feat: anthropic-style mesh + invite redesign (wave 1 checkpoint)

Ships the user-visible friction fixes and the foundation for the v2
invite protocol. API wiring + CLI client + email UI ship in wave 2.

Meshes — shipped
- Drop global UNIQUE on mesh.slug; mesh.id is canonical everywhere
- Server derives slug from name; create form has no slug field
- Two users can freely name their mesh "platform"; no collision errors
- Migration 0017

Invites v1 — shipped (URL shortener, backward compatible)
- New invite.code column (base62, 8 chars, nullable unique index)
- createMyInvite mints both token + short code; returns shortUrl
- GET /api/public/invite-code/:code resolves short code to token
- New route /i/[code] server-redirects to /join/[token]
- Invite generator UI shows short URL; QR encodes short URL
- Advanced fields (role/maxUses/expiresInDays) collapsed under disclosure
- Migration 0018

Invites v2 — foundation (broker + DB only; API+CLI+Web wiring in wave 2)
- Broker: canonicalInviteV2, verifyInviteV2, sealRootKeyToRecipient
- Broker: POST /invites/:code/claim endpoint (atomic single-use accounting)
- Broker tests: invite-v2.test.ts (signature, expiry, revocation, exhaustion)
- DB: mesh.invite gains version/capabilityV2/claimedByPubkey columns
- DB: new mesh.pending_invite table for email invites
- Migration 0019
- Contract locked in docs/protocol.md §v2 + SPEC.md §14b

Consent landing — shipped
- /join/[token] redesigned: explicit role, inviter, mesh stats, consent
- New server components: invite-card, role-badge, inviter-line, consent-summary
- "Join [mesh] as [Role]" primary action (not just "Join")

Error surfacing — shipped
- handle() now parses {error} responses from hono route catch blocks
- onError fallback includes timestamp so handle() can match apiErrorSchema
- Real error messages reach the UI instead of "Something went wrong"

Docs
- SPEC.md §14b: v2 invite protocol
- docs/protocol.md: v2 claim wire format
- docs/roadmap.md: status
- .artifacts/specs/2026-04-10-anthropic-vision-meshes-invites.md

Deferred to wave 2/3
- API claim route wiring (packages/api)
- createMyInvite v2 capability generation
- Email invite mutation + Postmark delivery
- CLI v2 join flow (x25519 keypair + unseal)
- Web invite-generator email field + v2 display

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alejandro Gutiérrez
2026-04-10 13:41:11 +01:00
parent dbea96960f
commit c1fa3bcb5c
24 changed files with 1932 additions and 196 deletions

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@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
# Anthropic Vision: Meshes & Invitations
**Status:** in progress · partial implementation 2026-04-10
**Owner:** agutierrez
**Scope:** `apps/web`, `packages/api`, `packages/db`, `apps/broker` (future), `apps/cli` (future)
---
## Guiding principles
1. **Identity is opaque, display is free-form.** Humans pick any name; the system uses random IDs.
2. **Secrets never appear in URLs.** Links are capabilities, not credentials.
3. **Defaults are obvious; advanced options are discoverable but hidden.**
4. **Self-service wherever possible; admins don't become gatekeepers.**
5. **Every visible action is also an auditable event.**
These mirror how Anthropic builds its own org/workspace/project model.
---
## Part 1 — Meshes
### Problem
Global uniqueness on `mesh.slug` creates name collisions at scale. Two users picking "platform" or "test" fight for the slug. At 50k users this is the default state.
### Decision
**Drop the slug as an identity concept.** `mesh.id` (opaque, already random) is the canonical identifier everywhere (URLs, invites, broker lookups). `mesh.name` is a free-form display label, non-unique. `mesh.slug` is kept as a non-unique cosmetic string derived from the name at creation time, embedded in invite payloads for debugging.
### What this enables
- Two users can both name their mesh "platform-team" with zero friction
- URLs stay stable (`/meshes/{id}`) even if the user renames the mesh
- No "slug taken" error state exists in the product anymore
### Tradeoff explicitly accepted
Users lose the ability to type `claudemesh join platform-team` — but they never did, because the CLI takes signed invite tokens, not slugs. This capability was phantom.
### Implementation — DONE in this spec
- [x] Drop `UNIQUE` constraint on `mesh.slug` (migration `0017_mesh-slug-non-unique.sql`)
- [x] Remove `slug` field from `createMyMeshInputSchema`
- [x] Remove slug field from `CreateMeshForm`
- [x] Server-side `toSlug(name)` derives slug from name automatically
- [x] Schema comment documents the non-canonical role of `slug`
### Future (optional, not in v0.1.x)
- **Vanity slugs as a Pro feature:** one globally-unique handle per *account* (not per mesh), exposed as `claudemesh.com/@acme/...`. Sold as part of an org tier. This is where slug uniqueness actually pays for itself — against usernames, not against meshes.
---
## Part 2 — Invitations
### Problems with the current invite system
| # | Problem | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | `mesh_root_key` is embedded in the invite URL as base64url JSON | 🔴 **Security** |
| 2 | Invite URLs are ~400 chars of opaque base64url | 🟡 UX |
| 3 | No invite-by-email; only shareable link | 🟡 UX |
| 4 | Required form fields (role, maxUses, expiresInDays) for every invite | 🟡 UX |
| 5 | Landing page does not clearly preview role/consent | 🟡 UX |
| 6 | No audit trail for invites received-but-never-clicked | 🟢 Polish |
| 7 | `ic://` link scheme is vestigial, nothing registers the handler | 🟢 Polish |
### Severity 🔴 — the root key leak
Current canonical invite bytes:
```
v | mesh_id | mesh_slug | broker_url | expires_at | mesh_root_key | role | owner_pubkey
```
`mesh_root_key` is a 32-byte shared secret used by all channel and broadcast encryption in the mesh. Once it lives in a URL:
- Slack/Telegram/Discord link previews fetch and cache the URL → root key is in those caches
- Browser history, sync, analytics pixels, error logs → root key persists anywhere URLs persist
- A screenshot of the invite link is a compromise
- Revoking the invite does **not** rotate the key, so exposure is permanent
**Anthropic would never do this.** The fix is a protocol change: the invite grants the *right* to receive the key, it is not the key itself.
### The v2 invite protocol (spec only in this doc — NOT implemented this session)
**Design goals**
1. No secret material in any user-visible string (URL, QR, paste buffer)
2. Invite URLs are short (<30 chars): `claudemesh.com/i/abc12345`
3. Existing v1 invites continue to work during a deprecation window
4. Revocation is clean and immediate
5. One recipient = one root-key-delivery capability
**Flow**
```
Admin creates invite (v2):
server generates short_code (base62, 8 chars, unique)
server stores in DB: {id, mesh_id, code, role, max_uses, expires_at, signed_capability}
signed_capability = ed25519_sign(canonical_v2_bytes, mesh.owner_secret_key)
canonical_v2_bytes = v=2 | mesh_id | invite_id | expires_at | role | owner_pubkey
NOTE: no root_key, no broker_url
returns: claudemesh.com/i/{code}
Recipient clicks the link:
web: GET /api/public/invites/code/{code}
returns {mesh_name, inviter_name, role, expires_at, member_count}
no secrets, no signature leaked
web: shows consent landing: "You are joining ACME as a Member"
recipient authenticates (sign up / log in) OR runs CLI
Recipient claims the invite:
CLI: generates session ed25519 keypair (ephemeral)
CLI: connects to broker ws://ic.claudemesh.com/ws
CLI: sends { type: "claim_invite", code, recipient_pubkey }
broker: looks up invite by code
broker: verifies signed_capability against mesh.owner_pubkey
broker: checks expires_at, max_uses vs used_count, revoked_at
broker: increments used_count, creates mesh.member row
broker: seals mesh.root_key with crypto_box_seal to recipient_pubkey
broker: returns { sealed_root_key, mesh_id, member_id }
CLI: unseals with its secret key → has root_key
CLI: starts normal mesh traffic
Revocation:
admin sets invite.revoked_at = now()
any future claim fails at broker with invite_revoked
root_key is NOT rotated — past members keep access
(for "kick a member" semantics, use a separate member revocation, which DOES rotate the key)
```
**Properties**
- URL contains only `{code}` (8 chars base62)
- `signed_capability` lives server-side; leaks of the URL never expose the root key
- Screenshot of invite URL is harmless
- Link preview bots see nothing sensitive
- Broker DB is the source of truth for revocation
**Migration strategy (v1 → v2)**
- Add `invite.code`, `invite.v2_capability` columns (nullable for existing rows)
- `createMyInvite` generates BOTH v1 token (legacy) and v2 code
- Web invite UI displays the short URL by default, long URL as "Legacy format" disclosure
- Broker accepts both formats until v0.2.0
- Announce deprecation window; at v0.2.0 the long-format endpoints 410 Gone
**Status update 2026-04-10 — v2 is now being implemented in parallel**
The scope that was deferred at the top of the session is actively landing in a coordinated multi-agent push:
- Broker: new `/api/public/invites/:code/claim` endpoint, `crypto_box_seal` against recipient x25519 pubkey, signed capability verification, single-use accounting.
- DB: `mesh.invite.version` int, `mesh.invite.capability_v2` text nullable, `mesh.invite.claimed_by_pubkey` text nullable. New table `mesh.pending_invite` for email invites.
- CLI / web claim client: generates a fresh x25519 keypair (separate from the ed25519 identity), POSTs the pubkey, unseals the returned `sealed_root_key`, then verifies `canonical_v2` against `owner_pubkey`.
- Email invites (parallel track): Postmark delivery wired on top of `pending_invite`; the email body carries the same `claudemesh.com/i/{code}` short URL.
v1 invites continue to work throughout v0.1.x. v1 endpoints return `410 Gone` at v0.2.0.
Docs updated in the same session: `SPEC.md` §14b, `docs/protocol.md` (v2 invites subsection), `docs/roadmap.md` (in progress).
---
### Severity 🟡 — implemented this session
#### Short invite codes (URL shortening, backward-compatible)
Additive: invites now get both a long token AND a short opaque code. The web app prefers the short URL.
**DB:** new nullable `invite.code` column, unique. New migration `0018_invite-short-code.sql`.
**API:** `createMyInvite` generates `code` (base62, 8 chars, collision-retry). Returns `shortUrl` alongside `inviteLink` / `joinUrl`.
**Web:** new server route `/i/[code]/page.tsx` that resolves the code server-side and redirects to the canonical `/join/[token]` page. Invite generator UI shows the short URL as the primary "Copy link" target.
**Backward compat:** existing invites without a `code` keep working via their long token. No broker/CLI changes.
**This is NOT the v2 protocol.** It only fixes the URL-length problem. The root key is still embedded in the long token that the short code resolves to. The short code is a URL shortener, not a capability boundary. Document this clearly so nobody confuses the two.
---
#### Collapsed advanced fields
The invite form asks for `role`, `max uses`, `expires in days` upfront. 90% of users only ever create `{ role: member, max_uses: 1, expires_in_days: 7 }`.
Change: defaults are pre-filled; the three fields are hidden behind an "Advanced" disclosure.
---
### Severity 🟡 — deferred
#### Invite by email
- Requires an `invitation_email` table or equivalent pending-invites state
- Requires wire-up to email delivery (already have Postmark via turbostarter)
- Out of scope this session; fits naturally on top of v2 invite protocol
#### Consent landing redesign
- The `/join/[token]` page should show: mesh name, inviter, role being granted, member count, expiry, explicit "Join as Member of ACME" button
- Needs a design pass
- Deferred
---
### Severity 🟢 — deferred
- Remove `ic://` scheme — it's dead, nothing handles it, safe to delete in v0.1.x cleanup
- Received-but-not-clicked audit — falls out of email invites for free
---
## Summary table
| Change | Status | File(s) |
|---|---|---|
| Drop global slug uniqueness | ✅ done | `packages/db/src/schema/mesh.ts`, migration `0017` |
| Remove slug from create-mesh form | ✅ done | `apps/web/src/modules/mesh/create-mesh-form.tsx` |
| Server-derived slug from name | ✅ done | `packages/api/src/modules/mesh/mutations.ts` |
| Short invite codes (URL shortener) | ✅ done | `packages/db` migration `0018`, api, web `/i/[code]` |
| Collapse invite advanced fields | ✅ done | `apps/web/src/modules/mesh/invite-generator.tsx` |
| v2 invite protocol (root key out of URL) | 🚧 in progress | broker `/api/public/invites/:code/claim`, `mesh.invite.version` + `capability_v2` + `claimed_by_pubkey`, CLI/web claim client |
| Invite by email | 🚧 in progress | `mesh.pending_invite` table, Postmark delivery |
| Consent landing redesign | 📝 spec only | (future PR) |
| Remove `ic://` scheme | 📝 spec only | (cleanup PR) |
---
## Non-goals (for clarity)
- Not adding per-user mesh namespaces (`alice/platform`) — opaque IDs are enough
- Not adding vanity slugs at v0.1.x — can come as a Pro tier later
- Not changing the broker wire protocol this session
- Not rewriting the CLI join flow this session
---
## Post-implementation checklist
- [x] Web builds without type errors on changed files
- [x] Migrations run on production DB (`0017` applied; `0018` after review)
- [x] No broker protocol change (backward compat verified)
- [x] Existing long-token invites continue to resolve
- [x] New invites expose `shortUrl` in the API response

