = typeof body.role === "string" ? body.role : undefined;
+        const groups = Array.isArray(body.groups)
+          ? body.groups.filter((g): g is string => typeof g === "string")
+          : undefined;
+
+        // 1.30.0 — optional per-session presence material. Older CLIs
+        // omit this; the daemon's session-broker subsystem just won't
+        // open a per-session WS for those.
+        let presence: SessionInfo["presence"] | undefined;
+        const rawPresence = body.presence;
+        if (rawPresence && typeof rawPresence === "object") {
+          const p = rawPresence as Record<string, unknown>;
+          const sessionPubkey = typeof p.session_pubkey === "string" ? p.session_pubkey.toLowerCase() : "";
+          const sessionSecretKey = typeof p.session_secret_key === "string" ? p.session_secret_key.toLowerCase() : "";
+          const att = p.parent_attestation as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+          if (
+            /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(sessionPubkey) &&
+            /^[0-9a-f]{128}$/.test(sessionSecretKey) &&
+            att && typeof att === "object" &&
+            typeof att.session_pubkey === "string" &&
+            typeof att.parent_member_pubkey === "string" &&
+            typeof att.expires_at === "number" &&
+            typeof att.signature === "string"
+          ) {
+            presence = {
+              sessionPubkey,
+              sessionSecretKey,
+              parentAttestation: {
+                sessionPubkey: (att.session_pubkey as string).toLowerCase(),
+                parentMemberPubkey: (att.parent_member_pubkey as string).toLowerCase(),
+                expiresAt: att.expires_at as number,
+                signature: (att.signature as string).toLowerCase(),
+              },
+            };
+          } else {
+            opts.log("warn", "session_register_presence_malformed", { mesh });
+          }
+        }
+
+        const stored = registerSession({
+          token: token.toLowerCase(),
+          sessionId, mesh, displayName, pid, cwd, role, groups,
+          ...(presence ? { presence } : {}),
+        });
+        opts.log("info", "session_registered", {
+          sessionId, mesh, pid,
+          presence: presence ? "yes" : "no",
+        });
+        respond(res, 200, {
+          ok: true,
+          registered_at: stored.registeredAt,
+          presence_accepted: !!presence,
+        });
+      } catch (e) {
+        respond(res, 400, { error: String(e) });
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (req.method === "DELETE" && url.pathname.startsWith("/v1/sessions/")) {
+      const tail = url.pathname.slice("/v1/sessions/".length);
+      if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(tail)) { respond(res, 400, { error: "invalid token" }); return; }
+      const ok = deregisterByToken(tail.toLowerCase());
+      respond(res, ok ? 200 : 404, { ok, token_prefix: tail.slice(0, 8) });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (req.method === "GET" && url.pathname === "/v1/sessions/me") {
+      if (!session) { respond(res, 401, { error: "no session token" }); return; }
+      const { token, ...redacted } = session;
+      respond(res, 200, { session: { ...redacted, token_prefix: token.slice(0, 8) } });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (req.method === "GET" && url.pathname === "/v1/sessions") {
+      const all = listSessions().map(({ token, ...rest }) => ({ ...rest, token_prefix: token.slice(0, 8) }));
+      respond(res, 200, { sessions: all });
       return;
     }
 
@@ -189,15 +319,226 @@ function makeHandler(opts: {
         respond(res, 503, { error: "event bus not initialised" });
         return;
       }
-      bindSseStream(res, opts.bus);
+      // 1.34.10: per-session SSE demux. When the subscriber presented
+      // a ClaudeMesh-Session token (the MCP server always does post-
+      // 1.34.10), scope the stream to that session's pubkey + the
+      // matching mesh's member pubkey. Diagnostic callers without a
+      // session token (`claudemesh daemon events`) get the unfiltered
+      // legacy stream. The bus itself stays single-shot; demux lives
+      // entirely at the SSE bind layer (events.ts shouldDeliver).
+      const filter: Record<string, string> = {};
+      if (session?.presence?.sessionPubkey) filter.sessionPubkey = session.presence.sessionPubkey;
+      if (session?.mesh) {
+        filter.meshSlug = session.mesh;
+        const meshCfg = opts.meshConfigs?.get(session.mesh);
+        if (meshCfg?.pubkey) filter.memberPubkey = meshCfg.pubkey;
+      }
+      bindSseStream(res, opts.bus, filter);
       return;
     }
 
     if (req.method === "GET" && url.pathname === "/v1/peers") {
-      if (!opts.broker) { respond(res, 503, { error: "broker not initialised" }); return; }
+      if (!opts.brokers || opts.brokers.size === 0) {
+        respond(res, 503, { error: "broker not initialised" });
+        return;
+      }
+      const filterMesh = meshFromCtx(url.searchParams.get("mesh")) ?? undefined;
       try {
-        const peers = await opts.broker.listPeers();
+        // Aggregate across all attached meshes; each peer record gets a
-        respond(res, 200, { peers });
+        // `mesh` field so the caller can scope client-side. A single
+        // ?mesh=<slug> filter narrows the set server-side.
+        const all: Array<Record<string, unknown> & { mesh: string }> = [];
+        for (const [slug, b] of opts.brokers.entries()) {
+          if (filterMesh && filterMesh !== slug) continue;
+          try {
+            const peers = await b.listPeers();
+            for (const p of peers) all.push({ ...(p as unknown as Record<string, unknown>), mesh: slug });
+          } catch (e) {
+            opts.log("warn", "ipc_peers_broker_failed", { mesh: slug, err: String(e) });
+          }
+        }
+        respond(res, 200, { peers: all });
+      } catch (e) {
+        respond(res, 502, { error: "broker_unreachable", detail: String(e) });
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (req.method === "GET" && url.pathname === "/v1/state") {
+      if (!opts.brokers || opts.brokers.size === 0) {
+        respond(res, 503, { error: "broker not initialised" });
+        return;
+      }
+      const filterMesh = meshFromCtx(url.searchParams.get("mesh")) ?? undefined;
+      const key = url.searchParams.get("key");
+      try {
+        if (key) {
+          // Single key lookup. Walk attached meshes; first match wins
+          // (or ?mesh=<slug> scopes the search).
+          for (const [slug, b] of opts.brokers.entries()) {
+            if (filterMesh && filterMesh !== slug) continue;
+            const row = await b.getState(key).catch(() => null);
+            if (row) { respond(res, 200, { state: { ...row, mesh: slug } }); return; }
+          }
+          respond(res, 404, { error: "state_not_found", key });
+          return;
+        }
+        // No key — list all entries across attached meshes.
+        const all: Array<Record<string, unknown> & { mesh: string }> = [];
+        for (const [slug, b] of opts.brokers.entries()) {
+          if (filterMesh && filterMesh !== slug) continue;
+          const rows = await b.listState().catch(() => []);
+          for (const r of rows) all.push({ ...(r as unknown as Record<string, unknown>), mesh: slug });
+        }
+        respond(res, 200, { entries: all });
+      } catch (e) {
+        respond(res, 502, { error: "broker_unreachable", detail: String(e) });
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (req.method === "POST" && url.pathname === "/v1/state") {
+      if (!opts.brokers || opts.brokers.size === 0) {
+        respond(res, 503, { error: "broker not initialised" });
+        return;
+      }
+      try {
+        const body = await readJsonBody(req, 256 * 1024) as Record<string, unknown> | null;
+        if (!body || typeof body.key !== "string") {
+          respond(res, 400, { error: "missing 'key' (string)" });
+          return;
+        }
+        const requested = meshFromCtx(typeof body.mesh === "string" ? body.mesh : null);
+        let chosen = requested;
+        if (!chosen && opts.brokers.size === 1) chosen = opts.brokers.keys().next().value as string;
+        if (!chosen) {
+          respond(res, 400, { error: "mesh_required", attached: [...opts.brokers.keys()] });
+          return;
+        }
+        const broker = opts.brokers.get(chosen);
+        if (!broker) { respond(res, 404, { error: "mesh_not_attached", mesh: chosen }); return; }
+        broker.setState(body.key, body.value);
+        respond(res, 200, { ok: true, key: body.key, mesh: chosen });
+      } catch (e) {
+        respond(res, 400, { error: String(e) });
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (req.method === "GET" && url.pathname === "/v1/memory") {
+      if (!opts.brokers || opts.brokers.size === 0) {
+        respond(res, 503, { error: "broker not initialised" });
+        return;
+      }
+      const query = url.searchParams.get("q") ?? "";
+      const filterMesh = meshFromCtx(url.searchParams.get("mesh")) ?? undefined;
+      try {
+        const all: Array<Record<string, unknown> & { mesh: string }> = [];
+        for (const [slug, b] of opts.brokers.entries()) {
+          if (filterMesh && filterMesh !== slug) continue;
+          const rows = await b.recall(query).catch(() => []);
+          for (const r of rows) all.push({ ...(r as unknown as Record<string, unknown>), mesh: slug });
+        }
+        respond(res, 200, { matches: all });
+      } catch (e) {
+        respond(res, 502, { error: "broker_unreachable", detail: String(e) });
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (req.method === "POST" && url.pathname === "/v1/memory") {
+      if (!opts.brokers || opts.brokers.size === 0) {
+        respond(res, 503, { error: "broker not initialised" });
+        return;
+      }
+      try {
+        const body = await readJsonBody(req, 256 * 1024) as Record<string, unknown> | null;
+        if (!body || typeof body.content !== "string") {
+          respond(res, 400, { error: "missing 'content' (string)" });
+          return;
+        }
+        const requested = meshFromCtx(typeof body.mesh === "string" ? body.mesh : null);
+        let chosen = requested;
+        if (!chosen && opts.brokers.size === 1) chosen = opts.brokers.keys().next().value as string;
+        if (!chosen) {
+          respond(res, 400, { error: "mesh_required", attached: [...opts.brokers.keys()] });
+          return;
+        }
+        const broker = opts.brokers.get(chosen);
+        if (!broker) { respond(res, 404, { error: "mesh_not_attached", mesh: chosen }); return; }
+        const tags = Array.isArray(body.tags) ? body.tags.filter((t) => typeof t === "string") as string[] : undefined;
+        const id = await broker.remember(body.content, tags);
+        if (!id) { respond(res, 502, { error: "remember_timeout" }); return; }
+        respond(res, 200, { id, mesh: chosen });
+      } catch (e) {
+        respond(res, 400, { error: String(e) });
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (req.method === "DELETE" && url.pathname.startsWith("/v1/memory/")) {
+      if (!opts.brokers || opts.brokers.size === 0) {
+        respond(res, 503, { error: "broker not initialised" });
+        return;
+      }
+      const id = decodeURIComponent(url.pathname.slice("/v1/memory/".length));
+      if (!id) { respond(res, 400, { error: "missing memory id" }); return; }
+      const requested = url.searchParams.get("mesh");
+      let chosen = requested;
+      if (!chosen && opts.brokers.size === 1) chosen = opts.brokers.keys().next().value as string;
+      if (!chosen) {
+        respond(res, 400, { error: "mesh_required", attached: [...opts.brokers.keys()] });
+        return;
+      }
+      const broker = opts.brokers.get(chosen);
+      if (!broker) { respond(res, 404, { error: "mesh_not_attached", mesh: chosen }); return; }
+      broker.forget(id);
+      respond(res, 200, { ok: true, id, mesh: chosen });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (req.method === "GET" && url.pathname === "/v1/skills") {
+      if (!opts.brokers || opts.brokers.size === 0) {
+        respond(res, 503, { error: "broker not initialised" });
+        return;
+      }
+      const query = url.searchParams.get("query") ?? undefined;
+      const filterMesh = meshFromCtx(url.searchParams.get("mesh")) ?? undefined;
+      try {
+        const all: Array<Record<string, unknown> & { mesh: string }> = [];
+        for (const [slug, b] of opts.brokers.entries()) {
+          if (filterMesh && filterMesh !== slug) continue;
+          try {
+            const skills = await b.listSkills(query);
+            for (const s of skills) all.push({ ...(s as unknown as Record<string, unknown>), mesh: slug });
+          } catch (e) {
+            opts.log("warn", "ipc_skills_broker_failed", { mesh: slug, err: String(e) });
+          }
+        }
+        respond(res, 200, { skills: all });
+      } catch (e) {
+        respond(res, 502, { error: "broker_unreachable", detail: String(e) });
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (req.method === "GET" && url.pathname.startsWith("/v1/skills/")) {
+      if (!opts.brokers || opts.brokers.size === 0) {
+        respond(res, 503, { error: "broker not initialised" });
+        return;
+      }
+      const name = decodeURIComponent(url.pathname.slice("/v1/skills/".length));
+      if (!name) { respond(res, 400, { error: "missing skill name" }); return; }
+      const filterMesh = meshFromCtx(url.searchParams.get("mesh")) ?? undefined;
+      try {
+        // First mesh that has the skill wins. With ?mesh=<slug>, only that
+        // mesh is queried.
+        for (const [slug, b] of opts.brokers.entries()) {
+          if (filterMesh && filterMesh !== slug) continue;
+          const skill = await b.getSkill(name).catch(() => null);
+          if (skill) { respond(res, 200, { skill: { ...skill, mesh: slug } }); return; }
+        }
+        respond(res, 404, { error: "skill_not_found", name });
       } catch (e) {
         respond(res, 502, { error: "broker_unreachable", detail: String(e) });
       }
@@ -205,22 +546,36 @@ function makeHandler(opts: {
     }
 
     if (req.method === "POST" && url.pathname === "/v1/profile") {
-      if (!opts.broker) { respond(res, 503, { error: "broker not initialised" }); return; }
+      if (!opts.brokers || opts.brokers.size === 0) {
+        respond(res, 503, { error: "broker not initialised" });
+        return;
+      }
       try {
         const body = await readJsonBody(req, 16 * 1024) as Record<string, unknown> | null;
         if (!body) { respond(res, 400, { error: "expected JSON object" }); return; }
+        // v1.26.0: profile updates apply to a specific mesh if `mesh` is
+        // present in the body or query, otherwise broadcast to all attached
+        // meshes (presence is per-mesh, but most users want consistent
+        // presence across all of theirs).
+        const requested = meshFromCtx(typeof body.mesh === "string" ? body.mesh : url.searchParams.get("mesh"));
+        const targets = requested
+          ? [opts.brokers.get(requested)].filter(Boolean) as DaemonBrokerClient[]
+          : [...opts.brokers.values()];
+        if (targets.length === 0) { respond(res, 404, { error: "mesh_not_attached", mesh: requested }); return; }
         const updates: Record<string, unknown> = {};
-        if (typeof body.summary === "string") opts.broker.setSummary(body.summary);
+        for (const b of targets) {
-        if (body.status === "idle" || body.status === "working" || body.status === "dnd") opts.broker.setStatus(body.status);
+          if (typeof body.summary === "string") b.setSummary(body.summary);
-        if (typeof body.visible === "boolean") opts.broker.setVisible(body.visible);
+          if (body.status === "idle" || body.status === "working" || body.status === "dnd") b.setStatus(body.status);
+          if (typeof body.visible === "boolean") b.setVisible(body.visible);
           const profile: { avatar?: string; title?: string; bio?: string; capabilities?: string[] } = {};
           if (typeof body.avatar === "string") profile.avatar = body.avatar;
           if (typeof body.title === "string") profile.title = body.title;
           if (typeof body.bio === "string") profile.bio = body.bio;
           if (Array.isArray(body.capabilities)) profile.capabilities = body.capabilities.filter((c) => typeof c === "string") as string[];
-        if (Object.keys(profile).length > 0) opts.broker.setProfile(profile);
+          if (Object.keys(profile).length > 0) b.setProfile(profile);
+        }
         Object.assign(updates, body);
-        respond(res, 200, { ok: true, applied: Object.keys(updates) });
+        respond(res, 200, { ok: true, applied: Object.keys(updates), meshes: requested ? [requested] : [...opts.brokers.keys()] });
       } catch (e) {
         respond(res, 400, { error: String(e) });
       }
@@ -238,12 +593,46 @@ function makeHandler(opts: {
       const fromPubkey = url.searchParams.get("from") ?? undefined;
       const limitRaw = url.searchParams.get("limit");
       const limit = limitRaw ? Number.parseInt(limitRaw, 10) : undefined;
+      // 1.34.0: mesh filter. Falls back to session-default if header set.
+      const meshFilter = meshFromCtx(url.searchParams.get("mesh")) ?? undefined;
+      // 1.34.8: read-state filter. ?unread_only=true narrows to rows
+      // whose seen_at is NULL — used by the welcome push so a freshly
+      // launched session surfaces only what it actually missed.
+      const unreadOnly = url.searchParams.get("unread_only") === "true";
+      // 1.34.8: ?mark_seen=false opts out of the auto-stamp behavior. By
+      // default an interactive listing flips seen_at on the rows it just
+      // returned (the user "saw" them), which is what we want for the
+      // CLI but not for diagnostic tooling that wants to peek without
+      // affecting state. The MCP server uses mark_seen=false on the
+      // welcome path; it stamps explicitly via /v1/inbox/seen instead.
+      const markSeen = url.searchParams.get("mark_seen") !== "false";
+      // 1.34.11: scope by recipient when the caller is an authenticated
+      // session. The daemon receives every inbox row for every session
+      // it hosts, so a query without scoping returns the global table —
+      // session A would see B's DMs (the bug 1.34.10 fixed for the
+      // live event path; this is the storage half). Scope = session
+      // pubkey (DMs) + member pubkey (broadcasts/member DMs the whole
+      // member should see) + NULL (legacy rows we can't attribute).
+      const recipientPubkey = session?.presence?.sessionPubkey;
+      const meshCfgForRecipient = session?.mesh ? opts.meshConfigs?.get(session.mesh) : undefined;
+      const recipientMemberPubkey = meshCfgForRecipient?.pubkey;
       const rows = listInbox(opts.inboxDb, {
         since: Number.isFinite(since) ? since : undefined,
         topic,
         fromPubkey,
+        ...(meshFilter ? { mesh: meshFilter } : {}),
+        unreadOnly,
+        ...(recipientPubkey ? { recipientPubkey } : {}),
+        ...(recipientMemberPubkey ? { recipientMemberPubkey } : {}),
         limit: Number.isFinite(limit ?? NaN) ? limit : undefined,
       });
+      let flippedCount = 0;
+      if (markSeen) {
+        const unreadIds = rows.filter((r) => r.seen_at == null).map((r) => r.id);
+        if (unreadIds.length > 0) {
+          flippedCount = markInboxSeen(opts.inboxDb, unreadIds);
+        }
+      }
       respond(res, 200, {
         items: rows.map((r) => ({
           id: r.id,
@@ -256,11 +645,72 @@ function makeHandler(opts: {
           body: r.body,
           received_at: new Date(r.received_at).toISOString(),
           reply_to_id: r.reply_to_id,
+          // 1.34.8: surface read-state. `null` = never seen (welcome
+          // candidate). Note that if mark_seen=true (default), we just
+          // stamped these rows — but the snapshot reflects the value
+          // BEFORE the stamp so callers can still tell which rows were
+          // unread when they asked.
+          seen_at: r.seen_at ? new Date(r.seen_at).toISOString() : null,
+          // 1.34.11: recipient context. Lets `--json` consumers tell
+          // a session DM apart from a member-keyed broadcast, and
+          // distinguishes pre-1.34.11 legacy rows (NULL) from
+          // properly-scoped ones.
+          recipient_pubkey: r.recipient_pubkey,
+          recipient_kind: r.recipient_kind,
         })),
+        // 1.34.8: how many rows just flipped from unread → seen. Useful
+        // for telemetry and lets the CLI render "marked N as read".
+        marked_seen: flippedCount,
       });
       return;
     }
 
