docs: specs for binary distribution pipeline + per-peer capabilities
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Capture the design for the two tier-2 items that weren't shipped inline
in alpha.28 — both require CI/infrastructure work (GitHub Actions,
Homebrew tap, winget manifest) or broker schema migration that's safer
to do as a separate PR with feature flag rollout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alejandro Gutiérrez
2026-04-15 02:34:45 +01:00
parent d33b8fc43b
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# Per-Peer Capabilities
## Goal
Give mesh members fine-grained control over what peers can do to their
session. Today: any mesh peer can send you any message; all messages get
pushed as `<channel>` reminders. Users can't say "only @alice can send me
messages," "read-only peers," or "@bob can broadcast but not DM."
## Current state
- Mesh-level role: `admin` | `member` (only affects invite issuance)
- No per-peer filter — every peer message is delivered
- No per-peer read/write split (all peers have the same capabilities)
## Target capability model
| Capability | Meaning |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| `read` | Peer appears in your list_peers, can see your summary |
| `dm` | Peer can send you direct messages |
| `broadcast` | Peer's group broadcasts reach you |
| `state-read` | Peer can read shared state keys |
| `state-write`| Peer can set shared state keys |
| `file-read` | Peer can read files you've shared (already exists) |
## CLI surface
```
claudemesh grant @alice dm broadcast # allow direct + broadcast
claudemesh grant @bob state-read # read-only
claudemesh revoke @alice broadcast
claudemesh grants # list current grants per peer
claudemesh block @spammer # shorthand for revoke-all
```
## Broker schema
New column on `mesh_member`:
```sql
peer_grants jsonb DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb
-- shape: { "<peer_pubkey_hex>": ["dm", "broadcast", ...] }
```
Alternative (cleaner): separate `peer_grant` table keyed on
`(member_id, target_pubkey)`.
## Enforcement point
Broker's message router (`apps/broker/src/index.ts` — send flow).
Before writing the encrypted message to the recipient's queue, check
`recipient.peer_grants[sender_pubkey]` against message kind. Drop
silently if disallowed (sender sees delivered, recipient sees nothing —
matches Signal/iMessage block semantics).
## Defaults
- Unknown peers: `read + dm` (matches current behavior — additive-safe rollout)
- Existing members: grandfathered into `read + dm + broadcast + state-read`
via a migration
- `claudemesh profile --default-grants read dm` lets users change their own default
## UI
- `claudemesh peers` renders a `[grants: dm,broadcast]` tag per peer
- `claudemesh verify` gains a `--with-grants` flag that shows the grant set
alongside the safety number (helps the "did I accidentally block them?" check)
## Crypto implications
Grants are server-enforced metadata. Not capability tokens. A malicious
broker could forward messages regardless — this is about UX trust (spam /
noise control), not protocol security. The spec is clear about this.
## Migration plan
1. Ship broker schema change (jsonb column, nullable, default `{}`).
2. Ship `grant/revoke/grants/block` CLI commands against an unused column.
3. Enable enforcement in broker behind a per-mesh feature flag.
4. Flip on for all meshes.
## Priority
Nice-to-have. The killer feature here is `block` — every mesh gets a bad
actor eventually. Ship `block` first even if the full grant system is deferred.