4 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Alejandro Gutiérrez	004602a83c	fix(cli): v0.1.8 — remove Zod dependency (bun bundler crash) ... Replace Zod schemas with plain TypeScript validation in env.ts, config.ts, and invite/parse.ts. Zod 4 classes break under bun build --target=node (Class2 is not a constructor). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-06 10:51:42 +01:00
Alejandro Gutiérrez	59e999535d	feat(cli): accept https://claudemesh.com/join/<token> invite URL format ... Pairs with claudemesh-2's new /join/[token] landing page. Users can now paste a clickable HTTPS URL instead of the dev-only ic:// scheme. apps/cli/src/invite/parse.ts — new extractInviteToken() handles four input formats before handing the raw base64url token to the existing parseInviteLink pipeline: - https://claudemesh.com/join/<token> (primary, clickable) - https://claudemesh.com/<locale>/join/<token> (i18n prefix) - ic://join/<token> (still supported, dev) - <raw-token> (last resort: bare base64url) User-facing strings updated to the HTTPS form: - cli help: "join <url>" - install success message - list (no-meshes) hint - MCP server "no meshes" error - README.md primary example - docs/QUICKSTART.md Path A + Path B Verified extractInviteToken() on all 4 formats — each returns the same base64url token → same broker /join lookup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-05 16:32:50 +01:00
Alejandro Gutiérrez	0c4a9591fa	feat(broker): invite signature verification + atomic one-time-use ... Completes the v0.1.0 security model. Every /join is now gated by a signed invite that the broker re-verifies against the mesh owner's ed25519 pubkey, plus an atomic single-use counter. schema (migrations/0001_demonic_karnak.sql): - mesh.mesh.owner_pubkey: ed25519 hex of the invite signer - mesh.invite.token_bytes: canonical signed bytes (for re-verification) Both nullable; required for new meshes going forward. canonical invite format (signed bytes): `${v}|${mesh_id}|${mesh_slug}|${broker_url}|${expires_at}| ${mesh_root_key}|${role}|${owner_pubkey}` wire format — invite payload in ic://join/<base64url(JSON)> now has: owner_pubkey: "<64 hex>" signature: "<128 hex>" broker joinMesh() (apps/broker/src/broker.ts): 1. verify ed25519 signature over canonical bytes using payload's owner_pubkey → else invite_bad_signature 2. load mesh, ensure mesh.owner_pubkey matches payload's owner_pubkey → else invite_owner_mismatch (prevents a malicious admin from substituting their own owner key) 3. load invite row by token, verify mesh_id matches → else invite_mesh_mismatch 4. expiry check → else invite_expired 5. revoked check → else invite_revoked 6. idempotency: if pubkey is already a member, return existing id WITHOUT burning an invite use 7. atomic CAS: UPDATE used_count = used_count + 1 WHERE used_count < max_uses → if 0 rows affected, return invite_exhausted 8. insert member with role from payload cli side: - apps/cli/src/invite/parse.ts: zod-validated owner_pubkey + signature fields; client verifies signature immediately and rejects tampered links (fail-fast before even touching the broker) - buildSignedInvite() helper: owners sign invites client-side - enrollWithBroker sends {invite_token, invite_payload, peer_pubkey, display_name} (was: {mesh_id, peer_pubkey, display_name, role}) - parseInviteLink is now async (libsodium ready + verify) seed-test-mesh.ts generates an owner keypair, sets mesh.owner_pubkey, builds + signs an invite, stores the invite row, emits ownerPubkey + ownerSecretKey + inviteToken + inviteLink in the output JSON. tests — invite-signature.test.ts (9 new): - valid signed invite → join succeeds - tampered payload → invite_bad_signature - signer not the mesh owner → invite_owner_mismatch - expired invite → invite_expired - revoked invite → invite_revoked - exhausted (maxUses=2, 3rd join) → invite_exhausted - idempotent re-join doesn't burn a use - atomic single-use: 5 concurrent joins → exactly 1 success, 4 exhausted - mesh_id payload vs DB row mismatch → invite_mesh_mismatch verified live: tampered link blocked client-side with a clear error. Unmodified link joins cleanly end-to-end (roundtrip.ts + join-roundtrip.ts both pass). 64/64 tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-04 23:02:12 +01:00
Alejandro Gutiérrez	758ea0e42c	feat(cli): invite-link parsing + join flow + keypair generation ... End-to-end join: user runs `claudemesh join ic://join/<base64>` and walks away with a signed member record + persistent keypair. new modules: - src/crypto/keypair.ts: libsodium ed25519 keypair generation. Format is crypto_sign_keypair raw bytes, hex-encoded (32-byte pub, 64-byte secret = seed || pub). Same format libsodium will need in Step 18 for sign/verify. - src/invite/parse.ts: ic://join/<base64url(JSON)> parser with Zod shape validation + expiry check. encodeInviteLink helper for tests. - src/invite/enroll.ts: POST /join to broker, converts ws:// to http:// transparently. rewritten join command wires them together: 1. parse invite → 2. generate keypair → 3. POST /join → 4. persist config → 5. print success. state/config.ts: saveConfig now chmods the file to 0600 after write, since it holds ed25519 secret keys. No-op on Windows. signature verification (step 18) + invite-token one-time-use tracking are deferred. For now the invite link is a plain bearer token; any client with the link can join. verified end-to-end via apps/cli/scripts/join-roundtrip.ts: build invite → run join subprocess → load new config → connect as new member → send A→B → receive push. Flow passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-04 22:36:32 +01:00