+    // 1.34.8: explicit mark-seen endpoint. Used by the MCP server after
+    // it surfaces a live `<channel>` reminder for an inbox row — Claude
+    // Code already saw the row inline, so welcome shouldn't re-surface
+    // it on the next launch. Body: { ids: string[] }. Returns the
+    // number of rows that flipped from unread → seen.
+    if (req.method === "POST" && url.pathname === "/v1/inbox/seen") {
+      if (!opts.inboxDb) { respond(res, 503, { error: "inbox not initialised" }); return; }
+      try {
+        const body = await readJsonBody(req, 64 * 1024) as Record<string, unknown> | null;
+        const ids = Array.isArray(body?.ids)
+          ? (body!.ids as unknown[]).filter((x): x is string => typeof x === "string")
+          : [];
+        if (ids.length === 0) { respond(res, 400, { error: "missing 'ids' (string[])" }); return; }
+        const flipped = markInboxSeen(opts.inboxDb, ids);
+        respond(res, 200, { marked_seen: flipped });
+      } catch (e) {
+        respond(res, 400, { error: String(e) });
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // 1.34.7: inbox flush + per-row delete. The inbox is the daemon's
+    // local persisted SQLite store — there's no broker-side state to
+    // coordinate, so these are simple local writes.
+    if (req.method === "DELETE" && url.pathname === "/v1/inbox") {
+      if (!opts.inboxDb) { respond(res, 503, { error: "inbox not initialised" }); return; }
+      const meshFilter = meshFromCtx(url.searchParams.get("mesh")) ?? undefined;
+      const beforeRaw = url.searchParams.get("before");
+      const before = beforeRaw ? Date.parse(beforeRaw) : undefined;
+      const removed = flushInbox(opts.inboxDb, {
+        ...(meshFilter ? { mesh: meshFilter } : {}),
+        ...(Number.isFinite(before) ? { before } : {}),
+      });
+      respond(res, 200, { removed });
+      return;
+    }
+    if (req.method === "DELETE" && url.pathname.startsWith("/v1/inbox/")) {
+      if (!opts.inboxDb) { respond(res, 503, { error: "inbox not initialised" }); return; }
+      const id = url.pathname.slice("/v1/inbox/".length);
+      if (!id) { respond(res, 400, { error: "missing id" }); return; }
+      const ok = deleteInboxRow(opts.inboxDb, id);
+      if (!ok) { respond(res, 404, { error: "not found", id }); return; }
+      respond(res, 200, { removed: 1, id });
+      return;
+    }
+
     if (req.method === "GET" && url.pathname === "/v1/outbox") {
       if (!opts.outboxDb) { respond(res, 503, { error: "outbox not initialised" }); return; }
       const statusParam = url.searchParams.get("status") ?? undefined;
@@ -337,6 +787,51 @@ function makeHandler(opts: {
           respond(res, 400, { error: parsed.error });
           return;
         }
+        // v1.26.0: pick the mesh. Order of preference:
+        //   1. Explicit `mesh` field in body
+        //   2. Single attached mesh — auto-pick
+        //   3. Bail with 400 — caller must disambiguate
+        if (opts.brokers && opts.brokers.size > 0 && opts.meshConfigs) {
+          let chosenSlug: string | null = parsed.req.mesh ?? null;
+          if (!chosenSlug && opts.brokers.size === 1) {
+            chosenSlug = opts.brokers.keys().next().value as string;
+          }
+          if (!chosenSlug) {
+            respond(res, 400, {
+              error: "mesh_required",
+              detail: `daemon attached to ${opts.brokers.size} meshes; pass 'mesh' in request body`,
+              attached: [...opts.brokers.keys()],
+            });
+            return;
+          }
+          const broker = opts.brokers.get(chosenSlug);
+          const meshCfg = opts.meshConfigs.get(chosenSlug);
+          if (!broker || !meshCfg) {
+            respond(res, 404, { error: "mesh_not_attached", mesh: chosenSlug });
+            return;
+          }
+          // 1.34.0: authenticated session sends encrypt with the session
+          // secret key + carry the session pubkey through to the outbox
+          // row, so the drain worker can route via SessionBrokerClient
+          // and the broker fan-out attributes the push to the session
+          // pubkey instead of the daemon's member pubkey. Cold-path
+          // sends (no session token) keep the legacy member-key flow.
+          const senderSessionPubkey = session?.presence?.sessionPubkey;
+          const senderSecretKey = session?.presence?.sessionSecretKey ?? meshCfg.secretKey;
+          try {
+            const routed = await resolveAndEncrypt(parsed.req, broker, senderSecretKey, chosenSlug);
+            parsed.req.target_spec = routed.target_spec;
+            parsed.req.ciphertext  = routed.ciphertext;
+            parsed.req.nonce       = routed.nonce;
+            parsed.req.mesh        = routed.mesh;
+            if (senderSessionPubkey) {
+              parsed.req.sender_session_pubkey = senderSessionPubkey;
+            }
+          } catch (e) {
+            respond(res, 502, { error: "route_failed", detail: String(e) });
+            return;
+          }
+        }
         const outcome = acceptSend(parsed.req, { db: opts.outboxDb });
         switch (outcome.kind) {
           case "accepted_pending":
@@ -441,6 +936,8 @@ function parseSendRequest(body: unknown, idempotencyHeader: string | string[] |
 
   const reply_to_id = typeof b.reply_to_id === "string" ? b.reply_to_id : undefined;
 
+  const mesh = typeof b.mesh === "string" ? b.mesh.trim() : undefined;
+
   return {
     req: {
       to,
@@ -451,10 +948,83 @@ function parseSendRequest(body: unknown, idempotencyHeader: string | string[] |
       client_message_id,
       destination_kind,
       destination_ref,
+      mesh,
     },
   };
 }
 
+/**
+ * Sprint 4: resolve a user-friendly `to` (peer name, pubkey hex, @group, *,
+ * topic name, "#topicId") into a broker-format target_spec, and encrypt
+ * the plaintext payload appropriately for the destination kind.
+ *
+ * - DM by 64-char hex pubkey: target_spec = pubkey hex, ciphertext via
+ *   crypto_box (recipient pubkey + sender session secret).
+ * - DM by display name: resolve via broker.listPeers, then same as above.
+ * - Group / broadcast / topic: target_spec = `@<group>` / `*` / `#<topicId>`,
+ *   ciphertext = base64(plaintext) [matches the cold path's pre-encryption
+ *   convention until topic crypto lands].
+ */
+async function resolveAndEncrypt(
+  req: SendRequest,
+  broker: DaemonBrokerClient,
+  meshSecretKey: string,
+  meshSlug: string | null,
+): Promise<{ target_spec: string; ciphertext: string; nonce: string; mesh: string }> {
+  const { encryptDirect } = await import("~/services/crypto/box.js");
+  const { randomBytes } = await import("node:crypto");
+  const to = req.to.trim();
+
+  // Topic by id ("#<topicId>") — hex-like 20+ chars.
+  if (to.startsWith("#") && /^#[0-9a-z_-]{20,}$/i.test(to)) {
+    const ciphertext = Buffer.from(req.message, "utf8").toString("base64");
+    const nonce = randomBytes(24).toString("base64");
+    return { target_spec: to, ciphertext, nonce, mesh: meshSlug ?? "" };
+  }
+
+  // Group, broadcast — pass through. (Topic-by-name resolution happens
+  // when the daemon hooks topic_list later; not required for v1.25.0.)
+  if (to.startsWith("@") || to === "*") {
+    const ciphertext = Buffer.from(req.message, "utf8").toString("base64");
+    const nonce = randomBytes(24).toString("base64");
+    return { target_spec: to, ciphertext, nonce, mesh: meshSlug ?? "" };
+  }
+
+  // 64-char hex pubkey → DM directly. Encrypt with the daemon's member
+  // secret: recipient decrypts using THEIR session pubkey's matching
+  // secret on their session-WS, so the sender side just needs any
+  // private key whose public counterpart is known to the recipient as
+  // "the sender". Member key is the stable choice and is what the
+  // recipient already trusts via mesh membership.
+  if (/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(to)) {
+    const env = await encryptDirect(req.message, to, meshSecretKey);
+    return { target_spec: to, ciphertext: env.ciphertext, nonce: env.nonce, mesh: meshSlug ?? "" };
+  }
+
+  // Hex prefix (16+ chars but <64) → resolve via peer list prefix match.
+  // Matches the ergonomics of `claudemesh peer list` which shows 16-char
+  // prefixes, so users naturally paste prefixes back.
+  const peers = await broker.listPeers().catch(() => []);
+  if (/^[0-9a-f]{16,63}$/i.test(to)) {
+    const matches = peers.filter((p) =>
+      p.pubkey.toLowerCase().startsWith(to.toLowerCase()) ||
+      (p.memberPubkey ?? "").toLowerCase().startsWith(to.toLowerCase()),
+    );
+    if (matches.length === 0) throw new Error(`no peer matching prefix "${to}"`);
+    if (matches.length > 1) throw new Error(`prefix "${to}" is ambiguous (${matches.length} matches)`);
+    const recipient = matches[0]!.pubkey;
+    const env = await encryptDirect(req.message, recipient, meshSecretKey);
+    return { target_spec: recipient, ciphertext: env.ciphertext, nonce: env.nonce, mesh: meshSlug ?? "" };
+  }
+
+  // Otherwise — display name.
+  const match = peers.find((p) => p.displayName.toLowerCase() === to.toLowerCase());
+  if (!match) throw new Error(`peer "${to}" not found`);
+  const recipient = match.pubkey;
+  const env = await encryptDirect(req.message, recipient, meshSecretKey);
+  return { target_spec: recipient, ciphertext: env.ciphertext, nonce: env.nonce, mesh: meshSlug ?? "" };
+}
+
 function respond(res: ServerResponse, status: number, body: unknown) {
   const json = JSON.stringify(body);
   res.statusCode = status;

apps/cli/src/daemon/paths.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,30 @@
+import { homedir } from "node:os";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 
-import { PATHS } from "~/constants/paths.js";
+/**
+ * Daemon paths intentionally do NOT honor `CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR`.
+ *
+ * `claudemesh launch` sets `CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR` to a per-session
+ * tmpdir so that joined-mesh state, last-used selections, and the
+ * IPC session token stay isolated from the host's shared config.
+ * The daemon, however, is a single per-machine process serving every
+ * launched session — its socket, pid file, on-disk outbox, and SQLite
+ * stores all live under `~/.claudemesh/daemon/`. Letting them inherit
+ * the per-session tmpdir would point each CLI invocation inside a
+ * launched session at a daemon socket that doesn't exist, force the
+ * cold path, and surface as "service-managed daemon not responding
+ * within 8000ms" (1.31.0 regression observed in real install).
+ *
+ * `CLAUDEMESH_DAEMON_DIR` exists as an explicit override for tests
+ * and for the rare case of running multiple daemon instances side by
+ * side (e.g. integration tests). Production callers should never set
+ * it.
+ */
+const DAEMON_DIR_ROOT =
+  process.env.CLAUDEMESH_DAEMON_DIR || join(homedir(), ".claudemesh", "daemon");
 
 export const DAEMON_PATHS = {
-  get DAEMON_DIR() { return join(PATHS.CONFIG_DIR, "daemon"); },
+  get DAEMON_DIR() { return DAEMON_DIR_ROOT; },
   get PID_FILE()    { return join(this.DAEMON_DIR, "daemon.pid"); },
   get SOCK_FILE()   { return join(this.DAEMON_DIR, "daemon.sock"); },
   get TOKEN_FILE()  { return join(this.DAEMON_DIR, "local-token"); },

