Commit Graph

159 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alejandro Gutiérrez
64ca600195 chore(cli): rename package to claudemesh-cli (unscoped) for npm publish
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@claudemesh/cli was already taken on npm by an unrelated project
(claudemesh "domain packages", v1.0.7). PM picked option A: publish
unscoped as claudemesh-cli. Binary name stays "claudemesh" — users
type the natural thing on install:

  npm install -g claudemesh-cli
  claudemesh install
  claudemesh join ic://join/...

renamed references everywhere:
- apps/cli/package.json: name
- apps/cli/README.md: title + install command
- apps/cli/src/{index.ts, mcp/server.ts, commands/install.ts} headers
- docs/QUICKSTART.md: install command, version banner, npx hint
- docs/roadmap.md: package name

also (PM journey-friction #5): surface the "restart Claude Code" step
LOUDLY in install output. Added a yellow-bold warning line after the
✓ success lines so new users don't miss the restart step (MCP tools
only load on Claude Code restart).

  ⚠  RESTART CLAUDE CODE for MCP tools to appear.

ANSI colors gated on isTTY + NO_COLOR/TERM=dumb guards.

bundle rebuilt. ready for npm publish pending user's `npm adduser`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-05 14:41:59 +01:00
Alejandro Gutiérrez
714d82e4e7 chore(cli): bundle for node, prep for npm publish
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Makes @claudemesh/cli installable globally via npm without requiring
bun on user machines. (Bun stays the dev runtime; bundled output is
node-compatible.)

- bun build --target=node --outfile dist/index.js produces a 2.69MB
  standalone bundle with node-shebang banner
- package.json: add description/keywords/author/license/homepage/
  repository, set bin to ./dist/index.js, files=[dist, README, LICENSE],
  publishConfig.access=public, engines.node >=20
- prepublishOnly auto-runs the build
- pin zod from catalog: to 4.1.13 (npm rejects catalog: refs)
- swap Bun.spawnSync → node:child_process.spawnSync in install.ts
  (the only Bun-global usage in the package)
- strip shebang from src/index.ts (banner supplies it post-bundle)

install command now runs in two modes:
- BUNDLED (npm i -g): detects dist/index.js path, writes MCP entry
  with command "claudemesh" (relies on the global bin shim on PATH)
- SOURCE (bun src/index.ts, dev): preflights bun, writes MCP entry
  with command "bun <absolute-path> mcp"

verified end-to-end:
- node dist/index.js --help prints usage ✓
- node dist/index.js install writes correct ~/.claude.json ✓
- node dist/index.js mcp | tools/list returns all 5 tools ✓
- bun src/index.ts install (dev mode) still works ✓

NOT PUBLISHED YET — @claudemesh/cli is owned by an unrelated project
on npm. Awaiting user decision on alternative name (claudemesh-cli,
@alezmad/claudemesh-cli, or new org scope). Bundle is name-agnostic
and will reuse regardless.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-05 14:31:27 +01:00
Alejandro Gutiérrez
47304d2a52 feat(cli): install command auto-writes ~/.claude.json MCP entry
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The previous flow printed a \`claude mcp add ...\` command and asked
users to paste it. That's 2 steps, a typo surface, and a point of
user dropoff. Replace with direct read-modify-write of ~/.claude.json.

install:
- preflights bun on PATH (clear error + Bun.com link if missing)
- verifies the MCP entry file exists on disk
- reads ~/.claude.json (empty object if absent)
- adds/updates mcpServers.claudemesh with resolved absolute path
- writes back with 0600 perms, creates parent dir if needed
- read-back verification (bails loudly if post-write state is wrong)
- idempotent: re-running returns "unchanged" if entry already matches
- preserves existing mcpServers entries + other top-level config keys

uninstall:
- removes the claudemesh entry if present
- no-ops cleanly when entry or config file doesn't exist
- doesn't touch anything else

Both print a clear post-action hint: "Restart Claude Code to load
the MCP server. Then join a mesh with claudemesh join <invite-link>".

