claudemesh requires an account — mesh membership is tied to user.id.
e8ad7a5 flipped the config default but the env var override at
env.config.ts:43 still defaulted to true, keeping the button visible.
Fixed at env var level + example files. Needs Coolify rebuild since
NEXT_PUBLIC_* is build-time in Next standalone.
Production /join on the broker (from feat 18c) rejects every invite
with invite_bad_signature because the web UI was emitting unsigned
payloads. This fixes that.
createMyMesh now generates ed25519 owner keypair + 32-byte root key
and stores all three on the mesh row. createMyInvite loads them,
signs the canonical invite bytes via crypto_sign_detached, and
emits a fully-signed payload matching what the broker expects:
payload = {v, mesh_id, mesh_slug, broker_url, expires_at,
mesh_root_key, role, owner_pubkey, signature}
canonical = same fields minus signature, "|"-delimited
signature = ed25519_sign(canonical, mesh.owner_secret_key)
token = base64url(JSON(payload)) ← stored as invite.token
The base64url(JSON) token IS the DB lookup key — broker's /join
does `WHERE invite.token = <that string>`, then re-verifies the
signature it extracts from the decoded payload.
Also drops the sha256 derivePlaceholderRootKey() helper and the
encodeInviteLink helper, both replaced by inline logic.
backfill extended: the one-off script now populates owner_pubkey
AND owner_secret_key AND root_key together in a single pass. Query
condition is `WHERE any of the three IS NULL`, so running it
post-migration catches every row regardless of partial prior fills.
requires packages/api to depend on libsodium-wrappers + types
(added). 64/64 broker tests still green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Populates mesh.mesh.owner_pubkey for pre-18c rows by generating a
fresh ed25519 keypair per mesh + emitting the secret key to stdout
for out-of-band hand-off.
Idempotent: only patches rows WHERE owner_pubkey IS NULL. Machine-
readable output (tab-separated: mesh_id, slug, pubkey, secret_key)
so operators can pipe into a secure store.
Usage:
DATABASE_URL=... bun apps/broker/scripts/backfill-owner-pubkey.ts > owners.tsv
# then securely distribute secrets to mesh owners
Verified locally: nulled smoke-test mesh's owner_pubkey → ran backfill
→ fresh keypair written, secret emitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WS handshake is now authenticated end-to-end. The broker proves that
every connected peer actually holds the secret key for the pubkey
they claim as identity — not just that they know the pubkey.
wire format change:
{type:"hello", meshId, memberId, pubkey, sessionId, pid, cwd,
timestamp, signature}
where signature = ed25519_sign(canonical, secretKey)
and canonical = `${meshId}|${memberId}|${pubkey}|${timestamp}`
broker verifies on every hello:
1. timestamp within ±60s of broker clock → else close(1008, timestamp_skew)
2. pubkey is 64 hex chars, signature is 128 hex chars → else malformed
3. crypto_sign_verify_detached(signature, canonical, pubkey) → else bad_signature
4. (existing) mesh.member row exists for (meshId, pubkey) → else unauthorized
All rejection paths close the WS with code 1008 + structured error
message + metrics counter increment (connections_rejected_total by
reason).
new modules:
- apps/broker/src/crypto.ts: canonicalHello, verifyHelloSignature,
HELLO_SKEW_MS constant
- apps/cli/src/crypto/hello-sig.ts: matching signHello helper
clients updated:
- apps/cli/src/ws/client.ts: signs hello before send
- apps/broker/scripts/{peer-a,peer-b}.ts (smoke-test): sign hellos
with seed-provided secret keys
new regression tests — tests/hello-signature.test.ts (7):
- valid signature accepted
- bad signature (signed with wrong key) rejected
- timestamp too old rejected (>60s)
- timestamp too far in future rejected (>60s)
- tampered canonical field (different meshId at verify time) rejected
- malformed hex pubkey rejected
- malformed signature length rejected
verified live:
- apps/broker/scripts/smoke-test.sh: full hello+ack+send+push flow
- apps/cli/scripts/roundtrip.ts: signed hello + encrypted message
- 55/55 tests pass
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Direct messages between peers are now end-to-end encrypted. The
broker only ever sees {nonce, ciphertext} — plaintext lives on the
two endpoints.
apps/cli/src/crypto/envelope.ts:
- encryptDirect(message, recipientPubkeyHex, senderSecretKeyHex)
→ {nonce, ciphertext} via crypto_box_easy, 24-byte fresh nonce
- decryptDirect(envelope, senderPubkeyHex, recipientSecretKeyHex)
→ plaintext or null (null on MAC failure / malformed input)
- ed25519 keys (from Step 17) are converted to X25519 on the fly via
crypto_sign_ed25519_{pk,sk}_to_curve25519 — one signing keypair
covers both signing + encryption roles.
BrokerClient.send():
- if targetSpec is a 64-hex pubkey → encrypt via crypto_box
- else (broadcast "*" or channel "#foo") → base64-wrapped plaintext
(shared-key encryption for channels lands in a later step)
InboundPush now carries:
- plaintext: string | null (decrypted body, null if decryption failed
OR it's a non-direct message)
- kind: "direct" | "broadcast" | "channel" | "unknown"
MCP check_messages formatter reads plaintext directly.
side-fixes pulled in during 18a:
- apps/broker/scripts/seed-test-mesh.ts now generates real ed25519
keypairs (the previous "aaaa…" / "bbbb…" fillers weren't valid
curve points, so crypto_sign_ed25519_pk_to_curve25519 rejected
them). Seed output now includes secretKey for each peer.
- apps/broker/src/broker.ts drainForMember wraps the atomic claim in
a CTE + outer ORDER BY so FIFO ordering is SQL-sourced, not
JS-sorted (Postgres microsecond timestamps collapse to the same
Date.getTime() milliseconds otherwise).
- vitest.config.ts fileParallelism: false — test files share
DB state via cleanupAllTestMeshes afterAll, so running them in
parallel caused one file's cleanup to race another's inserts.
- integration/health.test.ts "returns 200" now uses waitFullyHealthy
(a 200-only waiter) instead of waitHealthyOrAny — prevents a race
with the startup DB ping.
verified live:
- apps/cli/scripts/roundtrip.ts (direct A→B): ciphertext in DB is
opaque bytes (not base64-plaintext), decrypted correctly on arrival
- apps/cli/scripts/join-roundtrip.ts (full join → encrypted send):
PASSED
- 48/48 broker tests green
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds scripts/{seed-test-mesh,peer-a,peer-b,smoke-test}.ts|.sh that
prove an end-to-end message flow works against a real Postgres:
- seed-test-mesh.ts creates user+mesh+2 members with deterministic
hex pubkeys ("aa..aa", "bb..bb"), writes seed JSON to stdout
- peer-a.ts sends hello then a direct "send" message to peer B's
pubkey with fake ciphertext "hello-from-a"
- peer-b.ts sends hello, waits up to 5s for a push, asserts
senderPubkey matches peer A, exits 0/1
- smoke-test.sh wires the three together
Verified flow: hello registers presence row → send queues into
mesh.message_queue → fanout matches connected peer by pubkey →
drainForMember joins on mesh.member for senderPubkey → push lands
with ciphertext + correct sender attribution.
Also fixes a date-serialization bug that blocked the first run:
applyPendingHookStatus used `sql${col} >= ${jsDate}` which passed
JS Date.toString() to Postgres (failed to parse). Replaced raw
sql`` template with typed gte/desc/isNotNull operators from
drizzle-orm. Same fix applied in sweepPendingStatuses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
