docs(spec): session capabilities — first-class concept

Spec for the gap #4 follow-up from the 1.34.x triage. Builds on
2026-04-15-per-peer-capabilities.md (member-keyed recipient grants)
by adding a sender-side cap subset on session attestations: parent
member signs {session_pubkey, allowed_caps[], expires_at}, broker
enforces intersection of recipient grants × session caps on every
protected operation.

v2 attestation alongside v1 (different canonical prefix
"claudemesh-session-attest-v2|..." → no collision). Default when
no caps subset is declared = full member caps (today's behavior;
opt-in restriction, not breaking).

CLI surface: claudemesh launch --caps dm,read. Bonus: set_state
gate (state-write cap) ships in the same release — closes the
"any session can clobber shared keys like current-pr" footgun.

Migration: dry-run mode for one release before flipping
enforcement. Mirrors the original per-peer-capabilities rollout.

Estimate: ~1 sprint + 1 week dry-run window.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.artifacts/specs/2026-05-04-session-capabilities.md

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+# Session capabilities — first-class concept
+
+**Status:** spec, queued behind v0.3.0 topic-encryption work.
+**Owner:** alezmad
+**Author:** Claude (Sprint B follow-up, 2026-05-04)
+**Related:** `2026-04-15-per-peer-capabilities.md` (existing per-peer
+caps system, member-keyed), `2026-05-04-per-session-presence.md`
+(per-launch session presence — what we're now restricting).
+
+## Problem
+
+Per-peer capability grants (`apps/broker/src/index.ts:2178+, 2309+`)
+are keyed on the sender's **stable member pubkey**. The grant model
+gives the recipient fine-grained control: "alice can DM me",
+"bob can read state but not broadcast", etc.
+
+But: as of v1.30.0 (`per-session-presence`), every `claudemesh
+launch` mints a per-launch ephemeral keypair with a parent attestation
+binding it to the member identity. The launched session inherits **all**
+the member's capabilities transitively, because cap enforcement always
+falls through to the member key.
+
+Concretely:
+
+- Member `alice` is in mesh `flexicar`, granted `dm + state-read +
+  state-write` by everyone.
+- Alice launches a session with `claudemesh launch` to do an automated
+  task — say, run a Claude Code agent that iterates over PRs.
+- That session has full member privileges. It can DM peers, write
+  shared state keys (e.g. clobber `current-pr`), grant new caps, ban
+  members, etc. — none of which the user wanted to delegate.
+
+There is no way to express "this session can DM peers but cannot
+deploy services or grant caps." The parent attestation is a binary
+existence proof — "this session was vouched by a member" — with no
+capability subset.
+
+Plus an adjacent footgun: `set_state` (`apps/broker/src/index.ts:2949`)
+has **no cap check at all**. Anyone in the mesh can write any key. The
+spec at `2026-04-15-per-peer-capabilities.md` lists `state-write` as a
+planned cap but it was never wired into the broker. Shared keys like
+`current-pr` are write-anyone today.
+
+## Goal
+
+A launched session can be issued **a capability subset** of its
+parent member, signed by the parent at launch time, and the broker
+enforces the **intersection** of recipient grants × session caps on
+every protected operation.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Changing the existing per-peer cap model. Member-keyed grants stay
+  authoritative for "who is allowed to talk to me."
+- Cross-machine session caps (waiting on 2.0.0 HKDF identity).
+- Per-tool granularity inside the Claude Code MCP surface — this
+  spec only covers the broker-enforceable verbs (dm, broadcast,
+  state-read, state-write, grant, kick, ban, profile-write,
+  service-deploy).
+- Delegation: a session cannot re-vouch a sub-session with its own
+  cap subset. Only members can attest sessions. (Could be lifted in
+  a future spec; today's launch flow doesn't need it.)
+
+## Design
+
+### Capability vocabulary
+
+Existing (today, member-level):
+
+| Capability    | Effect when GRANTED on a recipient → sender pair  |
+|---------------|---------------------------------------------------|
+| `read`        | Sender appears in recipient's `list_peers`        |
+| `dm`          | Sender can DM recipient                           |
