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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alejandro Gutiérrez
2026-04-06 00:30:54 +01:00
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## Template 1: Cold email to Claude Code / MCP team at Anthropic
**To:** [RECIPIENT — e.g., hiring@anthropic.com, or a specific engineer/PM on the Claude Code team]
**To:** jobs@anthropic.com (or direct to a Claude Code / MCP team member if identified)
**Subject:** Built an E2E-encrypted mesh for Claude Code sessions — found some things about dev-channels
---
Hi [NAME],
Hi,
I'm Alejandro Gutierrez. I built claudemesh — an open-source peer-to-peer mesh that connects Claude Code sessions across machines via MCP. Each session holds its own ed25519 keypair, messages route through a WebSocket broker that only sees ciphertext, and the MCP server exposes `send_message` / `list_peers` / `check_messages` as tools inside Claude Code.
I'm Alejandro Gutiérrez — fighter pilot turned AI builder. I built claudemesh — an open-source peer-to-peer mesh that connects Claude Code sessions across machines via MCP. Each session holds its own ed25519 keypair, messages route through a WebSocket broker that only sees ciphertext, and the MCP server exposes `send_message` / `list_peers` / `check_messages` as tools inside Claude Code.
One specific finding from the implementation: your `--dangerously-load-development-channels` flag allows MCP servers to push `notifications/claude/channel` messages that get injected as system reminders mid-turn. I validated this end-to-end with Claude Code v2.1.92. It works — and it opens a real prompt-injection surface that I wrote up in a threat model ([LINK TO THREAT_MODEL.md or protocol doc]).
One specific finding from the implementation: your `--dangerously-load-development-channels` flag allows MCP servers to push `notifications/claude/channel` messages that get injected as system reminders mid-turn. I validated this end-to-end with Claude Code v2.1.92. It works — and it opens a real prompt-injection surface that I wrote up in a threat model ([THREAT_MODEL.md](https://github.com/alezmad/claudemesh-cli/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md)).
The repo is MIT: [github.com/alezmad/claudemesh-cli](https://github.com/alezmad/claudemesh-cli). Protocol spec with the crypto model: [claudemesh.com/docs](https://claudemesh.com/docs).
The repo is MIT: [github.com/alezmad/claudemesh-cli](https://github.com/alezmad/claudemesh-cli). Protocol spec: [PROTOCOL.md](https://github.com/alezmad/claudemesh-cli/blob/main/PROTOCOL.md).
I'm looking for a conversation about roles on the MCP ecosystem or Claude Code platform side. Happy to walk through the protocol decisions or the threat model in more detail.
Before software I spent a decade flying F-18s and running operational safety for the Spanish Air Force. The safety thinking transfers directly: systems either handle failure modes or they fail people. That's what drew me to Anthropic.
Alejandro Gutierrez
[EMAIL] | [PHONE/LINKEDIN]
I'm looking for a conversation about roles on the MCP ecosystem or Claude Code platform side. Happy to walk through the protocol decisions or the threat model.
Alejandro A. Gutiérrez Mourente
info@whyrating.com · linkedin.com/in/alejandrogutierrezmourente
claudemesh.com · github.com/alezmad/claudemesh-cli
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@@ -120,7 +123,7 @@ is a single point of routing (not of trust — crypto is peer-side), and
enterprise self-host packaging is a v0.2 goal.
Repo (MIT): https://github.com/alezmad/claudemesh-cli
Protocol spec: https://claudemesh.com/docs
Protocol spec: https://github.com/alezmad/claudemesh-cli/blob/main/PROTOCOL.md
npm: claudemesh-cli
Would love feedback on the trust model and the protocol design.
@@ -128,4 +131,4 @@ Would love feedback on the trust model and the protocol design.
---
*All templates drafted 2026-04-05. Review before sending — check that repo URLs, doc links, and the threat model are publicly accessible.*
*All templates drafted 2026-04-05. Personalized 2026-04-06. Verify all URLs are live before sending.*