feat(cli): 1.34.7 → 1.34.13 — multi-session correctness train
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Seven-ship sequence that took the daemon from "works for one session"
to "internally consistent for N sessions on one daemon." Architecture
invariant after 1.34.13: every shared store / channel scopes by
recipient (SSE demux at bind layer + token forwarding, inbox per-
recipient columns, outbox sender-session routing).

- 1.34.7  inbox flush + delete commands
- 1.34.8  seen_at column + TTL prune + first echo guard
- 1.34.9  broader echo guard + system-event polish + staleness warning
- 1.34.10 per-session SSE demux (SseFilterOptions) + universal daemon
          (--mesh / --name deprecated) + daemon_started version stamp
- 1.34.11 inbox per-recipient column (storage half of 1.34.10)
- 1.34.12 daemon up detaches by default (logs to ~/.claudemesh/daemon/
          daemon.log; service units explicitly pass --foreground)
- 1.34.13 MCP forwards session token on /v1/events — the actual fix
          that activates 1.34.10's demux. Without this header the
          daemon's session resolved null, filter was empty, every MCP
          received the unfiltered global stream.

Roadmap entry at docs/roadmap.md captures the timeline + the four
known gaps tracked for follow-ups (launch env-var leak, broker
listPeers mesh-filter, kick on control-plane no-op, session caps as
first-class concept).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alejandro Gutiérrez
2026-05-04 21:10:07 +01:00
parent cba4a938ec
commit 6780899185
24 changed files with 2568 additions and 143 deletions

View File

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
import type { SqliteDb } from "./db/sqlite.js";
import type { DaemonBrokerClient } from "./broker.js";
import type { SessionBrokerClient } from "./session-broker.js";
import type { OutboxStatus } from "./db/outbox.js";
const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 500;
@@ -32,6 +33,10 @@ interface PendingRow {
ciphertext: string | null;
priority: string | null;
mesh: string | null;
/** 1.34.0: hex pubkey of the originating session — drain prefers
* routing via that session's WS so broker fan-out attributes the
* push to the session pubkey. NULL on cold-path / pre-1.34.0 rows. */
sender_session_pubkey: string | null;
}
export interface DrainOptions {
@@ -40,6 +45,20 @@ export interface DrainOptions {
* broker keyed by its `mesh` column. Single-mesh daemons pass a
* Map of size 1; multi-mesh daemons pass one entry per joined mesh. */
brokers: Map<string, DaemonBrokerClient>;
/**
* 1.34.0: lookup for the per-session WS keyed by hex session pubkey.
* When an outbox row has `sender_session_pubkey` set and this lookup
* returns an open client, the drain routes via the session-WS so the
* broker fan-out attributes the push to the session pubkey instead
* of the daemon's stable member pubkey.
*
* Returning `undefined` (or an unopened client) signals "no session
* WS available" — the drain backs off and retries; it does NOT fall
* back to the daemon-WS, because the row was encrypted with the
* session secret and would fail to decrypt on the recipient side
* if attribution silently changed mid-flight.
*/
getSessionBrokerByPubkey?: (sessionPubkey: string) => SessionBrokerClient | undefined;
log?: (level: "info" | "warn" | "error", msg: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
}
@@ -88,7 +107,8 @@ async function drainOnce(opts: DrainOptions, log: NonNullable<DrainOptions["log"
const now = Date.now();
const rows = opts.db.prepare(`
SELECT id, client_message_id, request_fingerprint, payload, attempts,
target_spec, nonce, ciphertext, priority, mesh
target_spec, nonce, ciphertext, priority, mesh,
sender_session_pubkey
FROM outbox
WHERE status = 'pending' AND next_attempt_at <= ?
ORDER BY enqueued_at
@@ -101,21 +121,34 @@ async function drainOnce(opts: DrainOptions, log: NonNullable<DrainOptions["log"
if (markInflight(opts.db, row.id, now) === 0) continue; // raced with another drainer
const fpHex = bufferToHex(row.request_fingerprint);
// v1.26.0: pick the broker keyed by the row's mesh. Legacy rows
// (mesh=NULL) fall back to the only broker if there's exactly one;
// otherwise mark dead because we don't know where to send them.
let broker: DaemonBrokerClient | undefined;
// v1.26.0: pick the daemon-WS broker keyed by the row's mesh.
// Legacy rows (mesh=NULL) fall back to the only broker if there's
// exactly one; otherwise mark dead because we don't know where to
// send them.
let daemonBroker: DaemonBrokerClient | undefined;
if (row.mesh) {
broker = opts.brokers.get(row.mesh);
daemonBroker = opts.brokers.get(row.mesh);
} else if (opts.brokers.size === 1) {
broker = opts.brokers.values().next().value;
daemonBroker = opts.brokers.values().next().value;
}
if (!broker) {
if (!daemonBroker) {
log("warn", "drain_no_broker_for_mesh", { id: row.id, mesh: row.mesh ?? "(null)" });
markDead(opts.db, row.id, `no_broker_for_mesh:${row.mesh ?? "null"}`);
continue;
}
// 1.34.0: when the row was written by an authenticated session,
// dispatch via the matching SessionBrokerClient so broker fan-out
// attributes the push to the session pubkey. Encryption is
// session-secret based on those rows, so we MUST NOT silently fall
// back to the daemon-WS — the recipient's decrypt would fail. If
// the session-WS is closed (reconnecting / session terminated), we
// back off and retry.
let sessionBroker: SessionBrokerClient | undefined;
if (row.sender_session_pubkey && opts.getSessionBrokerByPubkey) {
sessionBroker = opts.getSessionBrokerByPubkey(row.sender_session_pubkey);
}
// Sprint 4: use the row's resolved target/ciphertext if present.
// Legacy v0.9.0 rows (NULL on these columns) fall back to the
// broadcast smoke-test shape so existing in-flight rows still drain.
@@ -135,16 +168,31 @@ async function drainOnce(opts: DrainOptions, log: NonNullable<DrainOptions["log"
priority = "next";
}
const sendArgs = {
targetSpec,
priority,
nonce,
ciphertext,
client_message_id: row.client_message_id,
request_fingerprint_hex: fpHex,
};
let res;
try {
res = await broker.send({
targetSpec,
priority,
nonce,
ciphertext,
client_message_id: row.client_message_id,
request_fingerprint_hex: fpHex,
});
if (row.sender_session_pubkey) {
// Session-attributed row. Require an open session-WS — see comment
// above on why we don't fall back to the daemon-WS.
if (!sessionBroker || !sessionBroker.isOpen()) {
log("info", "drain_session_ws_not_ready", {
id: row.id, session_pubkey: row.sender_session_pubkey.slice(0, 12),
});
backoffPending(opts.db, row.id, row.attempts + 1, "session_ws_not_open", "session_ws_not_open");
continue;
}
res = await sessionBroker.send(sendArgs);
} else {
res = await daemonBroker.send(sendArgs);
}
} catch (e) {
log("warn", "drain_send_threw", { id: row.id, err: String(e) });
backoffPending(opts.db, row.id, row.attempts + 1, "exception", String(e));