verified locally with HOME=/tmp/fake-home:
- fresh install → ✓ added, config emitted correctly
- re-install → ✓ unchanged (idempotent)
- install alongside existing "other-mcp" entry → both preserved,
  plus unrelated top-level keys kept verbatim
- uninstall → ✓ removed, claudemesh gone, other entries intact
- uninstall again → · not present (no error)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-05 14:19:58 +01:00
Alejandro Gutiérrez
0c4a9591fa feat(broker): invite signature verification + atomic one-time-use
Completes the v0.1.0 security model. Every /join is now gated by a
signed invite that the broker re-verifies against the mesh owner's
ed25519 pubkey, plus an atomic single-use counter.

schema (migrations/0001_demonic_karnak.sql):
- mesh.mesh.owner_pubkey: ed25519 hex of the invite signer
- mesh.invite.token_bytes: canonical signed bytes (for re-verification)
Both nullable; required for new meshes going forward.

canonical invite format (signed bytes):
  `${v}|${mesh_id}|${mesh_slug}|${broker_url}|${expires_at}|
   ${mesh_root_key}|${role}|${owner_pubkey}`

wire format — invite payload in ic://join/<base64url(JSON)> now has:
  owner_pubkey: "<64 hex>"
  signature:    "<128 hex>"

broker joinMesh() (apps/broker/src/broker.ts):
1. verify ed25519 signature over canonical bytes using payload's
   owner_pubkey → else invite_bad_signature
2. load mesh, ensure mesh.owner_pubkey matches payload's owner_pubkey
   → else invite_owner_mismatch (prevents a malicious admin from
   substituting their own owner key)
3. load invite row by token, verify mesh_id matches → else
   invite_mesh_mismatch
4. expiry check → else invite_expired
5. revoked check → else invite_revoked
6. idempotency: if pubkey is already a member, return existing id
   WITHOUT burning an invite use
7. atomic CAS: UPDATE used_count = used_count + 1 WHERE used_count <
   max_uses → if 0 rows affected, return invite_exhausted
8. insert member with role from payload

cli side:
- apps/cli/src/invite/parse.ts: zod-validated owner_pubkey + signature
  fields; client verifies signature immediately and rejects tampered
  links (fail-fast before even touching the broker)
- buildSignedInvite() helper: owners sign invites client-side
- enrollWithBroker sends {invite_token, invite_payload, peer_pubkey,
  display_name} (was: {mesh_id, peer_pubkey, display_name, role})
- parseInviteLink is now async (libsodium ready + verify)

seed-test-mesh.ts generates an owner keypair, sets mesh.owner_pubkey,
builds + signs an invite, stores the invite row, emits ownerPubkey +
ownerSecretKey + inviteToken + inviteLink in the output JSON.

tests — invite-signature.test.ts (9 new):
- valid signed invite → join succeeds
- tampered payload → invite_bad_signature
- signer not the mesh owner → invite_owner_mismatch
- expired invite → invite_expired
- revoked invite → invite_revoked
- exhausted (maxUses=2, 3rd join) → invite_exhausted
- idempotent re-join doesn't burn a use
- atomic single-use: 5 concurrent joins → exactly 1 success, 4 exhausted
- mesh_id payload vs DB row mismatch → invite_mesh_mismatch

verified live: tampered link blocked client-side with a clear error.
Unmodified link joins cleanly end-to-end (roundtrip.ts + join-roundtrip.ts
both pass). 64/64 tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-04 23:02:12 +01:00
Alejandro Gutiérrez
9d3dbcecaf feat(broker): verify ed25519 hello signature against member pubkey
WS handshake is now authenticated end-to-end. The broker proves that
every connected peer actually holds the secret key for the pubkey
they claim as identity — not just that they know the pubkey.

wire format change:
  {type:"hello", meshId, memberId, pubkey, sessionId, pid, cwd,
   timestamp, signature}
  where signature = ed25519_sign(canonical, secretKey)
  and canonical = `${meshId}|${memberId}|${pubkey}|${timestamp}`

broker verifies on every hello:
1. timestamp within ±60s of broker clock → else close(1008, timestamp_skew)
2. pubkey is 64 hex chars, signature is 128 hex chars → else malformed
3. crypto_sign_verify_detached(signature, canonical, pubkey) → else bad_signature
4. (existing) mesh.member row exists for (meshId, pubkey) → else unauthorized

All rejection paths close the WS with code 1008 + structured error
message + metrics counter increment (connections_rejected_total by
reason).

new modules:
- apps/broker/src/crypto.ts: canonicalHello, verifyHelloSignature,
  HELLO_SKEW_MS constant
- apps/cli/src/crypto/hello-sig.ts: matching signHello helper

clients updated:
- apps/cli/src/ws/client.ts: signs hello before send
- apps/broker/scripts/{peer-a,peer-b}.ts (smoke-test): sign hellos
  with seed-provided secret keys

new regression tests — tests/hello-signature.test.ts (7):
- valid signature accepted
- bad signature (signed with wrong key) rejected
- timestamp too old rejected (>60s)
- timestamp too far in future rejected (>60s)
- tampered canonical field (different meshId at verify time) rejected
- malformed hex pubkey rejected
- malformed signature length rejected

verified live:
- apps/broker/scripts/smoke-test.sh: full hello+ack+send+push flow
- apps/cli/scripts/roundtrip.ts: signed hello + encrypted message
- 55/55 tests pass

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-04 22:53:40 +01:00
Alejandro Gutiérrez
81a8d0714b feat(crypto): client-side direct-message encryption with crypto_box
Direct messages between peers are now end-to-end encrypted. The
broker only ever sees {nonce, ciphertext} — plaintext lives on the
two endpoints.

apps/cli/src/crypto/envelope.ts:
- encryptDirect(message, recipientPubkeyHex, senderSecretKeyHex)
  → {nonce, ciphertext} via crypto_box_easy, 24-byte fresh nonce
- decryptDirect(envelope, senderPubkeyHex, recipientSecretKeyHex)
  → plaintext or null (null on MAC failure / malformed input)
- ed25519 keys (from Step 17) are converted to X25519 on the fly via
  crypto_sign_ed25519_{pk,sk}_to_curve25519 — one signing keypair
  covers both signing + encryption roles.

BrokerClient.send():
- if targetSpec is a 64-hex pubkey → encrypt via crypto_box
- else (broadcast "*" or channel "#foo") → base64-wrapped plaintext
  (shared-key encryption for channels lands in a later step)

InboundPush now carries:
- plaintext: string | null   (decrypted body, null if decryption failed
                              OR it's a non-direct message)
- kind: "direct" | "broadcast" | "channel" | "unknown"
MCP check_messages formatter reads plaintext directly.

side-fixes pulled in during 18a:
- apps/broker/scripts/seed-test-mesh.ts now generates real ed25519
  keypairs (the previous "aaaa…" / "bbbb…" fillers weren't valid
  curve points, so crypto_sign_ed25519_pk_to_curve25519 rejected
  them). Seed output now includes secretKey for each peer.
- apps/broker/src/broker.ts drainForMember wraps the atomic claim in
  a CTE + outer ORDER BY so FIFO ordering is SQL-sourced, not
  JS-sorted (Postgres microsecond timestamps collapse to the same
  Date.getTime() milliseconds otherwise).
- vitest.config.ts fileParallelism: false — test files share
  DB state via cleanupAllTestMeshes afterAll, so running them in
  parallel caused one file's cleanup to race another's inserts.
- integration/health.test.ts "returns 200" now uses waitFullyHealthy
  (a 200-only waiter) instead of waitHealthyOrAny — prevents a race
  with the startup DB ping.

verified live:
- apps/cli/scripts/roundtrip.ts (direct A→B): ciphertext in DB is
  opaque bytes (not base64-plaintext), decrypted correctly on arrival
- apps/cli/scripts/join-roundtrip.ts (full join → encrypted send):
  PASSED
- 48/48 broker tests green

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-04 22:48:33 +01:00
Alejandro Gutiérrez
758ea0e42c feat(cli): invite-link parsing + join flow + keypair generation
End-to-end join: user runs `claudemesh join ic://join/<base64>` and
walks away with a signed member record + persistent keypair.