+| `broadcast`   | Sender's broadcasts reach recipient               |
+| `state-read`  | Sender can read shared state                      |
+| `state-write` | (planned) Sender can write shared state          |
+| `file-read`   | Sender can fetch files recipient shared           |
+
+New (session-level — cap subset on the attestation):
+
+These are the **verbs the session is allowed to invoke**, NOT what
+peers can do TO it. A session attestation declaring `["dm", "read"]`
+means the session can SEND dm/read-list operations; it cannot
+broadcast, write state, grant, etc.
+
+| Session cap       | Gates which broker operations                  |
+|-------------------|------------------------------------------------|
+| `dm`              | `send` with single recipient                   |
+| `broadcast`       | `send` with `*`, `@group`, `#topic`            |
+| `state-read`      | `get_state`, `list_state`                      |
+| `state-write`     | `set_state`                                    |
+| `grant`           | `grant`, `revoke`, `block`                     |
+| `kick`            | `kick`, `disconnect`                           |
+| `ban`             | `ban`, `unban`                                 |
+| `profile-write`   | `set_profile`, `set_summary`, `set_status`     |
+| `service-deploy`  | `mesh_service_register`, `_unregister`         |
+
+The default cap set when no subset is declared: the **full member
+set** (today's behavior — opt-in restriction, not breaking).
+
+### Attestation v2
+
+Existing v1 (`apps/cli/src/services/broker/session-hello-sig.ts`):
+
+```
+canonical = `claudemesh-session-attest|<parent>|<session>|<expires>`
+```
+
+New v2 (additive — broker accepts both):
+
+```
+canonical = `claudemesh-session-attest-v2|<parent>|<session>|<expires>|<sorted-caps-csv>`
+```
+
+Where `<sorted-caps-csv>` is the lower-cased, comma-joined,
+ASCII-sorted cap list. Empty-list = full member caps (default,
+back-compat).
+
+**Wire shape additions on `session_hello`:**
+
+```ts
+{
+  type: "session_hello",
+  ...existing fields...,
+  parentAttestation: {
+    sessionPubkey,
+    parentMemberPubkey,
+    expiresAt,
+    signature,
+    // NEW:
+    allowed_caps?: string[],  // omitted = full member set
+    version?: 2,              // omitted = v1
+  },
+}
+```
+
+The broker version-detects: `version === 2` → verify v2 canonical
+including `allowed_caps`. Default behavior is unchanged for clients
+that don't pass it.
+
+### Enforcement
+
+Add `allowed_caps: string[] | null` to the in-memory `PeerConn`
+shape (`apps/broker/src/index.ts:131`). Populated from
+`handleSessionHello` (the v2 attestation supplies it) and from
+`handleHello` (control-plane / member connection — set to `null`,
+meaning "full member caps").
+
+**Effective cap check** for a sending peer needing `cap`:
+
+```ts
+function senderHasCap(conn: PeerConn, cap: string): boolean {
+  if (conn.allowed_caps === null) return true; // member-level, no subset
+  return conn.allowed_caps.includes(cap);
+}
+```
+
+Wire this into every broker operation in the table above. The
+existing per-peer recipient-cap check at `2178+, 2309+` stays —
+session caps gate the **sender side**, recipient grants gate the
+**receive side**, and both must allow:
+
+```
+allowed = senderHasCap(conn, capNeeded) && recipientGrants[sender][capNeeded]
+```
+
+### `set_state` gate (bonus, ship together)
+
+Today: no cap check. After this spec: `set_state` requires
+`state-write` on the sender side. Migration: existing members
+default to having `state-write` in their member caps (no recipient
+grant model for state-write — it's a sender-side gate only, mesh-
+wide). New attestations can omit it to forbid the session.
+
+The recipient-side analog (per-peer state-write grants) is left for
+a future spec — today the value of guarding state-write is
+session-level (avoid an automated session clobbering shared keys),
+not peer-level.
+
+### CLI surface
+
+```
+claudemesh launch --caps dm,read         # tight: read-only chat agent
+claudemesh launch --caps dm,broadcast    # send-only, no state writes
+claudemesh launch                        # default: full member caps
+```
+
+`claudemesh launch --caps ?` prints the table above with descriptions.
+
+`claudemesh peer list --json` includes `allowed_caps` per row when