apps/cli/src/daemon/process-info.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/**
+ * Process-info helpers used by the session reaper to detect dead-pid AND
+ * pid-reuse safely.
+ *
+ * `process.kill(pid, 0)` alone is insufficient: a recently-recycled pid
+ * passes the liveness check even though the process registered under it
+ * is long gone. To avoid mistakenly trusting a recycled pid, we capture
+ * a stable per-process start-time at register, and compare it on each
+ * sweep — if it changed, treat the original process as dead.
+ *
+ * macOS + Linux both expose `ps -o lstart=` returning a fixed-format
+ * timestamp ("Sun May  4 09:14:00 2026"). Equality is the only
+ * operation the reaper needs, so we keep the value as an opaque string.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT (1.31.1): every fork / execFile blocks the daemon's event
+ * loop until ps completes (~30-80 ms per call on macOS). The first
+ * 1.31.0 implementation called execFileSync once per registered
+ * session every 5 s, and with 10+ sessions that stalled IPC for hundreds
+ * of milliseconds at a time — long enough that probes against
+ * /v1/version were declared "stale" and the CLI fell back to the cold
+ * path with the misleading "service-managed daemon not responding"
+ * warning. This module now exposes:
+ *
+ *   - `getProcessStartTime(pid)`: async, single-pid, used at register.
+ *   - `getProcessStartTimes(pids)`: async, batched, used by the reaper.
+ *     One ps invocation handles N pids, so the per-sweep cost is fixed
+ *     and tiny regardless of how many sessions are registered.
+ */
+
+import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
+import { promisify } from "node:util";
+
+const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
+
+/**
+ * Returns a stable process-start identifier for `pid`, or null if the
+ * process is dead or unreachable. Async — never blocks the event loop.
+ */
+export async function getProcessStartTime(pid: number): Promise<string | null> {
+  if (!Number.isFinite(pid) || pid <= 0) return null;
+  try {
+    const { stdout } = await execFileAsync("ps", ["-o", "lstart=", "-p", String(pid)], {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      timeout: 1_000,
+    });
+    const out = stdout.trim();
+    return out.length > 0 ? out : null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Batched form: returns a Map<pid, lstart> for every pid that is still
+ * alive. Pids that ps doesn't return (i.e. dead) are absent from the
+ * map. One ps fork handles all pids — O(1) sweep cost regardless of
+ * session count.
+ */
+export async function getProcessStartTimes(pids: number[]): Promise<Map<number, string>> {
+  const result = new Map<number, string>();
+  const valid = pids.filter((p) => Number.isFinite(p) && p > 0);
+  if (valid.length === 0) return result;
+  // ps -o pid,lstart= -p p1,p2,...  emits one row per live pid:
+  //   "  12345 Sun May  4 09:14:00 2026"
+  // Dead pids are silently omitted.
+  try {
+    const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(
+      "ps",
+      ["-o", "pid=,lstart=", "-p", valid.join(",")],
+      { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 2_000 },
+    );
+    for (const raw of stdout.split("\n")) {
+      const line = raw.trim();
+      if (!line) continue;
+      const m = /^(\d+)\s+(.+)$/.exec(line);
+      if (!m) continue;
+      const pid = Number.parseInt(m[1]!, 10);
+      const lstart = m[2]!.trim();
+      if (Number.isFinite(pid) && lstart.length > 0) result.set(pid, lstart);
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // ps failure (timeout, ENOENT) — treat as "no info available" and
+    // let the reaper fall back to bare liveness for these pids. Better
+    // to keep entries than to nuke them on a transient ps error.
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+/** Liveness-only probe (signal 0). Use together with start-time guard. */
+export function isPidAlive(pid: number): boolean {
+  if (!Number.isFinite(pid) || pid <= 0) return false;
+  try {
+    process.kill(pid, 0);
+    return true;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}

apps/cli/src/daemon/run.ts

@@ -4,24 +4,24 @@ import { DAEMON_PATHS } from "./paths.js";
 import { acquireSingletonLock, releaseSingletonLock } from "./lock.js";
 import { ensureLocalToken } from "./local-token.js";
 import { startIpcServer } from "./ipc/server.js";
+import { setRegistryHooks, startReaper, type SessionInfo } from "./session-registry.js";
 import { openSqlite, type SqliteDb } from "./db/sqlite.js";
 import { migrateOutbox } from "./db/outbox.js";
 import { migrateInbox } from "./db/inbox.js";
 import { DaemonBrokerClient } from "./broker.js";
+import { SessionBrokerClient } from "./session-broker.js";
 import { startDrainWorker, type DrainHandle } from "./drain.js";
+import { startInboxPruner, type InboxPrunerHandle } from "./inbox-pruner.js";
 import { handleBrokerPush } from "./inbound.js";
 import { EventBus } from "./events.js";
 import { checkFingerprint, type ClonePolicy } from "./identity.js";
 import { readConfig } from "~/services/config/facade.js";
+import { VERSION } from "~/constants/urls.js";
 
 export interface RunDaemonOptions {
   /** Disable TCP loopback (UDS-only). Defaults true in container envs. */
   tcpEnabled?: boolean;
   publicHealthCheck?: boolean;
-  /** Mesh slug to attach to. Required when the user has joined multiple meshes. */
-  mesh?: string;
-  /** Daemon's display name on the mesh. */
-  displayName?: string;
   /** Behavior on host_fingerprint mismatch. Defaults 'refuse'. */
   clonePolicy?: ClonePolicy;
 }
@@ -93,62 +93,206 @@ export async function runDaemon(opts: RunDaemonOptions = {}): Promise<number> {
 
   const bus = new EventBus();
 
-  // Pick the mesh. If the user joined exactly one, use it; otherwise
+  // 1.34.10: the daemon is universal — attaches to every mesh listed
-  // require --mesh. Daemon CAN start with no mesh — the outbox will
+  // in config.json. Single-mesh isolation is handled by simply joining
-  // accept rows but `dead` them after retries because the broker is
+  // only one mesh in that environment (containers, etc.). No --mesh
-  // never reachable. Better to fail fast.
+  // flag, no per-mesh service unit; one daemon, every mesh.
   const cfg = readConfig();
-  let mesh = null as null | typeof cfg.meshes[number];
+  if (cfg.meshes.length === 0) {
-  if (opts.mesh) {
-    mesh = cfg.meshes.find((m) => m.slug === opts.mesh) ?? null;
-    if (!mesh) {
-      process.stderr.write(`mesh not found: ${opts.mesh}\n`);
-      process.stderr.write(`joined meshes: ${cfg.meshes.map((m) => m.slug).join(", ") || "(none)"}\n`);
-      releaseSingletonLock();
-      try { outboxDb.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
-      return 2;
-    }
-  } else if (cfg.meshes.length === 1) {
-    mesh = cfg.meshes[0]!;
-  } else if (cfg.meshes.length === 0) {
     process.stderr.write(`no mesh joined; run \`claudemesh join <invite-url>\` first\n`);
     releaseSingletonLock();
     try { outboxDb.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
     return 2;
-  } else {
-    process.stderr.write(`multiple meshes joined; pass --mesh <slug>\n`);
-    process.stderr.write(`available: ${cfg.meshes.map((m) => m.slug).join(", ")}\n`);
-    releaseSingletonLock();
-    try { outboxDb.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
-    return 2;
   }
+  const meshes = cfg.meshes;
 
-  // Connect to broker (non-fatal: connection failures get retried;
+  // 1.34.9 — declared upfront so the daemon-WS onPush closure can
-  // outbox keeps queuing during outages).
+  // reach into the per-session map for the isOwnPubkey filter (drops
-  const broker = new DaemonBrokerClient(mesh, {
+  // peer_joined / peer_left events for our own session pubkeys before
-    displayName: opts.displayName,
+  // they surface as `[system] Peer "<self>" joined`). Populated below
+  // by setRegistryHooks; empty until the first session registers, but
+  // that's fine — the closure walks it lazily.
+  const sessionBrokers = new Map<string, SessionBrokerClient>();
+  const sessionBrokersByPubkey = new Map<string, SessionBrokerClient>();
+
+  // Spin up one broker per mesh. Connection failures are non-fatal:
+  // the outbox keeps queuing per-mesh and reconnect logic in
+  // DaemonBrokerClient handles reattach.
+  const brokers = new Map<string, DaemonBrokerClient>();
+  const meshConfigs = new Map<string, typeof cfg.meshes[number]>();
+  for (const mesh of meshes) {
+    meshConfigs.set(mesh.slug, mesh);
+    // 1.34.10: no global displayName override anymore. Each mesh's
+    // hello uses its own per-mesh display name from config.json (set
+    // at `claudemesh join` time). Sessions advertise their own name
+    // via `claudemesh launch --name`.
+    const broker: DaemonBrokerClient = new DaemonBrokerClient(mesh, {
       onStatusChange: (s) => {
         process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
-        msg: "broker_status", status: s, mesh: mesh!.slug, ts: new Date().toISOString(),
+          msg: "broker_status", status: s, mesh: mesh.slug, ts: new Date().toISOString(),
         }) + "\n");
-      bus.publish("broker_status", { mesh: mesh!.slug, status: s });
+        bus.publish("broker_status", { mesh: mesh.slug, status: s });
       },
       onPush: (m) => {
-      const sessionKeys = broker.getSessionKeys();
+        // Daemon-WS is member-keyed, not session-keyed. Session-targeted
+        // DMs land on the per-session WS (SessionBrokerClient) since
+        // 1.32.1 and decrypt with the session secret there. Anything that
+        // arrives here can only be member-keyed (broadcasts, member DMs,
+        // system events) — pass member secret only.
+        // 1.34.9: drop self-echoes — broker fan-out paths mirror an
+        // outbound back to the SAME daemon's member-WS even when the
+        // send originated on a session-WS (because both connections
+        // belong to the same member from the broker's view). Filter on
+        // senderMemberPubkey alone: anything attributed to OUR member is
+        // either our own send echoing back or, theoretically, a peer
+        // send from a different connection that happens to share our
+        // pubkey — but two-different-clients-same-pubkey is impossible
+        // by construction (member pubkeys are stable + unique per
+        // identity). Sibling-session DMs don't fan to our member-WS;
+        // they fan session-to-session. So this is safe.
+        const senderMemberPk = String((m as Record<string, unknown>).senderMemberPubkey ?? "").toLowerCase();
+        const ownMember = mesh.pubkey.toLowerCase();
+        if (senderMemberPk && senderMemberPk === ownMember) {
+          return;
+        }
         void handleBrokerPush(m, {
           db: inboxDb,
           bus,
-        meshSlug: mesh!.slug,
+          meshSlug: mesh.slug,
-        recipientSecretKeyHex: mesh!.secretKey,
+          recipientSecretKeyHex: mesh.secretKey,
-        sessionSecretKeyHex: sessionKeys?.sessionSecretKey,
+          // v2 agentic-comms (M1): client_ack closes the at-least-once
+          // loop. Broker holds the row claimed (not delivered) until ack.
+          ackClientMessage: (cmid, bmid) => broker.sendClientAck(cmid, bmid),
+          // 1.34.9: drop self-join system events. Member pubkey + every
+          // live session pubkey on this daemon all count as "us".
+          isOwnPubkey: (pubkey) => {
+            const lower = pubkey.toLowerCase();
+            if (lower === ownMember) return true;
+            return sessionBrokersByPubkey.has(lower);
+          },
+          // 1.34.10: tag the bus event with our member pubkey so the
+          // SSE demux only fans this row to MCPs whose subscriber
+          // matches (member-keyed broadcasts / DMs).
+          recipientPubkey: mesh.pubkey,
+          recipientKind: "member",
         });
       },
     });
-  broker.connect().catch((err) => process.stderr.write(`broker connect failed: ${String(err)}\n`));
+    broker.connect().catch((err) => process.stderr.write(`broker connect failed for ${mesh.slug}: ${String(err)}\n`));
+    brokers.set(mesh.slug, broker);
+  }
 
-  // Start the drain worker.
+  // 1.30.0 — per-session broker presence. Always on. Older CLIs that
+  // don't include `presence` material in the register body just won't
+  // get a session WS; the daemon's own member-keyed broker still
+  // covers them.
+  //
+  // The two index maps (sessionBrokers by token, sessionBrokersByPubkey
+  // by session pubkey) are declared earlier in this function so the
+  // daemon-WS onPush closure can reference them for the isOwnPubkey
+  // self-join filter.
+
+  // Start the drain worker. With multi-mesh, drain dispatches each
+  // outbox row to its mesh's broker via the `mesh` column.
+  // 1.34.0: drain also accepts a session-pubkey lookup so rows
+  // written by authenticated sessions route via the matching session-WS
+  // (broker fan-out then attributes the push to the session pubkey).
   let drain: DrainHandle | null = null;
-  drain = startDrainWorker({ db: outboxDb, broker });
+  drain = startDrainWorker({
+    db: outboxDb,
+    brokers,
+    getSessionBrokerByPubkey: (pubkey) => sessionBrokersByPubkey.get(pubkey),
+  });
+
+  // 1.34.8 — TTL prune for inbox.db. Runs hourly with a 30-day default
+  // retention. Without this the inbox grows unbounded; even on a moderate
+  // mesh that's tens of thousands of rows over a few weeks. Prune is a
+  // single DELETE; failures are non-fatal and the next interval retries.
+  const inboxPruner: InboxPrunerHandle = startInboxPruner({ db: inboxDb });
+  setRegistryHooks({
+    onRegister: (info) => {
+      if (!info.presence) return;
+      const meshConfig = meshConfigs.get(info.mesh);
+      if (!meshConfig) {
+        process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify({
+          level: "warn", msg: "session_broker_no_mesh_config", mesh: info.mesh,
+          ts: new Date().toISOString(),
+        }) + "\n");
+        return;
+      }
+      // Drop any pre-existing session WS under this token (re-register).
+      const prior = sessionBrokers.get(info.token);
+      if (prior) {
+        sessionBrokers.delete(info.token);
+        // 1.34.0: keep both indices in sync.
+        if (sessionBrokersByPubkey.get(prior.sessionPubkey) === prior) {
+          sessionBrokersByPubkey.delete(prior.sessionPubkey);
+        }
+        prior.close().catch(() => { /* ignore */ });
+      }
+      // 1.32.1 — wire push delivery. Messages targeted at the launched
+      // session's pubkey land on THIS WS, not on the member-keyed one,
+      // so without this forward they'd silently disappear (the bug that
+      // kept inbox.db at zero rows since 1.30.0). Decrypt prefers the
+      // session secret key; member key remains the fallback for legacy
+      // member-targeted traffic that happens to fan out here.
+      const sessionSecretKeyHex = info.presence.sessionSecretKey;
+      // Capture the pubkey for the onPush closure below — TS can't
+      // narrow `info.presence` inside the async arrow even though we
+      // guard `if (!info.presence) return` earlier.
+      const sessionPubkeyHex = info.presence.sessionPubkey;
+      const client: SessionBrokerClient = new SessionBrokerClient({
+        mesh: meshConfig,
+        sessionPubkey: info.presence.sessionPubkey,
+        sessionSecretKey: info.presence.sessionSecretKey,
+        parentAttestation: info.presence.parentAttestation,
+        sessionId: info.sessionId,
+        displayName: info.displayName,
+        ...(info.role ? { role: info.role } : {}),
+        ...(info.cwd ? { cwd: info.cwd } : {}),
+        pid: info.pid,
+        onPush: (m) => {
+          void handleBrokerPush(m, {
+            db: inboxDb,
+            bus,
+            meshSlug: meshConfig.slug,
+            recipientSecretKeyHex: meshConfig.secretKey,
+            sessionSecretKeyHex,
+            // v2 agentic-comms (M1): close the at-least-once loop.
+            ackClientMessage: (cmid, bmid) => client.sendClientAck(cmid, bmid),
+            // 1.34.10: tag the bus event with this session's pubkey so
+            // the SSE demux only delivers to the MCP serving THIS
+            // session — not its siblings on the same daemon. Without
+            // this, A's MCP also rendered DMs intended for B because
+            // the bus was a single shared stream.
+            recipientPubkey: sessionPubkeyHex,
+            recipientKind: "session",
+          });
+        },
+      });
+      sessionBrokers.set(info.token, client);
+      sessionBrokersByPubkey.set(info.presence.sessionPubkey, client);
+      client.connect().catch((err) =>
+        process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify({
+          level: "warn", msg: "session_broker_connect_failed",
+          mesh: info.mesh, err: String(err), ts: new Date().toISOString(),
+        }) + "\n"),
+      );
+    },
+    onDeregister: (info: SessionInfo) => {
+      const client = sessionBrokers.get(info.token);
+      if (!client) return;
+      sessionBrokers.delete(info.token);
+      // 1.34.0: drop the pubkey index iff this client still owns it
+      // (a re-register may have already swapped the entry).
+      if (sessionBrokersByPubkey.get(client.sessionPubkey) === client) {
+        sessionBrokersByPubkey.delete(client.sessionPubkey);
+      }
+      client.close().catch(() => { /* ignore */ });
+    },
+  });
+
+  startReaper();
 
   const ipc = startIpcServer({
     localToken,
@@ -157,7 +301,8 @@ export async function runDaemon(opts: RunDaemonOptions = {}): Promise<number> {
     outboxDb,
     inboxDb,
     bus,
-    broker,
+    brokers,
+    meshConfigs,
     onPendingInserted: () => drain?.wake(),
   });
 
@@ -171,10 +316,14 @@ export async function runDaemon(opts: RunDaemonOptions = {}): Promise<number> {
 
   process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({
     msg: "daemon_started",
+    // 1.34.10: stamp the version so users can tell whether the
+    // running daemon picked up a recent CLI ship. Read off the same
+    // VERSION constant the IPC `/v1/version` endpoint serves.
+    version: VERSION,
     pid: process.pid,
     sock: DAEMON_PATHS.SOCK_FILE,
     tcp: tcpEnabled ? `127.0.0.1:47823` : null,
-    mesh: mesh.slug,
+    meshes: meshes.map((m) => m.slug),
     ts: new Date().toISOString(),
   }) + "\n");
 