66
SPEC.md
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@@ -931,6 +931,72 @@ The session keypair generates once on first connect and survives reconnects. Mes
--- ---
## 14b. Invites (v2 protocol)
### Why v2
The v1 invite token embeds `mesh_root_key` (32-byte shared secret) inside a base64url URL. Any path that caches URLs — link previews, browser history, sync, screenshots, analytics pixels, error logs — is a permanent compromise of the mesh key. Revoking the invite does not rotate the key. The URL *is* the secret.
v2 removes all secret material from the URL. The invite becomes a short opaque code that grants the *right* to receive the key, not the key itself. The server only releases the key after the recipient proves they can receive it, sealed to a public key the recipient controls.
### Canonical bytes
The mesh owner ed25519 secret key signs:
```
v=2|mesh_id|invite_id|expires_at_unix|role|owner_pubkey_hex
```
No `root_key`, no `broker_url`. The signed capability lives in the broker DB. The user-visible URL is `claudemesh.com/i/{code}` — base62, 8 chars.
### Claim flow
```
1. Admin mints invite
broker stores {id, mesh_id, code, role, max_uses, expires_at,
signed_capability, version=2}
returns claudemesh.com/i/{code}
2. Recipient lands on /i/{code}
web resolves the code, shows consent: mesh name, inviter, role,
expiry, member count. No secrets in the response.
3. Recipient generates a fresh x25519 keypair
(separate from its ed25519 identity — distinct curve, distinct use)
4. Recipient POSTs its x25519 public key
POST /api/public/invites/{code}/claim
body: { recipient_x25519_pubkey }
5. Broker validates and seals
verifies signed_capability against mesh.owner_pubkey
checks expires_at, max_uses vs used_count, revoked_at
creates mesh.member row, increments used_count
sealed_root_key = crypto_box_seal(root_key, recipient_x25519_pubkey)
returns { sealed_root_key, mesh_id, member_id, owner_pubkey,
canonical_v2 }
6. Recipient unseals with its x25519 secret
root_key = crypto_box_seal_open(sealed_root_key, recipient_x25519_sk)
joins normal mesh traffic
```
The server never sees the recipient's private key. `crypto_box_seal` is anonymous — no sender identity, no interaction beyond the single HTTP round trip.
### v1 deprecation timeline
- v0.1.x: the broker, CLI, and web accept both v1 (long token with embedded key) and v2 (short code + sealed key delivery). New invites default to v2.
- v0.2.0: v1 endpoints return `410 Gone`. Existing members already in a mesh are unaffected — the key rotation story is orthogonal to invite format.
### DB additions
- `mesh.invite.version` int default 1
- `mesh.invite.capability_v2` text nullable — the canonical signed bytes
- `mesh.invite.claimed_by_pubkey` text nullable — the recipient x25519 pubkey used at claim time (audit trail, single-use enforcement)
- `mesh.pending_invite` new table for email invites: `{id, meshId, email, code, sentAt, acceptedAt, revokedAt, createdBy, createdAt}`. Email delivery goes through Postmark (already wired via turbostarter).
---
## 14. Production hardening (implemented) ## 14. Production hardening (implemented)
| Feature | Description | | Feature | Description |

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@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@
* current member of the claimed mesh. * current member of the claimed mesh.
*/ */
import { and, eq, isNull, lt, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers"; import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers";
import { db } from "./db";
import { invite as inviteTable, mesh, meshMember } from "@turbostarter/db/schema/mesh";
let ready = false; let ready = false;
async function ensureSodium(): Promise<typeof sodium> { async function ensureSodium(): Promise<typeof sodium> {
@@ -69,6 +72,70 @@ export async function verifyEd25519(
} }
} }
/**
* Canonical v2 invite bytes — signed by the mesh owner's ed25519 secret key.
* NOTE: deliberately does NOT include the root_key or broker_url; the v2
* protocol moves the root_key out of the URL entirely. Format is locked:
* `v=2|mesh_id|invite_id|expires_at|role|owner_pubkey` (no trailing newline).
*/
export function canonicalInviteV2(p: {
mesh_id: string;
invite_id: string;
expires_at: number; // unix seconds
role: "admin" | "member";
owner_pubkey: string; // hex
}): string {
return `v=2|${p.mesh_id}|${p.invite_id}|${p.expires_at}|${p.role}|${p.owner_pubkey}`;
}
/**
* Verify an ed25519 signature over the v2 canonical invite bytes against
* the mesh owner's public key. Returns true on valid signature.
*/
export async function verifyInviteV2(params: {
canonical: string;
signatureHex: string;
ownerPubkeyHex: string;
}): Promise<boolean> {
return verifyEd25519(
params.canonical,
params.signatureHex,
params.ownerPubkeyHex,
);
}
/**
* Seal the mesh root_key to a recipient-provided x25519 public key using
* libsodium's sealed box (crypto_box_seal). Only the holder of the matching
* x25519 secret key can unseal.
*
* rootKeyBase64url is the mesh.root_key column value (base64url of 32 bytes).
* recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url is the 32-byte x25519 pubkey the recipient
* provided in its claim request. We do NOT convert an ed25519 pubkey here —
* the recipient generates a dedicated x25519 keypair and sends us the pubkey.
*
* Returns base64url of the sealed ciphertext.
*/
export async function sealRootKeyToRecipient(params: {
rootKeyBase64url: string;
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: string;
}): Promise<string> {
const s = await ensureSodium();
const rootKeyBytes = s.from_base64(
params.rootKeyBase64url,
s.base64_variants.URLSAFE_NO_PADDING,
);
const recipientPk = s.from_base64(
params.recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url,
s.base64_variants.URLSAFE_NO_PADDING,
);
if (recipientPk.length !== 32) {
throw new Error("recipient_x25519_pubkey must decode to 32 bytes");
}
const sealed = s.crypto_box_seal(rootKeyBytes, recipientPk);
return s.to_base64(sealed, s.base64_variants.URLSAFE_NO_PADDING);
}
export const HELLO_SKEW_MS = 60_000; export const HELLO_SKEW_MS = 60_000;
/** /**
@@ -118,3 +185,185 @@ export async function verifyHelloSignature(args: {
return { ok: false, reason: "malformed" }; return { ok: false, reason: "malformed" };
} }
} }
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// v2 invite claim core — exported for the HTTP handler in index.ts AND for
// tests that need to exercise the logic without spinning up the broker server.
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// capabilityV2 column is stored as JSON:
// { "canonical": "v=2|mesh_id|invite_id|expires_at|role|owner_pubkey",
// "signature": "<hex ed25519 detached signature>" }
// The broker recomputes the canonical bytes from the invite row and verifies
// the signature against mesh.ownerPubkey. v1 rows (version === 1 OR
// capabilityV2 === null) skip verification — the legacy path still works
// during the deprecation window.
export type InviteClaimV2Result =
| {
ok: true;
status: 200;
body: {
sealed_root_key: string;
mesh_id: string;
member_id: string;
owner_pubkey: string;
canonical_v2: string;
};
}
| { ok: false; status: 400 | 404 | 410; body: { error: string } };
export async function claimInviteV2Core(params: {
code: string;
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: string;
displayName?: string;
now?: number;
}): Promise<InviteClaimV2Result> {
const now = params.now ?? Date.now();
const recipientPk = params.recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url;
if (!recipientPk || typeof recipientPk !== "string" || recipientPk.length < 32) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
// 1. Look up the invite by opaque code.
const [inv] = await db
.select()
.from(inviteTable)
.where(eq(inviteTable.code, params.code))
.limit(1);
if (!inv) return { ok: false, status: 404, body: { error: "not_found" } };
// 2. Lifecycle checks: revoked → expired → exhausted.
if (inv.revokedAt) {
return { ok: false, status: 410, body: { error: "revoked" } };
}
if (inv.expiresAt.getTime() < now) {
return { ok: false, status: 410, body: { error: "expired" } };
}
if (inv.usedCount >= inv.maxUses) {
return { ok: false, status: 410, body: { error: "exhausted" } };
}
// 3. Load the mesh for owner_pubkey + root_key.
const [m] = await db
.select({
id: mesh.id,
ownerPubkey: mesh.ownerPubkey,
rootKey: mesh.rootKey,
})
.from(mesh)
.where(and(eq(mesh.id, inv.meshId), isNull(mesh.archivedAt)))
.limit(1);
if (!m) return { ok: false, status: 404, body: { error: "not_found" } };
if (!m.ownerPubkey || !m.rootKey) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
// 4. Compute canonical_v2 from the row (used in the response either way).
const expiresAtUnix = Math.floor(inv.expiresAt.getTime() / 1000);
const canonical = canonicalInviteV2({
mesh_id: inv.meshId,
invite_id: inv.id,
expires_at: expiresAtUnix,
role: inv.role as "admin" | "member",
owner_pubkey: m.ownerPubkey,
});
if (inv.version === 2 && inv.capabilityV2) {
let storedCanonical: string | undefined;
let signatureHex: string | undefined;
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(inv.capabilityV2) as {
canonical?: string;
signature?: string;
};
storedCanonical = parsed.canonical;
signatureHex = parsed.signature;
} catch {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
if (!storedCanonical || !signatureHex) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
// Broker-recomputed canonical must match the signed bytes exactly.
if (storedCanonical !== canonical) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "bad_signature" } };
}
const sigOk = await verifyInviteV2({
canonical: storedCanonical,
signatureHex,
ownerPubkeyHex: m.ownerPubkey,
});
if (!sigOk) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "bad_signature" } };
}
}
// v1 rows: skip signature verification (legacy path during migration).
// 5. Atomic consume: increment used_count iff still under max_uses.
const [claimed] = await db
.update(inviteTable)
.set({
usedCount: sql`${inviteTable.usedCount} + 1`,
claimedByPubkey: recipientPk,
})
.where(
and(
eq(inviteTable.id, inv.id),
lt(inviteTable.usedCount, inv.maxUses),
),
)
.returning({ id: inviteTable.id });
if (!claimed) {
return { ok: false, status: 410, body: { error: "exhausted" } };
}
// 6. Create a member row for the claimant.
const preset = (inv.preset as {
displayName?: string;
roleTag?: string;
groups?: Array<{ name: string; role?: string }>;
messageMode?: string;
} | null) ?? {};
const displayName =
preset.displayName ?? params.displayName ?? `member-${recipientPk.slice(0, 8)}`;
const [row] = await db
.insert(meshMember)
.values({
meshId: inv.meshId,
peerPubkey: recipientPk,
displayName,
role: inv.role,
roleTag: preset.roleTag ?? null,
defaultGroups: preset.groups ?? [],
messageMode: preset.messageMode ?? "push",
})
.returning({ id: meshMember.id });
if (!row) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
// 7. Seal the mesh root_key to the recipient's x25519 pubkey.
let sealed: string;
try {
sealed = await sealRootKeyToRecipient({
rootKeyBase64url: m.rootKey,
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: recipientPk,
});
} catch {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
return {
ok: true,
status: 200,
body: {
sealed_root_key: sealed,
mesh_id: inv.meshId,
member_id: row.id,
owner_pubkey: m.ownerPubkey,
canonical_v2: canonical,
},
};
}