+present (`null` = full member). Lets users audit what their running
+sessions can actually do.
+
+### Migration plan (mirrors `2026-04-15-per-peer-capabilities.md` §"Migration plan")
+
+1. **Broker schema additive** — `PeerConn.allowed_caps` in-memory
+   only; no DB column. Reload-on-reconnect is fine because the
+   attestation is re-sent on every WS open (it's the proof of
+   identity).
+
+2. **CLI ships v2 attestation alongside v1.** New `--caps` flag
+   defaults to omitted (= v1 attestation, full caps). Older
+   brokers ignore the new fields entirely.
+
+3. **Broker accepts v2.** When `allowed_caps` arrives, store it.
+   No enforcement yet — log denied operations as `cap_check_dryrun`
+   metric counter, still allow them through.
+
+4. **Dry-run release.** Ship one CLI + broker release that emits
+   the metric but doesn't enforce. Watch for false positives in
+   real meshes for ≥ 1 week.
+
+5. **Flip enforcement on.** Broker rejects operations failing the
+   cap check with `forbidden: missing session capability "<cap>"`.
+   Default ("no caps declared = full member") keeps existing
+   sessions unaffected.
+
+6. **`set_state` gate** ships in step 5 alongside the rest. Default
+   member caps include `state-write`, so flipping it on doesn't
+   break existing flows. Only sessions that explicitly omit
+   `state-write` from `--caps` lose write access.
+
+### Crypto notes
+
+- v2 attestation re-uses `crypto_sign_detached` over the new
+  canonical string; same parent member secret key, same TTL caps
+  (≤24 h), same `expiresAt` semantics.
+- v1 signatures are NOT v2 signatures — collision is impossible
+  because the canonical strings have different prefixes
+  (`claudemesh-session-attest` vs `claudemesh-session-attest-v2`).
+  Domain separation is intrinsic.
+- Like the existing per-peer cap system: caps are server-enforced
+  metadata, not capability tokens. A malicious broker can ignore
+  them. This is about UX trust + footgun prevention, not protocol-
+  level security.
+
+## Open questions
+
+1. **Should the session attestation also bind to a fingerprint of
+   the launched binary / Claude version?** Would let a member say
+   "this session is constrained to Claude Code v1.34.15" so a
+   compromised launched-binary doesn't get reused. Probably no — too
+   much friction for the threat model.
+
+2. **What's the right default for `claudemesh launch` going forward?**
+   Once enforcement ships, do we change the default `--caps` from
+   "full member" to "dm + read + state-read"? Tighter but breaks
+   existing automation that writes state. Probably worth a one-
+   release deprecation warning ("your session will lose state-write
+   in v2.0.0 unless you pass --caps state-write") and then flip in
+   v2.0.0.
+
+3. **Does `--caps` belong in `~/.claudemesh/config.json` per-mesh
+   defaults too?** A user who always launches read-only agents
+   wants `caps: ["dm", "read"]` as a personal default. Easy add;
+   defer until users ask for it.
+
+4. **Per-tool MCP cap surface?** Out of scope here, but: a `claudemesh
+   launch --tools peer:read,memory:write` would be a finer cut than
+   broker-verb caps. The broker can't enforce that — it'd live in the
+   MCP wrapper / Claude Code's allowedTools. Different layer.
+
+## Test plan
+
+- Pure-logic tests on `senderHasCap` (member-level → always true,
+  empty caps → always false, declared caps → exact match).
+- Broker integration: launch a session with `--caps dm`, attempt
+  `set_state` → expect `forbidden: missing session capability
+  "state-write"`.
+- v1 attestation still accepted, no `allowed_caps` set, all caps
+  permitted (back-compat).
+- v2 attestation with empty `allowed_caps` array → broker treats
+  as "explicitly empty, no caps allowed" (NOT "full member"). The
+  full-member default is "field omitted entirely". Test both.
+- Dry-run mode: cap fail increments the counter but the operation
+  proceeds. Smoke-test before flipping enforcement.
+
+## Estimate
+
+- Spec review + open-question resolution: 1–2 days.
+- Broker change (PeerConn field, attestation v2 accept, per-verb
+  enforcement, dry-run mode): 2–3 days.
+- CLI change (`--caps` flag, attestation builder, peer list
+  surface): 1 day.
+- Tests: 1 day.
+- Dry-run release window: ≥ 1 week.
+
+Total: ~1 sprint of focused work, plus a dry-run window.

