4bc3c045ae3f3d1a23f3ff3988b4a4c657d11a3b
7 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Alejandro Gutiérrez
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c1fa3bcb5c |
feat: anthropic-style mesh + invite redesign (wave 1 checkpoint)
Ships the user-visible friction fixes and the foundation for the v2
invite protocol. API wiring + CLI client + email UI ship in wave 2.
Meshes — shipped
- Drop global UNIQUE on mesh.slug; mesh.id is canonical everywhere
- Server derives slug from name; create form has no slug field
- Two users can freely name their mesh "platform"; no collision errors
- Migration 0017
Invites v1 — shipped (URL shortener, backward compatible)
- New invite.code column (base62, 8 chars, nullable unique index)
- createMyInvite mints both token + short code; returns shortUrl
- GET /api/public/invite-code/:code resolves short code to token
- New route /i/[code] server-redirects to /join/[token]
- Invite generator UI shows short URL; QR encodes short URL
- Advanced fields (role/maxUses/expiresInDays) collapsed under disclosure
- Migration 0018
Invites v2 — foundation (broker + DB only; API+CLI+Web wiring in wave 2)
- Broker: canonicalInviteV2, verifyInviteV2, sealRootKeyToRecipient
- Broker: POST /invites/:code/claim endpoint (atomic single-use accounting)
- Broker tests: invite-v2.test.ts (signature, expiry, revocation, exhaustion)
- DB: mesh.invite gains version/capabilityV2/claimedByPubkey columns
- DB: new mesh.pending_invite table for email invites
- Migration 0019
- Contract locked in docs/protocol.md §v2 + SPEC.md §14b
Consent landing — shipped
- /join/[token] redesigned: explicit role, inviter, mesh stats, consent
- New server components: invite-card, role-badge, inviter-line, consent-summary
- "Join [mesh] as [Role]" primary action (not just "Join")
Error surfacing — shipped
- handle() now parses {error} responses from hono route catch blocks
- onError fallback includes timestamp so handle() can match apiErrorSchema
- Real error messages reach the UI instead of "Something went wrong"
Docs
- SPEC.md §14b: v2 invite protocol
- docs/protocol.md: v2 claim wire format
- docs/roadmap.md: status
- .artifacts/specs/2026-04-10-anthropic-vision-meshes-invites.md
Deferred to wave 2/3
- API claim route wiring (packages/api)
- createMyInvite v2 capability generation
- Email invite mutation + Postmark delivery
- CLI v2 join flow (x25519 keypair + unseal)
- Web invite-generator email field + v2 display
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Alejandro Gutiérrez
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0c4a9591fa |
feat(broker): invite signature verification + atomic one-time-use
Completes the v0.1.0 security model. Every /join is now gated by a
signed invite that the broker re-verifies against the mesh owner's
ed25519 pubkey, plus an atomic single-use counter.
schema (migrations/0001_demonic_karnak.sql):
- mesh.mesh.owner_pubkey: ed25519 hex of the invite signer
- mesh.invite.token_bytes: canonical signed bytes (for re-verification)
Both nullable; required for new meshes going forward.
canonical invite format (signed bytes):
`${v}|${mesh_id}|${mesh_slug}|${broker_url}|${expires_at}|
${mesh_root_key}|${role}|${owner_pubkey}`
wire format — invite payload in ic://join/<base64url(JSON)> now has:
owner_pubkey: "<64 hex>"
signature: "<128 hex>"
broker joinMesh() (apps/broker/src/broker.ts):
1. verify ed25519 signature over canonical bytes using payload's
owner_pubkey → else invite_bad_signature
2. load mesh, ensure mesh.owner_pubkey matches payload's owner_pubkey
→ else invite_owner_mismatch (prevents a malicious admin from
substituting their own owner key)
3. load invite row by token, verify mesh_id matches → else
invite_mesh_mismatch
4. expiry check → else invite_expired
5. revoked check → else invite_revoked
6. idempotency: if pubkey is already a member, return existing id
WITHOUT burning an invite use
7. atomic CAS: UPDATE used_count = used_count + 1 WHERE used_count <
max_uses → if 0 rows affected, return invite_exhausted
8. insert member with role from payload
cli side:
- apps/cli/src/invite/parse.ts: zod-validated owner_pubkey + signature
fields; client verifies signature immediately and rejects tampered
links (fail-fast before even touching the broker)
- buildSignedInvite() helper: owners sign invites client-side
- enrollWithBroker sends {invite_token, invite_payload, peer_pubkey,
display_name} (was: {mesh_id, peer_pubkey, display_name, role})
- parseInviteLink is now async (libsodium ready + verify)
seed-test-mesh.ts generates an owner keypair, sets mesh.owner_pubkey,
builds + signs an invite, stores the invite row, emits ownerPubkey +
ownerSecretKey + inviteToken + inviteLink in the output JSON.
tests — invite-signature.test.ts (9 new):
- valid signed invite → join succeeds
- tampered payload → invite_bad_signature
- signer not the mesh owner → invite_owner_mismatch
- expired invite → invite_expired
- revoked invite → invite_revoked
- exhausted (maxUses=2, 3rd join) → invite_exhausted
- idempotent re-join doesn't burn a use
- atomic single-use: 5 concurrent joins → exactly 1 success, 4 exhausted
- mesh_id payload vs DB row mismatch → invite_mesh_mismatch
verified live: tampered link blocked client-side with a clear error.