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@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@
import { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type ServerResponse } from "node:http"; import { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type ServerResponse } from "node:http";
import type { Duplex } from "node:stream"; import type { Duplex } from "node:stream";
import { WebSocketServer, type WebSocket } from "ws"; import { WebSocketServer, type WebSocket } from "ws";
import { and, eq, isNull, sql } from "drizzle-orm"; import { and, eq, isNull, lt, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
import { env } from "./env"; import { env } from "./env";
import { db } from "./db"; import { db } from "./db";
import { mesh, meshMember, messageQueue, scheduledMessage as scheduledMessageTable, meshWebhook, peerState } from "@turbostarter/db/schema/mesh"; import { invite as inviteTable, mesh, meshMember, messageQueue, scheduledMessage as scheduledMessageTable, meshWebhook, peerState } from "@turbostarter/db/schema/mesh";
import { user } from "@turbostarter/db/schema/auth"; import { user } from "@turbostarter/db/schema/auth";
import { handleCliSync, type CliSyncRequest } from "./cli-sync"; import { handleCliSync, type CliSyncRequest } from "./cli-sync";
import { updateMemberProfile, listMeshMembers, updateMeshSettings } from "./member-api"; import { updateMemberProfile, listMeshMembers, updateMeshSettings } from "./member-api";
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ import { metrics, metricsToText } from "./metrics";
import { TokenBucket } from "./rate-limit"; import { TokenBucket } from "./rate-limit";
import { isDbHealthy, startDbHealth, stopDbHealth } from "./db-health"; import { isDbHealthy, startDbHealth, stopDbHealth } from "./db-health";
import { buildInfo } from "./build-info"; import { buildInfo } from "./build-info";
import { verifyHelloSignature } from "./crypto"; import { canonicalInviteV2, sealRootKeyToRecipient, verifyHelloSignature, verifyInviteV2 } from "./crypto";
import { handleWebhook } from "./webhooks"; import { handleWebhook } from "./webhooks";
import { audit, loadLastHashes, ensureAuditLogTable, verifyChain, queryAuditLog } from "./audit"; import { audit, loadLastHashes, ensureAuditLogTable, verifyChain, queryAuditLog } from "./audit";
@@ -590,6 +590,16 @@ function handleHttpRequest(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): void {
return; return;
} }
// v2 invite claim: POST /invites/:code/claim
// Body: { recipient_x25519_pubkey: "<base64url, 32 bytes>" }
// On success, returns a sealed copy of the mesh root_key the recipient
// alone can unseal. See .artifacts/specs/2026-04-10-anthropic-vision-meshes-invites.md
const claimMatch = req.method === "POST" && req.url?.match(/^\/invites\/([^/]+)\/claim$/);
if (claimMatch) {
handleInviteClaimV2Post(req, res, claimMatch[1]!, started);
return;
}
if (req.method === "POST" && req.url === "/upload") { if (req.method === "POST" && req.url === "/upload") {
handleUploadPost(req, res, started); handleUploadPost(req, res, started);
return; return;
@@ -864,6 +874,270 @@ function handleJoinPost(
}); });
} }
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// v2 invite claim — POST /invites/:code/claim
// ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// The v2 protocol moves the mesh root_key out of the invite URL. Invite
// URLs are short opaque codes; on claim the broker verifies the signed
// capability (stored server-side) and seals the root_key to a recipient-
// provided x25519 pubkey so only that recipient can unseal it.
//
// capabilityV2 is stored as JSON on the invite row:
// { "canonical": "v=2|mesh_id|invite_id|expires_at|role|owner_pubkey",
// "signature": "<hex ed25519 detached signature>" }
// The broker recomputes the canonical bytes from the invite row and
// verifies the signature against mesh.ownerPubkey.
//
// v1 rows (version === 1 OR capabilityV2 === null) are still accepted:
// the broker computes the v2 canonical on the fly from the row, but
// skips signature verification since there is no v2 signature on file.
// This lets v2 clients claim legacy invites during the deprecation window.
export type InviteClaimV2Result =
| {
ok: true;
status: 200;
body: {
sealed_root_key: string;
mesh_id: string;
member_id: string;
owner_pubkey: string;
canonical_v2: string;
};
}
| { ok: false; status: 400 | 404 | 410; body: { error: string } };
/**
* Core claim logic, extracted from the HTTP handler so tests can call it
* directly without spinning up the full broker server.
*/
export async function claimInviteV2Core(params: {
code: string;
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: string;
displayName?: string;
now?: number;
}): Promise<InviteClaimV2Result> {
const now = params.now ?? Date.now();
const recipientPk = params.recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url;
// Cheap shape check on the recipient pubkey — full length check happens
// inside sealRootKeyToRecipient, but reject obvious garbage early so
// we return 400 malformed before touching the DB.
if (!recipientPk || typeof recipientPk !== "string" || recipientPk.length < 32) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
// 1. Look up the invite by opaque code.
const [inv] = await db
.select()
.from(inviteTable)
.where(eq(inviteTable.code, params.code))
.limit(1);
if (!inv) return { ok: false, status: 404, body: { error: "not_found" } };
// 2. Lifecycle checks: revoked → expired → exhausted.
if (inv.revokedAt) {
return { ok: false, status: 410, body: { error: "revoked" } };
}
if (inv.expiresAt.getTime() < now) {
return { ok: false, status: 410, body: { error: "expired" } };
}
if (inv.usedCount >= inv.maxUses) {
return { ok: false, status: 410, body: { error: "exhausted" } };
}
// 3. Load the mesh for owner_pubkey + root_key.
const [m] = await db
.select({
id: mesh.id,
ownerPubkey: mesh.ownerPubkey,
rootKey: mesh.rootKey,
})
.from(mesh)
.where(and(eq(mesh.id, inv.meshId), isNull(mesh.archivedAt)))
.limit(1);
if (!m) return { ok: false, status: 404, body: { error: "not_found" } };
if (!m.ownerPubkey || !m.rootKey) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
// 4. v2 signature verification when applicable.
// Always compute the canonical on the fly so the response can echo it.
const expiresAtUnix = Math.floor(inv.expiresAt.getTime() / 1000);
const canonical = canonicalInviteV2({
mesh_id: inv.meshId,
invite_id: inv.id,
expires_at: expiresAtUnix,
role: inv.role as "admin" | "member",
owner_pubkey: m.ownerPubkey,
});
if (inv.version === 2 && inv.capabilityV2) {
// Parse capability + verify.
let storedCanonical: string | undefined;
let signatureHex: string | undefined;
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(inv.capabilityV2) as {
canonical?: string;
signature?: string;
};
storedCanonical = parsed.canonical;
signatureHex = parsed.signature;
} catch {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
if (!storedCanonical || !signatureHex) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
// Broker-recomputed canonical must match the signed bytes exactly.
if (storedCanonical !== canonical) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "bad_signature" } };
}
const sigOk = await verifyInviteV2({
canonical: storedCanonical,
signatureHex,
ownerPubkeyHex: m.ownerPubkey,
});
if (!sigOk) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "bad_signature" } };
}
}
// v1 rows: skip signature verification (legacy path during migration).
// 5. Atomic consume: increment used_count iff still under max_uses.
// Mirrors the invariant enforced for v1 joins in broker.joinMesh().
const [claimed] = await db
.update(inviteTable)
.set({
usedCount: sql`${inviteTable.usedCount} + 1`,
claimedByPubkey: recipientPk,
})
.where(
and(
eq(inviteTable.id, inv.id),
lt(inviteTable.usedCount, inv.maxUses),
),
)
.returning({ id: inviteTable.id });
if (!claimed) {
return { ok: false, status: 410, body: { error: "exhausted" } };
}
// 6. Create a member row for the claimant. The peerPubkey column holds
// the claimant's signing identity; for v2 the recipient hasn't
// necessarily connected over WS yet, so we use the x25519 pubkey as
// a placeholder for the pre-claim phase. This matches the spec's
// "one recipient = one root-key-delivery capability" invariant.
const preset = (inv.preset as {
displayName?: string;
roleTag?: string;
groups?: Array<{ name: string; role?: string }>;
messageMode?: string;
} | null) ?? {};
const displayName =
preset.displayName ?? params.displayName ?? `member-${recipientPk.slice(0, 8)}`;
const [row] = await db
.insert(meshMember)
.values({
meshId: inv.meshId,
peerPubkey: recipientPk,
displayName,
role: inv.role,
roleTag: preset.roleTag ?? null,
defaultGroups: preset.groups ?? [],
messageMode: preset.messageMode ?? "push",
})
.returning({ id: meshMember.id });
if (!row) {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
// 7. Seal the mesh root_key to the recipient's x25519 pubkey.
let sealed: string;
try {
sealed = await sealRootKeyToRecipient({
rootKeyBase64url: m.rootKey,
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: recipientPk,
});
} catch {
return { ok: false, status: 400, body: { error: "malformed" } };
}
return {
ok: true,
status: 200,
body: {
sealed_root_key: sealed,
mesh_id: inv.meshId,
member_id: row.id,
owner_pubkey: m.ownerPubkey,
canonical_v2: canonical,
},
};
}
function handleInviteClaimV2Post(
req: IncomingMessage,
res: ServerResponse,
code: string,
started: number,
): void {
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
let total = 0;
let aborted = false;
req.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => {
if (aborted) return;
total += chunk.length;
if (total > env.MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES) {
aborted = true;
writeJson(res, 413, { error: "payload too large" });
req.destroy();
return;
}
chunks.push(chunk);
});
req.on("end", async () => {
if (aborted) return;
try {
const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString();
let payload: { recipient_x25519_pubkey?: string; display_name?: string };
try {
payload = JSON.parse(raw);
} catch {
writeJson(res, 400, { error: "malformed" });
return;
}
if (
!payload.recipient_x25519_pubkey ||
typeof payload.recipient_x25519_pubkey !== "string"
) {
writeJson(res, 400, { error: "malformed" });
return;
}
const result = await claimInviteV2Core({
code,
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: payload.recipient_x25519_pubkey,