apps/broker/src/index.ts

@@ -156,6 +156,11 @@ interface PeerConn {
     bio?: string;
     capabilities?: string[];
   };
+  /** v2 agentic-comms presence taxonomy. Mirrors the value passed to
+   *  `recordPresence`. Used by the kick handler to refuse no-op kicks
+   *  on long-lived control-plane connections (daemon, dashboard) that
+   *  would just auto-reconnect. */
+  peerRole: "control-plane" | "session" | "service";
 }
 
 const connections = new Map<string, PeerConn>();
@@ -1797,6 +1802,7 @@ async function handleHello(
     groups: initialGroups,
     visible: saved?.visible ?? true,
     profile: saved?.profile ?? {},
+    peerRole: "control-plane",
   });
   incMeshCount(hello.meshId);
   void audit(hello.meshId, "peer_joined", member.id, effectiveDisplayName, {
@@ -2022,6 +2028,7 @@ async function handleSessionHello(
     groups: initialGroups,
     visible: true,
     profile: {},
+    peerRole: "session",
   });
   incMeshCount(hello.meshId);
   void audit(hello.meshId, "peer_joined", member.id, effectiveDisplayName, {
@@ -4645,11 +4652,30 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
           }
 
           const affected: string[] = [];
+          // 1.34.15 (gap #3a): kick was a no-op against long-lived
+          // control-plane connections (daemon, dashboard) — closing
+          // their WS just triggered the auto-reconnect loop, the
+          // kicker's CLI rendered "Their Claude Code session ended"
+          // (which was misleading), and the user-visible state was
+          // unchanged seconds later. We now refuse to close control-
+          // plane WSes and surface the skipped peers in a new
+          // additive ack field. Pre-1.34.15 CLI clients only read
+          // `kicked`/`affected`, so this stays back-compat.
+          //
+          // For `kick`-only: the soft `disconnect` verb still closes
+          // control-plane WSes intentionally — that's what users want
+          // when they're nudging a peer for it to re-authenticate.
+          const skippedControlPlane: string[] = [];
+          const skipControlPlane = isKick;
           const now = Date.now();
 
           if (km.all) {
             for (const [pid, peer] of connections) {
               if (peer.meshId !== conn.meshId || pid === presenceId) continue;
+              if (skipControlPlane && peer.peerRole === "control-plane") {
+                skippedControlPlane.push(peer.displayName || pid);
+                continue;
+              }
               try { peer.ws.close(closeCode, closeReason); } catch {}
               connections.delete(pid);
               void disconnectPresence(pid);
@@ -4661,6 +4687,10 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
               if (peer.meshId !== conn.meshId || pid === presenceId) continue;
               const [pres] = await db.select({ lastPingAt: presence.lastPingAt }).from(presence).where(eq(presence.id, pid)).limit(1);
               if (pres && pres.lastPingAt && pres.lastPingAt.getTime() < cutoff) {
+                if (skipControlPlane && peer.peerRole === "control-plane") {
+                  skippedControlPlane.push(peer.displayName || pid);
+                  continue;
+                }
                 try { peer.ws.close(closeCode, `${closeReason}_stale`); } catch {}
                 connections.delete(pid);
                 void disconnectPresence(pid);
@@ -4671,6 +4701,10 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
             for (const [pid, peer] of connections) {
               if (peer.meshId !== conn.meshId) continue;
               if (peer.displayName === km.target || peer.memberPubkey === km.target || peer.memberPubkey.startsWith(km.target)) {
+                if (skipControlPlane && peer.peerRole === "control-plane") {
+                  skippedControlPlane.push(peer.displayName || pid);
+                  continue;
+                }
                 try { peer.ws.close(closeCode, closeReason); } catch {}
                 connections.delete(pid);
                 void disconnectPresence(pid);
@@ -4679,8 +4713,20 @@ function handleConnection(ws: WebSocket): void {
             }
           }
 
-          conn.ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: ackType, kicked: affected, affected, _reqId: km._reqId }));
-          log.info(`ws ${closeReason}`, { presence_id: presenceId, count: affected.length, target: km.target ?? km.stale ?? "all" });
+          conn.ws.send(JSON.stringify({
+            type: ackType,
+            kicked: affected,
+            affected,
+            // Additive — older CLI clients ignore this field.
+            ...(skippedControlPlane.length > 0 ? { skipped_control_plane: skippedControlPlane } : {}),
+            _reqId: km._reqId,
+          }));
+          log.info(`ws ${closeReason}`, {
+            presence_id: presenceId,
+            count: affected.length,
+            target: km.target ?? km.stale ?? "all",
+            skipped_control_plane: skippedControlPlane.length,
+          });
           break;
         }
 