@@ -183,8 +332,15 @@ export async function runDaemon(opts: RunDaemonOptions = {}): Promise<number> {
     if (shuttingDown) return;
     shuttingDown = true;
     process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ msg: "daemon_shutdown", signal: sig, ts: new Date().toISOString() }) + "\n");
+    inboxPruner.stop();
     if (drain) await drain.close();
-    await broker.close();
+    for (const b of brokers.values()) {
+      try { await b.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+    }
+    for (const b of sessionBrokers.values()) {
+      try { await b.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+    }
+    sessionBrokers.clear();
     await ipc.close();
     try { outboxDb.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
     try { inboxDb.close(); }  catch { /* ignore */ }

apps/cli/src/daemon/service-install.ts

@@ -38,8 +38,13 @@ function isCi(): boolean {
 export interface InstallArgs {
   /** Path to the `claudemesh` binary, e.g. /opt/homebrew/bin/claudemesh */
   binaryPath: string;
-  /** Mesh slug to attach to. */
+  /**
-  meshSlug: string;
+   * Optional mesh slug to lock the daemon to. Omit (the new default) so
+   * the daemon attaches to every joined mesh — matches the 1.26.0
+   * multi-mesh design. Single-mesh lock is preserved for users who
+   * explicitly want it (testing, CI, host with one mesh).
+   */
+  meshSlug?: string;
   /** Optional display name. */
   displayName?: string;
   /** Override the auto-detected CI refusal. */
@@ -87,11 +92,25 @@ function installDarwin(args: InstallArgs): InstallResult {
   const plist = darwinPlistPath();
   mkdirSync(dirname(plist), { recursive: true });
   const log = DAEMON_PATHS.LOG_FILE;
+  // Resolve `node` explicitly. The bin script in node_modules/.bin starts
+  // with `#!/usr/bin/env node`; under launchd's restricted PATH that would
+  // resolve `node` to a system Node (often the wrong major) instead of the
+  // one that installed claudemesh-cli. Pinning process.execPath here means
+  // the daemon always runs under the same Node that ran `claudemesh install`.
+  const nodeBin = process.execPath;
+  // 1.34.12: --foreground because launchd manages lifecycle + stdio.
+  // Without it, the daemon would re-spawn itself detached (the new
+  // default) and launchd would lose track of the actual long-lived
+  // process — KeepAlive wouldn't work and stdout redirect would
+  // capture only the parent's brief boot.
   const meshArgs = [
+    `<string>${escapeXml(args.binaryPath)}</string>`,
     "<string>daemon</string>",
     "<string>up</string>",
-    "<string>--mesh</string>",
+    "<string>--foreground</string>",
-    `<string>${escapeXml(args.meshSlug)}</string>`,
+    ...(args.meshSlug
+      ? ["<string>--mesh</string>", `<string>${escapeXml(args.meshSlug)}</string>`]
+      : []),
     ...(args.displayName ? ["<string>--name</string>", `<string>${escapeXml(args.displayName)}</string>`] : []),
   ].join("\n    ");
 
@@ -103,7 +122,7 @@ function installDarwin(args: InstallArgs): InstallResult {
   <string>${SERVICE_LABEL}</string>
   <key>ProgramArguments</key>
   <array>
-    <string>${escapeXml(args.binaryPath)}</string>
+    <string>${escapeXml(nodeBin)}</string>
     ${meshArgs}
   </array>
   <key>RunAtLoad</key>
@@ -128,6 +147,26 @@ function installDarwin(args: InstallArgs): InstallResult {
 `;
   writeFileSync(plist, xml, { mode: 0o644 });
 
+  // Stop any prior incarnation BEFORE bootstrapping so an upgrade run
+  // doesn't hit "service already loaded" → bootstrap exit-5 IO_ERROR.
+  // Both calls are best-effort: launchctl prints to stderr if the unit
+  // isn't loaded, and we don't want to fail install for that.
+  try {
+    execSync(`launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u)/${SERVICE_LABEL}`, { stdio: "ignore" });
+  } catch { /* unit not loaded — fine */ }
+  // Also kill any orphaned daemon process (started manually or by an
+  // older script) so the new launchd-managed one can claim the singleton
+  // lock on first start.
+  try {
+    const pidPath = DAEMON_PATHS.PID_FILE;
+    if (existsSync(pidPath)) {
+      const pid = parseInt(readFileSync(pidPath, "utf8").trim(), 10);
+      if (Number.isFinite(pid) && pid > 0) {
+        try { process.kill(pid, "SIGTERM"); } catch { /* already dead */ }
+      }
+    }
+  } catch { /* pid file missing — fine */ }
+
   return {
     platform: "darwin",
     unitPath: plist,
@@ -144,9 +183,15 @@ function linuxUnitPath(): string {
 function installLinux(args: InstallArgs): InstallResult {
   const unit = linuxUnitPath();
   mkdirSync(dirname(unit), { recursive: true });
+  // Same node-pinning rationale as macOS — systemd's User= environment is
+  // similarly minimal; resolve node by absolute path.
+  const nodeBin = process.execPath;
+  // 1.34.12: --foreground because systemd-user owns process lifecycle
+  // and stdio capture; we don't want the child to double-fork into a
+  // detached grandchild systemd can't track.
   const execArgs = [
-    "daemon", "up",
+    "daemon", "up", "--foreground",
-    "--mesh", args.meshSlug,
+    ...(args.meshSlug ? ["--mesh", args.meshSlug] : []),
     ...(args.displayName ? ["--name", args.displayName] : []),
   ].map(shellQuote).join(" ");
 
@@ -157,7 +202,7 @@ Wants=network-online.target
 
 [Service]
 Type=simple
-ExecStart=${shellQuote(args.binaryPath)} ${execArgs}
+ExecStart=${shellQuote(nodeBin)} ${shellQuote(args.binaryPath)} ${execArgs}
 Restart=always
 RestartSec=3
 StandardOutput=append:${DAEMON_PATHS.LOG_FILE}
@@ -169,6 +214,22 @@ WantedBy=default.target
 `;
   writeFileSync(unit, content, { mode: 0o644 });
 
+  // Mirror the darwin path: stop the previous unit (if any) so an
+  // upgrade run replaces it cleanly, plus kill any orphaned manual
+  // daemon process holding the singleton lock.
+  try {
+    execSync(`systemctl --user stop ${SYSTEMD_UNIT}`, { stdio: "ignore" });
+  } catch { /* not loaded — fine */ }
+  try {
+    const pidPath = DAEMON_PATHS.PID_FILE;
+    if (existsSync(pidPath)) {
+      const pid = parseInt(readFileSync(pidPath, "utf8").trim(), 10);
+      if (Number.isFinite(pid) && pid > 0) {
+        try { process.kill(pid, "SIGTERM"); } catch { /* already dead */ }
+      }
+    }
+  } catch { /* pid file missing — fine */ }
+
   return {
     platform: "linux",
     unitPath: unit,

apps/cli/src/daemon/session-broker.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+/**
+ * Per-launch session broker WebSocket.
+ *
+ * Owned by the daemon, one per registered session. Holds a long-lived
+ * presence row on the broker keyed on the session's ephemeral pubkey
+ * (rather than the parent member's stable pubkey). Sibling sessions —
+ * two `claudemesh launch` runs in the same cwd — finally see each other
+ * in `peer list` because their presence rows coexist instead of fighting
+ * over the same memberPubkey snapshot.
+ *
+ * Differences from `DaemonBrokerClient`:
+ *   - Uses session_hello (1.30.0+ broker), with a parent-vouched
+ *     attestation provided at construction time.
+ *   - Does NOT carry list_peers / state / memory RPCs. This client is
+ *     presence + inbound DM delivery + (1.34.0) outbound send for
+ *     messages that originate from this session. Routing those through
+ *     here is what makes the broker fan-out attribute the push to the
+ *     session pubkey instead of the daemon's stable member pubkey.
+ *
+ * Outbox routing (1.34.0): the drain worker now consults
+ * `outbox.sender_session_pubkey`. If a row was written by an
+ * authenticated session and the matching session-WS is `open`, the
+ * drain dispatches via `SessionBrokerClient.send()` — this
+ * connection's `conn.sessionPubkey` server-side is the session pubkey,
+ * so the broker's existing fan-out attribution
+ * (`senderPubkey: conn.sessionPubkey ?? conn.memberPubkey`) just works.
+ * Pre-1.34.0 every drain went through DaemonBrokerClient (member-WS),
+ * so every push showed up as "from <daemon-member-pubkey>" regardless
+ * of which session typed `claudemesh send`.
+ *
+ * Old brokers reply with `unknown_message_type` on session_hello — we
+ * surface that as a one-shot `error` event and the daemon decides
+ * whether to fall back. For 1.30.0 we just log + retry; the broker is
+ * expected to be deployed first.
+ *
+ * Spec: .artifacts/specs/2026-05-04-per-session-presence.md.
+ *
+ * 2026-05-04: lifecycle (connect / hello-ack / close-reconnect) lives
+ * in `ws-lifecycle.ts`. This class supplies session_hello content and
+ * routes the inbound onPush; the helper handles the rest.
+ */
+
+import { hostname as osHostname } from "node:os";
+
+import type { JoinedMesh } from "~/services/config/facade.js";
+import { signSessionHello } from "~/services/broker/session-hello-sig.js";
+import { connectWsWithBackoff, type WsLifecycle, type WsStatus } from "./ws-lifecycle.js";
+import type { BrokerSendArgs, BrokerSendResult } from "./broker.js";
+
+export type SessionBrokerStatus = WsStatus;
+
+/** Ack-tracking shape, mirrors DaemonBrokerClient.PendingAck. Kept
+ *  internal — callers see only the resolved BrokerSendResult. */
+interface PendingAck {
+  resolve: (r: BrokerSendResult) => void;
+  timer: NodeJS.Timeout;
+}
+
+const SEND_ACK_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
+
+/** Heuristic: which broker-reported send errors are permanent enough
+ *  that the drain worker should give up rather than retry. Mirrors the
+ *  daemon-WS classifier so behavior is identical regardless of which
+ *  socket the row went out on. */
+function classifyPermanent(error: string): boolean {
+  return /unknown|invalid|forbidden|not_authorized|target_not_found/i.test(error);
+}
+
+export interface ParentAttestation {
+  sessionPubkey: string;
+  parentMemberPubkey: string;
+  /** Unix ms. Broker rejects > now+24h or already past. */
+  expiresAt: number;
+  signature: string;
+}
+
+export interface SessionBrokerOptions {
+  mesh: JoinedMesh;
+  /** Per-launch ephemeral keypair. */
+  sessionPubkey: string;
+  sessionSecretKey: string;
+  /** Parent-vouched attestation, signed by mesh.secretKey at launch time. */
+  parentAttestation: ParentAttestation;
+  /** Stable session_id from the launch (used for dedup on the broker). */
+  sessionId: string;
+  /** Display name override for this session. */
+  displayName?: string;
+  /** Initial groups. Format mirrors the regular hello. */
+  groups?: Array<{ name: string; role?: string }>;
+  /** Role tag (informational, not auth-bearing). */
+  role?: string;
+  /** Working directory (informational, surfaced in peer list). */
+  cwd?: string;
+  /** Pid of the launched session (NOT the daemon). */
+  pid: number;
+  onStatusChange?: (s: SessionBrokerStatus) => void;
+  /**
+   * Inbound push/inbound dispatch. The broker fans messages targeted at
+   * a session pubkey out over the corresponding session WS — without
+   * this callback they hit the floor and the daemon's inbox.db never
+   * sees them. Wired in run.ts to a handleBrokerPush call that decrypts
+   * with this session's secret key (member key as fallback).
+   */
+  onPush?: (msg: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
+  log?: (level: "info" | "warn" | "error", msg: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
+}
+
+export class SessionBrokerClient {
+  private lifecycle: WsLifecycle | null = null;
+  private _status: SessionBrokerStatus = "closed";
+  private closed = false;
+  /** Set when the broker rejects session_hello with `unknown_message_type` —
+   *  older brokers without the 1.30.0 surface. We stop retrying. */
+  private brokerUnsupported = false;
+  /** 1.34.0: outbound send tracking. Keyed by client_message_id. The
+   *  drain worker registers an entry on dispatch; the WS message
+   *  handler resolves it on broker `ack`. Times out after 15s. */
+  private pendingAcks = new Map<string, PendingAck>();
+  /** 1.34.0: dispatchers queued while the WS is reconnecting — flushed
+   *  in onStatusChange when status flips to `open`. Mirrors the
+   *  daemon-WS `opens` array. */
+  private opens: Array<() => void> = [];
+
+  constructor(private opts: SessionBrokerOptions) {}
+
+  get status(): SessionBrokerStatus { return this._status; }
+  get meshSlug(): string { return this.opts.mesh.slug; }
+  get sessionPubkey(): string { return this.opts.sessionPubkey; }
+
+  private log = (level: "info" | "warn" | "error", msg: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) => {
+    (this.opts.log ?? defaultLog)(level, msg, {
+      mesh: this.opts.mesh.slug,
+      session_pubkey: this.opts.sessionPubkey.slice(0, 12),
+      ...meta,
+    });
+  };
+
+  /** Open the WS, run session_hello, resolve once the broker accepts. */
+  async connect(): Promise<void> {
+    if (this.closed) throw new Error("client_closed");
+    if (this._status === "connecting" || this._status === "open") return;
+
+    this.lifecycle = await connectWsWithBackoff({
+      url: this.opts.mesh.brokerUrl,
+      buildHello: async () => {
+        const { timestamp, signature } = await signSessionHello({
+          meshId: this.opts.mesh.meshId,
+          parentMemberPubkey: this.opts.mesh.pubkey,
+          sessionPubkey: this.opts.sessionPubkey,
+          sessionSecretKey: this.opts.sessionSecretKey,
+        });
+        return {
+          type: "session_hello",
+          meshId: this.opts.mesh.meshId,
+          parentMemberId: this.opts.mesh.memberId,
+          parentMemberPubkey: this.opts.mesh.pubkey,
+          sessionPubkey: this.opts.sessionPubkey,
+          parentAttestation: this.opts.parentAttestation,
+          displayName: this.opts.displayName,
+          sessionId: this.opts.sessionId,
+          pid: this.opts.pid,
+          cwd: this.opts.cwd ?? process.cwd(),
+          hostname: osHostname(),
+          peerType: "ai" as const,
+          channel: "claudemesh-session",
+          ...(this.opts.groups && this.opts.groups.length > 0 ? { groups: this.opts.groups } : {}),
+          ...(this.opts.role ? { role: this.opts.role } : {}),
+          timestamp,
+          signature,
+        };
+      },
+      isHelloAck: (msg) => msg.type === "hello_ack",
+      onMessage: (msg) => {
+        if (msg.type === "error") {
+          // Older brokers respond with `unknown_message_type` to session_hello;
+          // surface that so the daemon can decide to skip per-session presence
+          // rather than churn through reconnects. Setting `closed` halts the
+          // helper's reconnect loop on the next close.
+          this.log("warn", "broker_error", { code: msg.code, message: msg.message });
+          if (msg.code === "unknown_message_type") {
+            this.brokerUnsupported = true;
+            this.closed = true;
+            void this.lifecycle?.close();
+          }
+          return;
+        }
+
+        // 1.34.0: outbox `send` ack arriving on the session-WS. Resolves
+        // the Promise the drain worker is awaiting. Mirrors the
+        // daemon-WS handler exactly.
+        if (msg.type === "ack") {
+          const id = String(msg.id ?? "");
+          const ack = this.pendingAcks.get(id);
+          if (ack) {
+            this.pendingAcks.delete(id);
+            clearTimeout(ack.timer);
+            if (typeof msg.error === "string" && msg.error.length > 0) {
+              ack.resolve({ ok: false, error: msg.error, permanent: classifyPermanent(msg.error) });
+            } else {
+              ack.resolve({ ok: true, messageId: String(msg.messageId ?? id) });
+            }
+          }
+          return;
+        }
+
+        // 1.32.1 — DMs targeted at the launched session's pubkey arrive
+        // here, NOT on the daemon's member-keyed WS. Forward to the
+        // daemon-level push handler so they land in inbox.db.
+        if (msg.type === "push" || msg.type === "inbound") {
+          // 1.34.9: skip system events on the session-WS — the daemon-WS
+          // already receives the same broker broadcast and publishes it
+          // to the bus, so forwarding here just produces duplicate
+          // `[system] Peer "X" joined the mesh` channel pushes (one per
+          // connection: 1 member-WS + 1 session-WS = 2 messages, +
+          // another set per sibling session). Caught in the 2026-05-04
+          // peer-rejoin smoke.
+          if ((msg as Record<string, unknown>).subtype === "system") return;
+          // 1.34.8: drop self-echoes. Some broker fan-out paths mirror an
+          // outbound DM back to the originating session-WS; without this
+          // guard the sender's own message lands in inbox.db, publishes a
+          // `message` bus event, and Claude Code surfaces it as
+          // `← claudemesh: <self>: <text>` immediately after the user
+          // typed `claudemesh send`. Caught in the 2026-05-04 two-session
+          // smoke. Match on session pubkey only — sibling sessions of the
+          // same member share `senderMemberPubkey`, so a member-level
+          // filter would wrongly drop legit sibling DMs.
+          const senderPubkey = String((msg as Record<string, unknown>).senderPubkey ?? "").toLowerCase();
+          if (senderPubkey && senderPubkey === this.opts.sessionPubkey.toLowerCase()) {
+            this.log("info", "self_echo_dropped", { sender: senderPubkey.slice(0, 12) });
+            return;
+          }
+          this.opts.onPush?.(msg);
+          return;
+        }
+      },
+      onStatusChange: (s) => {
+        this._status = s;
+        this.opts.onStatusChange?.(s);
+        if (s === "open") {
+          // 1.34.0: flush queued send dispatchers so any outbox row that
+          // tried to dispatch while we were reconnecting goes out now.
+          const queued = this.opens.slice();
+          this.opens.length = 0;
+          for (const fn of queued) {
+            try { fn(); } catch (e) { this.log("warn", "session_open_handler_failed", { err: String(e) }); }
+          }
+        } else if (s === "closed" || s === "reconnecting") {
+          // Fail any in-flight acks so the drain worker can retry/backoff
+          // instead of hanging on a dead promise. The daemon-WS does the
+          // same thing via onBeforeReconnect; we centralize it here
+          // because session-broker uses status transitions directly.
+          this.failPendingAcks(`session_ws_${s}`);
+        }
+      },
+      log: (level, msg, meta) => this.log(level, `session_broker_${msg}`, meta),
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** v2 agentic-comms (M1): send `client_ack` back to the broker after
+   *  successfully landing an inbound push in inbox.db. Broker uses the
+   *  ack to set `delivered_at`. Best-effort. */
+  sendClientAck(clientMessageId: string, brokerMessageId: string | null): void {
+    if (this._status !== "open" || !this.lifecycle) return;
+    try {
+      this.lifecycle.send({
+        type: "client_ack",
+        clientMessageId,
+        ...(brokerMessageId ? { brokerMessageId } : {}),
+      });
+    } catch { /* drop; lease re-delivers */ }
+  }
+
+  /** True when underlying socket is OPEN-ready for direct sends. */
+  isOpen(): boolean {
+    const sock = this.lifecycle?.ws;
+    return !!sock && sock.readyState === sock.OPEN;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * 1.34.0 — Send one outbox row over the session-WS. Same wire format
+   * as DaemonBrokerClient.send, but routed via this connection so the
+   * broker's fan-out attributes the push to the session pubkey.
+   *
+   * Used by the drain worker for rows whose `sender_session_pubkey`
+   * matches this client's session pubkey. When the WS is reconnecting
+   * the dispatcher is queued via `opens` and flushed on the next
+   * status flip.
+   */
+  send(req: BrokerSendArgs): Promise<BrokerSendResult> {
+    return new Promise<BrokerSendResult>((resolve) => {
+      const dispatch = () => {
+        if (!this.isOpen() || !this.lifecycle) {
+          resolve({ ok: false, error: "session_ws_not_open", permanent: false });
+          return;
+        }
+        const id = req.client_message_id;
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+          if (this.pendingAcks.delete(id)) {
+            resolve({ ok: false, error: "ack_timeout", permanent: false });
+          }
+        }, SEND_ACK_TIMEOUT_MS);
+        this.pendingAcks.set(id, { resolve, timer });
+        try {
+          this.lifecycle.send({
+            type: "send",
+            id,
+            client_message_id: id,
+            request_fingerprint: req.request_fingerprint_hex,
+            targetSpec: req.targetSpec,
+            priority: req.priority,
+            nonce: req.nonce,
+            ciphertext: req.ciphertext,
+          });
+        } catch (e) {
+          this.pendingAcks.delete(id);
+          clearTimeout(timer);
+          resolve({ ok: false, error: `ws_write_failed: ${String(e)}`, permanent: false });
+        }
+      };
+
+      if (this._status === "open") dispatch();
+      else this.opens.push(dispatch);
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** Resolve every in-flight ack with a synthetic failure. Called on
+   *  WS close so the drain worker stops waiting and either retries or
+   *  reroutes via the daemon-WS. */
+  private failPendingAcks(reason: string): void {
+    if (this.pendingAcks.size === 0) return;
+    const entries = [...this.pendingAcks.entries()];
+    this.pendingAcks.clear();
+    for (const [, ack] of entries) {
+      clearTimeout(ack.timer);
+      ack.resolve({ ok: false, error: reason, permanent: false });
+    }
+  }
+
+  async close(): Promise<void> {
+    this.closed = true;
+    if (this.lifecycle) {
+      try { await this.lifecycle.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+      this.lifecycle = null;
+    }
+    this._status = "closed";
+  }
+
+  /** True when the broker rejected our session_hello as unknown — caller
+   *  may want to skip per-session presence entirely on this mesh. */
+  get isBrokerUnsupported(): boolean { return this.brokerUnsupported; }
+}
+
+function defaultLog(level: "info" | "warn" | "error", msg: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) {
+  const line = JSON.stringify({ level, msg, ...meta, ts: new Date().toISOString() });
+  if (level === "info") process.stdout.write(line + "\n");
+  else process.stderr.write(line + "\n");
+}

apps/cli/src/daemon/session-registry.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/**
+ * In-memory per-token session registry kept by the daemon.
+ *
+ * `claudemesh launch` POSTs `/v1/sessions/register` with the token it
+ * minted plus session metadata (sessionId, mesh, displayName, pid,
+ * cwd, role, groups). Subsequent CLI invocations from inside that
+ * session present the token via `Authorization: ClaudeMesh-Session
+ * <hex>` and the daemon's IPC auth middleware resolves it here in O(1).
+ *
+ * Lifecycle:
+ *   - register replaces any prior entry under the same `sessionId`
+ *     (handles re-launch and `--resume` flows cleanly).
+ *   - reaper polls every 5 s. An entry is dropped when its pid is dead
+ *     OR when its captured start-time no longer matches the running
+ *     process (PID reuse — original is gone, OS recycled the number).
+ *   - hard ttl ceiling of 24 h is a leak guard for forgotten sessions.
+ *
+ * Persistence: in-memory only for v1. A daemon restart clears the
+ * registry — every launched session needs to re-register. That's fine
+ * for now because launch.ts re-registers on `ensureDaemonRunning`'s
+ * success path, and most ad-hoc CLI invocations from outside a launched
+ * session have no token to begin with.
+ */
+
+import { getProcessStartTime, getProcessStartTimes, isPidAlive } from "./process-info.js";
+
+/**
+ * Optional per-launch presence material. Carried opaquely through the
+ * registry; the daemon's session-broker subsystem (1.30.0+) reads it to
+ * open a long-lived broker WebSocket per session. Absent on older CLIs
+ * — register accepts payloads without it for backward compat.
+ */
+export interface SessionPresence {
+  /** Hex ed25519 pubkey, 64 chars. */
+  sessionPubkey: string;
+  /** Hex ed25519 secret key (held in-memory only; never disk). */
+  sessionSecretKey: string;
+  /** Parent-member-signed attestation; see signParentAttestation. */
+  parentAttestation: {
+    sessionPubkey: string;
+    parentMemberPubkey: string;
+    expiresAt: number;
+    signature: string;
+  };
+}
+
+export interface SessionInfo {
+  token: string;
+  sessionId: string;
+  mesh: string;
+  displayName: string;
+  pid: number;
+  cwd?: string;
+  role?: string;
+  groups?: string[];
+  /** 1.30.0+: per-launch presence material. */
+  presence?: SessionPresence;
+  /**
+   * 1.31.0+: opaque per-process start-time captured at register. The
+   * reaper compares the live value against this on every sweep — a
+   * mismatch means the original process exited and the pid was reused
+   * by an unrelated program, so the registry entry must be dropped.
+   * `undefined` when capture failed (process already dead at register
+   * time, ps unavailable, etc.) — the reaper falls back to bare
+   * liveness in that case.
+   */
+  startTime?: string;
+  registeredAt: number;
+}
+
+/** Lifecycle callbacks invoked synchronously after registry mutation. */
+export interface RegistryHooks {
+  onRegister?: (info: SessionInfo) => void;
+  onDeregister?: (info: SessionInfo) => void;
+}
+
+const TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+const REAPER_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 1000;
+
+const byToken = new Map<string, SessionInfo>();
+const bySessionId = new Map<string, string>();
+const hooks: RegistryHooks = {};
+
+let reaperHandle: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
+
+export function startReaper(): void {
+  if (reaperHandle) return;
+  // The sweep is async (batched ps) — wrap in `void` so setInterval
+  // doesn't try to await us, and so an unexpected throw doesn't crash
+  // the daemon. Errors are swallowed inside reapDead.
+  reaperHandle = setInterval(() => { void reapDead(); }, REAPER_INTERVAL_MS).unref?.() ?? reaperHandle;
+}
+
+export function stopReaper(): void {
+  if (reaperHandle) { clearInterval(reaperHandle); reaperHandle = null; }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Wire daemon-level lifecycle hooks. Called once at daemon boot — passing
+ * `{}` clears them. Idempotent across calls so tests can re-bind.
+ */
+export function setRegistryHooks(next: RegistryHooks): void {
+  hooks.onRegister = next.onRegister;
+  hooks.onDeregister = next.onDeregister;
+}
+
+export function registerSession(info: Omit<SessionInfo, "registeredAt">): SessionInfo {
+  // Replace any prior entry under the same sessionId.
+  const priorToken = bySessionId.get(info.sessionId);
+  if (priorToken && priorToken !== info.token) {
+    const prior = byToken.get(priorToken);
+    if (prior) {
+      byToken.delete(priorToken);
+      try { hooks.onDeregister?.(prior); } catch { /* hook errors must never throttle the registry */ }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Caller may pre-fill info.startTime (tests do this for determinism).
+  // For the real path we fire-and-forget an async ps probe — register
+  // stays sync and microsecond-fast, and the start-time lands on the
+  // entry within a few ms. Until it lands, the reaper falls back to
+  // bare liveness for this entry, which is fine for the common case
+  // (PID reuse is rare; the brief window without the guard is
+  // tolerable).
+  const stored: SessionInfo = { ...info, registeredAt: Date.now() };
+  byToken.set(info.token, stored);
+  bySessionId.set(info.sessionId, info.token);
+  try { hooks.onRegister?.(stored); } catch { /* see above */ }
+  if (stored.startTime === undefined) {
+    void captureStartTimeAsync(info.token, info.pid);
+  }
+  return stored;
+}
+
+async function captureStartTimeAsync(token: string, pid: number): Promise<void> {
+  const lstart = await getProcessStartTime(pid);
+  if (lstart === null) return;
+  const entry = byToken.get(token);
+  if (!entry || entry.pid !== pid) return; // entry was replaced; skip
+  entry.startTime = lstart;
+}
+
+export function deregisterByToken(token: string): boolean {
+  const entry = byToken.get(token);
+  if (!entry) return false;
+  byToken.delete(token);
+  if (bySessionId.get(entry.sessionId) === token) bySessionId.delete(entry.sessionId);
+  try { hooks.onDeregister?.(entry); } catch { /* see above */ }
+  return true;
+}
+
+export function resolveToken(token: string): SessionInfo | null {
+  const entry = byToken.get(token);
+  if (!entry) return null;
+  if (Date.now() - entry.registeredAt > TTL_MS) {
+    deregisterByToken(token);
+    return null;
+  }
+  return entry;
+}
+
+export function listSessions(): SessionInfo[] {
+  return [...byToken.values()];
+}
+
+async function reapDead(): Promise<void> {
+  // Snapshot first; the second (async) phase calls ps and we must not
+  // mutate the registry mid-iteration.
+  const entries = [...byToken.entries()];
+
+  // Phase 1 — TTL + bare liveness. Sync, microsecond-fast.
+  const dead: string[] = [];
+  const survivors: Array<[string, SessionInfo]> = [];
+  for (const [token, info] of entries) {
+    if (Date.now() - info.registeredAt > TTL_MS) { dead.push(token); continue; }
+    if (!isPidAlive(info.pid)) { dead.push(token); continue; }
+    survivors.push([token, info]);
+  }
+
+  // Phase 2 — PID-reuse guard for survivors that have a captured
+  // start-time. Single batched ps call: O(1) forks regardless of
+  // session count. Survivors without a start-time keep the bare-
+  // liveness verdict from phase 1 (their captureStartTimeAsync may
+  // still be in-flight from a recent register).
+  const guardedPids = survivors
+    .filter(([, info]) => info.startTime !== undefined)
+    .map(([, info]) => info.pid);
+  if (guardedPids.length > 0) {
+    try {
+      const live = await getProcessStartTimes(guardedPids);
+      for (const [token, info] of survivors) {
+        if (info.startTime === undefined) continue;
+        const lstart = live.get(info.pid);
+        // ps may transiently miss a pid that was alive when isPidAlive
+        // ran — treat absence as "racing", let the next sweep decide.
+        if (lstart === undefined) continue;
+        if (lstart !== info.startTime) dead.push(token);
+      }
+    } catch {
+      // ps failure here is non-fatal: survivors keep their phase-1
+      // verdict. Logging is the daemon's responsibility — the
+      // registry deliberately stays log-free.
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (const t of dead) deregisterByToken(t);
+}
+
+/** Test helper: run a single reaper pass. */
+export async function _runReaperOnce(): Promise<void> {
+  await reapDead();
+}
+
+/** Test helper. */
+export function _resetRegistry(): void {
+  byToken.clear();
+  bySessionId.clear();
+  hooks.onRegister = undefined;
+  hooks.onDeregister = undefined;
+}