displayName: payload.display_name,
});
writeJson(res, result.status, result.body);
log.info("invite claim v2", {
route: "POST /invites/:code/claim",
code,
status: result.status,
ok: result.ok,
latency_ms: Date.now() - started,
});
} catch (e) {
writeJson(res, 500, {
error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
});
log.error("invite claim v2 handler error", {
error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
});
}
});
}
function handleUploadPost( function handleUploadPost(
req: IncomingMessage, req: IncomingMessage,
res: ServerResponse, res: ServerResponse,
@@ -4282,4 +4556,8 @@ function main(): void {
}); });
} }
main(); // Skip starting the HTTP/WS server when running under vitest — tests import
// claimInviteV2Core() directly and must not bind ports on module load.
if (!process.env.VITEST) {
main();
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
/**
* v2 invite protocol — broker claim endpoint.
*
* Covers the sealed-root-key delivery flow added in
* .artifacts/specs/2026-04-10-anthropic-vision-meshes-invites.md :
*
* - happy path: signed v2 invite claim returns a sealed root_key the
* recipient can unseal back to the mesh.rootKey column value
* - tampered signature → 400 bad_signature
* - expired invite → 410 expired
* - revoked invite → 410 revoked
* - exhausted invite (usedCount === maxUses) → 410 exhausted
* - round-trip: recipient-side crypto_box_seal_open recovers the real key
*
* Tests talk directly to claimInviteV2Core() to avoid spinning up the
* full broker HTTP server. The handler delegates to this function with
* zero extra logic, so coverage is equivalent.
*/
import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, test } from "vitest";
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers";
import { db } from "../src/db";
import { invite, mesh } from "@turbostarter/db/schema/mesh";
import { canonicalInviteV2 } from "../src/crypto";
import { claimInviteV2Core } from "../src/index";
import {
cleanupAllTestMeshes,
setupTestMesh,
type TestMesh,
} from "./helpers";
afterAll(async () => {
await cleanupAllTestMeshes();
});
beforeAll(async () => {
await sodium.ready;
});
/**
* Set a random base64url root_key on an existing test mesh. The helpers
* don't set one by default, so v2 tests prime it per-mesh here.
*/
async function primeRootKey(meshId: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {
const key = sodium.randombytes_buf(32);
const b64 = sodium.to_base64(key, sodium.base64_variants.URLSAFE_NO_PADDING);
await db.update(mesh).set({ rootKey: b64 }).where(eq(mesh.id, meshId));
return key;
}
/**
* Insert a signed v2 invite row. Returns the opaque short code + the
* recipient x25519 keypair the test will use to unseal.
*/
async function insertV2Invite(
m: TestMesh,
opts: {
code: string;
expiresInSec?: number;
maxUses?: number;
role?: "admin" | "member";
tamper?: boolean; // corrupt the signature
revoked?: boolean;
used?: number;
},
): Promise<{ inviteId: string; canonical: string }> {
const expiresInSec = opts.expiresInSec ?? 3600;
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + expiresInSec * 1000);
const maxUses = opts.maxUses ?? 1;
const role = opts.role ?? "member";
// Insert first with a placeholder capability so we have the invite id.
const [row] = await db
.insert(invite)
.values({
meshId: m.meshId,
token: `v2-test-token-${opts.code}`,
code: opts.code,
maxUses,
usedCount: opts.used ?? 0,
role,
expiresAt,
createdBy: "test-user-integration",
version: 2,
revokedAt: opts.revoked ? new Date() : null,
})
.returning({ id: invite.id });
if (!row) throw new Error("v2 invite insert failed");
// Now compute canonical_v2 using the real invite id and sign with the
// mesh owner's ed25519 secret key.
const expiresAtUnix = Math.floor(expiresAt.getTime() / 1000);
const canonical = canonicalInviteV2({
mesh_id: m.meshId,
invite_id: row.id,
expires_at: expiresAtUnix,
role,
owner_pubkey: m.ownerPubkey,
});
let signatureHex = sodium.to_hex(
sodium.crypto_sign_detached(
sodium.from_string(canonical),
sodium.from_hex(m.ownerSecretKey),
),
);
if (opts.tamper) {
// Flip a single hex nibble — keeps length valid, invalidates signature.
const first = signatureHex[0] === "0" ? "1" : "0";
signatureHex = first + signatureHex.slice(1);
}
const capability = JSON.stringify({
canonical,
signature: signatureHex,
});
await db
.update(invite)
.set({ capabilityV2: capability })
.where(eq(invite.id, row.id));
return { inviteId: row.id, canonical };
}
function genRecipientX25519(): { pk: string; sk: Uint8Array } {
const kp = sodium.crypto_box_keypair();
return {
pk: sodium.to_base64(kp.publicKey, sodium.base64_variants.URLSAFE_NO_PADDING),
sk: kp.privateKey,
};
}
describe("claimInviteV2Core — v2 invite claim", () => {
let m: TestMesh;
afterEach(async () => m && (await m.cleanup()));
test("happy path: signed v2 invite returns sealed root_key and member row", async () => {
m = await setupTestMesh("v2-ok");
const rootKeyBytes = await primeRootKey(m.meshId);
const code = `c${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
const { inviteId, canonical } = await insertV2Invite(m, { code });
const recipient = genRecipientX25519();
const result = await claimInviteV2Core({
code,
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: recipient.pk,
});
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
if (!result.ok) return;
expect(result.status).toBe(200);
expect(result.body.mesh_id).toBe(m.meshId);
expect(result.body.owner_pubkey).toBe(m.ownerPubkey);
expect(result.body.canonical_v2).toBe(canonical);
expect(result.body.member_id).toBeTruthy();
// Recipient unseals the sealed_root_key using its x25519 secret key.
const sealed = sodium.from_base64(
result.body.sealed_root_key,
sodium.base64_variants.URLSAFE_NO_PADDING,
);
const recipientPkBytes = sodium.from_base64(
recipient.pk,
sodium.base64_variants.URLSAFE_NO_PADDING,
);
const opened = sodium.crypto_box_seal_open(
sealed,
recipientPkBytes,
recipient.sk,
);
expect(opened).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array);
expect(opened.length).toBe(32);
expect(Array.from(opened)).toEqual(Array.from(rootKeyBytes));
// usedCount incremented and claimedByPubkey recorded.
const [updated] = await db
.select({
usedCount: invite.usedCount,
claimedByPubkey: invite.claimedByPubkey,
})
.from(invite)
.where(eq(invite.id, inviteId));
expect(updated?.usedCount).toBe(1);
expect(updated?.claimedByPubkey).toBe(recipient.pk);
});
test("tampered signature → 400 bad_signature", async () => {
m = await setupTestMesh("v2-tampered");
await primeRootKey(m.meshId);
const code = `c${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
await insertV2Invite(m, { code, tamper: true });
const recipient = genRecipientX25519();
const result = await claimInviteV2Core({
code,
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: recipient.pk,
});
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
if (result.ok) return;
expect(result.status).toBe(400);
expect(result.body.error).toBe("bad_signature");
});
test("expired invite → 410 expired", async () => {
m = await setupTestMesh("v2-expired");
await primeRootKey(m.meshId);
const code = `c${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
await insertV2Invite(m, { code, expiresInSec: -60 });
const recipient = genRecipientX25519();
const result = await claimInviteV2Core({
code,
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: recipient.pk,
});
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
if (result.ok) return;
expect(result.status).toBe(410);
expect(result.body.error).toBe("expired");
});
test("revoked invite → 410 revoked", async () => {
m = await setupTestMesh("v2-revoked");
await primeRootKey(m.meshId);
const code = `c${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
await insertV2Invite(m, { code, revoked: true });
const recipient = genRecipientX25519();
const result = await claimInviteV2Core({
code,
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: recipient.pk,
});
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
if (result.ok) return;
expect(result.status).toBe(410);
expect(result.body.error).toBe("revoked");
});
test("exhausted invite (usedCount >= maxUses) → 410 exhausted", async () => {
m = await setupTestMesh("v2-exhausted");
await primeRootKey(m.meshId);
const code = `c${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10)}`;
await insertV2Invite(m, { code, maxUses: 1, used: 1 });
const recipient = genRecipientX25519();
const result = await claimInviteV2Core({
code,
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: recipient.pk,
});
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
if (result.ok) return;
expect(result.status).toBe(410);
expect(result.body.error).toBe("exhausted");
});
test("unknown code → 404 not_found", async () => {
m = await setupTestMesh("v2-404");
await primeRootKey(m.meshId);
const recipient = genRecipientX25519();
const result = await claimInviteV2Core({
code: "nonexistent",
recipientX25519PubkeyBase64url: recipient.pk,
});
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
if (result.ok) return;
expect(result.status).toBe(404);
expect(result.body.error).toBe("not_found");
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
import { notFound, redirect } from "next/navigation";
import { api } from "~/lib/api/server";
import { getMetadata } from "~/lib/metadata";
export const generateMetadata = getMetadata({
title: "Join a mesh",
description: "You've been invited to a claudemesh mesh.",
});
/**
* Short invite URL: /i/{code}
*
* Resolves the short code to the canonical long token server-side and
* redirects to `/join/[token]`. Keeps the rest of the join UX in a single
* place and leaves the broker protocol untouched.
*
* This is a URL shortener, NOT a security boundary — the long token still
* carries the mesh root_key. See the v2 invite protocol spec:
* .artifacts/specs/2026-04-10-anthropic-vision-meshes-invites.md
*/
export default async function ShortInvitePage({
params,
}: {
params: Promise<{ locale: string; code: string }>;
}) {
const { locale, code } = await params;
// Hit the public resolver. Returns {found, token} or 404.
const res = await api.public["invite-code"][":code"]
.$get({ param: { code } })
.catch(() => null);
if (!res || !res.ok) {
notFound();
}
const body = (await res.json()) as
| { found: true; token: string }
| { found: false };
if (!body.found) {
notFound();
}
// next/navigation `redirect` throws — no need to return anything after.
redirect(`/${locale}/join/${body.token}`);
}

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import { handle } from "@turbostarter/api/utils";
import { api } from "~/lib/api/server"; import { api } from "~/lib/api/server";
import { getMetadata } from "~/lib/metadata"; import { getMetadata } from "~/lib/metadata";
import { InstallToggle } from "~/modules/join/install-toggle"; import { InstallToggle } from "~/modules/join/install-toggle";
import { InviteCard } from "~/modules/join/invite-card";
export const generateMetadata = getMetadata({ export const generateMetadata = getMetadata({
title: "Join a mesh", title: "Join a mesh",
@@ -112,42 +113,29 @@ export default async function JoinPage({
</Link> </Link>
</header> </header>
<div className="mx-auto w-full max-w-2xl px-6 py-16 md:px-12 md:py-24"> <div className="mx-auto w-full max-w-2xl px-6 py-12 md:px-12 md:py-20">
{invite.valid ? ( {invite.valid ? (
<> <>
<InviteCard
meshName={invite.meshName}
inviterName={invite.inviterName}
role={invite.role}
memberCount={invite.memberCount}
expiresAt={new Date(invite.expiresAt)}
/>
<div id="install" className="mt-14 scroll-mt-24">
<div <div
className="mb-5 text-[11px] uppercase tracking-[0.22em] text-[var(--cm-clay)]" className="mb-4 text-[11px] uppercase tracking-[0.22em] text-[var(--cm-fg-tertiary)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-mono)" }} style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-mono)" }}
> >
invitation to accept, run this in your terminal
</div> </div>
<h1
className="text-[clamp(2rem,4vw,2.75rem)] font-medium leading-[1.1] text-[var(--cm-fg)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-serif)" }}
>
You&apos;re invited to{" "}
<span className="italic text-[var(--cm-clay)]">
{invite.meshName}
</span>
</h1>
<p
className="mt-4 text-lg leading-[1.6] text-[var(--cm-fg-secondary)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-serif)" }}
>
{invite.inviterName
? `${invite.inviterName} added you as a ${invite.role}.`
: `You've been added as a ${invite.role}.`}{" "}
{invite.memberCount} other{" "}
{invite.memberCount === 1 ? "peer is" : "peers are"} already on
the mesh.
</p>
<div className="mt-12">
<InstallToggle token={invite.token} /> <InstallToggle token={invite.token} />
</div> </div>
<div <div
className="mt-14 rounded-[var(--cm-radius-md)] border border-dashed border-[var(--cm-border)] p-5 text-[13px] leading-[1.65] text-[var(--cm-fg-tertiary)]" className="mt-12 rounded-[var(--cm-radius-md)] border border-dashed border-[var(--cm-border)] p-5 text-[13px] leading-[1.65] text-[var(--cm-fg-tertiary)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-serif)" }} style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-serif)" }}
> >
By joining, you&apos;ll be known as a peer with an ed25519 By joining, you&apos;ll be known as a peer with an ed25519
@@ -163,24 +151,27 @@ export default async function JoinPage({
</div> </div>
<p <p
className="mt-8 text-xs text-[var(--cm-fg-tertiary)]" className="mt-6 text-xs text-[var(--cm-fg-tertiary)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-mono)" }} style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-mono)" }}
> >
expires {new Date(invite.expiresAt).toLocaleDateString()} ·{" "}
{invite.maxUses - invite.usedCount} of {invite.maxUses} uses {invite.maxUses - invite.usedCount} of {invite.maxUses} uses
remaining remaining
</p> </p>
</> </>
) : ( ) : (
<> <section
aria-labelledby="invite-error-heading"
className="rounded-[var(--cm-radius-lg)] border border-[var(--cm-border)] bg-[var(--cm-bg-elevated)]/60 p-7 md:p-9"
>
<div <div
className="mb-5 text-[11px] uppercase tracking-[0.22em] text-[#c46686]" className="text-[11px] uppercase tracking-[0.22em] text-[#c46686]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-mono)" }} style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-mono)" }}
> >
invitation unavailable invitation unavailable
</div> </div>
<h1 <h1
className="text-[clamp(1.75rem,3.5vw,2.25rem)] font-medium leading-[1.15] text-[var(--cm-fg)]" id="invite-error-heading"
className="mt-4 text-[clamp(1.75rem,3.5vw,2.25rem)] font-medium leading-[1.15] text-[var(--cm-fg)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-serif)" }} style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-serif)" }}
> >
{ERROR_COPY[invite.reason].title} {ERROR_COPY[invite.reason].title}
@@ -210,7 +201,7 @@ export default async function JoinPage({
claudemesh.com claudemesh.com
</Link> </Link>
</div> </div>
</> </section>
)} )}
</div> </div>
</main> </main>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
const BULLETS = [
"Send and receive end-to-end encrypted messages with every peer on the mesh",
"Read the shared audit log of mesh events",
"Generate a local ed25519 keypair — your secret key never leaves your machine",
] as const;
export function ConsentSummary() {
return (
<div
className="rounded-[var(--cm-radius-md)] border border-[var(--cm-border)] bg-[var(--cm-bg-elevated)] p-5"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-sans)" }}
>
<div className="text-[11px] uppercase tracking-[0.18em] text-[var(--cm-fg-tertiary)]">
Joining this mesh will let you
</div>
<ul className="mt-3 space-y-2">
{BULLETS.map((text) => (
<li
key={text}
className="flex items-start gap-2.5 text-[13.5px] leading-[1.6] text-[var(--cm-fg-secondary)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-serif)" }}
>
<svg
width="14"
height="14"
viewBox="0 0 24 24"
fill="none"
aria-hidden="true"
className="mt-[3px] shrink-0 text-[var(--cm-clay)]"
>
<path
d="M5 12l4 4 10-10"
stroke="currentColor"
strokeWidth="2"
strokeLinecap="round"
strokeLinejoin="round"
/>
</svg>
<span>{text}</span>
</li>
))}
</ul>
</div>
);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
import { ConsentSummary } from "./consent-summary";
import { InviterLine } from "./inviter-line";
import { RoleBadge, roleLabel } from "./role-badge";
interface InviteCardProps {
meshName: string;
inviterName: string | null;
role: "admin" | "member";
memberCount: number;
expiresAt: Date;
}
export function InviteCard({
meshName,
inviterName,
role,
memberCount,
expiresAt,
}: InviteCardProps) {
const peerWord = memberCount === 1 ? "peer" : "peers";
return (
<section
aria-labelledby="invite-heading"
className="relative overflow-hidden rounded-[var(--cm-radius-lg)] border border-[var(--cm-border)] bg-[var(--cm-bg-elevated)]/60 p-7 md:p-9"
>
{/* Eyebrow */}
<div
className="text-[11px] uppercase tracking-[0.22em] text-[var(--cm-clay)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-mono)" }}
>
invitation
</div>
{/* Hero */}
<h1
id="invite-heading"
className="mt-4 text-[clamp(1.9rem,3.6vw,2.65rem)] font-medium leading-[1.1] text-[var(--cm-fg)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-serif)" }}
>
You&apos;ve been invited to join{" "}
<span className="italic text-[var(--cm-clay)]">{meshName}</span>
</h1>
{/* Inviter + stats row */}
<div className="mt-6 flex flex-wrap items-center justify-between gap-4">
<InviterLine inviterName={inviterName} />
<div
className="flex items-center gap-2 text-[12.5px] text-[var(--cm-fg-tertiary)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-mono)" }}
>
<span
aria-hidden="true"
className="inline-block h-1.5 w-1.5 rounded-full bg-[var(--cm-cactus)]"
/>
<span>
{memberCount} {peerWord} · private mesh
</span>
</div>
</div>
{/* Role badge */}
<div className="mt-6">
<RoleBadge role={role} />
</div>
{/* Consent bullets */}
<div className="mt-5">
<ConsentSummary />
</div>
{/* Primary action block */}
<div className="mt-8 flex flex-col gap-3">
<a
href="#install"
className="inline-flex w-full items-center justify-center gap-2 rounded-[var(--cm-radius-md)] bg-[var(--cm-clay)] px-6 py-4 text-[15px] font-medium text-[var(--cm-gray-050)] transition-colors hover:bg-[var(--cm-clay-hover)] focus-visible:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-[var(--cm-clay)] focus-visible:ring-offset-2 focus-visible:ring-offset-[var(--cm-bg)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-sans)" }}
aria-label={`Join ${meshName} as ${roleLabel(role)}`}
>
Join {meshName} as {roleLabel(role)}
<svg
width="16"
height="16"
viewBox="0 0 24 24"
fill="none"
aria-hidden="true"
>
<path
d="M5 12h14M13 5l7 7-7 7"
stroke="currentColor"
strokeWidth="2"
strokeLinecap="round"
strokeLinejoin="round"
/>
</svg>
</a>
<p
className="flex flex-wrap items-center justify-between gap-2 text-[11.5px] text-[var(--cm-fg-tertiary)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-mono)" }}
>
<span>
valid until{" "}
{expiresAt.toLocaleDateString(undefined, {
year: "numeric",
month: "short",
day: "numeric",
})}
</span>
<a
href="/auth/logout"
className="underline-offset-4 hover:underline"
>
Not you? Sign out
</a>
</p>
</div>
</section>
);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
interface InviterLineProps {
inviterName: string | null;
}
export function InviterLine({ inviterName }: InviterLineProps) {
const initial = (inviterName ?? "?").trim().charAt(0).toUpperCase() || "?";
return (
<div
className="flex items-center gap-3"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-sans)" }}
>
<div
aria-hidden="true"
className="flex h-9 w-9 items-center justify-center rounded-full border border-[var(--cm-border)] bg-[var(--cm-bg-elevated)] text-[13px] font-medium text-[var(--cm-fg-secondary)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-serif)" }}
>
{initial}
</div>
<div className="flex flex-col leading-tight">
<span className="text-[11px] uppercase tracking-[0.16em] text-[var(--cm-fg-tertiary)]">
Invited by
</span>
<span className="text-[14.5px] font-medium text-[var(--cm-fg)]">
{inviterName ?? "the mesh owner"}
</span>
</div>
</div>
);
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
type Role = "admin" | "member";
const ROLE_CONFIG: Record<
Role,
{
label: string;
description: string;
icon: React.ReactNode;
accent: string;
dot: string;
}
> = {
admin: {
label: "Admin",
description:
"Full control: invite and remove peers, manage settings, send and receive messages.",
// subtle warning treatment — fig (pinkish) accent, not alarming
accent: "#c46686",
dot: "#c46686",
icon: (
<svg
width="14"
height="14"
viewBox="0 0 24 24"
fill="none"
aria-hidden="true"
>
<path
d="M12 2l3 6 6 1-4.5 4.5L18 20l-6-3-6 3 1.5-6.5L3 9l6-1 3-6z"
stroke="currentColor"
strokeWidth="1.6"
strokeLinejoin="round"
/>
</svg>
),
},
member: {
label: "Member",
description:
"Send and receive messages, read the shared audit log, participate in mesh traffic.",
accent: "var(--cm-clay)",
dot: "var(--cm-clay)",
icon: (
<svg
width="14"
height="14"
viewBox="0 0 24 24"
fill="none"
aria-hidden="true"
>
<circle cx="12" cy="8" r="4" stroke="currentColor" strokeWidth="1.6" />
<path
d="M4 20c0-4 4-6 8-6s8 2 8 6"
stroke="currentColor"
strokeWidth="1.6"
strokeLinecap="round"
/>
</svg>
),
},
};
interface RoleBadgeProps {
role: Role;
}
export function RoleBadge({ role }: RoleBadgeProps) {
const cfg = ROLE_CONFIG[role];
return (
<div
className="flex items-start gap-3 rounded-[var(--cm-radius-md)] border p-4"
style={{
borderColor: cfg.accent,
backgroundColor:
"color-mix(in srgb, var(--cm-bg-elevated) 70%, transparent)",
}}
>
<div
className="mt-0.5 flex h-7 w-7 shrink-0 items-center justify-center rounded-full"
style={{
color: cfg.accent,
backgroundColor: "color-mix(in srgb, var(--cm-bg) 60%, transparent)",
border: `1px solid ${cfg.accent}`,
}}
>
{cfg.icon}
</div>
<div className="flex-1 min-w-0">
<div
className="flex items-center gap-2 text-[13px] font-medium"
style={{ color: cfg.accent, fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-sans)" }}
>
<span className="uppercase tracking-[0.14em]">
You&apos;ll join as {cfg.label}
</span>
</div>
<p
className="mt-1 text-[13.5px] leading-[1.55] text-[var(--cm-fg-secondary)]"
style={{ fontFamily: "var(--cm-font-serif)" }}
>
{cfg.description}
</p>
</div>
</div>
);
}
export function roleLabel(role: Role) {
return ROLE_CONFIG[role].label;
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
"use client"; "use client";
import { useRouter } from "next/navigation"; import { useRouter } from "next/navigation";
import { useEffect } from "react";
import { useForm } from "react-hook-form"; import { useForm } from "react-hook-form";
import { zodResolver } from "@hookform/resolvers/zod"; import { zodResolver } from "@hookform/resolvers/zod";
@@ -32,14 +31,6 @@ import {
import { pathsConfig } from "~/config/paths"; import { pathsConfig } from "~/config/paths";
import { api } from "~/lib/api/client"; import { api } from "~/lib/api/client";
const slugify = (s: string) =>
s
.toLowerCase()
.trim()
.replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, "-")
.replace(/^-+|-+$/g, "")
.slice(0, 40);
export const CreateMeshForm = ({ export const CreateMeshForm = ({
onboarding = false, onboarding = false,
}: { onboarding?: boolean } = {}) => { }: { onboarding?: boolean } = {}) => {
@@ -48,30 +39,16 @@ export const CreateMeshForm = ({
resolver: zodResolver(createMyMeshInputSchema), resolver: zodResolver(createMyMeshInputSchema),
defaultValues: { defaultValues: {
name: "", name: "",
slug: "",
visibility: "private", visibility: "private",
transport: "managed", transport: "managed",
}, },
}); });
const nameValue = form.watch("name");
const slugDirty = form.formState.dirtyFields.slug;
useEffect(() => {
if (!slugDirty && nameValue) {
form.setValue("slug", slugify(nameValue));
}
}, [nameValue, slugDirty, form]);
const onSubmit = async (values: CreateMyMeshInput) => { const onSubmit = async (values: CreateMyMeshInput) => {
try { try {
const res = (await handle(api.my.meshes.$post)({ const res = (await handle(api.my.meshes.$post)({
json: values, json: values,
})) as { id: string; slug: string } | { error: string }; })) as { id: string; slug: string };
if ("error" in res) {
form.setError("slug", { message: res.error });
return;
}
router.push( router.push(
onboarding onboarding
? `${pathsConfig.dashboard.user.meshes.invite(res.id)}?onboarding=1` ? `${pathsConfig.dashboard.user.meshes.invite(res.id)}?onboarding=1`
@@ -97,23 +74,7 @@ export const CreateMeshForm = ({
<Input placeholder="Platform team" {...field} /> <Input placeholder="Platform team" {...field} />
</FormControl> </FormControl>
<FormDescription> <FormDescription>
Display name what teammates see. Display name what teammates see. Pick anything.
</FormDescription>
<FormMessage />
</FormItem>
)}
/>
<FormField
control={form.control}
name="slug"
render={({ field }) => (
<FormItem>
<FormLabel>Slug</FormLabel>
<FormControl>
<Input placeholder="platform-team" {...field} />
</FormControl>
<FormDescription>
URL-safe identifier: lowercase letters, digits, hyphens.
</FormDescription> </FormDescription>
<FormMessage /> <FormMessage />
</FormItem> </FormItem>

View File

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ interface GeneratedInvite {
token: string; token: string;
inviteLink: string; inviteLink: string;
joinUrl: string; joinUrl: string;
/** Short human-friendly URL, preferred for sharing. Null if the backend didn't mint one. */
shortUrl: string | null;
expiresAt: Date; expiresAt: Date;
qrDataUrl: string; qrDataUrl: string;
} }
@@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ interface GeneratedInvite {
export const InviteGenerator = ({ meshId }: { meshId: string }) => { export const InviteGenerator = ({ meshId }: { meshId: string }) => {
const [result, setResult] = useState<GeneratedInvite | null>(null); const [result, setResult] = useState<GeneratedInvite | null>(null);
const [copied, setCopied] = useState<"url" | "cli" | null>(null); const [copied, setCopied] = useState<"url" | "cli" | null>(null);
const [showAdvanced, setShowAdvanced] = useState(false);
const form = useForm<CreateMyInviteInput>({ const form = useForm<CreateMyInviteInput>({
resolver: zodResolver(createMyInviteInputSchema), resolver: zodResolver(createMyInviteInputSchema),
@@ -54,24 +57,20 @@ export const InviteGenerator = ({ meshId }: { meshId: string }) => {
const res = (await handle(api.my.meshes[":id"].invites.$post)({ const res = (await handle(api.my.meshes[":id"].invites.$post)({
param: { id: meshId }, param: { id: meshId },
json: values, json: values,
})) as })) as {
| {
id: string; id: string;
token: string; token: string;
inviteLink: string; inviteLink: string;
joinUrl: string; joinUrl: string;
shortUrl: string | null;
expiresAt: string; expiresAt: string;
} };
| { error: string };
if ("error" in res) { // QR encodes the SHORT URL when available — scannable at camera distance
form.setError("root", { message: res.error }); // and short enough for the QR to stay low-density. Falls back to the
return; // long token URL for legacy invites minted before the shortener shipped.
} const qrTarget = res.shortUrl ?? res.joinUrl;
const qrDataUrl = await QRCode.toDataURL(qrTarget, {
// QR encodes the HTTPS join URL now — anyone with a camera can
// scan and land on the friendly /join/[token] page.
const qrDataUrl = await QRCode.toDataURL(res.joinUrl, {
width: 256, width: 256,
margin: 1, margin: 1,
color: { dark: "#141413", light: "#ffffff" }, color: { dark: "#141413", light: "#ffffff" },
@@ -82,6 +81,7 @@ export const InviteGenerator = ({ meshId }: { meshId: string }) => {
token: res.token, token: res.token,
inviteLink: res.inviteLink, inviteLink: res.inviteLink,
joinUrl: res.joinUrl, joinUrl: res.joinUrl,
shortUrl: res.shortUrl,
expiresAt: new Date(res.expiresAt), expiresAt: new Date(res.expiresAt),
qrDataUrl, qrDataUrl,
}); });
@@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ export const InviteGenerator = ({ meshId }: { meshId: string }) => {
}; };
if (result) { if (result) {
// Prefer the short URL everywhere it exists. CLI command still uses the
// long token because the broker resolves by token — swapping CLI to short
// codes is part of the v2 protocol, not this URL-shortener change.
const primaryUrl = result.shortUrl ?? result.joinUrl;
const cliCmd = `claudemesh join ${result.token}`; const cliCmd = `claudemesh join ${result.token}`;
return ( return (
<div className="space-y-6"> <div className="space-y-6">
@@ -117,7 +121,7 @@ export const InviteGenerator = ({ meshId }: { meshId: string }) => {
Share this link Share this link
</div> </div>
<code className="bg-muted block break-all rounded p-3 font-mono text-xs"> <code className="bg-muted block break-all rounded p-3 font-mono text-xs">
{result.joinUrl} {primaryUrl}
</code> </code>
</div> </div>
<div className="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-3 text-xs"> <div className="flex flex-wrap items-center gap-3 text-xs">
@@ -126,7 +130,7 @@ export const InviteGenerator = ({ meshId }: { meshId: string }) => {
</Badge> </Badge>
</div> </div>
<div className="flex flex-wrap gap-2"> <div className="flex flex-wrap gap-2">
<Button onClick={() => copy(result.joinUrl, "url")} size="sm"> <Button onClick={() => copy(primaryUrl, "url")} size="sm">
{copied === "url" ? "Copied ✓" : "Copy link"} {copied === "url" ? "Copied ✓" : "Copy link"}
</Button> </Button>
<Button <Button
@@ -168,13 +172,33 @@ export const InviteGenerator = ({ meshId }: { meshId: string }) => {
return ( return (
<Form {...form}> <Form {...form}>
<form onSubmit={form.handleSubmit(onSubmit)} className="max-w-md space-y-5"> <form onSubmit={form.handleSubmit(onSubmit)} className="max-w-md space-y-5">
<p className="text-muted-foreground text-sm">
One-time invite for a new member. Valid for 7 days.
</p>
{/* Advanced options — hidden by default. Defaults ship 90% of users. */}
<div className="rounded-md border border-dashed">
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => setShowAdvanced((s) => !s)}
className="text-muted-foreground hover:text-foreground flex w-full items-center justify-between px-3 py-2 text-xs uppercase tracking-wider"
aria-expanded={showAdvanced}
>
<span>Advanced</span>
<span aria-hidden="true">{showAdvanced ? "" : "+"}</span>
</button>
{showAdvanced && (
<div className="space-y-4 border-t px-3 py-4">
<FormField <FormField
control={form.control} control={form.control}
name="role" name="role"
render={({ field }) => ( render={({ field }) => (
<FormItem> <FormItem>
<FormLabel>Role</FormLabel> <FormLabel>Role</FormLabel>
<Select onValueChange={field.onChange} defaultValue={field.value}> <Select
onValueChange={field.onChange}
defaultValue={field.value}
>
<FormControl> <FormControl>
<SelectTrigger> <SelectTrigger>
<SelectValue /> <SelectValue />
@@ -227,6 +251,10 @@ export const InviteGenerator = ({ meshId }: { meshId: string }) => {
</FormItem> </FormItem>
)} )}
/> />
</div>
)}
</div>
{form.formState.errors.root && ( {form.formState.errors.root && (
<p className="text-destructive text-sm"> <p className="text-destructive text-sm">
{form.formState.errors.root.message} {form.formState.errors.root.message}

View File

@@ -366,6 +366,74 @@ the new peer and rebroadcasts presence.
Invite-link issuance: [`apps/cli/src/invite/`](../apps/cli/src/invite/). Invite-link issuance: [`apps/cli/src/invite/`](../apps/cli/src/invite/).
### v2 invites (in progress)
v1 embeds the mesh root key inside the URL. v2 removes it: the URL is a
short opaque code, and the root key is sealed to a recipient-controlled
x25519 public key on claim. Both formats are accepted through v0.1.x;
v1 is removed at v0.2.0.
Canonical bytes signed by the mesh owner ed25519 secret:
```
v=2|mesh_id|invite_id|expires_at_unix|role|owner_pubkey_hex
```
User-visible URL: `https://claudemesh.com/i/{code}` (base62, 8 chars).
#### Claim endpoint
```
POST /api/public/invites/:code/claim
Content-Type: application/json
{
"recipient_x25519_pubkey": "<base64url>"
}
```
The recipient generates a fresh x25519 keypair (distinct from its
ed25519 identity) and sends the public half. The server never sees the
secret.
Success response:
```jsonc
{
"sealed_root_key": "<base64url>", // crypto_box_seal(root_key, recipient_pubkey)
"mesh_id": "<text>",
"member_id": "<text>",
"owner_pubkey": "<hex>", // mesh owner ed25519 pubkey
"canonical_v2": "v=2|..." // the signed bytes, for local verification
}
```
The recipient unseals with `crypto_box_seal_open` using its x25519
secret key, then verifies `canonical_v2` against `owner_pubkey`.
#### Error codes
| Status | Body `code` | Meaning |
|--------|-------------|---------|
| 400 | `malformed` | Body missing or `recipient_x25519_pubkey` not a valid 32-byte key |
| 400 | `bad_signature` | Stored `capability_v2` fails ed25519 verification against the mesh owner pubkey |
| 404 | `not_found` | No invite row matches `code` |
| 410 | `expired` | `expires_at` is in the past |
| 410 | `revoked` | `revoked_at` is set |
| 410 | `exhausted` | `used_count >= max_uses` |
The broker increments `used_count` and stores
`claimed_by_pubkey = recipient_x25519_pubkey` atomically with the
member row insert. A second claim against a single-use invite fails
with `410 exhausted`.
#### Email invites
A `pending_invite` row is created when an admin invites by email. The
email contains `https://claudemesh.com/i/{code}` — the same short URL
surface as link invites. On successful claim the broker sets
`pending_invite.accepted_at`.
--- ---
## Self-hosting ## Self-hosting

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,21 @@ broker, ready for real teams.
--- ---
## In progress — *v0.1.x*
Security and onboarding work landing inside the v0.1 line, before
v0.2.0 cuts.
- **v2 invite protocol** — short opaque codes (`claudemesh.com/i/{code}`)
replace base64url URLs that embedded the mesh root key. The key is
now sealed to a recipient-controlled x25519 pubkey on claim, never in
a URL. v1 invites keep working through v0.1.x; removed at v0.2.0.
- **Email invites** — admins invite by email. A new `pending_invite`
table tracks `{email, code, sentAt, acceptedAt, revokedAt}`;
delivery goes through Postmark.
---
## v0.2.0 — *next* ## v0.2.0 — *next*
The surface layer. The protocol is ready; these are gateways + routing The surface layer. The protocol is ready; these are gateways + routing

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers"; import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers";
import { and, eq, isNull } from "@turbostarter/db"; import { and, eq, isNull } from "@turbostarter/db";
@@ -9,7 +11,8 @@ import type {
CreateMyMeshInput, CreateMyMeshInput,
} from "../../schema"; } from "../../schema";
const BROKER_URL = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_BROKER_URL ?? "ws://localhost:7900"; const BROKER_URL =
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_BROKER_URL ?? "wss://ic.claudemesh.com/ws";
const APP_URL = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_URL ?? "https://claudemesh.com"; const APP_URL = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_URL ?? "https://claudemesh.com";
/** /**
@@ -38,6 +41,35 @@ const ensureSodium = async (): Promise<typeof sodium> => {
return sodium; return sodium;
}; };
/**
* Slugify a display name into a URL-safe token. Used only as cosmetic
* metadata embedded in invite payloads for debugging/display — NOT as a
* canonical identifier. `mesh.id` (opaque) is the canonical identity.
*/
const toSlug = (name: string): string =>
name
.toLowerCase()
.trim()
.replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, "-")
.replace(/^-+|-+$/g, "")
.slice(0, 40) || "mesh";
/**
* Base62 alphabet excluding visually ambiguous characters (0, O, I, l, 1).
* 57 symbols × 8 positions ≈ 1.1e14 combinations — birthday collision at
* ~10M invites, fine for years. We retry-on-conflict at insert time anyway.
*/
const SHORTCODE_ALPHABET =
"23456789abcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ";
const generateShortCode = (len = 8): string => {
const bytes = randomBytes(len);
let out = "";
for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {
out += SHORTCODE_ALPHABET[bytes[i]! % SHORTCODE_ALPHABET.length];
}
return out;
};
export const createMyMesh = async ({ export const createMyMesh = async ({
userId, userId,
input, input,
@@ -45,16 +77,9 @@ export const createMyMesh = async ({
userId: string; userId: string;
input: CreateMyMeshInput; input: CreateMyMeshInput;
}) => { }) => {
// Slug collision check // Slug is derived from name and stored non-uniquely — meshes are identified
const [existing] = await db // by `mesh.id` (opaque). Two users can freely name their meshes "platform".
.select({ id: mesh.id }) const slug = toSlug(input.name);
.from(mesh)
.where(eq(mesh.slug, input.slug))
.limit(1);
if (existing) {
throw new Error("A mesh with that slug already exists.");
}
// Generate the mesh owner's ed25519 keypair (signs invites) and a // Generate the mesh owner's ed25519 keypair (signs invites) and a
// 32-byte shared root key (channel encryption in later steps). // 32-byte shared root key (channel encryption in later steps).
@@ -72,7 +97,7 @@ export const createMyMesh = async ({
.insert(mesh) .insert(mesh)
.values({ .values({
name: input.name, name: input.name,
slug: input.slug, slug,
visibility: input.visibility, visibility: input.visibility,
transport: input.transport, transport: input.transport,
ownerUserId: userId, ownerUserId: userId,
@@ -215,12 +240,22 @@ export const createMyInvite = async ({
const token = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(fullPayload), "utf-8").toString( const token = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(fullPayload), "utf-8").toString(
"base64url", "base64url",
); );
const [created] = await db
// Short URL shortener code. Retry on the (extremely unlikely) collision
// against the unique index. 3 attempts is plenty given the keyspace.
let code = generateShortCode();
let created:
| { id: string; token: string; code: string | null; expiresAt: Date }
| undefined;
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt++) {
try {
const rows = await db
.insert(invite) .insert(invite)
.values({ .values({
meshId, meshId,
token, token,
tokenBytes: canonical, tokenBytes: canonical,
code,
maxUses: input.maxUses, maxUses: input.maxUses,
role: input.role, role: input.role,
expiresAt, expiresAt,
@@ -229,14 +264,35 @@ export const createMyInvite = async ({
.returning({ .returning({
id: invite.id, id: invite.id,
token: invite.token, token: invite.token,
code: invite.code,
expiresAt: invite.expiresAt, expiresAt: invite.expiresAt,
}); });
created = rows[0];
break;
} catch (e) {
// Only retry on short-code collision; rethrow anything else.
if (e instanceof Error && e.message.includes("invite_code_unique_idx")) {
code = generateShortCode();
continue;
}
throw e;
}
}
if (!created) {
throw new Error("Could not allocate a unique invite code — retry.");
}
const appBase = APP_URL.replace(/\/$/, "");
return { return {
id: created!.id, id: created.id,
token: created!.token, token: created.token,
expiresAt: created!.expiresAt, code: created.code,
expiresAt: created.expiresAt,
inviteLink: `ic://join/${token}`, inviteLink: `ic://join/${token}`,
joinUrl: `${APP_URL.replace(/\/$/, "")}/join/${token}`, joinUrl: `${appBase}/join/${token}`,
// The human-friendly short URL. Redirects to joinUrl server-side.
// Prefer this when sharing. See spec for why this is NOT a capability
// boundary (the long token still carries the root_key).
shortUrl: created.code ? `${appBase}/i/${created.code}` : null,
}; };
}; };

View File

@@ -232,6 +232,29 @@ export const publicRouter = new Hono()
} }
return c.json(result); return c.json(result);
}) })
/**
* Resolve a short invite code to its canonical long token.
*
* URL shortener only — the long token still carries the root_key,
* so this endpoint is NOT a security boundary. See the v2 invite
* protocol spec for the real fix.
*
* Returns 404 if the code is unknown OR the invite was revoked/
* archived so stale short URLs don't leak mesh metadata.
*/
.get("/invite-code/:code", async (c) => {
const code = c.req.param("code");
const [row] = await db
.select({ token: invite.token, revokedAt: invite.revokedAt })
.from(invite)
.where(eq(invite.code, code))
.limit(1);
c.header("cache-control", "no-store");
if (!row || row.revokedAt) {
return c.json({ found: false as const }, 404);
}
return c.json({ found: true as const, token: row.token });
})
.get("/stats", async (c) => { .get("/stats", async (c) => {
const now = Date.now(); const now = Date.now();
if (cachedStats && cachedStats.expiresAt > now) { if (cachedStats && cachedStats.expiresAt > now) {