apps/broker/tests/kick-control-plane-skip.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/**
+ * Kick control-plane skip: 1.34.15 (gap #3a) refuses to close
+ * long-lived control-plane connections (claudemesh daemon, dashboard)
+ * via `kick`, because they auto-reconnect within seconds and the verb
+ * was effectively a no-op. The soft `disconnect` verb keeps the old
+ * behavior so users can still nudge a control-plane peer to
+ * re-authenticate.
+ *
+ * Pure-logic test — mirrors the branch inside handleSend's kick case
+ * without spinning up a broker. Same pattern as
+ * grants-enforcement.test.ts.
+ */
+
+import { describe, expect, test } from "vitest";
+
+type PeerRole = "control-plane" | "session" | "service";
+
+/** Mirrors the predicate inserted into the kick handler. */
+function shouldSkipKick(args: {
+  verb: "kick" | "disconnect";
+  peerRole: PeerRole;
+}): boolean {
+  const skipControlPlane = args.verb === "kick";
+  return skipControlPlane && args.peerRole === "control-plane";
+}
+
+describe("kick control-plane skip (gap #3a)", () => {
+  test("kick on control-plane → skipped (would auto-reconnect)", () => {
+    expect(shouldSkipKick({ verb: "kick", peerRole: "control-plane" })).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test("kick on session → not skipped (closes user session)", () => {
+    expect(shouldSkipKick({ verb: "kick", peerRole: "session" })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("kick on service → not skipped", () => {
+    expect(shouldSkipKick({ verb: "kick", peerRole: "service" })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("disconnect on control-plane → not skipped (intentional nudge)", () => {
+    expect(shouldSkipKick({ verb: "disconnect", peerRole: "control-plane" })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("disconnect on session → not skipped", () => {
+    expect(shouldSkipKick({ verb: "disconnect", peerRole: "session" })).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

apps/cli/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,110 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 1.34.15 (2026-05-04) — `peer list --mesh` actually scopes + `kick` refuses control-plane
+
+Two follow-ups from the 1.34.x train, both backwards-compatible.
+
+### `peer list --mesh <slug>` no longer aggregates across meshes
+
+`apps/cli/src/commands/peers.ts:140` was calling
+`tryListPeersViaDaemon()` with no argument, so a multi-mesh daemon
+returned peers from EVERY attached mesh and the renderer printed
+"peers on flexicar" with cross-mesh rows mixed in. The daemon's
+`/v1/peers?mesh=<slug>` filter (server-side, since 1.26.0) was
+already correctly scoping when the slug was passed; the CLI just
+wasn't passing it. Fixed.
+
+`apps/cli/src/commands/launch.ts:407` (the `printBrokerWelcome` peer
+count in the launch banner) had the same bug. The "N peers online"
+line in the welcome now shows the count for the launched mesh only.
+
+`apps/cli/src/commands/send.ts` cross-mesh hex-prefix resolution is
+intentionally cross-mesh (the user is targeting by hex without
+specifying a mesh) and was deliberately left as-is.
+
+### `claudemesh kick` refuses no-op kicks on control-plane connections
+
+Pre-1.34.15, kicking a daemon's member-WS or a dashboard connection
+just closed the socket — the daemon's WS-lifecycle reconnect loop
+brought it back within seconds, the kicker's CLI rendered "Their
+Claude Code session ended" (which was misleading), and the user-
+visible state was unchanged. The verb was effectively a no-op, but
+the user had to learn that the hard way.
+
+The broker's kick handler (`apps/broker/src/index.ts:4628+`) now
+skips peers where `peerRole === "control-plane"` and surfaces the
+skipped peers in a new additive ack field `skipped_control_plane`.
+The soft `disconnect` verb keeps the old behavior — useful when
+intentionally nudging a control-plane peer to re-authenticate.
+
+The CLI (`apps/cli/src/commands/kick.ts`) reads the new field and
+prints a clearer message: refused peers are listed, with the hint
+that `claudemesh ban <peer>` is the right tool to remove a member,
+or `claudemesh daemon down` to take a daemon offline locally.
+
+`apps/broker/src/index.ts` adds `peerRole` to the in-memory
+`PeerConn` shape, populated from both connection paths
+(member-keyed `hello` → `"control-plane"`, per-launch
+`session_hello` → `"session"`). The DB-side role taxonomy is
+unchanged.
+
+### Back-compat
+
+- Older CLI clients ignore the new `skipped_control_plane` ack
+  field; their kick continues to print "Kicked 0 peer(s)" against
+  a control-plane target as before.
+- Older brokers don't emit the field at all; newer CLI handles
+  the absence (the new branch is only reached when the field is
+  present and non-empty).
+- The new `peerRole` slot on `PeerConn` is filled at every
+  `connections.set` callsite, so older code paths never read
+  `undefined`.
+
+### Tests
+
+- `apps/broker/tests/kick-control-plane-skip.test.ts` — 5 cases
+  covering the kick/disconnect × control-plane/session/service
+  truth table.
+
+## 1.34.14 (2026-05-04) — stale `CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR` falls back
+
+`claudemesh launch` exports `CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR=<tmpdir>` to its
+spawned `claude` so the per-session mesh selection is isolated from
+`~/.claudemesh/config.json`. The tmpdir is `rmSync`'d on launch exit
+via the `process.on('exit', cleanup)` handler.
+
+Footgun: if a later `claudemesh` invocation INHERITED that env — a
+Bash tool call inside Claude Code, a tmux pane that captured the env
+via `update-environment`, an exported var the user forgot to clear —
+the inherited path pointed at a tmpdir that no longer existed.
+Pre-1.34.14 we silently used the dead path, `readConfig()` came back
+empty, and the user saw "No meshes joined" from an otherwise-working
+install. Fish users hit it harder because fish has no `unset` —
+they had to discover `set -e CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR`.
+
+`apps/cli/src/constants/paths.ts` now resolves `CONFIG_DIR` once via
+a memoized `resolveConfigDir()`:
+
+  1. No env var → `~/.claudemesh` (default, unchanged).
+  2. Env points at a dir containing `config.json` → trust it. The
+     legitimate per-session-launch case is byte-identical to before.
+  3. Env set but stale (dir gone) → warn once on stderr (TTY-only —
+     CI / MCP boot / piped scripts stay quiet) with a shell-specific
+     unset hint, then fall back to `~/.claudemesh`.
+
+The check is on the directory's existence, not on `config.json`,
+because a fresh-launch tmpdir legitimately has no `config.json` until
+the first write. The stale signature we catch is the outer launch's
+`rmSync(tmpDir, {recursive: true})` cleanup, which removes the
+directory entirely.
+
+The "no meshes" check from the original triage was deliberately NOT
+adopted: a launched session that legitimately joins one mesh would
+hit it.
+
+No back-compat surface affected. No other files changed. `_resetPathsForTest()`
+exported for unit tests.
+
 ## 1.34.13 (2026-05-04) — MCP forwards session token on /v1/events
 