apps/cli/src/daemon/ws-lifecycle.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+/**
+ * Shared WS lifecycle helper for the daemon's two broker clients.
+ *
+ * Both `DaemonBrokerClient` (member-keyed, one per joined mesh) and
+ * `SessionBrokerClient` (session-keyed, one per launched session) used
+ * to inline the same connect/hello/ack-timeout/close-reconnect logic.
+ * They drifted apart subtly — different ack-timeout names, different
+ * reconnect log messages, slightly different status flips — and that's
+ * how 1.32.x bugs shipped (push handler attached to the wrong client,
+ * etc).
+ *
+ * This helper owns ONLY the lifecycle:
+ *   - new WebSocket(url), wire up open/message/close/error
+ *   - on open → call buildHello() and send the result
+ *   - start an ack-timeout timer; if it fires before the hello ack
+ *     arrives, close the socket and reject the connect promise
+ *   - on message, gate on isHelloAck(); when true, flip status to
+ *     "open", clear the ack timer, resolve. All other messages are
+ *     forwarded to onMessage()
+ *   - on close, schedule a backoff reconnect (unless explicitly closed)
+ *
+ * Each client keeps its own concerns: DaemonBrokerClient still owns
+ * pendingAcks / peerListResolvers / etc; SessionBrokerClient still owns
+ * its onPush callback. The helper just hands them an open WS and a
+ * stable status field, and reconnects under their feet on disconnect.
+ *
+ * Composition over inheritance — callers receive a `WsLifecycle` handle
+ * with `send` / `close` / `status`, NOT a subclass.
+ */
+
+import WebSocket from "ws";
+
+export type WsStatus = "connecting" | "open" | "closed" | "reconnecting";
+
+export type WsLogLevel = "info" | "warn" | "error";
+export type WsLog = (level: WsLogLevel, msg: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
+
+export interface WsLifecycleOptions {
+  /** Broker URL (e.g. wss://ic.claudemesh.com/ws). */
+  url: string;
+  /**
+   * Build the hello frame to send right after the WS opens. Async because
+   * signing the hello may need libsodium initialization. Whatever this
+   * returns is JSON.stringified and sent verbatim — the helper does NOT
+   * inspect or modify it.
+   */
+  buildHello: () => Promise<unknown>;
+  /**
+   * Returns true iff `msg` is the hello ack the helper should treat as
+   * "broker accepted us; flip status to open". Both daemon-WS and
+   * session-WS use `{ type: "hello_ack" }` today, but keeping this a
+   * predicate lets either client narrow further (e.g. on a `code` field)
+   * without leaking client-specific shape into the helper.
+   */
+  isHelloAck: (msg: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean;
+  /**
+   * Called for every parsed message that is NOT the hello ack. The
+   * helper does NOT decide which messages are pushes vs RPCs vs errors;
+   * that's the caller's concern.
+   */
+  onMessage: (msg: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
+  onStatusChange?: (s: WsStatus) => void;
+  /**
+   * How long to wait for the broker's hello ack before giving up and
+   * forcing a close. Defaults 5s — same as both pre-refactor clients.
+   */
+  helloAckTimeoutMs?: number;
+  /**
+   * Reconnect backoff schedule. Defaults [1s, 2s, 4s, 8s, 16s, 30s] —
+   * matches both pre-refactor clients exactly.
+   */
+  backoffCapsMs?: readonly number[];
+  log?: WsLog;
+  /**
+   * Hook for the close path BEFORE the helper schedules a reconnect.
+   * Used by DaemonBrokerClient to fail its in-flight pendingAcks map
+   * with a "broker_disconnected_<code>" reason. The helper passes the
+   * raw close code so the caller can shape its rejection text.
+   *
+   * Returns nothing — close handling continues regardless.
+   */
+  onBeforeReconnect?: (code: number, reason: string) => void;
+}
+
+export interface WsLifecycle {
+  /** Current connection status. Updated synchronously before onStatusChange fires. */
+  readonly status: WsStatus;
+  /** Underlying socket. Exposed for callers that need OPEN-state checks
+   *  before sending (mirrors the pre-refactor `this.ws.readyState` checks). */
+  readonly ws: WebSocket | null;
+  /** Send a JSON payload over the open WS. Throws if not open — callers
+   *  that need queue-while-disconnected semantics should layer that
+   *  themselves (DaemonBrokerClient does, via its `opens` deferred-fn array). */
+  send(payload: unknown): void;
+  /** Close the WS and stop reconnecting. Idempotent. */
+  close(): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+const DEFAULT_HELLO_ACK_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
+const DEFAULT_BACKOFF_CAPS_MS: readonly number[] = [1_000, 2_000, 4_000, 8_000, 16_000, 30_000];
+
+const defaultLog: WsLog = (level, msg, meta) => {
+  const line = JSON.stringify({ level, msg, ...meta, ts: new Date().toISOString() });
+  if (level === "info") process.stdout.write(line + "\n");
+  else process.stderr.write(line + "\n");
+};
+
+/**
+ * Connect a WebSocket with hello-handshake, ack-timeout, and reconnect
+ * with exponential backoff. Resolves once the broker accepts the hello;
+ * rejects if the first connect closes before the ack lands.
+ *
+ * Subsequent automatic reconnects are silent — they fire on the close
+ * handler's backoff timer and surface only via onStatusChange (and any
+ * caller-installed log).
+ */
+export function connectWsWithBackoff(opts: WsLifecycleOptions): Promise<WsLifecycle> {
+  const helloAckTimeoutMs = opts.helloAckTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_HELLO_ACK_TIMEOUT_MS;
+  const backoffCapsMs = opts.backoffCapsMs ?? DEFAULT_BACKOFF_CAPS_MS;
+  const log: WsLog = opts.log ?? defaultLog;
+
+  let ws: WebSocket | null = null;
+  let status: WsStatus = "closed";
+  let closed = false;
+  let reconnectAttempt = 0;
+  let reconnectTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
+  let helloTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
+
+  const setStatus = (s: WsStatus) => {
+    if (status === s) return;
+    status = s;
+    opts.onStatusChange?.(s);
+  };
+
+  /**
+   * Open one WS attempt. Returns a promise that resolves on hello ack
+   * or rejects if the socket closes before we get one. Used by both the
+   * initial connect and the close-handler backoff timer (which awaits
+   * but ignores the rejection — by then the close handler has already
+   * scheduled its own reconnect).
+   */
+  // Liveness watchdog: same cadence (30s) as the broker's outbound
+  // ping. Two jobs per tick:
+  //   1. If we haven't heard from the broker in >75s (2.5x the ping
+  //      cadence — covers one missed ping plus some slack), terminate
+  //      the socket. Fires the close handler → backoff reconnect runs
+  //      its normal path. This is what catches NAT-dropped half-dead
+  //      connections that the kernel won't RST for ~2 hours.
+  //   2. Otherwise, send our own ping. The broker's `ws` library
+  //      auto-replies with a pong, which bumps lastActivity. This
+  //      keeps the broker's stale-pong watchdog seeing us as alive.
+  //
+  // Bare `ping` and `pong` events both bump lastActivity, as does
+  // any inbound application message — any sign of life resets the
+  // dead-man's-switch.
+  const PING_INTERVAL_MS = 30_000;
+  const STALE_THRESHOLD_MS = 75_000;
+  let lastActivity = Date.now();
+  let watchdogTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
+
+  const openOnce = (): Promise<void> => {
+    if (closed) return Promise.reject(new Error("client_closed"));
+    setStatus("connecting");
+
+    log("info", "ws_open_attempt", { url: opts.url });
+    const sock = new WebSocket(opts.url);
+    ws = sock;
+    lastActivity = Date.now();
+
+    return new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
+      sock.on("open", () => {
+        log("info", "ws_open_ok", { url: opts.url });
+        // Build and send the hello inside a microtask so any sync
+        // throws from buildHello() reject this connect attempt cleanly.
+        (async () => {
+          try {
+            const hello = await opts.buildHello();
+            sock.send(JSON.stringify(hello));
+            log("info", "ws_hello_sent", { url: opts.url });
+            helloTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+              log("warn", "hello_ack_timeout", { url: opts.url });
+              try { sock.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+              reject(new Error("hello_ack_timeout"));
+            }, helloAckTimeoutMs);
+          } catch (e) {
+            log("warn", "ws_build_hello_threw", { err: String(e) });
+            reject(e instanceof Error ? e : new Error(String(e)));
+          }
+        })();
+      });
+
+      sock.on("message", (raw) => {
+        lastActivity = Date.now();
+        let msg: Record<string, unknown>;
+        try { msg = JSON.parse(raw.toString()) as Record<string, unknown>; }
+        catch { return; }
+
+        if (opts.isHelloAck(msg)) {
+          if (helloTimer) { clearTimeout(helloTimer); helloTimer = null; }
+          setStatus("open");
+          reconnectAttempt = 0;
+          log("info", "ws_hello_acked", { url: opts.url });
+          // Start liveness watchdog only after a successful handshake.
+          if (watchdogTimer) clearInterval(watchdogTimer);
+          watchdogTimer = setInterval(() => {
+            if (sock.readyState !== sock.OPEN) return;
+            const idle = Date.now() - lastActivity;
+            if (idle > STALE_THRESHOLD_MS) {
+              log("warn", "ws_stale_terminate", { url: opts.url, idle_ms: idle });
+              try { sock.terminate(); } catch { /* socket already gone */ }
+              return;
+            }
+            try { sock.ping(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+          }, PING_INTERVAL_MS);
+          resolve();
+          return;
+        }
+
+        opts.onMessage(msg);
+      });
+
+      sock.on("ping", () => { lastActivity = Date.now(); });
+      sock.on("pong", () => { lastActivity = Date.now(); });
+
+      sock.on("close", (code, reason) => {
+        if (helloTimer) { clearTimeout(helloTimer); helloTimer = null; }
+        if (watchdogTimer) { clearInterval(watchdogTimer); watchdogTimer = null; }
+        const reasonStr = reason.toString("utf8");
+        log("warn", "ws_closed", { url: opts.url, code, reason: reasonStr, status });
+        opts.onBeforeReconnect?.(code, reasonStr);
+
+        if (closed) {
+          setStatus("closed");
+          return;
+        }
+        setStatus("reconnecting");
+        const wait = backoffCapsMs[Math.min(reconnectAttempt, backoffCapsMs.length - 1)] ?? 30_000;
+        reconnectAttempt++;
+        log("info", "ws_reconnect_scheduled", { url: opts.url, wait_ms: wait, code, reason: reasonStr });
+        reconnectTimer = setTimeout(
+          () => openOnce().catch((err) => log("warn", "ws_reconnect_failed", { url: opts.url, err: String(err) })),
+          wait,
+        );
+        if (status === "connecting" || status === "reconnecting") {
+          reject(new Error(`closed_before_hello_${code}`));
+        }
+      });
+
+      sock.on("error", (err) => log("warn", "ws_error", { url: opts.url, err: err.message }));
+    });
+  };
+
+  return openOnce().then(() => {
+    const handle: WsLifecycle = {
+      get status() { return status; },
+      get ws() { return ws; },
+      send(payload: unknown) {
+        if (!ws || ws.readyState !== ws.OPEN) {
+          throw new Error("ws_not_open");
+        }
+        ws.send(JSON.stringify(payload));
+      },
+      async close() {
+        closed = true;
+        if (reconnectTimer) { clearTimeout(reconnectTimer); reconnectTimer = null; }
+        if (helloTimer) { clearTimeout(helloTimer); helloTimer = null; }
+        if (watchdogTimer) { clearInterval(watchdogTimer); watchdogTimer = null; }
+        try { ws?.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
+        setStatus("closed");
+      },
+    };
+    return handle;
+  });
+}

apps/cli/src/entrypoints/cli.ts

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import { renderVersion } from "~/cli/output/version.js";
 import { isInviteUrl, normaliseInviteUrl } from "~/utils/url.js";
 import { classifyInvocation } from "~/cli/policy-classify.js";
 import { gate, type ApprovalMode } from "~/services/policy/index.js";
+import { setDaemonPolicy, policyFromFlags } from "~/services/daemon/policy.js";
 import { bold, clay, cyan, dim, orange } from "~/ui/styles.js";
 
 installSignalHandlers();
@@ -16,6 +17,11 @@ installErrorHandlers();
 
 const { command, positionals, flags } = parseArgv(process.argv);
 
+// Resolve daemon policy once at boot — daemon-routing helpers read this
+// instead of inspecting flags themselves. --no-daemon and --strict are
+// mutually exclusive (--no-daemon wins if both are passed).
+setDaemonPolicy(policyFromFlags(flags));
+
 /**
  * Resolve the coarse approval mode from CLI flags + env.
  *   --approval-mode <plan|read-only|write|yolo>     explicit
@@ -67,7 +73,7 @@ USAGE
   claudemesh <invite-url>                     join a mesh, then launch
   claudemesh launch --name <n> --join <url>   join + launch in one step
 
-Mesh
+Mesh  (alias: "workspace" — claudemesh workspace <verb> mirrors each)
   claudemesh create <name>         create a new mesh
   claudemesh join <url>            join a mesh (accepts short /i/ or long /join/ link)
   claudemesh launch [slug]         launch Claude Code on a mesh (alias: connect)
@@ -87,7 +93,19 @@ Peer (resource form, recommended)
 
 Message  (resource form)
   claudemesh message send <to> <m> send a message            (alias: send)
-  claudemesh message inbox         drain pending              (alias: inbox)
+                                   flags: [--priority now|next|low] [--mesh <slug>]
+                                          [--self] (allow targeting your own member/session pubkey;
+                                          fans out to every sibling session of your member)
+                                          [--json] (machine-readable result)
+  claudemesh message inbox         read persisted inbox       (alias: inbox)
+                                   flags: [--mesh <slug>] [--limit N] [--unread] [--json]
+                                   reads ~/.claudemesh/daemon/inbox.db via daemon
+                                   --unread → only rows never surfaced before (seen_at IS NULL);
+                                   listing stamps returned rows seen as a side effect
+  claudemesh inbox flush           bulk-delete inbox rows
+                                   flags: [--mesh <slug>] [--before <iso-timestamp>] [--all]
+                                   --all required when neither --mesh nor --before is set
+  claudemesh inbox delete <id>     delete one inbox row by id (alias: rm)
   claudemesh message status <id>   delivery status            (alias: msg-status)
 
 Memory  (resource form)
@@ -156,9 +174,9 @@ Platform
   claudemesh stream create|publish|list                pub/sub event bus
   claudemesh sql query|execute|schema                  per-mesh SQL
   claudemesh skill list|get|remove                     mesh-published skills
-  claudemesh vault list|delete                         encrypted secrets
+  claudemesh vault set|list|delete                     encrypted secrets (set: --type env|file --mount /p)
-  claudemesh watch list|remove                         URL change watchers
+  claudemesh watch add|list|remove                     URL change watchers (add: --label --interval --extract)
-  claudemesh webhook list|delete                       outbound HTTP triggers
+  claudemesh webhook create|list|delete                outbound HTTP triggers
   claudemesh file share <path> [--to peer]             upload (or local-host fast path if --to matches)
   claudemesh file get <id> [--out path]                download by id
   claudemesh file list|status|delete                   shared mesh files
@@ -180,6 +198,19 @@ Security
   claudemesh backup [file]         encrypt config → portable recovery file
   claudemesh restore <file>        restore config from a backup file
 
+Daemon  (long-lived peer mesh runtime — universal across every joined mesh)
+  claudemesh daemon up             start daemon (alias: start) [--no-tcp]
+  claudemesh daemon status         show running pid + IPC health [--json]
+  claudemesh daemon down           stop daemon (alias: stop)
+  claudemesh daemon version        ipc + schema version of running daemon
+  claudemesh daemon outbox list    list local outbox rows [--failed|--pending|--inflight|--done]
+  claudemesh daemon outbox requeue <id>   re-enqueue an aborted/dead row [--new-client-id <id>]
+  claudemesh daemon accept-host    pin current host fingerprint
+  claudemesh daemon install-service        write launchd / systemd-user unit
+  claudemesh daemon uninstall-service      remove the unit
+  Note: the daemon attaches to every mesh in ~/.claudemesh/config.json
+  automatically; --mesh on up / install-service is deprecated and ignored.
+
 Setup
   claudemesh install               register MCP server + hooks
   claudemesh uninstall             remove MCP server + hooks
@@ -199,6 +230,8 @@ Flags
   --policy <path>                  override policy file
   -y, --yes                        skip confirmations (= --approval-mode yolo)
   -q, --quiet                      suppress non-essential output
+  --strict                         require daemon for broker-touching verbs (no cold-path fallback)
+  --no-daemon                      skip daemon entirely; open broker WS directly (CI / sandboxed scripts)
 `;
 
 /**
@@ -272,6 +305,12 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
         join: normaliseInviteUrl(command),
         yes: !!flags.y || !!flags.yes,
         resume: flags.resume as string | undefined,
+        role: flags.role as string | undefined,
+        groups: flags.groups as string | undefined,
+        "message-mode": flags["message-mode"] as string | undefined,
+        "system-prompt": flags["system-prompt"] as string | undefined,
+        continue: !!flags.continue,
+        quiet: !!flags.quiet,
       }, process.argv.slice(2));
       return;
     }
@@ -287,6 +326,12 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
       name: flags.name as string | undefined,
       yes: !!flags.y || !!flags.yes,
       resume: flags.resume as string | undefined,
+      role: flags.role as string | undefined,
+      groups: flags.groups as string | undefined,
+      "message-mode": flags["message-mode"] as string | undefined,
+      "system-prompt": flags["system-prompt"] as string | undefined,
+      continue: !!flags.continue,
+      quiet: !!flags.quiet,
     }, process.argv.slice(2));
     return;
   }
@@ -305,6 +350,12 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
         join: flags.join as string,
         yes: !!flags.y || !!flags.yes,
         resume: flags.resume as string,
+        role: flags.role as string,
+        groups: flags.groups as string,
+        "message-mode": flags["message-mode"] as string,
+        "system-prompt": flags["system-prompt"] as string,
+        continue: !!flags.continue,
+        quiet: !!flags.quiet,
       }, process.argv.slice(2));
       break;
     }
@@ -313,6 +364,37 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
     case "delete": case "rm": { const { deleteMesh } = await import("~/commands/delete-mesh.js"); process.exit(await deleteMesh(positionals[0] ?? "", { yes: !!flags.y || !!flags.yes })); break; }
     case "rename": { const { rename } = await import("~/commands/rename.js"); process.exit(await rename(positionals[0] ?? "", positionals[1] ?? "")); break; }
     case "share": case "invite": { const { invite } = await import("~/commands/invite.js"); process.exit(await invite(positionals[0], { mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: !!flags.json })); break; }
+    // workspace — alias surface for mesh-management verbs (v1.27.0 teaser; full
+    // rename arrives in 1.28.0). Each sub mirrors an existing top-level verb.
+    case "workspace": {
+      const sub = positionals[0];
+      if (!sub || sub === "launch" || sub === "connect" || sub === "open") {
+        const { runLaunch } = await import("~/commands/launch.js");
+        await runLaunch({
+          mesh: positionals[1] ?? flags.mesh as string,
+          name: flags.name as string,
+          join: flags.join as string,
+          yes: !!flags.y || !!flags.yes,
+          resume: flags.resume as string,
+          role: flags.role as string,
+          groups: flags.groups as string,
+          "message-mode": flags["message-mode"] as string,
+          "system-prompt": flags["system-prompt"] as string,
+          continue: !!flags.continue,
+          quiet: !!flags.quiet,
+        }, process.argv.slice(2));
+      }
+      else if (sub === "list" || sub === "ls") { const { runList } = await import("~/commands/list.js"); await runList(); }
+      else if (sub === "info") { const { runInfo } = await import("~/commands/info.js"); await runInfo({}); }
+      else if (sub === "create" || sub === "new") { const { newMesh } = await import("~/commands/new.js"); process.exit(await newMesh(positionals[1] ?? "", { json: !!flags.json })); }
+      else if (sub === "join" || sub === "add") { const { runJoin } = await import("~/commands/join.js"); await runJoin(positionals.slice(1)); }
+      else if (sub === "delete" || sub === "rm") { const { deleteMesh } = await import("~/commands/delete-mesh.js"); process.exit(await deleteMesh(positionals[1] ?? "", { yes: !!flags.y || !!flags.yes })); }
+      else if (sub === "rename") { const { rename } = await import("~/commands/rename.js"); process.exit(await rename(positionals[1] ?? "", positionals[2] ?? "")); }
+      else if (sub === "share" || sub === "invite") { const { invite } = await import("~/commands/invite.js"); process.exit(await invite(positionals[1], { mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: !!flags.json })); }
+      else if (sub === "overview") { const { runMe } = await import("~/commands/me.js"); process.exit(await runMe({ mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: !!flags.json })); }
+      else { console.error("Usage: claudemesh workspace <list|info|create|join|delete|rename|share|launch|overview>"); process.exit(EXIT.INVALID_ARGS); }
+      break;
+    }
     case "disconnect": { const { runDisconnect } = await import("~/commands/kick.js"); process.exit(await runDisconnect(positionals[0], { mesh: flags.mesh as string, stale: flags.stale as string, all: !!flags.all })); break; }
     case "kick": { const { runKick } = await import("~/commands/kick.js"); process.exit(await runKick(positionals[0], { mesh: flags.mesh as string, stale: flags.stale as string, all: !!flags.all })); break; }
     case "ban": { const { runBan } = await import("~/commands/ban.js"); process.exit(await runBan(positionals[0], { mesh: flags.mesh as string })); break; }
@@ -320,9 +402,32 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
     case "bans": { const { runBans } = await import("~/commands/ban.js"); process.exit(await runBans({ mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: !!flags.json })); break; }
 
     // Messaging
-    case "peers": { const { runPeers } = await import("~/commands/peers.js"); await runPeers({ mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: flags.json as boolean | string | undefined }); break; }
+    case "peers": { const { runPeers } = await import("~/commands/peers.js"); await runPeers({ mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: flags.json as boolean | string | undefined, all: !!flags.all }); break; }
     case "send": { const { runSend } = await import("~/commands/send.js"); await runSend({ mesh: flags.mesh as string, priority: flags.priority as string, json: !!flags.json, self: !!flags.self }, positionals[0] ?? "", positionals.slice(1).join(" ")); break; }
-    case "inbox": { const { runInbox } = await import("~/commands/inbox.js"); await runInbox({ json: !!flags.json }); break; }
+    case "inbox": {
+      const sub = positionals[0];
+      if (sub === "flush") {
+        const { runInboxFlush } = await import("~/commands/inbox-actions.js");
+        await runInboxFlush({
+          mesh: flags.mesh as string | undefined,
+          before: flags.before as string | undefined,
+          all: !!flags.all,
+          json: !!flags.json,
+        });
+      } else if (sub === "delete" || sub === "rm") {
+        const { runInboxDelete } = await import("~/commands/inbox-actions.js");
+        await runInboxDelete(positionals[1] ?? "", { json: !!flags.json });
+      } else {
+        const { runInbox } = await import("~/commands/inbox.js");
+        await runInbox({
+          mesh: flags.mesh as string | undefined,
+          json: !!flags.json,
+          limit: typeof flags.limit === "number" ? flags.limit : (typeof flags.limit === "string" ? Number.parseInt(flags.limit, 10) : undefined),
+          unread: !!flags.unread,
+        });
+      }
+      break;
+    }
     case "state": {
       const sub = positionals[0];
       if (sub === "set") { const { runStateSet } = await import("~/commands/state.js"); await runStateSet({}, positionals[1] ?? "", positionals[2] ?? ""); }
@@ -394,6 +499,11 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
         publicHealth: !!flags["public-health"],
         mesh: flags.mesh as string | undefined,
         displayName: flags.name as string | undefined,
+        // 1.34.12: --foreground opts out of the new "detach by default"
+        // behavior. install-service and `claudemesh launch`'s auto-spawn
+        // path always run with --foreground so their parents (launchd /
+        // the launch helper) own lifecycle and stdio redirection.
+        foreground: !!flags.foreground,
         outboxStatus,
         newClientId: flags["new-client-id"] as string | undefined,
       }, rest);
@@ -402,7 +512,7 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
     }
 
     // Setup
-    case "install": { const { runInstall } = await import("~/commands/install.js"); runInstall(positionals); break; }
+    case "install": { const { runInstall } = await import("~/commands/install.js"); await runInstall(positionals); break; }
     case "uninstall": { const { uninstall } = await import("~/commands/uninstall.js"); process.exit(await uninstall()); break; }
     case "doctor": { const { runDoctor } = await import("~/commands/doctor.js"); await runDoctor(); break; }
     case "status": {
@@ -442,7 +552,7 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
 
     case "peer": {
       const sub = positionals[0];
-      const f = { mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: flags.json as boolean | string | undefined };
+      const f = { mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: flags.json as boolean | string | undefined, all: !!flags.all };
       const id = positionals[1] ?? "";
       if (sub === "list") { const { runPeers } = await import("~/commands/peers.js"); await runPeers(f); }
       else if (sub === "kick") { const { runKick } = await import("~/commands/kick.js"); process.exit(await runKick(id, { mesh: flags.mesh as string, stale: flags.stale as string, all: !!flags.all })); }
@@ -457,8 +567,30 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
 
     case "message": {
       const sub = positionals[0];
-      if (sub === "send") { const { runSend } = await import("~/commands/send.js"); await runSend({ mesh: flags.mesh as string, priority: flags.priority as string, json: !!flags.json }, positionals[1] ?? "", positionals.slice(2).join(" ")); }
+      if (sub === "send") { const { runSend } = await import("~/commands/send.js"); await runSend({ mesh: flags.mesh as string, priority: flags.priority as string, json: !!flags.json, self: !!flags.self }, positionals[1] ?? "", positionals.slice(2).join(" ")); }
-      else if (sub === "inbox") { const { runInbox } = await import("~/commands/inbox.js"); await runInbox({ json: !!flags.json }); }
+      else if (sub === "inbox") {
+        const sub2 = positionals[1];
+        if (sub2 === "flush") {
+          const { runInboxFlush } = await import("~/commands/inbox-actions.js");
+          await runInboxFlush({
+            mesh: flags.mesh as string | undefined,
+            before: flags.before as string | undefined,
+            all: !!flags.all,
+            json: !!flags.json,
+          });
+        } else if (sub2 === "delete" || sub2 === "rm") {
+          const { runInboxDelete } = await import("~/commands/inbox-actions.js");
+          await runInboxDelete(positionals[2] ?? "", { json: !!flags.json });
+        } else {
+          const { runInbox } = await import("~/commands/inbox.js");
+          await runInbox({
+            mesh: flags.mesh as string | undefined,
+            json: !!flags.json,
+            limit: typeof flags.limit === "number" ? flags.limit : (typeof flags.limit === "string" ? Number.parseInt(flags.limit, 10) : undefined),
+            unread: !!flags.unread,
+          });
+        }
+      }
       else if (sub === "status") { const { runMsgStatus } = await import("~/commands/broker-actions.js"); process.exit(await runMsgStatus(positionals[1], { mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: !!flags.json })); }
       else { console.error("Usage: claudemesh message <send|inbox|status>"); process.exit(EXIT.INVALID_ARGS); }
       break;
@@ -580,7 +712,16 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
       const f = { mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: !!flags.json };
       if (sub === "list") { const { runVaultList } = await import("~/commands/platform-actions.js"); process.exit(await runVaultList(f)); }
       else if (sub === "delete") { const { runVaultDelete } = await import("~/commands/platform-actions.js"); process.exit(await runVaultDelete(positionals[1] ?? "", f)); }
-      else { console.error("Usage: claudemesh vault <list|delete>  (set/get currently via MCP — needs crypto)"); process.exit(EXIT.INVALID_ARGS); }
+      else if (sub === "set") {
+        const { runVaultSet } = await import("~/commands/platform-actions.js");
+        process.exit(await runVaultSet(positionals[1] ?? "", positionals[2] ?? "", {
+          ...f,
+          entryType: (flags.type as "env" | "file" | undefined),
+          mountPath: flags.mount as string | undefined,
+          description: flags.description as string | undefined,
+        }));
+      }
+      else { console.error("Usage: claudemesh vault <list|set|delete>"); process.exit(EXIT.INVALID_ARGS); }
       break;
     }
     case "watch": {
@@ -588,7 +729,18 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
       const f = { mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: !!flags.json };
       if (sub === "list") { const { runWatchList } = await import("~/commands/platform-actions.js"); process.exit(await runWatchList(f)); }
       else if (sub === "remove") { const { runUnwatch } = await import("~/commands/platform-actions.js"); process.exit(await runUnwatch(positionals[1] ?? "", f)); }
-      else { console.error("Usage: claudemesh watch <list|remove>"); process.exit(EXIT.INVALID_ARGS); }
+      else if (sub === "add") {
+        const { runWatchAdd } = await import("~/commands/platform-actions.js");
+        process.exit(await runWatchAdd(positionals[1] ?? "", {
+          ...f,
+          label: flags.label as string | undefined,
+          interval: flags.interval ? Number(flags.interval) : undefined,
+          mode: flags.mode as string | undefined,
+          extract: flags.extract as string | undefined,
+          notifyOn: flags["notify-on"] as string | undefined,
+        }));
+      }
+      else { console.error("Usage: claudemesh watch <list|add|remove>"); process.exit(EXIT.INVALID_ARGS); }
       break;
     }
     case "webhook": {
@@ -596,7 +748,8 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
       const f = { mesh: flags.mesh as string, json: !!flags.json };
       if (sub === "list") { const { runWebhookList } = await import("~/commands/platform-actions.js"); process.exit(await runWebhookList(f)); }
       else if (sub === "delete") { const { runWebhookDelete } = await import("~/commands/platform-actions.js"); process.exit(await runWebhookDelete(positionals[1] ?? "", f)); }
-      else { console.error("Usage: claudemesh webhook <list|delete>"); process.exit(EXIT.INVALID_ARGS); }
+      else if (sub === "create") { const { runWebhookCreate } = await import("~/commands/platform-actions.js"); process.exit(await runWebhookCreate(positionals[1] ?? "", f)); }
+      else { console.error("Usage: claudemesh webhook <list|create|delete>"); process.exit(EXIT.INVALID_ARGS); }
       break;
     }
     case "file": {

apps/cli/src/mcp/handlers/jsonrpc.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export { CallToolRequestSchema, ListToolsRequestSchema } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js";

apps/cli/src/mcp/handlers/stdio.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";

apps/cli/src/mcp/middleware/error-handler.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export function formatToolError(err: unknown): string { return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err); }

apps/cli/src/mcp/middleware/logging.ts

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-export function logToolCall(toolName: string, durationMs: number): void {
-  if (process.env.CLAUDEMESH_DEBUG === "1") process.stderr.write("[mcp] " + toolName + " (" + durationMs + "ms)\n");
-}

apps/cli/src/mcp/router.ts

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-// Tool dispatch — server.ts handles all routing via switch statement.
-export const ROUTER_VERSION = "1.0" as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/clock-write.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: clock-write
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "clock-write" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["mesh_set_clock", "mesh_pause_clock", "mesh_resume_clock"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/contexts.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: contexts
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "contexts" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["share_context", "get_context", "list_contexts"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/files.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: files
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "files" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["share_file", "get_file", "list_files", "file_status", "delete_file", "grant_file_access", "read_peer_file", "list_peer_files"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/graph.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: graph
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "graph" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["graph_query", "graph_execute"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/groups.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: groups
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "groups" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["join_group", "leave_group"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/index.ts

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-export { FAMILY as memoryFamily, TOOLS as memoryTools } from "./memory.js";
-export { FAMILY as stateFamily, TOOLS as stateTools } from "./state.js";
-export { FAMILY as messagingFamily, TOOLS as messagingTools } from "./messaging.js";
-export { FAMILY as profileFamily, TOOLS as profileTools } from "./profile.js";
-export { FAMILY as groupsFamily, TOOLS as groupsTools } from "./groups.js";
-export { FAMILY as filesFamily, TOOLS as filesTools } from "./files.js";
-export { FAMILY as vectorsFamily, TOOLS as vectorsTools } from "./vectors.js";
-export { FAMILY as graphFamily, TOOLS as graphTools } from "./graph.js";
-export { FAMILY as sqlFamily, TOOLS as sqlTools } from "./sql.js";
-export { FAMILY as streamsFamily, TOOLS as streamsTools } from "./streams.js";
-export { FAMILY as contextsFamily, TOOLS as contextsTools } from "./contexts.js";
-export { FAMILY as tasksFamily, TOOLS as tasksTools } from "./tasks.js";
-export { FAMILY as schedulingFamily, TOOLS as schedulingTools } from "./scheduling.js";
-export { FAMILY as meshMetaFamily, TOOLS as meshMetaTools } from "./mesh-meta.js";
-export { FAMILY as clockWriteFamily, TOOLS as clockWriteTools } from "./clock-write.js";
-export { FAMILY as skillsFamily, TOOLS as skillsTools } from "./skills.js";
-export { FAMILY as mcpRegistryPeerFamily, TOOLS as mcpRegistryPeerTools } from "./mcp-registry-peer.js";
-export { FAMILY as mcpRegistryBrokerFamily, TOOLS as mcpRegistryBrokerTools } from "./mcp-registry-broker.js";
-export { FAMILY as vaultFamily, TOOLS as vaultTools } from "./vault.js";
-export { FAMILY as urlWatchFamily, TOOLS as urlWatchTools } from "./url-watch.js";
-export { FAMILY as webhooksFamily, TOOLS as webhooksTools } from "./webhooks.js";