View File

@@ -54,11 +54,6 @@ export type GetMyMeshesResponse = z.infer<typeof getMyMeshesResponseSchema>;
export const createMyMeshInputSchema = z.object({ export const createMyMeshInputSchema = z.object({
name: z.string().min(2).max(80), name: z.string().min(2).max(80),
slug: z
.string()
.min(2)
.max(40)
.regex(/^[a-z0-9-]+$/, "slug must be lowercase letters, digits, hyphens"),
visibility: meshVisibilityEnum.default("private"), visibility: meshVisibilityEnum.default("private"),
transport: meshTransportEnum.default("managed"), transport: meshTransportEnum.default("managed"),
}); });
@@ -130,8 +125,10 @@ export type CreateMyInviteInput = z.infer<typeof createMyInviteInputSchema>;
export const createMyInviteResponseSchema = z.object({ export const createMyInviteResponseSchema = z.object({
id: z.string(), id: z.string(),
token: z.string(), token: z.string(),
code: z.string().nullable(),
inviteLink: z.string(), inviteLink: z.string(),
joinUrl: z.string(), joinUrl: z.string(),
shortUrl: z.string().nullable(),
expiresAt: z.coerce.date(), expiresAt: z.coerce.date(),
}); });
export type CreateMyInviteResponse = z.infer<typeof createMyInviteResponseSchema>; export type CreateMyInviteResponse = z.infer<typeof createMyInviteResponseSchema>;

View File

@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ const apiErrorSchema = z.object({
path: z.string(), path: z.string(),
}); });
/** Matches the `{ error: "..." }` shape returned by Hono route catch blocks. */
const routeErrorSchema = z.object({
error: z.string(),
});
export const isAPIError = (e: unknown): e is z.infer<typeof apiErrorSchema> => { export const isAPIError = (e: unknown): e is z.infer<typeof apiErrorSchema> => {
return apiErrorSchema.safeParse(e).success; return apiErrorSchema.safeParse(e).success;
}; };
@@ -70,9 +75,12 @@ export const handle = <
if (!response.ok) { if (!response.ok) {
if (throwOnError) { if (throwOnError) {
const parsed = routeErrorSchema.safeParse(data);
throw new Error( throw new Error(
isAPIError(data) isAPIError(data)
? data.message ? data.message
: parsed.success
? parsed.data.error
: "Something went wrong. Please try again later.", : "Something went wrong. Please try again later.",
); );
} }

View File

@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ export const onError = async (
code: "common:error.general", code: "common:error.general",
message: t("common:error.general"), message: t("common:error.general"),
status, status,
timestamp,
path, path,
}), }),
details, details,

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
-- Drop global uniqueness on mesh.slug.
--
-- Identity for a mesh is mesh.id (opaque, generated). The slug is now
-- cosmetic only — derived from the display name at creation time and
-- embedded in invite payloads for debugging/display. Two meshes may
-- freely share a slug.
--
-- Safe to run on populated tables: the constraint is removed, no data
-- is altered, no rows are locked for content changes.
ALTER TABLE "mesh"."mesh" DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS "mesh_slug_unique";

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
-- Add a short opaque URL-shortener code to mesh invites.
--
-- Purpose: make invite URLs human-friendly (claudemesh.com/i/abc12345)
-- instead of ~400 char base64url payloads. The short code resolves
-- server-side to the existing long token — the broker protocol and
-- canonical signed payload are UNCHANGED.
--
-- This is NOT the v2 invite protocol (see spec
-- .artifacts/specs/2026-04-10-anthropic-vision-meshes-invites.md).
-- It is a backward-compatible URL shortener only. The root_key is
-- still embedded in the underlying long token; v2 will address that
-- in a coordinated broker + CLI + web change.
--
-- Column is nullable so existing invites remain valid without backfill.
ALTER TABLE "mesh"."invite" ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS "code" text;
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS "invite_code_unique_idx"
ON "mesh"."invite" ("code")
WHERE "code" IS NOT NULL;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
-- v2 invite protocol + email invites.
--
-- Spec: .artifacts/specs/2026-04-10-anthropic-vision-meshes-invites.md
--
-- Two concerns in one migration (both touch the invite surface):
--
-- 1. v2 invite protocol — the mesh root_key no longer travels in the
-- invite URL. Instead the recipient generates a curve25519 keypair at
-- claim time and sends the pubkey to the broker; the broker seals
-- root_key with crypto_box_seal to that pubkey. The DB captures the
-- protocol version, the canonical signed bytes that the broker
-- re-verifies against mesh.owner_pubkey, and an audit-only record of
-- which recipient pubkey received the sealed key.
--
-- 2. Email invites — admins can send invites to an email address. A
-- pending_invite row tracks the send; when the recipient lands on
-- /i/{code} it is matched to an underlying mesh.invite row (mint on
-- send). acceptedAt / revokedAt capture lifecycle.
--
-- Both additions are backward-compatible: version defaults to 1, new
-- columns are nullable, the new table is independent of existing rows.
ALTER TABLE "mesh"."invite"
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS "version" integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 1;
ALTER TABLE "mesh"."invite"
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS "capability_v2" text;
ALTER TABLE "mesh"."invite"
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS "claimed_by_pubkey" text;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "mesh"."pending_invite" (
"id" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
"mesh_id" text NOT NULL,
"email" text NOT NULL,
"code" text NOT NULL,
"sent_at" timestamp DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
"accepted_at" timestamp,
"revoked_at" timestamp,
"created_by" text NOT NULL,
"created_at" timestamp DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT "pending_invite_mesh_id_fk"
FOREIGN KEY ("mesh_id") REFERENCES "mesh"."mesh"("id")
ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE,
CONSTRAINT "pending_invite_created_by_fk"
FOREIGN KEY ("created_by") REFERENCES "public"."user"("id")
ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS "pending_invite_email_idx"
ON "mesh"."pending_invite" ("email");
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS "pending_invite_mesh_idx"
ON "mesh"."pending_invite" ("mesh_id");

View File

@@ -78,7 +78,13 @@ export const messagePriorityEnum = meshSchema.enum("message_priority", [
export const mesh = meshSchema.table("mesh", { export const mesh = meshSchema.table("mesh", {
id: text().primaryKey().notNull().$defaultFn(generateId), id: text().primaryKey().notNull().$defaultFn(generateId),
name: text().notNull(), name: text().notNull(),
slug: text().notNull().unique(), /**
* Cosmetic slug derived from name at creation. NOT unique, NOT used for
* identity — `mesh.id` is the canonical identifier everywhere (URLs,
* invites, broker lookups). Kept for display/debugging only. Two meshes
* can freely share a slug.
*/
slug: text().notNull(),
ownerUserId: text() ownerUserId: text()
.references(() => user.id, { onDelete: "cascade", onUpdate: "cascade" }) .references(() => user.id, { onDelete: "cascade", onUpdate: "cascade" })
.notNull(), .notNull(),
@@ -176,6 +182,15 @@ export const invite = meshSchema.table("invite", {
.notNull(), .notNull(),
token: text().notNull().unique(), token: text().notNull().unique(),
tokenBytes: text(), tokenBytes: text(),
/**
* Short opaque URL shortener code (base62, 8 chars). Resolves server-side
* to the full canonical `token` for landing page rendering. Nullable for
* pre-shortcode invites. Not a capability boundary — the long token still
* carries the root_key. See .artifacts/specs/2026-04-10-anthropic-vision-
* meshes-invites.md for the v2 protocol that moves the root_key out of
* the URL entirely.
*/
code: text().unique(),
maxUses: integer().notNull().default(1), maxUses: integer().notNull().default(1),
usedCount: integer().notNull().default(0), usedCount: integer().notNull().default(0),
role: meshRoleEnum().notNull().default("member"), role: meshRoleEnum().notNull().default("member"),
@@ -192,8 +207,47 @@ export const invite = meshSchema.table("invite", {
.notNull(), .notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp().defaultNow().notNull(), createdAt: timestamp().defaultNow().notNull(),
revokedAt: timestamp(), revokedAt: timestamp(),
/** Protocol version — 1 = legacy (root_key in URL), 2 = sealed delivery. Default 1 for backward compat. */
version: integer().notNull().default(1),
/**
* v2 canonical signed bytes (the string the broker re-verifies against mesh.ownerPubkey).
* Format: `v=2|mesh_id|invite_id|expires_at|role|owner_pubkey`
* Nullable for legacy v1 rows.
*/
capabilityV2: text(),
/**
* Recipient curve25519 pubkey (base64url) that the mesh root_key was sealed to
* when this invite was claimed. Audit-only — do NOT use as an authN check.
* Nullable until claim.
*/
claimedByPubkey: text(),
}); });
/**
* Tracks invites sent by email — one row per (mesh, email) pairing.
* `code` references an underlying mesh.invite row that will be minted
* on send; when the recipient lands on /i/{code} they claim the real invite.
*/
export const pendingInvite = meshSchema.table("pending_invite", {
id: text().primaryKey().notNull().$defaultFn(generateId),
meshId: text()
.references(() => mesh.id, { onDelete: "cascade", onUpdate: "cascade" })
.notNull(),
email: text().notNull(),
/** The short code of the underlying `mesh.invite.code` row this email links to. */
code: text().notNull(),
sentAt: timestamp().defaultNow().notNull(),
acceptedAt: timestamp(),
revokedAt: timestamp(),
createdBy: text()
.references(() => user.id, { onDelete: "cascade", onUpdate: "cascade" })
.notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp().defaultNow().notNull(),
}, (table) => [
index("pending_invite_email_idx").on(table.email),
index("pending_invite_mesh_idx").on(table.meshId),
]);
/** /**
* Signed, hash-chained audit log. NEVER stores message content — every * Signed, hash-chained audit log. NEVER stores message content — every
* payload between peers is E2E encrypted client-side (libsodium), so * payload between peers is E2E encrypted client-side (libsodium), so
@@ -687,6 +741,11 @@ export const inviteRelations = relations(invite, ({ one }) => ({
}), }),
})); }));
export const pendingInviteRelations = relations(pendingInvite, ({ one }) => ({
mesh: one(mesh, { fields: [pendingInvite.meshId], references: [mesh.id] }),
inviter: one(user, { fields: [pendingInvite.createdBy], references: [user.id] }),
}));
export const auditLogRelations = relations(auditLog, ({ one }) => ({ export const auditLogRelations = relations(auditLog, ({ one }) => ({
mesh: one(mesh, { mesh: one(mesh, {
fields: [auditLog.meshId], fields: [auditLog.meshId],