 The 1.34.10 SSE demux + 1.34.11 inbox per-recipient column were both

apps/cli/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "claudemesh-cli",
-  "version": "1.34.13",
+  "version": "1.34.15",
   "description": "Peer mesh for Claude Code sessions — CLI + MCP server.",
   "keywords": [
     "claude-code",

apps/cli/src/commands/kick.ts

@@ -76,12 +76,32 @@ export async function runKick(
   if ("error" in built) { render.err(String(built.error)); return EXIT.INVALID_ARGS; }
 
   return await withMesh({ meshSlug }, async (client) => {
-    const result = await client.sendAndWait(built as Record<string, unknown>) as { affected?: string[]; kicked?: string[] };
+    const result = await client.sendAndWait(built as Record<string, unknown>) as {
+      affected?: string[];
+      kicked?: string[];
+      // 1.34.15: broker refuses to kick control-plane WSes (they'd
+      // just auto-reconnect). Older brokers don't emit this field.
+      skipped_control_plane?: string[];
+    };
     const peers = result?.affected ?? result?.kicked ?? [];
-    if (peers.length === 0) render.info("No peers matched.");
-    else {
+    const skipped = result?.skipped_control_plane ?? [];
+
+    if (peers.length === 0 && skipped.length === 0) {
+      render.info("No peers matched.");
+    } else if (peers.length === 0 && skipped.length > 0) {
+      render.warn(
+        `${skipped.length} match(es) refused: ${skipped.join(", ")} — control-plane connections (daemon / dashboard) auto-reconnect, so kick is a no-op.`,
+        "To take a daemon offline locally, run `claudemesh daemon down` on that machine. To remove a member from the mesh, use `claudemesh ban <peer>`.",
+      );
+    } else {
       render.ok(`Kicked ${peers.length} peer(s): ${peers.join(", ")}`);
       render.hint("Their Claude Code session ended. They can rejoin anytime by running `claudemesh`.");
+      if (skipped.length > 0) {
+        render.warn(
+          `(also refused ${skipped.length} control-plane connection(s): ${skipped.join(", ")})`,
+          "Daemon / dashboard connections auto-reconnect; kick is a no-op against them. Use `claudemesh ban <peer>` to remove a member entirely.",
+        );
+      }
     }
     return EXIT.SUCCESS;
   });

apps/cli/src/commands/launch.ts

@@ -400,11 +400,13 @@ async function printBrokerWelcome(meshSlug: string): Promise<void> {
     }
   } catch { /* daemon unreachable — not fatal */ }
 