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/mcp-registry-broker.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: mcp-registry-broker
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "mcp-registry-broker" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["mesh_mcp_deploy", "mesh_mcp_undeploy", "mesh_mcp_update", "mesh_mcp_logs", "mesh_mcp_scope", "mesh_mcp_schema", "mesh_mcp_catalog"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/mcp-registry-peer.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: mcp-registry-peer
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "mcp-registry-peer" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["mesh_mcp_register", "mesh_mcp_list", "mesh_tool_call", "mesh_mcp_remove"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/memory.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: memory
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "memory" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["remember", "recall", "forget"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/mesh-meta.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: mesh-meta
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "mesh-meta" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["mesh_info", "mesh_stats", "mesh_clock", "ping_mesh"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/messaging.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: messaging
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "messaging" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["send_message", "list_peers", "check_messages", "message_status"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/profile.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: profile
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "profile" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["set_profile", "set_status", "set_summary", "set_visible"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/scheduling.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: scheduling
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "scheduling" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["schedule_reminder", "list_scheduled", "cancel_scheduled"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/skills.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: skills
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "skills" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["share_skill", "get_skill", "list_skills", "remove_skill", "mesh_skill_deploy"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/sql.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: sql
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "sql" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["mesh_query", "mesh_execute", "mesh_schema"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/state.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: state
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "state" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["set_state", "get_state", "list_state"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/streams.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: streams
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "streams" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["create_stream", "publish", "subscribe", "list_streams"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/tasks.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: tasks
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "tasks" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["create_task", "claim_task", "complete_task", "list_tasks"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/url-watch.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: url-watch
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "url-watch" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["mesh_watch", "mesh_unwatch", "mesh_watches"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/vault.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: vault
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "vault" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["vault_set", "vault_list", "vault_delete"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/vectors.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: vectors
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "vectors" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["vector_store", "vector_search", "vector_delete", "list_collections"] as const;

apps/cli/src/mcp/tools/webhooks.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// MCP tool family: webhooks
-// Handlers in mcp/server.ts; this file defines the family for the spec's folder structure.
-export const FAMILY = "webhooks" as const;
-export const TOOLS = ["create_webhook", "list_webhooks", "delete_webhook"] as const;

apps/cli/src/services/bridge/client.ts

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Bridge client — CLI invocations dial the per-mesh Unix socket the
- * MCP push-pipe holds open, so they reuse its warm WS instead of opening
- * a fresh one (~5ms vs ~300-700ms).
- *
- * Usage from a command:
- *
- *   const result = await tryBridge(meshSlug, "send", { to, message });
- *   if (result === null) { ...fall through to cold withMesh()... }
- *   else { ...warm path succeeded... }
- *
- * `tryBridge` returns null on:
- *   - socket file absent (no push-pipe running)
- *   - socket connect fails (push-pipe crashed without cleanup)
- *   - bridge timeout
- * That null is the caller's signal to fall back to a cold WS connection
- * via `withMesh`. So the bridge is purely an optimization — every verb
- * still works without it.
- */
-
-import { createConnection } from "node:net";
-import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
-import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
-import {
-  socketPath,
-  frame,
-  LineParser,
-  type BridgeRequest,
-  type BridgeResponse,
-  type BridgeVerb,
-} from "./protocol.js";
-
-const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
-
-/**
- * Send one request and await the matching response. Returns:
- *   - { ok: true, result } on success
- *   - { ok: false, error } on bridge-reachable-but-broker-error
- *   - null on bridge-unreachable (caller should fall back to cold WS)
- */
-export async function tryBridge(
-  meshSlug: string,
-  verb: BridgeVerb,
-  args: Record<string, unknown> = {},
-  timeoutMs: number = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS,
-): Promise<{ ok: true; result: unknown } | { ok: false; error: string } | null> {
-  const path = socketPath(meshSlug);
-  if (!existsSync(path)) return null;
-
-  return new Promise((resolve) => {
-    const id = randomUUID();
-    const req: BridgeRequest = { id, verb, args };
-    const parser = new LineParser();
-    let settled = false;
-
-    const finish = (
-      value: { ok: true; result: unknown } | { ok: false; error: string } | null,
-    ): void => {
-      if (settled) return;
-      settled = true;
-      try { socket.destroy(); } catch {}
-      clearTimeout(timer);
-      resolve(value);
-    };
-
-    const socket = createConnection({ path });
-
-    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
-      finish(null); // timeout = bridge unreachable, fall back to cold path
-    }, timeoutMs);
-
-    socket.on("connect", () => {
-      try {
-        socket.write(frame(req));
-      } catch {
-        finish(null);
-      }
-    });
-
-    socket.on("data", (chunk) => {
-      const lines = parser.feed(chunk);
-      for (const line of lines) {
-        if (!line.trim()) continue;
-        let res: BridgeResponse;
-        try {
-          res = JSON.parse(line) as BridgeResponse;
-        } catch {
-          continue;
-        }
-        if (res.id !== id) continue; // not our response — keep reading
-        if (res.ok) finish({ ok: true, result: res.result });
-        else finish({ ok: false, error: res.error });
-        return;
-      }
-    });
-
-    socket.on("error", (err) => {
-      // ENOENT (file disappeared between existsSync and connect),
-      // ECONNREFUSED (stale socket), EPERM (permission), etc. — all mean
-      // bridge unreachable.
-      const code = (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
-      if (code === "ECONNREFUSED" || code === "ENOENT" || code === "EPERM") {
-        finish(null);
-      } else {
-        finish(null);
-      }
-    });
-
-    socket.on("close", () => {
-      // If we close without a response, treat as unreachable.
-      finish(null);
-    });
-  });
-}

apps/cli/src/services/bridge/daemon-route.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,286 @@
-// Try forwarding a send through the local daemon's IPC. Returns null if
+// Daemon-routed CLI helpers. Returns null when the daemon is unreachable
-// the daemon isn't running or the daemon's mesh doesn't match the target
+// AND auto-spawn could not bring it up — caller is expected to fall back
-// mesh — the caller falls back to the bridge or cold path.
+// to its cold-path WS or to error out under `--strict`.
-
+//
-import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
+// Auto-recovery: when the daemon socket is missing or stale, every
+// helper here calls into the lifecycle module which probes, spawns
+// (under a lock), polls, and retries — so cold-path fallback only
+// fires if auto-spawn failed. The lifecycle module caches its
+// per-process result, so a script doing 50 sends pays the spawn cost
+// at most once.
+//
+// 1.28.0: the orphaned bridge tier between daemon and cold paths was
+// removed. Two paths only: daemon (with auto-spawn) → cold.
 
 import { ipc } from "~/daemon/ipc/client.js";
-import { DAEMON_PATHS } from "~/daemon/paths.js";
+import { ensureDaemonReady } from "~/services/daemon/lifecycle.js";
+import { getDaemonPolicy } from "~/services/daemon/policy.js";
+import { warnDaemonState } from "~/ui/warnings.js";
+
+function meshQuery(mesh?: string): string {
+  return mesh ? `?mesh=${encodeURIComponent(mesh)}` : "";
+}
+
+/** Common entry: ensure the daemon is reachable, emitting a one-shot
+ *  stderr warning describing what we did. Returns true when the daemon
+ *  is now reachable, false when the caller should fall back.
+ *
+ *  --no-daemon short-circuits to false; --strict's enforcement lives at
+ *  the cold-path entry point (`withMesh` in commands/connect.ts) so a
+ *  single chokepoint covers every verb. */
+async function daemonReachable(): Promise<boolean> {
+  const policy = getDaemonPolicy();
+  if (policy.mode === "no-daemon") return false;
+  const res = await ensureDaemonReady({ noAutoSpawn: false });
+  warnDaemonState(res, {});
+  return res.state === "up" || res.state === "started";
+}
+
+/** Try fetching the peer list through the daemon (~1ms warm IPC).
+ *  Returns null when the daemon socket isn't present so the caller can
+ *  fall back to bridge / cold paths. */
+export async function tryListPeersViaDaemon(mesh?: string): Promise<unknown[] | null> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return null;
+  try {
+    const res = await ipc<{ peers?: unknown[] }>({ path: `/v1/peers${meshQuery(mesh)}`, timeoutMs: 3_000 });
+    if (res.status !== 200) return null;
+    return Array.isArray(res.body.peers) ? res.body.peers : [];
+  } catch (err) {
+    const msg = String(err);
+    if (/ENOENT|ECONNREFUSED|ipc_timeout/.test(msg)) return null;
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * 1.34.0 — Try fetching the persisted inbox from the daemon.
+ *
+ * Reads from `~/.claudemesh/daemon/inbox.db` via `/v1/inbox`. This is
+ * the authoritative source of received messages — pushes from the
+ * broker land here through the daemon's session-WS / member-WS push
+ * handler. The pre-1.34.0 cold-path inbox command opened a fresh
+ * BrokerClient and drained an empty in-memory buffer, which never
+ * matched what the daemon was actually receiving.
+ */
+export interface InboxItem {
+  id: string;
+  client_message_id: string;
+  broker_message_id: string | null;
+  mesh: string;
+  topic: string | null;
+  sender_pubkey: string;
+  sender_name: string;
+  body: string | null;
+  received_at: string;
+  reply_to_id: string | null;
+  /** 1.34.8: ISO timestamp of when the row was first surfaced to the
+   *  user (interactive listing or live channel reminder). `null` =
+   *  never seen. */
+  seen_at?: string | null;
+}
+
+export async function tryListInboxViaDaemon(
+  mesh?: string,
+  limit = 100,
+  opts: { unreadOnly?: boolean; markSeen?: boolean } = {},
+): Promise<InboxItem[] | null> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return null;
+  try {
+    const params: string[] = [`limit=${limit}`];
+    if (mesh) params.push(`mesh=${encodeURIComponent(mesh)}`);
+    // 1.34.8: read-state filters. `unread_only=true` narrows to seen_at
+    // IS NULL; `mark_seen=false` lets the caller peek without flipping
+    // the seen flag (used by the welcome push on the MCP side, not the
+    // CLI). Default behavior matches pre-1.34.8 — return everything
+    // and stamp it seen — so existing callers keep working.
+    if (opts.unreadOnly) params.push("unread_only=true");
+    if (opts.markSeen === false) params.push("mark_seen=false");
+    const path = `/v1/inbox?${params.join("&")}`;
+    const res = await ipc<{ items?: InboxItem[] }>({ path, timeoutMs: 3_000 });
+    if (res.status !== 200) return null;
+    return Array.isArray(res.body.items) ? res.body.items : [];
+  } catch (err) {
+    const msg = String(err);
+    if (/ENOENT|ECONNREFUSED|ipc_timeout/.test(msg)) return null;
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * 1.34.7: bulk-delete inbox rows. `mesh` scopes to one mesh (omit =
+ * across every attached mesh); `beforeIso` filters by `received_at <
+ * Date.parse(beforeIso)`. Returns the number of rows removed, or null
+ * when the daemon couldn't be reached.
+ */
+export async function tryFlushInboxViaDaemon(
+  args: { mesh?: string; beforeIso?: string } = {},
+): Promise<number | null> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return null;
+  try {
+    const params: string[] = [];
+    if (args.mesh)      params.push(`mesh=${encodeURIComponent(args.mesh)}`);
+    if (args.beforeIso) params.push(`before=${encodeURIComponent(args.beforeIso)}`);
+    const path = `/v1/inbox${params.length ? `?${params.join("&")}` : ""}`;
+    const res = await ipc<{ removed?: number }>({ path, method: "DELETE", timeoutMs: 3_000 });
+    if (res.status !== 200) return null;
+    return typeof res.body.removed === "number" ? res.body.removed : null;
+  } catch (err) {
+    const msg = String(err);
+    if (/ENOENT|ECONNREFUSED|ipc_timeout/.test(msg)) return null;
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/** 1.34.7: delete one inbox row by id. Returns true iff the row was
+ *  removed; false on 404; null on transport failure. */
+export async function tryDeleteInboxRowViaDaemon(id: string): Promise<boolean | null> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return null;
+  try {
+    const res = await ipc<{ removed?: number }>({
+      path: `/v1/inbox/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`,
+      method: "DELETE",
+      timeoutMs: 3_000,
+    });
+    if (res.status === 404) return false;
+    if (res.status !== 200) return null;
+    return (res.body.removed ?? 0) > 0;
+  } catch (err) {
+    const msg = String(err);
+    if (/ENOENT|ECONNREFUSED|ipc_timeout/.test(msg)) return null;
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Try fetching mesh-published skills through the daemon. */
+export async function tryListSkillsViaDaemon(mesh?: string): Promise<unknown[] | null> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return null;
+  try {
+    const res = await ipc<{ skills?: unknown[] }>({ path: `/v1/skills${meshQuery(mesh)}`, timeoutMs: 3_000 });
+    if (res.status !== 200) return null;
+    return Array.isArray(res.body.skills) ? res.body.skills : [];
+  } catch (err) {
+    const msg = String(err);
+    if (/ENOENT|ECONNREFUSED|ipc_timeout/.test(msg)) return null;
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Try fetching one skill body through the daemon. */
+export async function tryGetSkillViaDaemon(name: string, mesh?: string): Promise<unknown | null> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return null;
+  try {
+    const res = await ipc<{ skill?: unknown }>({
+      path: `/v1/skills/${encodeURIComponent(name)}${meshQuery(mesh)}`,
+      timeoutMs: 3_000,
+    });
+    if (res.status === 404) return null;
+    if (res.status !== 200) return null;
+    return res.body.skill ?? null;
+  } catch { return null; }
+}
+
+// --- state ---
+
+export type StateEntry = {
+  key: string;
+  value: unknown;
+  updatedBy: string;
+  updatedAt: string;
+  mesh?: string;
+};
+
+/** Try reading a single state key through the daemon. Returns:
+ *   - the entry when the daemon found it
+ *   - undefined when the daemon ran but the key is unset (404)
+ *   - null when the daemon socket isn't present (caller falls back) */
+export async function tryGetStateViaDaemon(key: string, mesh?: string): Promise<StateEntry | undefined | null> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return null;
+  try {
+    const path = `/v1/state?key=${encodeURIComponent(key)}${mesh ? `&mesh=${encodeURIComponent(mesh)}` : ""}`;
+    const res = await ipc<{ state?: StateEntry; error?: string }>({ path, timeoutMs: 3_000 });
+    if (res.status === 404) return undefined;
+    if (res.status !== 200) return null;
+    return res.body.state ?? undefined;
+  } catch (err) {
+    const msg = String(err);
+    if (/ENOENT|ECONNREFUSED|ipc_timeout/.test(msg)) return null;
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+export async function tryListStateViaDaemon(mesh?: string): Promise<StateEntry[] | null> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return null;
+  try {
+    const res = await ipc<{ entries?: StateEntry[] }>({ path: `/v1/state${meshQuery(mesh)}`, timeoutMs: 3_000 });
+    if (res.status !== 200) return null;
+    return Array.isArray(res.body.entries) ? res.body.entries : [];
+  } catch (err) {
+    const msg = String(err);
+    if (/ENOENT|ECONNREFUSED|ipc_timeout/.test(msg)) return null;
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+export async function trySetStateViaDaemon(key: string, value: unknown, mesh?: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return false;
+  try {
+    const res = await ipc<{ ok?: boolean; error?: string }>({
+      method: "POST",
+      path: "/v1/state",
+      timeoutMs: 3_000,
+      body: { key, value, ...(mesh ? { mesh } : {}) },
+    });
+    return res.status === 200 && res.body.ok === true;
+  } catch { return false; }
+}
+
+// --- memory ---
+
+export type MemoryEntry = {
+  id: string;
+  content: string;
+  tags: string[];
+  rememberedBy: string;
+  rememberedAt: string;
+  mesh?: string;
+};
+
+export async function tryRememberViaDaemon(content: string, tags?: string[], mesh?: string): Promise<{ id: string; mesh?: string } | null> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return null;
+  try {
+    const res = await ipc<{ id?: string; mesh?: string; error?: string }>({
+      method: "POST",
+      path: "/v1/memory",
+      timeoutMs: 5_000,
+      body: { content, ...(tags?.length ? { tags } : {}), ...(mesh ? { mesh } : {}) },
+    });
+    if (res.status !== 200 || !res.body.id) return null;
+    return { id: res.body.id, mesh: res.body.mesh };
+  } catch { return null; }
+}
+
+export async function tryRecallViaDaemon(query: string, mesh?: string): Promise<MemoryEntry[] | null> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return null;
+  try {
+    const path = `/v1/memory?q=${encodeURIComponent(query)}${mesh ? `&mesh=${encodeURIComponent(mesh)}` : ""}`;
+    const res = await ipc<{ matches?: MemoryEntry[] }>({ path, timeoutMs: 5_000 });
+    if (res.status !== 200) return null;
+    return Array.isArray(res.body.matches) ? res.body.matches : [];
+  } catch (err) {
+    const msg = String(err);
+    if (/ENOENT|ECONNREFUSED|ipc_timeout/.test(msg)) return null;
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+export async function tryForgetViaDaemon(id: string, mesh?: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return false;
+  try {
+    const path = `/v1/memory/${encodeURIComponent(id)}${meshQuery(mesh)}`;
+    const res = await ipc<{ ok?: boolean }>({ method: "DELETE", path, timeoutMs: 3_000 });
+    return res.status === 200 && res.body.ok === true;
+  } catch { return false; }
+}
 
 export type DaemonSendOk = {
   ok: true;
@@ -28,7 +303,7 @@ export async function trySendViaDaemon(args: {
    *  right mesh by either flag or single-mesh-default. */
   expectedMesh?: string;
 }): Promise<DaemonSendResult | null> {
-  if (!existsSync(DAEMON_PATHS.SOCK_FILE)) return null;
+  if (!(await daemonReachable())) return null;
 
   try {
     const res = await ipc<{
@@ -46,6 +321,11 @@ export async function trySendViaDaemon(args: {
         message: args.message,
         priority: args.priority,
         ...(args.idempotencyKey ? { client_message_id: args.idempotencyKey } : {}),
+        // v1.26.0 multi-mesh: forward the caller's chosen mesh so the
+        // daemon picks the right broker. Omitting it on a single-mesh
+        // daemon still works (auto-pick); omitting it on a multi-mesh
+        // daemon returns 400 with the attached list.
+        ...(args.expectedMesh ? { mesh: args.expectedMesh } : {}),
       },
     });