new modules:
- src/crypto/keypair.ts: libsodium ed25519 keypair generation. Format
  is crypto_sign_keypair raw bytes, hex-encoded (32-byte pub, 64-byte
  secret = seed || pub). Same format libsodium will need in Step 18
  for sign/verify.
- src/invite/parse.ts: ic://join/<base64url(JSON)> parser with Zod
  shape validation + expiry check. encodeInviteLink helper for tests.
- src/invite/enroll.ts: POST /join to broker, converts ws:// to http://
  transparently.

rewritten join command wires them together:
  1. parse invite → 2. generate keypair → 3. POST /join → 4. persist
  config → 5. print success.

state/config.ts: saveConfig now chmods the file to 0600 after write,
since it holds ed25519 secret keys. No-op on Windows.

signature verification (step 18) + invite-token one-time-use tracking
are deferred. For now the invite link is a plain bearer token; any
client with the link can join.

verified end-to-end via apps/cli/scripts/join-roundtrip.ts:
  build invite → run join subprocess → load new config → connect as
  new member → send A→B → receive push. Flow passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-04 22:36:32 +01:00
Alejandro Gutiérrez
20d968f989 feat(cli): websocket client + MCP tool integration
broker-client: full WS client with hello handshake + ack, auto-reconnect
with exponential backoff (1s → 30s capped), in-memory outbound queue
(max 100) during reconnect, 500-entry push buffer for check_messages.

MCP tool integration:
- send_message: "slug:target" prefix or single-mesh fast path
- check_messages: drains push buffers across all clients
- set_status: fans manual override across all connected meshes
- set_summary: stubbed (broker protocol extension needed)
- list_peers: stubbed — lists connected mesh slugs + statuses

manager module holds Map<meshId, BrokerClient>, starts on MCP server
boot for every joined mesh in ~/.claudemesh/config.json.

new CLI command: seed-test-mesh injects a mesh row for dev testing.

also fixes a broker-side hello race: handleHello sent hello_ack before
the caller closure assigned presenceId, so clients sending right after
the ack hit the no_hello check. Fix: return presenceId, caller sets
closure var, THEN sends hello_ack. Queue drain is fire-and-forget now.

round-trip verified: two clients, A→B, push received with correct
senderPubkey + ciphertext. 44/44 broker tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-04 22:30:11 +01:00
Alejandro Gutiérrez
8931296e82 feat(cli): scaffold @claudemesh/cli MCP client package (stubs)
The user-facing tool. Two invocation modes:
  - `claudemesh mcp`           → MCP server (stdio), consumed by Claude Code
  - `claudemesh <subcommand>`  → human CLI

Layout:
  apps/cli/
  ├── package.json       bin: { claudemesh: ./src/index.ts }
  ├── README.md          install + usage
  └── src/
      ├── index.ts       dispatcher (mcp | install | join | list | leave | --help)
      ├── env.ts         CLAUDEMESH_BROKER_URL, CONFIG_DIR, DEBUG
      ├── mcp/
      │   ├── server.ts  MCP stdio server with 5 tools
      │   ├── tools.ts   tool schemas (send_message, list_peers,
      │   │              check_messages, set_summary, set_status)
      │   └── types.ts
      ├── ws/client.ts   broker connection (stub for 15b)
      ├── state/config.ts ~/.claudemesh/config.json (joined meshes + keys)
      └── commands/
          ├── install.ts print `claude mcp add ...` instruction
          ├── join.ts    parse ic://join/... (stub, Step 17)
          ├── list.ts    show joined meshes
          └── leave.ts   remove mesh from local config

Tool stubs return "not connected, run `claudemesh join <invite-link>`"
errors until 15b wires the WS client.

Verified:
- `bun src/index.ts --help` → prints usage
- `bun src/index.ts install` → prints MCP add command with resolved path
- `bun src/index.ts list` → "No meshes joined yet"
- `bun src/index.ts mcp` (via stdin) → returns tools/list with all 5 tools

Deps: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, ws, libsodium-wrappers, zod.
Lockfile regenerated in the same commit per claudemesh-3's flag —
avoids breaking Coolify's --frozen-lockfile deploys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-04 22:23:12 +01:00