Closes the v1-vs-v2 split between CLI and dashboard. The web chat
panel now reads and writes the same crypto_secretbox-under-topic-key
ciphertext that CLI 1.8.0+ writes — every encrypted topic finally
renders correctly from the browser.
API
- POST /v1/me/peer-pubkey replaces the throwaway pubkey that
mutations.ts mints at mesh-create time with one whose secret the
browser actually holds. Idempotent; auth via the dashboard apikey
whose issuedByMemberId is the row to update.
Web
- apps/web/src/services/crypto/identity.ts — IndexedDB-backed
ed25519 identity, lazy-init on first use. Generates once per
browser-profile; survives reload. ed25519 → x25519 derivation for
crypto_box decrypt. Module-cached after first call.
- apps/web/src/services/crypto/topic-key.ts — mirrors the CLI
topic-key service. Fetches GET /v1/topics/:name/key, decrypts the
sealed copy with our x25519 secret, caches the 32-byte symmetric
key in-memory keyed by (apikey-prefix, topic). encryptMessage /
decryptMessage map directly onto crypto_secretbox{,_open}.
- apps/web/src/modules/mesh/topic-chat-panel.tsx — on mount:
registers our pubkey, fetches the topic key, polls /key every 5s
while not_sealed (matching the CLI's 30s re-seal cadence). Render
branches on bodyVersion: v2 -> decrypted-cache, v1 -> legacy
base64. Send branches: encrypts under the topic key when key is
ready, falls back to v1 plaintext on legacy or not-yet-sealed
topics. Composer shows a 🔒 v0.3.0 / "waiting for re-seal" badge.
Adds libsodium-wrappers + @types to apps/web. Browser bundle picks
up its own copy; the existing CLI/broker/API copies are untouched.
Threat model: IndexedDB is per-origin and not exfiltratable from
other sites; XSS or a malicious extension still wins, same as for
any browser-stored secret. Documented divergence from the CLI's
~/.claudemesh-stored keypair in the identity module's preamble.
137 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
137 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Browser-side persistent peer identity for claudemesh.
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*
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* Stores an ed25519 keypair in IndexedDB so the same browser tab,
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* the same browser after a reload, and the same user across reloads
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* keeps the same identity. Without this, every page-reload would
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* mint a new pubkey and the broker's per-topic-key seal would have
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* to chase a moving target.
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*
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* The keypair lives at `claudemesh-identity / kp / default`. There's
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* one identity per browser profile, shared across every mesh the
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* dashboard user is in. The matching `mesh.member.peer_pubkey` rows
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* are kept in sync server-side via `POST /v1/me/peer-pubkey`.
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*
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* Threat model: IndexedDB is per-origin and not exfiltratable from
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* other sites. A malicious extension or full XSS still wins — same
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* as for any browser-stored secret. The CLI's own keypair has
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* stronger guarantees because it lives in `~/.claudemesh/` outside
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* of the browser. We document the divergence in the dashboard UI.
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*/
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import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers";
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export interface BrowserIdentity {
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/** ed25519 public key — registered as `mesh.member.peer_pubkey`. */
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edPub: Uint8Array;
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/** ed25519 secret key — never leaves IndexedDB. */
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edSec: Uint8Array;
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/** x25519 public key, derived from edPub. Used in `crypto_box`. */
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xPub: Uint8Array;
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/** x25519 secret key, derived from edSec. Used in `crypto_box_open`. */
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xSec: Uint8Array;
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/** Hex form of `edPub` — what the API and DB store. */
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edPubHex: string;
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}
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const DB_NAME = "claudemesh-identity";
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const STORE = "kp";
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const KEY = "default";
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let cached: BrowserIdentity | null = null;
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let initPromise: Promise<BrowserIdentity> | null = null;
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async function openDb(): Promise<IDBDatabase> {
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const req = indexedDB.open(DB_NAME, 1);
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req.onupgradeneeded = () => {
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req.result.createObjectStore(STORE);
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};
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req.onsuccess = () => resolve(req.result);
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req.onerror = () => reject(req.error);
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});
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}
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async function readKeypair(): Promise<{
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edPub: Uint8Array;
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edSec: Uint8Array;
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} | null> {
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const db = await openDb();
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const tx = db.transaction(STORE, "readonly");
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const req = tx.objectStore(STORE).get(KEY);
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req.onsuccess = () => {
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const v = req.result as
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| { edPub: Uint8Array; edSec: Uint8Array }
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| undefined;
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resolve(v ?? null);
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};
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req.onerror = () => reject(req.error);
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});
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}
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async function writeKeypair(kp: {
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edPub: Uint8Array;
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edSec: Uint8Array;
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}): Promise<void> {
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const db = await openDb();
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const tx = db.transaction(STORE, "readwrite");
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tx.objectStore(STORE).put(kp, KEY);
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tx.oncomplete = () => resolve();
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tx.onerror = () => reject(tx.error);
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});
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}
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/**
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* Get-or-create the browser's persistent identity. First call on a
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* given origin generates a fresh ed25519 keypair, persists it, and
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* derives the matching x25519 pair. Subsequent calls return the
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* in-memory cache.
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*
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* Server registration (`POST /v1/me/peer-pubkey`) is the caller's
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* responsibility — this module only manages the local keypair.
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*/
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export async function getBrowserIdentity(): Promise<BrowserIdentity> {
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if (cached) return cached;
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if (initPromise) return initPromise;
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initPromise = (async () => {
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await sodium.ready;
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let stored = await readKeypair();
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if (!stored) {
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const kp = sodium.crypto_sign_keypair();
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stored = { edPub: kp.publicKey, edSec: kp.privateKey };
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await writeKeypair(stored);
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}
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const xPub = sodium.crypto_sign_ed25519_pk_to_curve25519(stored.edPub);
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const xSec = sodium.crypto_sign_ed25519_sk_to_curve25519(stored.edSec);
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cached = {
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edPub: stored.edPub,
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edSec: stored.edSec,
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xPub,
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xSec,
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edPubHex: sodium.to_hex(stored.edPub),
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};
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return cached;
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})();
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return initPromise;
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}
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/**
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* Wipe the local identity. The server-side `mesh.member.peer_pubkey`
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* is NOT cleared by this — call `POST /v1/me/peer-pubkey` again with
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* a fresh pubkey after rotation.
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*/
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export async function clearBrowserIdentity(): Promise<void> {
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cached = null;
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initPromise = null;
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const db = await openDb();
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await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
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const tx = db.transaction(STORE, "readwrite");
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tx.objectStore(STORE).delete(KEY);
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tx.oncomplete = () => resolve();
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tx.onerror = () => reject(tx.error);
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});
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}
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