Unmodified link joins cleanly end-to-end (roundtrip.ts + join-roundtrip.ts
both pass). 64/64 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Alejandro Gutiérrez
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9d3dbcecaf |
feat(broker): verify ed25519 hello signature against member pubkey
WS handshake is now authenticated end-to-end. The broker proves that
every connected peer actually holds the secret key for the pubkey
they claim as identity — not just that they know the pubkey.
wire format change:
{type:"hello", meshId, memberId, pubkey, sessionId, pid, cwd,
timestamp, signature}
where signature = ed25519_sign(canonical, secretKey)
and canonical = `${meshId}|${memberId}|${pubkey}|${timestamp}`
broker verifies on every hello:
1. timestamp within ±60s of broker clock → else close(1008, timestamp_skew)
2. pubkey is 64 hex chars, signature is 128 hex chars → else malformed
3. crypto_sign_verify_detached(signature, canonical, pubkey) → else bad_signature
4. (existing) mesh.member row exists for (meshId, pubkey) → else unauthorized
All rejection paths close the WS with code 1008 + structured error
message + metrics counter increment (connections_rejected_total by
reason).
new modules:
- apps/broker/src/crypto.ts: canonicalHello, verifyHelloSignature,
HELLO_SKEW_MS constant
- apps/cli/src/crypto/hello-sig.ts: matching signHello helper
clients updated:
- apps/cli/src/ws/client.ts: signs hello before send
- apps/broker/scripts/{peer-a,peer-b}.ts (smoke-test): sign hellos
with seed-provided secret keys
new regression tests — tests/hello-signature.test.ts (7):
- valid signature accepted
- bad signature (signed with wrong key) rejected
- timestamp too old rejected (>60s)
- timestamp too far in future rejected (>60s)
- tampered canonical field (different meshId at verify time) rejected
- malformed hex pubkey rejected
- malformed signature length rejected
verified live:
- apps/broker/scripts/smoke-test.sh: full hello+ack+send+push flow
- apps/cli/scripts/roundtrip.ts: signed hello + encrypted message
- 55/55 tests pass
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Alejandro Gutiérrez
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81a8d0714b |
feat(crypto): client-side direct-message encryption with crypto_box
Direct messages between peers are now end-to-end encrypted. The
broker only ever sees {nonce, ciphertext} — plaintext lives on the
two endpoints.
apps/cli/src/crypto/envelope.ts:
- encryptDirect(message, recipientPubkeyHex, senderSecretKeyHex)
→ {nonce, ciphertext} via crypto_box_easy, 24-byte fresh nonce
- decryptDirect(envelope, senderPubkeyHex, recipientSecretKeyHex)
→ plaintext or null (null on MAC failure / malformed input)
- ed25519 keys (from Step 17) are converted to X25519 on the fly via
crypto_sign_ed25519_{pk,sk}_to_curve25519 — one signing keypair
covers both signing + encryption roles.
BrokerClient.send():
- if targetSpec is a 64-hex pubkey → encrypt via crypto_box
- else (broadcast "*" or channel "#foo") → base64-wrapped plaintext
(shared-key encryption for channels lands in a later step)
InboundPush now carries:
- plaintext: string | null (decrypted body, null if decryption failed
OR it's a non-direct message)
- kind: "direct" | "broadcast" | "channel" | "unknown"
MCP check_messages formatter reads plaintext directly.
side-fixes pulled in during 18a:
- apps/broker/scripts/seed-test-mesh.ts now generates real ed25519
keypairs (the previous "aaaa…" / "bbbb…" fillers weren't valid
curve points, so crypto_sign_ed25519_pk_to_curve25519 rejected
them). Seed output now includes secretKey for each peer.
- apps/broker/src/broker.ts drainForMember wraps the atomic claim in
a CTE + outer ORDER BY so FIFO ordering is SQL-sourced, not
JS-sorted (Postgres microsecond timestamps collapse to the same
Date.getTime() milliseconds otherwise).
- vitest.config.ts fileParallelism: false — test files share
DB state via cleanupAllTestMeshes afterAll, so running them in
parallel caused one file's cleanup to race another's inserts.