-  // Peer count (best-effort).
+  // Peer count (best-effort). 1.34.15: scope to the launched mesh so
+  // multi-mesh daemons don't inflate the welcome banner with peers
+  // from other meshes the user didn't just attach to.
   let peerCount = -1;
   try {
     const { tryListPeersViaDaemon } = await import("~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js");
-    const peers = (await tryListPeersViaDaemon()) ?? [];
+    const peers = (await tryListPeersViaDaemon(meshSlug)) ?? [];
     peerCount = peers.filter((p) =>
       (p as { channel?: string }).channel !== "claudemesh-daemon",
     ).length;

apps/cli/src/commands/peers.ts

@@ -135,9 +135,17 @@ async function listPeersForMesh(slug: string): Promise<PeerRecord[]> {
   // lifecycle helper inside tryListPeersViaDaemon auto-spawns the
   // daemon if it's down and probes it for liveness — no separate bridge
   // tier is needed any more (1.28.0).
+  //
+  // 1.34.15: forward `slug` to the daemon as `?mesh=<slug>` so the
+  // server-side aggregator narrows to the requested mesh. Pre-1.34.15
+  // we called this with no argument, so a multi-mesh daemon returned
+  // peers from every attached mesh and the renderer printed "peers on
+  // flexicar" with cross-mesh rows mixed in. The daemon's
+  // `meshFromCtx` already does the right scoping when the slug is
+  // passed; the CLI just wasn't passing it.
   try {
     const { tryListPeersViaDaemon } = await import("~/services/bridge/daemon-route.js");
-    const dr = await tryListPeersViaDaemon();
+    const dr = await tryListPeersViaDaemon(slug);
     if (dr !== null) {
       return dr.map((p) => annotateSelf(p as PeerRecord, selfMemberPubkey, selfSessionPubkey));
     }

apps/cli/src/constants/paths.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,82 @@
+import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
 import { homedir } from "node:os";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 
 const home = homedir();
+const DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR = join(home, ".claudemesh");
+
+/**
+ * Resolve `CONFIG_DIR` once, with stale-env detection.
+ *
+ * `claudemesh launch` exposes `CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR=<tmpdir>` to its
+ * spawned `claude` so the per-session mesh selection is isolated from
+ * `~/.claudemesh/config.json`. The tmpdir is rmSync'd on launch exit.
+ *
+ * Footgun: if a `claudemesh` invocation INHERITS that env from an
+ * already-launched (or previously-launched) session — e.g. a Bash tool
+ * call inside Claude Code, or a tmux pane that captured the env via
+ * `update-environment` — the inherited path may point at a tmpdir that
+ * no longer exists. Pre-1.34.14 we silently used the dead path,
+ * `readConfig()` came back empty, and the user saw "No meshes joined"
+ * from an otherwise-working install.
+ *
+ * Resolution rules:
+ *   1. No env var       → `~/.claudemesh` (default).
+ *   2. Env points at a dir containing `config.json` → trust it
+ *      (the legitimate per-session-launch case).
+ *   3. Env set but stale (dir missing or no `config.json`) → warn
+ *      once on stderr (TTY-only) and fall back to `~/.claudemesh`.
+ *
+ * Memoized: resolves once on first access. Mid-process env mutations
+ * are intentionally ignored — paths must stay stable across one CLI
+ * invocation.
+ */
+let _resolvedConfigDir: string | null = null;
+let _warnedStaleEnv = false;
+
+function resolveConfigDir(): string {
+  if (_resolvedConfigDir !== null) return _resolvedConfigDir;
+  const envDir = process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR;
+  if (!envDir) {
+    _resolvedConfigDir = DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR;
+    return DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR;
+  }
+  // Trust the env when it resolves to a real directory. We check
+  // the DIR (not `config.json`) because the legitimate "fresh launch
+  // before any write" case has the dir but no config.json yet.
+  // The stale signature we want to catch is `rmSync(tmpDir,
+  // {recursive: true})` from the outer launch's cleanup — that
+  // removes the directory entirely, so a missing dir is the
+  // unambiguous "stale" signal.
+  if (existsSync(envDir)) {
+    _resolvedConfigDir = envDir;
+    return envDir;
+  }
+  // Stale: env set but the dir is gone. Most likely the outer
+  // launch's cleanup ran and we inherited its (now-dead) tmpdir
+  // path. Fall back to default and warn the user once on stderr —
+  // only when attached to a TTY, so non-interactive callers (CI,
+  // MCP boot, scripts piping stdout) stay quiet.
+  if (!_warnedStaleEnv && process.stderr.isTTY) {
+    _warnedStaleEnv = true;
+    const unsetHint =
+      process.env.SHELL?.endsWith("fish")
+        ? "set -e CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR CLAUDEMESH_IPC_TOKEN_FILE"
+        : "unset CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR CLAUDEMESH_IPC_TOKEN_FILE";
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `claudemesh: ignoring stale CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR=${envDir} (no config.json there); using ${DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR}.\n`
+        + `  Hint: this is usually a leftover env from a previous \`claudemesh launch\`. Clean it with:\n`
+        + `    ${unsetHint}\n`,
+    );
+  }
+  _resolvedConfigDir = DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR;
+  return DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR;
+}
 
 export const PATHS = {
-  CONFIG_DIR: process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR || join(home, ".claudemesh"),
+  get CONFIG_DIR() {
+    return resolveConfigDir();
+  },
   get CONFIG_FILE() {
     return join(this.CONFIG_DIR, "config.json");
   },
@@ -20,3 +92,12 @@ export const PATHS = {
   CLAUDE_JSON: join(home, ".claude.json"),
   CLAUDE_SETTINGS: join(home, ".claude", "settings.json"),
 } as const;
+
+/**
+ * Test-only: reset the memoized resolution. Not exported from the
+ * package barrel; reach in via the relative path from a test file.
+ */
+export function _resetPathsForTest(): void {
+  _resolvedConfigDir = null;
+  _warnedStaleEnv = false;
+}

apps/cli/tests/unit/paths-stale-env.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach, vi } from "vitest";
+import { mkdirSync, rmSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { tmpdir, homedir } from "node:os";
+
+/** Each test imports a fresh copy of paths.ts via dynamic import +
+ *  `_resetPathsForTest()` so memoization doesn't leak across cases. */
+
+const TEST_DIR = join(tmpdir(), "claudemesh-paths-test-" + Date.now());
+
+describe("paths CONFIG_DIR resolution", () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    delete process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR;
+    if (existsSync(TEST_DIR)) rmSync(TEST_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+  afterEach(() => {
+    delete process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR;
+    if (existsSync(TEST_DIR)) rmSync(TEST_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it("falls back to ~/.claudemesh when env var is unset", async () => {
+    const mod = await import("~/constants/paths.js");
+    mod._resetPathsForTest();
+    expect(mod.PATHS.CONFIG_DIR).toBe(join(homedir(), ".claudemesh"));
+  });
+
+  it("honors CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR when the dir exists, even without config.json", async () => {
+    mkdirSync(TEST_DIR, { recursive: true });
+    process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR = TEST_DIR;
+    const mod = await import("~/constants/paths.js");
+    mod._resetPathsForTest();
+    expect(mod.PATHS.CONFIG_DIR).toBe(TEST_DIR);
+  });
+
+  it("falls back to default when env points at a missing dir (stale-tmpdir case)", async () => {
+    process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR = "/var/folders/_nonexistent_claudemesh_dir_xyz123";
+    const mod = await import("~/constants/paths.js");
+    mod._resetPathsForTest();
+    // Suppress the stderr warning to keep test output clean
+    const stderr = vi.spyOn(process.stderr, "write").mockImplementation(() => true);
+    try {
+      expect(mod.PATHS.CONFIG_DIR).toBe(join(homedir(), ".claudemesh"));
+    } finally {
+      stderr.mockRestore();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("memoizes — second access returns the same path even if env changes mid-process", async () => {
+    mkdirSync(TEST_DIR, { recursive: true });
+    process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR = TEST_DIR;
+    const mod = await import("~/constants/paths.js");
+    mod._resetPathsForTest();
+    const first = mod.PATHS.CONFIG_DIR;
+    process.env.CLAUDEMESH_CONFIG_DIR = "/something/else";
+    expect(mod.PATHS.CONFIG_DIR).toBe(first);
+  });
+});