- integration/health.test.ts "returns 200" now uses waitFullyHealthy
(a 200-only waiter) instead of waitHealthyOrAny — prevents a race
with the startup DB ping.
verified live:
- apps/cli/scripts/roundtrip.ts (direct A→B): ciphertext in DB is
opaque bytes (not base64-plaintext), decrypted correctly on arrival
- apps/cli/scripts/join-roundtrip.ts (full join → encrypted send):
PASSED
- 48/48 broker tests green
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Alejandro Gutiérrez
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cd389c6bdd |
fix(broker): atomic message claim to prevent duplicate delivery
drainForMember previously ran SELECT undelivered rows, THEN UPDATE delivered_at. Two concurrent callers (e.g. WS fan-out on send + handleHello's own drain for the target) could both SELECT the same row before either UPDATEd, pushing the same envelope twice. now: single atomic UPDATE ... FROM member ... WHERE id IN ( SELECT id ... FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED ) RETURNING mq.*, m.peer_pubkey AS sender_pubkey. FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED is the key primitive — concurrent callers each claim DISJOINT sets, so a message can never be drained twice. Union of all concurrent drains still covers every eligible row. re-sorts RETURNING rows by created_at client-side (Postgres makes no FIFO guarantee on the RETURNING clause's output order), and normalizes created_at to Date since raw-sql results can come back as ISO strings. regression: tests/dup-delivery.test.ts (4 tests) - two concurrent drains produce disjoint result sets - six concurrent drains partition cleanly (20 messages, each drained once) - subsequent drain after success returns empty - FIFO ordering preserved within a single drain 48/48 tests pass. Live round-trip no longer logs the double-push. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Alejandro Gutiérrez
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3458860c1f |
test(broker): coverage for hardening modules — caps, limits, metrics, health, logs
Adds 23 tests across 4 files, taking total broker coverage from
21 → 44 passing in ~2.5s.
Unit tests (no I/O):
- tests/rate-limit.test.ts (6): TokenBucket capacity, refill rate,
no-overflow cap, independent buckets per key, sweep GC.
- tests/metrics.test.ts (5): all 10 series present in /metrics,
counter increment semantics, labelled series produce distinct lines,
gauge set overwrites, Prometheus format well-formed.
- tests/logging.test.ts (5): JSON per line, required fields (ts, level,
component, msg), context merging, level preservation, no plain-text
escape hatches.
Integration tests (spawn real broker subprocesses on random ports):
- tests/integration/health.test.ts (7):
* GET /health 200 + {status, db, version, gitSha, uptime} (healthy DB)
* GET /health 503 + {status:degraded, db:down} (unreachable DB)
* GET /metrics 200 text/plain with all expected series
* GET /nope → 404
* POST /hook/set-status oversized body → 413
* POST /hook/set-status 6th req/min → 429
* Rate limit isolation by (pid, cwd) key
Integration tests use node:child_process (vitest runs under Node, not
Bun — Bun.spawn isn't available). Each suite spawns its own broker
subprocess with a random port + tailored env vars.
Not yet covered (flagged for follow-up):
- WebSocket connection caps (needs seeded mesh + WS client setup)
- WebSocket message-size rejection (ws.maxPayload behavior)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Alejandro Gutiérrez
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e25115f1b0 |
test(broker): port test suite from claude-intercom to drizzle/postgres
21 integration tests (14 broker behavior + 7 path encoding), all passing in ~1s against a real Postgres (claudemesh_test database on the dev container). Test infrastructure: - apps/broker/vitest.config.ts extends @turbostarter/vitest-config/base - tests/helpers.ts: setupTestMesh() creates a fresh mesh + 2 members per test with a unique slug, returns cleanup function that cascades the delete. cleanupAllTestMeshes() as an afterAll safety net. - Mesh isolation in broker logic means tests don't interfere even when they share a database — no per-test TRUNCATE needed. Ported behavior tests (broker.test.ts, 14 tests): - hook flips status + queued "next" messages unblock - "now"-priority bypasses the working gate - DND is sacred (hooks cannot unset it) - hook source stays fresh through jsonl refresh - source decays to jsonl when hook signal goes stale - isHookFresh freshness window + source-type rules - TTL sweep flips stuck "working" → idle - TTL sweep leaves DND alone - first-turn race: hook fired pre-connect stashed in pending_status - applyPendingHookStatus picks newest matching entry - expired pending entries are ignored on connect - broadcast targetSpec (*) reaches all members - pubkey mismatch → message not drained - mesh isolation: peer in mesh X doesn't drain from mesh Y Ported encoding tests (encoding.test.ts, 7 tests): - macOS, Linux, Windows path encoding first-candidate correctness - Roberto's H:\Claude → H--Claude regression test (2026-04-04) - Candidate dedup, drive-stripped fallback, leading-dash fallback How to run: from apps/broker, DATABASE_URL="postgresql://.../claudemesh_test" pnpm test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |